At the beginning of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Karl Kaiser summed up the hitherto valid policy toward Russia:
“The West has underestimated Vladimir Putin. It has assumed a rationality that is obviously lacking, because Putin’s behavior shows that he is willing to bring harm upon his own country, which cannot be explained by rationality.”
The End of Ostpolitik as Germany Knew It
While Germany’s Russia policy had been based on rapprochement and reconciliation for decades, the war against Ukraine has led to a seismic shift in Germany’s relations with both countries. Just days after the invasion, Olaf Scholz announced a Zeitenwende (“turning point”) in security policy in his speech to the nation. 2 Despite all the hesitation in supporting Ukraine and the security policy adjustments, the German government quickly decoupled itself from Russian gas, built LNG terminals, and accepted high economic costs resulting from massive EU economic sanctions against Russia. This undermined the central foundation of German-Russian relations, which was based on close economic and energy interdependence. Social and political exchange was reduced to a minimum as well.
No Genuine Zeitenwende Yet, Mentally or Strategically
From the perspective of the German government, Russia has become the greatest security threat to Europe. Even before the full-scale attack on Ukraine, Moscow had waged a hybrid war against the West – for example, with disinformation campaigns, hacker and sabotage attacks, and massive intelligence activities in Germany and other European countries. But apparently, it took a full-scale war of aggression for large sections of the German elites and society to recognize the danger posed by Putin’s regime.
Although the massive military and financial support for Ukraine since the Zeitenwende speech, as well as the special fund of €100 billion for the Bundeswehr, show a fundamental change in German foreign and security policy – away from a “Russia first” policy and toward a focus on Ukraine – there seems to be no genuine mental or strategic shift.
The German government still takes a reactive approach, focusing on crisis management. Like the administration of US President Joe Biden, it is trying to avoid a major escalation with Russia. This shows that many have still not understood the logic of Russian politics. From Putin’s point of view, compromises are tantamount to weakness; appeasement and hesitation only encourage further aggression. The Kremlin leader thinks in win-lose categories; the two Minsk Agreements and the growing dependence of Germany on Russian gas after 2014 all but invited him to launch a large-scale attack on Ukraine. Russia is weaker than NATO and the EU in military and economic terms, but it skillfully exploits the weaknesses and indecision of its opponents. Within Europe, Germany is particularly vulnerable to such maneuvers because of its historical links with Russia. In addition, the power structure in Moscow is not dependent on the approval of a critical public.
The calls for peace negotiations from parts of the German population and political elite contradict the current reality on the battlefield. In no small part, the desire to end the war at any cost has opened up a vacuum that populist parties are now trying to fill. The reelection of Donald Trump will encourage Putin in his belief that he could strike a deal with Washington at the expense of Ukraine, and that US support for Ukraine could massively decrease.
Russian Aggression Will Lead to the Collapse of an Empire
Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine marks not only the end of the collective European security order negotiated after the Cold War but also an accelerated disintegration of the Russian Empire itself. While the Kremlin is trying to secure its “traditional sphere of influence” by military means – based on the idea that Russia cannot be an empire without Ukraine – and to militarily enforce spheres of interest in Europe, it is achieving the exact opposite: Russia’s aggression is accelerating the erosion of its hegemonic position in its post-Soviet neighborhood and thus Moscow’s role as a global actor. It brings NATO back to Europe as the most important security actor and has provoked a northern expansion of NATO to include Finland and Sweden. As a result of Western sanctions, Russia will fall further behind technologically and economically in the coming years, becoming more dependent on China. This means that the country will increasingly lose sovereignty and have to make more compromises with other actors.
At present, everything indicates that Russia will develop more like Iran rather than China: due to limited resources and isolation, it will only be able to play a disruptive role in international politics and will have no resources to shape the global order. However, since the Russian system is also characterized by its adaptability, it can be assumed that it will transform itself even more into a “good enough power.” While it will fall behind globally in terms of technology and economy, it will retain sufficient weapons and people to defend its interests.
Russia’s Waning Regional Hegemony
We should not expect the Russian state to collapse in the foreseeable future, since both the state and the security apparatus have been systematically expanded over the years. The sale of raw materials, primarily to India and China but also still to Europe, yields sufficient resources to buy the loyalty of elites. Propaganda, repression, and the imperial legacy hold both society and the elites together, leading to an almost total absence of visible resistance to the war. Putin’s system is becoming more and more legitimized by this conflict, which is portrayed as a proxy war with the West. Under Putin, Russia is well on its way to becoming a dictatorship. Being a revisionist power, the regime knows hardly any red lines; this makes it more dangerous than the late Soviet Union, which was more of a status quo power. Karl Kaiser pointed out this striking difference and its consequences for the West immediately after the war began:
“Even during the Cold War, one could assume a certain rationality on the part of the Soviet, Russian leadership. That is what prevented the Cold War between East and West from becoming hot. The assumption has been made that this is still the case. But it is not: the personality of Putin and the regime with which he has surrounded himself has displayed a different behavior.”
Another consequence is that Russian hegemony in Eastern Europe, the South Caucasus, and Central Asia is coming to an end. Russia can no longer guarantee authoritarian stability and, thus, order in the region. This means that it is increasingly being challenged by other actors with whom it is competing for power and influence. Specifically, there is China in Central Asia, Turkey in the South Caucasus, and the EU with its enlargement policy in Eastern Europe. But Iran and some Arab countries are also more active in Russia’s traditional sphere of influence. Post-Soviet states have changed their security perception of Russia as a result of the war against Ukraine. Their interest in counterbalancing Russia’s influence and reducing dependence on their large neighbor is growing.
Conversely, Moscow’s interests in relation to its neighboring states have changed, especially in the South Caucasus and Central Asia. The regime needs new trade routes and direct access to its most important trade partners, China, India, and Iran. At the same time, the member states of the Eurasian Economic Union, such as Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Armenia, serve as hubs for circumventing sanctions. Russia is investing heavily in these countries, and the influence of Russian money has also been growing since the beginning of the war due to a large wave of Russian immigration.
Europe Needs Deterrence, Diplomacy, and Strategy
There is no security for Europe outside of NATO anymore. In the case of Ukraine, this means that only NATO accession or effective security guarantees can lead to negotiations and an end to the war. Deterrence is the most important short-term instrument against Putin’s aggression. After Donald Trump’s reelection, strengthening the European pillar in NATO and investing in Europe’s own defense capabilities has become even more urgent. For a long time, the United States has encouraged large member states like Germany to take more responsibility for European security; now, this must indeed happen due to a shift in Washington’s priorities. In addition to deterrence, however, diplomacy and confidence-building measures are also needed to avoid possible overreactions. Karl Kaiser rightly pointed out that it is important to maintain options that allow for rapprochement:
“The policy must be transformed into a clear policy of strength, but one that leaves the door open to rapprochement as there are also forces in Russia that do not agree with the policy that Putin is pursuing.” ⁴
Germany and the EU also need a medium- and long-term strategy for dealing with Russia. In the long term, Russia must be reintegrated into Europe. However, this would require a regime change that is not in sight for the foreseeable future. Since the possibilities for exerting influence on Russia itself are limited, in the medium term it must be systematically weakened in its post-Soviet neighborhood, and its partnerships with China, Iran, and North Korea must be undermined. In this context, the EU should invest heavily in infrastructure in Eastern Europe, the South Caucasus, and Central Asia in order to bind these regions more closely to Europe and to entrench European norms and standards. For Turkey, in particular, which plays a key role in the South Caucasus and the Black Sea region, the EU needs a policy that links the country more closely to Europe, further integrates it economically, and modernizes the rules for access to the internal market.
With Trump in the White House and the continuing war against Ukraine, the next – hopefully more functional – German government will have to take a stronger lead in Europe and defend it. The prerequisite for this is what Karl Kaiser demanded of Western politicians, given their misreading of Putin and the start of the Russian war of aggression:
“This requires a reversal of policy and a review, which has now begun in the United States, and one hopes that this will also be the case in Europe, in Germany, and in the coalition. A review of the old assumption. Hopefully with a policy revision in its wake.”
This text is a chapter from the book “Paths to the Future: Perspectives on Foreign Policy: On the 90th Birthday of Karl Kaiser” and contains no footnotes. You can access the full version including footnotes in the PDF above or via the e-book.
