This DGAP Memo lays out why the arms shipments and possible sanctions announced by Donald Trump on July 14 mark a significant policy shift in his administration’s stance on Russia’s war against Ukraine. After detailing why the effects of this shift can only materialize on the battlefield months from now, it highlights the strategic opportunities it still offers both Europe and Ukraine to address current military-security challenges – especially if Germany plays an active role.
A Significant Change in US Policy
The July 14 announcement by Donald Trump indicates a major policy shift in his administration’s stance on Russia’s war against Ukraine in at least three main ways. First, according to his remarks about being “very unhappy” with Russian President Vladimir Putin and his attitude to ceasefire negotiations, the US president appears to have started realizing that Russia has not been pursuing a negotiated settlement in the past six months but has instead only used diplomatic talks as a tool for supporting her military objectives. The 50-day deadline that he gave Putin to reach peace indicates that Trump still prefers a managed, gradual turn and not a radical change.
Second, the announcement indicates that the United States is ready to put direct pressure on Russia to achieve an end to the war. Until then, Washington had only put direct pressure on Ukraine, both by diplomatic and military means. One may remember that military and intelligence support were first suspended in March 2025 and military deliveries were then cut again in early July. Meanwhile, Washington had only put indirect pressure on Russia: by continuing its intelligence support to Ukraine and by agreeing that other allies can continue to support Kyiv with US-made weapons, for example Australia delivering 49 Abrams tanks. Compared to this indirect approach, threatening Russia with “devastating” sanctions and providing Ukraine with long-range, precision strike weapons, thus enabling Kyiv to hit targets deep in Russia’s interior, marks a considerable hardening of the policy line – only if realized, of course.
In addition to delivering the weapons systems themselves, the announcement also has an element of information pressure in it. Though details are not yet known, it has been reported by the press that the US administration has considered delivering long-range joint air-to-surface standoff missiles (JASSM) and possibly even Tomahawk cruise missiles. Depending on the exact variant of JASSM to be delivered, even the former system would enable Ukraine to hit Russian military airports, command posts, and ammunition depots hundreds of kilometers deep inside Russia. Tomahawks would theoretically even be able to reach St. Petersburg or Moscow. While it is, in fact, unlikely that Washington would permit Kyiv to strike the Russian capital with US-made precision weapons due to escalation risks, the mere fact that Donald Trump reportedly asked Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyi about the possibility constitutes a manifestation of information pressure on Russia not yet seen from the Trump administration so far.
Third, Trump’s announcement confirmed a new framework for financing US military aid in the long term. This resulted from months of closed-door negotiations between the United States and several key European allies, including Germany. Based on data from the Ukraine Support Tracker published by the Kiel Institute of World Economics, the entire US military aid to Ukraine from January 2022 to late April 2025 was worth approximately €65 billion. In the same period, Europeans spent €72 billion on military aid, with the United Kingdom, Germany, Denmark, Netherlands, Sweden, and France being the largest contributors. While details are not known, the scheme of European countries – and, most probably, also like-minded non-European allies such as Canada and Australia – paying for US weapons to be delivered to Ukraine could ensure the sustainability of the continuous flow of much-needed American arms over the long run. According to press reports, it has already been agreed to ship the first three Patriot air defense missile batteries, two paid for by Germany and a third by Norway.
The New US Military Package Offers No Immediate Relief
Despite the apparent change of policy line, its effects on the battlefield will only materialize months from now – beyond the 50-day deadline given by Trump. This is due to a number of reasons. First and foremost, none of the new, promised weapon systems can be put into action immediately. Despite the legendary ingenuity of Ukrainian military engineers, it takes at least several weeks to integrate new weapons into a country’s arsenal and months to train both the soldiers and the technical personnel to operate them.
The more complex a weapon system is, the more time training and integration takes. In the beginning of the full-scale war, Ukrainian soldiers could be trained to use Javelin and NLAW anti-tank missiles in a matter of days. Yet, with more complex weapon systems, such as the self-propelled howitzer PzH 2000, this took months. Should the United States provide Ukraine with either the JASSM or Tomahawk missiles, it is unrealistic to expect any of them to become operational before mid-fall at the earliest.
The situation is, of course, better with those weapon systems that are already operated by Ukraine, such as the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) or the Patriot air defense systems. New shipments of missiles to these systems will hopefully end the ammunition shortage that has already been hampering Ukraine’s defense for months. Moreover, the delivery of more advanced missiles for them – such as unitary warhead ATACMS missiles for the HIMARS, which are designed against hardened targets – can be put into action much more quickly than entirely new weapons.
Meanwhile, though the new Patriots will indeed improve the protection of Ukraine against Russia’s hypersonic and ballistic missiles, including the KN-23s provided by North Korea, they will not offer realistic relief from the massive waves of Russian drones currently ravaging Ukraine's cities. The Geran’-1 and Geran’-2 drones employed by Russia are still very cheap, mass-produced weapons that cost only a few tens of thousands of dollars each. Hence, it would simply not be cost-effective to use PAC-3 interceptor missiles, which each cost more than one million dollars, against them.
Besides, in the short term, new weapons alone are not able to solve the most important problem of Ukraine’s defenses: the grave shortage of manpower. While exact numbers are classified, Ukrainian officials openly admit that Kyiv is not able to recruit and mobilize enough new soldiers to cover its battlefield losses and ensure the rotation of exhausted frontline troops. While new weapons may provide Ukraine with more firepower to increase Russia’s losses, the indirect positive effect – namely, that Ukraine’s losses would decrease – will only materialize weeks, possibly months later.
Another factor is the prevailing unpredictability of Trump’s administration. While these new promises indeed mark a new level of commitment, it cannot be taken for granted that all deliveries will take place and happen along the pre-agreed timeline. Experience shows that sudden halts of weapons shipments may, unfortunately, occur at any time and not necessarily only for a few days. One may hope that more predictability will be provided by NATO countries paying for the US weapons. Yet, in fact, there is hardly any guarantee for this. The same risk of unpredictability is also present regarding the continuation of the financing of US military assistance once the amounts dedicated by the previous Biden administration run dry.
A Unique Opportunity for Europe
Despite the unpredictability and unavoidable technical delays mentioned above, the Trump administration’s July 14 announcement provides Europe with a unique opportunity to help Ukraine continue to defend herself – and thus also Europe – from Russian aggression. By ensuring the continuous flow of US weapons, Europe and her like-minded allies overseas can provide Ukraine with all those modern weapon systems that no one else could deliver. This applies not only to the Patriots or ATACMS missiles, but also other key arms and equipment, including spare parts for the systems already in Ukraine’s possession.
Continued shipments of US weapons also help Europe by buying time for the continent to increase her own military industrial production capabilities, particularly the production of artillery ammunition, missiles, and armored vehicles. Hence, somewhat paradoxically, the US scheme also contributes to Europe’s strategic autonomy in the longer run because it provides the much-needed time for completing the new production facilities that have already been announced. Until they are operational, Ukraine’s needs can hopefully be covered from US stockpiles and production.
As European NATO members would pay for the arms for Ukraine in bilateral or “coalition of the willing” frameworks, this scheme is immune to any veto threat from other European countries. Thus, unlike the use of the European Peace Facility for aiding Ukraine, it could not be blocked by either Hungary or another unwilling country. Besides, it also allows for countries with other priorities to stay out without endangering the core objective: the continuous flow of US weapons to Ukraine. The Czech government already announced that it will continue to focus on procuring artillery ammunition for Ukraine instead, a task at which it has been highly successful in the last two years.
Indeed, paying for US weapons for Ukraine requires additional financial contributions from the willing NATO members. According to the decisions taken at the NATO summit in The Hague this June, direct contributions to Ukraine’s defenses are acknowledged as part of the five percent commitment. Consequently, allocating the necessary money for buying US weapons for Ukraine should not constitute an insurmountable problem.
However, it would be unwise to become over-confident about the sustainability of this scheme. Due to the prevailing unpredictability of the Trump administration, this agreement must not be perceived as an alternative to building Europe’s own defense capabilities but rather as an enabler of doing so. Keeping Ukraine in the fight, including supplying Kyiv with US-made weapons, buys Europe the time to get better prepared for the military-security challenges awaiting us.
Recommendations: Germany Needs to Lead by Example
It is in Germany’s security and political interest to continue and even strengthen the military assistance to Ukraine. Maintaining the willingness of the United States to supply arms in exchange for money is a crucial component of this. Therefore, Germany must focus its efforts on the following:
- As the strongest economy of the European Union, Germany should make and sustain proportionally large contributions to the financing of US arms supplies. It must lead by example to ensure the continued supply of US weapons to Ukraine.
- German diplomacy will need to continue facilitating and coordinating cooperation with like-minded allies – including in both EU and ad hoc multilateral formats – to provide the necessary funds. The coordinated procurement of the three Patriot batteries described above is a good example of the positive effect these efforts can have, but a lot more of such work lies ahead.
- Germany must also strengthen its contribution to the training of Ukraine’s forces, particularly on those new weapon systems that Ukraine may soon receive. Due to infrastructure shortages and the danger of Russian strikes, this training cannot be conducted on Ukrainian soil. Therefore, the possibility of joint German-US-Polish cooperation in training could be examined.
- Increasing its contribution to training also offers Germany opportunities to learn more from Ukraine’s combat experiences – especially with the same US-made weapons, such as the Patriots and various air-to-air missiles, that the German military also uses.
