The enlargement debate is back on the EU’s political agenda, including at this week’s European Council. While advancing a faster-track process for the candidate countries – and especially Ukraine – EU countries should not lose sight of the fact that an enlarged Union can’t just be a bigger version of the Union of today.
The last time enlargement was intensively debated in the EU, in the early 2000s, ahead of the “big bang enlargement” of 2004, anxiety ran high across the continent. There were fears of an “invasion of the Polish plumber” in Germany, and warnings of mass “welfare tourism” from new Member States in the UK.
At present, the discussion on accelerating the EU’s enlargement process focuses almost exclusively on the readiness of the candidate countries – their readiness to reap the benefits of EU integration faster than before, provided domestic reforms are implemented successfully. Chancellor Merz’s letter on Ukraine’s accession, or the Franco-German paper on speeding up the process for the Western Balkans, both feed into these concerns. But one could almost forget the fourth, unofficial, enlargement criteria: the EU and its members themselves need to be ready to enlarge – they need the absorption capacity to take on new members.
The accession of Ukraine alone – the largest country in Europe in terms of landmass, yet with a gross national income of $16,000 per capita (less than half of the EU average) – would bring dramatic changes to how the EU budget is allocated for example in agriculture policies and how cohesion between members is measured. Institutionally, it would also have an impact on voting in the Council, especially under unanimity and the composition of the European Parliament, where the larger Member States would likely loose seats.
Enlargement will reshape the balance of power within the EU and its institutions – whether the new members are Ukraine, Moldova or the Western Balkans. Set against this are the gains a larger Union stands to make: Ukraine’s military capabilities, economic opportunities in the Western Balkans, a well-educated younger workforce, and a more substantial geopolitical clout on the world stage.
It is therefore essential not to fall into the trap of domestic fears fuelled by far-right, sovereigntist forces. Instead, the enlargement debate needs to be enriched in two ways: with a reform agenda for the Union itself to tangibly counter potential public fears, and a stronger European discourse on the benefits of enlargement.
For the EU to be enlargement-ready, it must strengthen its core areas of operation in terms of institutional structures, it needs to actively address enlargement’s impact on the EU budget, and it needs to anticipate its impact on specific policy areas – its emissions trading system, for example. This process needs to start now in the Council and with the Commission finally publishing its proposals on policy reviews it has promised for the past two years.
Equally important, there needs to be a strategic preparation for a public debate – with answers ready for the fears that will inevitably surface, from import pressure on the agricultural sector to labour migration – although Ukrainians already provide valuable input to European workforce – to one’s country’s own position within the EU.
An enlarged Union cannot simply be the current EU with more members. Enlargement opens a window of opportunity to rethink the policy areas that will be decisive in shaping prosperity and security on the continent – including a fundamental rethink of what the EU should actually be responsible for delivering.
The Eastern enlargement ultimately showed that none of the fears cited above did become reality. Rather, significant welfare gains materialised in both old and new member states.
