Latvia: Dr. Māris Andžāns

Nuclear deterrence is not a constant issue in the public space, except news on such issues as the failing arms control regimes and North Korea. 

The government has not been vocal in public on nuclear weapons and the nuclear umbrella of NATO/NATO allies. But it can be safely argued that in the context of Latvia’s neighborhood, i.e. Russian nuclear capabilities and policies (like readiness to use it in case of a conventional confrontation), the nuclear deterrence of NATO/NATO allies is seen as of fundamental importance. The stronger the NATO/NATO allies’ nuclear deterrent, the better.

In the aforementioned context, it can be assumed that Germany’s role is seen as symbolic though important. Constraints of Germany’s military power are well known. However, through its more active role, especially the leading of the battlegroup in Lithuania, Germany is seen as a more credible military power and European power at large. Participation in nuclear sharing is seen as a facilitator to its credibility. 

Germany’s participation also bears the symbolism of the transatlantic link. Its withdrawal from nuclear sharing would be perceived in the Baltics and, furthermore, to the east of the Baltics, as another demonstration of weakening transatlantic unity.

Probably no immediate effects would be visible. It would be perceived to the east of Germany that it has decreased its military and political deterrent power. New compensating mechanisms might be sought, e.g. Poland might wish to take the role of Germany in nuclear sharing.

Russia would be the main benefactor of the situation in terms of weakening the transatlantic link and making its nuclear posture slightly more favourable.