France: Dr. Bruno Tertrais

DGAP asked leading European experts on foreign policy about Germany’s role in providing nuclear deterrence in Europe. These experts, who each represent an EU member or a key partner, responded to three open-ended questions. You can read the introduction to this assessment and download the whole report by clicking here.

Question 1

How does your government view the importance of nuclear deterrence and NATO’s nuclear sharing agreement for its own security and European security?

A central pillar of French and European security

Dr. Bruno Tertrais, Foundation for Strategic Research, France

The French government continues to see nuclear deterrence as a central pillar of both French and European security. It is seen as providing an anchor of stability in a world increasingly defined by the competition and friction between great powers.

Question 2

In the view of your government: What difference does Germany’s participation in nuclear sharing make? (Why) is Germany important in nuclear sharing?

Three reasons German participation matters to France

Dr. Bruno Tertrais, Foundation for Strategic Research, France

German participation in nuclear sharing is important to France in at least three respects: national, NATO and EU. First, it ensures a direct and material German responsibility in nuclear weapons management. It is important to ensure that divergences between France and Germany and the “strategic culture gap” do not broaden. Second, it ensures that one of the most important members of NATO is directly involved in nuclear deterrence. Third, it ensures that the biggest EU member has a direct responsibility in nuclear affairs.

Question 3

What would be the plausible/probable effects within NATO and for European security, if Germany were to leave nuclear sharing?

Unilateral withdrawal could seriously damage NATO credibility

Dr. Bruno Tertrais, Foundation for Strategic Research, France

This depends on the context and circumstances: If it were to be a forced decision by the US administration, the consequences would be dramatic. If Germany were to take this decision with the consent of NATO partners it would be regrettable, but its impact would be limited if it happened within the context of a general and consensual “reshuffling” of NATO's nuclear posture (for instance, Polish sharing, etc.). If Germany decides unilaterally – without the consent of its NATO partners – it would be Berlin’s sovereign right. But it could seriously damage the political credibility of NATO's deterrence posture, especially given that it could have serious “ripple effects” (debates in the Netherlands, Belgium etc.). Finally, the argument according to which “extended deterrence can exist without sharing” is moot, since we are not starting from scratch but talking about a radical change in NATO policy.

About the author

Deputy Director, Foundation for Strategic Research (FRS)

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