Latvia: Dr. Māris Andžāns

DGAP asked leading European experts on foreign policy about Germany’s role in providing nuclear deterrence in Europe. These experts, who each represent an EU member or a key partner, responded to three open-ended questions. You can read the introduction to this assessment and download the whole report by clicking here.

Question 1

How does your government view the importance of nuclear deterrence and NATO’s nuclear sharing agreement for its own security and European security?

Quiet but committed

Dr. Māris Andžāns, Latvian Institute of International Affairs, Latvia

Nuclear deterrence is not a constant issue in the public space, except news on such issues as the failing arms control regimes and North Korea. 

The government has not been vocal in public on nuclear weapons and the nuclear umbrella of NATO/NATO allies. But it can be safely argued that in the context of Latvia’s neighborhood, i.e. Russian nuclear capabilities and policies (like readiness to use it in case of a conventional confrontation), the nuclear deterrence of NATO/NATO allies is seen as of fundamental importance. The stronger the NATO/NATO allies’ nuclear deterrent, the better.

 

Question 2

In the view of your government: What difference does Germany’s participation in nuclear sharing make? (Why) is Germany important in nuclear sharing?

Participation grounds Germany's credibility as a European power

Dr. Māris Andžāns, Latvian Institute of International Affairs, Latvia

In the aforementioned context, it can be assumed that Germany’s role is seen as symbolic though important. Constraints of Germany’s military power are well known. However, through its more active role, especially the leading of the battlegroup in Lithuania, Germany is seen as a more credible military power and European power at large. Participation in nuclear sharing is seen as a facilitator to its credibility. 

Germany’s participation also bears the symbolism of the transatlantic link. Its withdrawal from nuclear sharing would be perceived in the Baltics and, furthermore, to the east of the Baltics, as another demonstration of weakening transatlantic unity.

 

Question 3

What would be the plausible/probable effects within NATO and for European security, if Germany were to leave nuclear sharing?

Russia is the only winner

Dr. Māris Andžāns, Latvian Institute of International Affairs, Latvia

Probably no immediate effects would be visible. It would be perceived to the east of Germany that it has decreased its military and political deterrent power. New compensating mechanisms might be sought, e.g. Poland might wish to take the role of Germany in nuclear sharing.

Russia would be the main benefactor of the situation in terms of weakening the transatlantic link and making its nuclear posture slightly more favourable.

About the author

Senior Research Fellow, Latvian Institute of International Affairs

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