Some prophecies come true immediately; others build up suspense for a while. The latter is true for the prediction of Karl Kaiser, a distinguished authority on the United States, that the US would play a lesser role in the world after the end of the East-West conflict. In 1992, this was counterintuitive, not to say contrarian: an objection to the established consensus of hope. Just two years earlier, liberal historian Francis Fukuyama had proclaimed the “end of history”; that same year, conservative commentator Charles Krauthammer announced America’s “unipolar moment.” In fact, American foreign and security policy over the following decades was based on two assumptions: that, after the fall of the Berlin Wall along with the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union, the rest of the world would also join in the triumph of free-market democracy; and that the United States would henceforth and forever be the planet’s sole superpower.
The reality check was not long in coming. The attacks of September 11, 2001, the Afghanistan operation, the Iraq war, the global financial crisis, an increasingly aggressive Russia, and the expansive rise of China led to a foreign policy paradigm shift: in the 2022 National Security Strategy, the Biden administration recognized that the United States was engaged in a global strategic competition for the shape of the international order – a tacit acceptance that the moment of unipolar hegemony was over. The importance of democratic allies as partners in shared values and as a power extender for the United States is all the greater – especially in a world in which the authoritarian rivals and opponents of Western democracies are increasingly closing ranks. One might call it idealistic realism.
After Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the Biden administration’s careful and judicious tending and expansion of America’s alliances became apparent in an exceptionally close cooperation with Europe (including the EU, which the previous administration had demonized), and in a particularly close embrace of Germany. At the same time, many Europeans suddenly became aware of their very limited ability to counter Russian aggression without the United States at their side. Where Ukraine would be today without this joint US-European support does not bear thinking about.
High Stakes for Europe and Germany
Two years later, however, the limits of these newfound roles are becoming all too apparent. There is agreement on the end of the neoliberal consensus on trade on both sides of the Atlantic, but Washington’s industrial protectionism and export controls are putting a strain on the relationship. The Middle East conflict threatens to spiral out of control; Russia is far from military or moral defeat; and attempts to contain China are failing. The international order is showing clear signs of disintegration.
On November 5, the American people unequivocally rejected a continuation of Biden’s policies with the last-minute candidate Kamala Harris – and opted instead for the dictator-friendly economic nationalism of Donald Trump. Europe will now have to devote far more effort to its own security.
The stakes are high. A neighborhood on fire, a world in disarray, globalization under attack, an unpredictable superpower, and authoritarian great powers that are not only fanning the flames on the fringes of the continent but are also intervening with increasing brazenness in Europe and its member states. In such a situation, political cohesion and the capacity to act are essential.
Europe Needs a Strong Germany to Move Forward
Which brings us, once again, to Germany. Even though two thirds of NATO countries now spend more than two percent of their gross domestic product on defense; even though Poland, the Baltic states, and the northern Europeans lead the way with significantly stronger investments in Europe’s defense; and even though Ursula von der Leyen’s “geopolitical Commission” is now entering its second round: Europe cannot make the necessary rapid progress without a strong, cooperative Germany.
Yet Karl Kaiser’s second prediction from 1992 – that Germany, as a “hesitant latecomer” (Helmuth Plessner’s “belated nation” sends its regards), would seek a larger role expansion and new responsibilities – already seems to be vanishing in the rearview mirror. As is well known, no other nation applied Fukuyama’s thesis of the end of history to itself more gratefully than Germany – and in a unique interpretation: as a reprieve from its own history. America’s “unipolar moment” was received in Germany as an invitation to embrace disarmament. Under the slogan Kultur der Zurückhaltung (culture of restraint), this meant downsizing the Bundeswehr, devaluing the disciplines of security policy and Eastern European studies, and suspending compulsory military service.
But then a German moment of expansion did occur. Having outsourced its military security to the United States, its energy security to Russia, and its export-led growth to China, the Berlin Republic achieved a massive increase in prosperity, security, and power – and suddenly found itself in the role of continental hegemon. In 2014, the German Federal President, Foreign Minister, and Defense Minister gave coordinated speeches at the Munich Security Conference in which they promised that Germany would take on more responsibility for Europe’s security in the future.
Ten years later, despite the invasion of Ukraine and the Zeitenwende, this new self-confidence has evaporated; instead, there is a sense of what journalist Jörg Lau describes as Verstörung (consternation). And with good reason. The current crises and wars are calling into question every single foundational principle of German foreign and security policy, while right- and left-wing national extremists are chipping away at the edifice of representative democracy. At the same time, Russia is waging an unprecedented campaign of disinformation and sabotage in Europe, and especially in Germany – a second front in a war that never targeted Ukraine alone. But a hopelessly divided “traffic light” coalition increasingly went its own way on the continent, undermining European solidarity… and collapsing precisely on the day after the US election.
Making Europe America’s “Indispensable Partner”
What, then, can be done? In terms of security policy, Europe will continue to depend on the United States as an ally for the foreseeable future. However, future US administrations (of whatever political hue) will only take Europe seriously as a military ally if it does much more to bolster its own defensive capabilities and resilience.
In the “non-kinetic” domain of global strategic competition, at least the Democrats’ strategists know that Europe’s economic and normative power is a formidable force multiplier, especially in the confrontation with China. And there are still Republicans like Wess Mitchell (the Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs under President Trump) who see Europe as an indispensable ally for that very reason. 6
However, Europe can only play this role if it speaks with one voice and actively defends its values and interests. This is Germany’s new responsibility today: to make Europe strong so that it can remain America’s indispensable partner.
This text is a chapter from the book “Paths to the Future: Perspectives on Foreign Policy: On the 90th Birthday of Karl Kaiser” and contains no footnotes. You can access the full version including footnotes in the PDF above or via the e-book.
