The EU has recently approved a Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans providing substantial funding, though the attached political conditions can be doubted. Indeed, since Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the EU’s geopolitical push for enlargement has further shifted the process away from a strictly merit-based approach, favouring political considerations instead. With this shift in mind, the current Macedonian government appears more comfortable to broaden its strategic alliances, including with illiberal figures like Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and U.S. President-elect Donald Trump. Should prospects for progress in EU accession negotiations fade, North Macedonia’s leadership could pivot towards domestic power consolidation, supported by these alternative partnerships.
The responsibility now lies largely with North Macedonia’s government to break the deadlock it faces on its EU path. Yet, almost 6 months into office, it has not actively supported the necessary constitutional reform recognising a Bulgarian community in the country. This constitutes a critical requirement by the EU to move towards a second intergovernmental conference (IGC), where the country would open its first negotiating cluster. While the EU sees this requirement as an integral part of the accession process, the Macedonian government continues to downplay it as merely a proposal. Without a bold move from both sides, North Macedonia risks falling behind other Western Balkan candidates. That is evidenced by its recent decoupling from Albania, which has just begun negotiations on its first cluster. This stall could in turn jeopardise the EU’s broader geopolitical and transformative aims for the region.
Please find the full article by Benjamin Couteau, Iliriana Gjoni, Milan Nič, Nikola Xaviereff and Wouter Zweers here.
