Change, instability, and transition will characterize the foreign policy environment over the coming months as politicians and citizens grapple with the reverberations of a double-whammy shaking the Western world: the United States, the globe’s premiere power, will once again be led by Donald J. Trump, the country’s chief disrupter, while Germany, Europe’s largest power, has to contend with a tumultuous collapse of its coalition government and an unclear path to new elections. Both events are bound to trigger consequences further afield.
Ukraine as the First Casualty of the New President
The first victim of these parallel developments may well be Ukraine. It was certainly no coincidence that Volodymyr Zelenskyy, Ukraine’s President, was among the very first foreign leaders to congratulate Trump on his victory. No one has more to gain from a good relationship with Trump because, for Zelenskyy, the stakes are high given Trump’s intention to end US aid and force a peace on Ukraine that many predict to be unjust and unfavorable.
Trump’s significant electoral win only worsens Ukraine’s position. In his acceptance speech Trump talked about a “mandate” that the American people had given him. That would certainly include his Ukraine agenda. Trump now “owns” the Republican Party. How strong the caucus of Republican Ukraine supporters remains within Congress, is unclear. It is clear, however, that Donald Trump will not tolerate much intra-party opposition. With possibly 54 Republicans in the US Senate Trump will have the upper hand in getting the cabinet approved that he favors. Previously unthinkable, this might make candidates like Rick Grenell – the former ambassador to Germany, who is well-known and much reviled in Germany for his blunt and ideological language – viable for a Senate confirmable position. Trump will certainly look for a loyal sub worker as Majority Leader to execute his agenda in the Senate. None of that bodes well for Ukraine. Hopes that conservative Ukraine hawks can put the brakes on Trump’s agenda looks less likely than ever before.
Political Instability in Germany and Its Consequences for Ukraine
Meanwhile, on the other side of the Atlantic, Ukraine has become a political football in Germany’s coalition collapse that is quickly turning into an electoral campaign. Chancellor Olaf Scholz, in ending the coalition and attempting to form a minority government before calling new elections next spring, has asked the conservative opposition to join ranks with him. He wants them to vote for an additional support package for Ukraine in the Bundestag. Opposition leader Friedrich Merz, smelling the bait, has quickly rejected the chancellor’s request. The victim of such political maneuvering on both sides of the aisle will certainly be Ukraine which has no patience for such games.
However, in a side remark, opposition leader Merz has opened the door to what could be a more responsible outcome of this contest for power: a Ukraine aid package could be passed within the 21-day period between Scholz’ expected loss of a vote of confidence and the dissolution of the Bundestag. Such an arrangement might even lead the way for stronger support of Ukraine by the political center in Germany next year – in whatever coalition government. Such a response would certainly be Germany’s most appropriate response to the election of Donald Trump.
A Week of Decisions: Germany’s Capacity to Act After US Elections & Government Crisis
Europe’s Role: Preempting a US-Russia Deal on Ukraine
Yet, it will not be a sufficient response. If Trump attempts to strike a deal with Vladimir Putin, Ukraine will most likely not sit at the table – and neither will Europe. No one will want to accept being shut out. Therefore, the major European countries (Poland, Great Britain, France, Italy and Germany) should form a contact group with Ukraine to explore the conditions for a ceasefire and an eventual peace before Trump even assumes office. Preempting Trump will better enable the European group to cooperate with Trump when the time comes.
Europe will also have to decide quickly whether the continent is unified enough to replace the Trump-led United States as Ukraine’s primary military backer. Europhile conventionalism holds that progress in European integration is always forged in crisis such as this. Europe, or so the tale goes, will stick together when it must. And indeed, it must – given Trump.
But likely, something else will happen: given Trump, groups of countries on the continent will run off in different directions. At least three distinct pathways are emerging: there are those, led by France, who will aim for “European sovereignty” and distance themselves from the United States. Secondly, there are those, led by Poland (and likely including Germany), who will accommodate Trump because of extreme security dependency. Thirdly, there are those, led by Hungary, who support Trump in search of populist Atlanticism.
A European Coalition of the Willing
The only answer to the danger of fragmentation is a European coalition of the willing, uniting the first two of these three groups – which together encompass the vast majority of EU countries plus Great Britain. Given France’s lame duck presidency, German leadership will be essential. Therefore, the silver lining of this double-whammy event is the hope that a moment of insecurity and transition can lead to a somewhat more stable period through new or newly legitimized leadership in Europe’s central power.
