Hrant Kostanyan is a researcher at CEPS, a Senior Key Expert at the College of Europe Natolin and an adjunct professor at Vesalius College in Brussels. Stefan Meister heads the program for Eastern Europe, Russia, and Central Asia at the DGAP's Robert Bosch Center.
1. Developing Crisis
The Euromaidan protests in 2013–14 were triggered by the refusal of President Viktor Yanukovych to sign the Association Agreement, including the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA), with the EU. The protests turned into a revolution, resulting in the ouster of Yanukovych in February 2014. The Kremlin reacted by annexing Crimea (March 2014) and orchestrating war in parts of Donbas and the creation of two separatist so-called “republics” , the Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR) and the Lugansk People’s Republic (LPR). Because of the rejection of a military option, economic sanctions have become the core instrument of the EU and the US for responding to Russian aggression. Although the sanctions are rather limited compared to the former EU and US sanctions against Iran and some economists have expressed skepticism about their economic impact, they are crucial to underpinning the credibility of the EU and influencing the cost-benefit calculation of the Russian leadership regarding Ukraine.[1]
The first major diplomatic attempt to halt the war and achieve a sustainable solution for the conflict in eastern Ukraine was the April 2014 “Geneva format” composed of Ukraine, Russia, the EU and the US. Its results were unedifying. The second attempt was the format of the Trilateral Contact Group on Ukraine, consisting of representatives from Ukraine, Russia and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), under which a protocol and follow-up memorandum called Minsk I were prepared and signed by Ukraine, Russia and representatives of the DPR and LPR on 5 September 2014.[2] However, the ceasefire agreed in the framework of Minsk I never worked and collapsed completely with the battle over Debaltseve in January 2015. To stop this escalation, another round of negotiations took place in the context of the so-called Normandy format (involving Ukraine, Russia, Germany and France), which on February 12, 2015 resulted in a package of measures dubbed Minsk II.[3] To give the new format more authority, the agreement was negotiated with the top leaders of all participating states personally.
The EU imposed sanctions on Russia in parallel with those imposed by the US and other Western allies, in June 2014 (related to Crimea and Sevastopol) and on July 31, 2014 (reinforced in September 2014) “in response to Russia’s actions in the east of Ukraine.” [4] The additional restrictive measures against Russia continued to be adopted by the EU (and the international partners) as violation s of the ceasefire continued, including after the battle of Debaltseve. Besides sanctioning persons linked to the annexation of Crimea and the war in eastern Ukraine, these restrictive measures cover financial, energy and defense sectors as well as dual-use goods. The EU sanctions are now prolonged until 31 July 2016 and can be extended another six months. EU heads of state and government tied removal of sanctions to the full implementation of the Minsk agreements. More than a year after the signature of the Minsk II package, despite the dialogue conducted in trilateral working groups, none of its elements were fully implemented. Meanwhile, support for sanctions related to Russia’s role in eastern Ukraine is wavering in a number of EU member state capitals, including Paris and Berlin. Minsk II has slowed military escalation and drawn a very dangerous situation into a diplomatic process. At the moment, however, the package cannot be practically implemented owing to its contradictory provisions and the limited interest of all participating parties.
Read the full article here.
Note1
D. Gros and F. Mustilli (2015), “The Economic Impact of Sanctions against Russia: Much ado about very little,” CEPS Commentary (www.ceps.eu/publications/economic-impact-sanctions-against-russia-much-…).
Note 2
Protocol on the results of consultations of the Trilateral Contact Group, signed in Minsk, September 5, 2014 (www.osce.org/home/123257).
Note 3
Minsk Agreement: Full text in English (http://www.unian.info/politics/1043394-minsk-agreement-full-text-in-eng…)
Note 4
Council of the EU (2015), “Russia: EU prolongs economic sanctions by six months” (http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/12/21-russi…)
