France: Dr. Bruno Tertrais

The French government continues to see nuclear deterrence as a central pillar of both French and European security. It is seen as providing an anchor of stability in a world increasingly defined by the competition and friction between great powers.

German participation in nuclear sharing is important to France in at least three respects: national, NATO and EU. First, it ensures a direct and material German responsibility in nuclear weapons management. It is important to ensure that divergences between France and Germany and the “strategic culture gap” do not broaden. Second, it ensures that one of the most important members of NATO is directly involved in nuclear deterrence. Third, it ensures that the biggest EU member has a direct responsibility in nuclear affairs.

This depends on the context and circumstances: If it were to be a forced decision by the US administration, the consequences would be dramatic. If Germany were to take this decision with the consent of NATO partners it would be regrettable, but its impact would be limited if it happened within the context of a general and consensual “reshuffling” of NATO's nuclear posture (for instance, Polish sharing, etc.). If Germany decides unilaterally – without the consent of its NATO partners – it would be Berlin’s sovereign right. But it could seriously damage the political credibility of NATO's deterrence posture, especially given that it could have serious “ripple effects” (debates in the Netherlands, Belgium etc.). Finally, the argument according to which “extended deterrence can exist without sharing” is moot, since we are not starting from scratch but talking about a radical change in NATO policy.