Russian networks

In his introduction, Dr. Stefan Meister, Head of Program on Eastern Europe, Russia, and Central Asia of the DGAP’s Robert Bosch Center, argued that the issue of Russian networks in Europe was closely connected to the notion of exporting norms. Moreover, as the European Union defined itself as a normative power, Meister said, it often underestimated Russia’s success in exporting its informal rules.

Anton Shekhovtsov, a Visiting Senior Fellow at the Legatum Institute in Kiev, said that the Kremlin had started building its networks of influence in Western media and organizations during President Vladimir Putin’s second term, based on the conviction that the West used the so-called color revolutions to challenge Russian power in the post-Soviet space. Russian networks were not only aiming at undermining the West for example by supporting far-right and far-left groups, or anti-globalist and anti-fracking movements, but also by addressing the Western public more generally in order to promote Russia’s interests. On the whole, this strategy was aimed at serving the Kremlin’s goal of establishing a “new Yalta:” a division of Europe into spheres of influence, with post-Soviet states (excluding the Baltic countries) under Russian hegemony and the unity of the European Union weakened.

Shekhovtsov stressed that it was important to observe the changing nature of the ways in which Russian networks function and evolve, swiftly changing their narratives according to the international context: from “defending compatriots” in Georgia in 2008, to the “Russian World” in Crimea, and the “New Russia” in the Donbas region. This corresponded to the unstable and ad-hoc nature of these networks: agents of influence in the West did not need to be ideologically close to the Kremlin as long as they served its goals. One also had to remember that not every group challenging the Western order was necessarily supported by the Kremlin.

Ayder Muzhdabaev, former editor-in-chief of the Russian newspaper Moskovskiy Komsomolets, said that the Russian authorities had confirmed the existence of groups in the West that not only supported the Kremlin’s actions in Ukraine but were also ready to legitimize Russia’s interests in the post-Soviet space more widely. These groups were often being supported by Russia in order to influence Western policy toward Eastern Europe in favor of reformulating a realpolitik that would create new spheres of influence in Europe and benefit Russia. Muzhdabaev argued that Russia was actively pursuing such networks and willing to spend a lot of money on them.

Even if the effectiveness of Russian networks attracted a lot of attention during the discussion, generally it was described as limited. While Stefan Meister pointed out that they had proven ineffective in preventing sanctions against Russia, the former MP Karsten Voigt referred to Russia’s decreased popularity in Western societies. Ayder Muzhdabaev said that Russian decision makers had been surprised by Germany’s support of the sanctions and France’s halting the sale of Mistral helicopter carriers to Russia, since they had assumed that Western governments would choose economic profit over a confrontation with Russia. Anton Shekhovtsov argued that this miscalculation was the outcome of the 2008 war in Georgia, when the West had not reacted strongly enough to Russia’s actions in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

In concluding the discussion, Muzhdabaev returned to the issue of economic sanctions: while Russian political and economic elites unofficially confirmed the sanctions’ destructive impact on the economy, their effectiveness would come to light only when disagreement within the elites would put an end to the public’s consensus around Russia’s foreign policy.