In his speech before the UN General Assembly and in a number of interviews with the US media, President Rouhani avowed his peaceful intentions toward the US and renounced nuclear weapons. What is there to suggest that this advance is serious?
Like in his interviews, Rouhani’s speech at the UN continues the political shift that is underway in Iran. This process began with his election to the presidency in May and was underscored by the selection of a new government and new foreign policy personnel.
Rouhani managed to secure the appointment of Mohammad Javad Zarif – who served for many years as Iran’s representative to the UN – as foreign minister. He also won the approval to place the previous foreign minister at the head of the Iranian atomic agency. Both of them support entering into negotiations with the US. The Iranian population has expressed growing discontent with the government in recent years. First there were protests – and then the election of a new president, which was a clear expression of the people’s desire for political change. Iranian society and the more open-minded political circles close to the regime have been looking for a way for their country to return to the international community and to create a better relationship with the West.
Last year it became progressively clearer to the Iranian leadership that they had entered a political blind alley. In 2009 the country’s spiritual leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, was still siding with then President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. He underestimated the Iranian people’s opposition to the president. Gradually the disastrous effects of Ahmadinejad’s economic policy became obvious. It ultimately came to a personal rift between the Supreme Leader and the president. Hassan Rouhani represents a fresh start. He gives hope to the majority of Iranians – and at the same time provides legitimacy to the political system.
Does Rouhani have enough maneuvering room on the domestic front?
Rouhani is a man of the system, unlike Mohammad Khatami, an earlier reform-minded president who was an outsider. He has already held numerous official positions. He belonged to the Expediency Council and the Assembly of Experts, served twice as deputy speaker in the Iranian parliament, spent many years at the head of the Supreme National Security Council, and has headed the Center for Strategic Research, a Tehran-based think tank, since 1992. In short, Rouhani comes from the inner circle of the regime. He thus enjoys the trust of the Supreme Leader. And his overwhelming electoral victory strengthens his position.
Rouhani met little parliamentary resistance to the ministers he named, so he was able to fill all key positions with his first choices. He grasped the fact that his administration would need to reflect a range of political currents in the country. He even has a certain amount of maneuvering room in the sensitive matter of internal security. This is how he recently managed to arrange the release of 80 political prisoners. In an interview with the US broadcaster CNN he emphasized that he wants to grant greater political freedom to the Iranian people.
Backed by the Supreme Leader’s trust as well as the support of the people, Rouhani has the right preconditions for a new start in foreign relations as well as careful domestic reforms. At the same time he must be cautious about overstepping the mark. The fact that he avoided meeting directly with President Obama in New York can be interpreted as a concession to the conservative hard-liners. The two presidents have now spoken by telephone, however.
Rouhani’s foes accuse him of merely uttering empty phrases in New York. What does Tehran need to do to refute its critics?
Rouhani’s charm offensive is not just a pretty fiction. It serves to refute certain stereotypes shaped by his predecessor’s demeanor that have damaged Iran’s image. He sought with his speech to establish trust, and he succeeded. Many Westerners find him plausible when he says that Iran is serious about pursuing result-oriented negotiations. He has created a point of departure for new negotiations on the nuclear question, which has certainly long been a point of contention between Tehran and Washington. His foreign minister Mohammad Javad Zarif agreed in New York with the foreign ministers of the “E3+3” states (Germany, France, and Great Britain plus the US, Russia, and China) to revive negotiations this October 15 in Geneva.
The Iranians put forward an ambitious schedule for the nuclear talks – an indication that they mean business. If there is progress, the US and Iran will, in due time, also want to take on other points of contention between the two countries. A whole range of problems have built up in the course of 35 years without direct contact.
What makes you think that this is the moment for successful nuclear talks?
The opportunities to reach an agreement are better than ever before; readiness has grown in both the US and Iran to show more faith in the other side. This does not mean that the talks will be easy. Neither party will be able to push through its maximum demands – neither a complete stop to Uranium enrichment nor an instant removal of all economic sanctions. The essential point for the West is that Iran guarantee that it will not use its nuclear material for military purposes.
The E3+3’s most pressing demand is that uranium enrichment not exceed the critical amount of 3.5% to 5% Uranium-235. This means that a solution must be found for the research reactor in Tehran, which uses enriched material of 20%. It must be guaranteed that no highly enriched uranium will be produced that could also be used for weapons of mass destruction. One possibility would be for Iran to immediately convert all the material into fuel rods directly after it has been made/created. Another would be to export it. The heavy water reactor in Arak, which is said to process plutonium, is also up for discussion.
Among the E3+3’s other demands, is that Iran ratify and adopt the Additional Protocol of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Already between 2003 and 2005 Tehran had voluntarily practiced and permitted inspections announced on short notice by the International Atomic Energy Agency – but it broke off cooperation in 2005 when no agreement could be reached. A difficult but important task for the negotiators would be to honor the respective concessions made by the other side. Nothing will be achieved through pressure alone.
What role does the Syria question play in US-Iranian rapprochement?
Iran has brought Syria into the picture. President Rouhani repeatedly condemned Damascus’s use of poison gas, stating that his own country was aware of its devastating effects, having itself been the victim of gas attacks. Iran has thus shown its full support for the US-Russian agreement on the destruction of Syrian chemical weapons. It has also offered to serve as a mediator in the Syrian civil war. Up to now the US has refused to give Tehran an active role in the Geneva negotiations. Now, however, the Iranians are arguing that Washington and Tehran both have an equal stake in preventing Sunni extremist forces from winning the upper hand in Syria.
First the Iranian administration has to clarify how it is going to deal with the regime of Bashar Al Assad and the Syrian opposition. In an interview, Rouhani made a deft distinction between members of the opposition and terrorists. Perhaps this opens up the possibility of starting a dialogue with the opposition – that is, if the opposition ever manages to reach a consensus. The majority of those forces considered moderate up until now have recently gone over to the side of the radical Sunni fighters. Iran is trying to play a part in finding a solution to the Syria conflict – and arrive at an understanding with the US about it. Not only in the US but above all in Saudi Arabia and within the Syrian opposition, including Iran in negotiations over the Syrian civil war will be a hard sell
Paul von Maltzahn is secretary general of the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP). From 2003 to 2006 he was the German ambassador to Iran.
The DGAP’s scholarly studies and publications are intended to contribute to the assessment of and discussion surrounding international developments. The opinions expressed in its publications are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the institution.
