That mindset — along with Russia’s nuclear arsenal and its seat on the United Nations Security Council — represents a potent Soviet legacy that defines Russia’s self-perception today.
Russia sees its historical role in the region as justification for trying to influence the politics, economies and culture of former Soviet countries. Russian leadership regularly questions the sovereignty and borders of neighboring post-Soviet states, as Russian President Vladimir Putin did in August 2014 when he declared, “The Kazakhs never had any statehood.” Or as James Sherr points out in his 2013 book, Hard Diplomacy and Soft Coercion: Russia’s Influence Abroad, integration with the European Union is a “choice,” while integration with Russia is “historically conditioned.” Dominance over its neighbors is, to the self-understanding of the Russian elites, crucial to the survival of the Russian state. This mentality is rooted in Russia’s history as an empire. Therefore, the Russian elites are willing to pay a much higher price to dominate the near abroad and prevent external players from questioning Russia’s role than the EU and NATO are willing pay for rapprochement, support or the integration of these states.
This understanding also influences how Russian elites perceive change in the neighborhood. When political, social and economic change occurs through fundamental reforms — for instance, in the context of free trade and association agreements with the EU — it undermines Russia’s political, social and economic hegemony and illustrates how political and economic reforms can bring post-Soviet countries closer to EU standards. The existence of an alternative to the Putin model is unacceptable to the current regime; Russia wants to set the rules and norms. Moscow tries to influence the region through informal relations and corruption. It prefers weak institutions and agreements based on personal ties. One reason Russia responded so aggressively to the Revolution of Dignity in Ukraine was to prevent the emergence of an alternative development model in the context of rapprochement with the EU. At the same time, Russia’s military intervention in Ukraine represents a failed “carrot-and-stick” policy that revealed the limits of its soft power.
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