The Trump administration’s announcement that it will not deploy intermediate-range missiles in Germany for the time being is not only a direct response to German Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s statements on the Iran conflict. It must also be viewed in the context of the realignment of US security and defense policy. The US administration’s shifting priorities could also affect arms exports – and recent developments point in this direction after the White House informed several NATO countries that deliveries of US military equipment they had ordered could face significant delays.
These changes pose a potential risk that the German government must factor into its policy planning. Despite massive investments in defense, Germany continues to source key military equipment from the US. For a long time, this was politically expedient, as defense cooperation was seen as part of the broader security partnership with Washington. The German government under Chancellor Olaf Scholz, for example, decided to purchase F-35 fighter jets, additional Patriot air defense systems and Chinook helicopters. However, confidence in the reliability of the US has declined significantly under the Trump administration.
In addition, according to The Washington Post, the Pentagon reportedly considered in March diverting military aid intended for Ukraine to the Middle East. The US government cites limited stockpiles combined with rising operational demands. Production bottlenecks in the US are adding to the problem. Replenishing ammunition and guided missiles used extensively in the Iran war – including Tomahawk cruise missiles – could take years. This, too, could complicate the German government’s efforts to acquire the weapons system through the Foreign Military Sales program.
At the same time, the US administration plans to use its dominance in international arms transfers more forcefully as a foreign policy tool. The America First Arms Transfer Strategy, presented in February by executive order, is primarily intended to expand domestic production capacity and boost exports. In the future, priority will be given in particular to countries that invest in their own defense and “have a critical role or geography in United States plans and operations.” Whether this includes Europe is uncertain. While previous US administrations viewed arms exports as a means of strengthening political relationships and alliances, the Trump administration is placing greater emphasis on industrial policy goals and economic gains.
To be sure, arms procurement from the US has always involved risks. Washington can, in principle, delay or block such deals on national security grounds, restrict the transfer of systems containing US components through re-export controls and, under certain circumstances, limit their use. However, the potential reprioritization under the new US approach – in which alliances and allies appear to carry less weight – creates new risks for Europe. There is also a danger that the Trump administration will use export decisions more strategically in the future as leverage to extract concessions from buyers in other policy areas.
The German government and the Bundestag should therefore not base future procurement decisions solely on interoperability and short-term availability. Instead, they should rely on well-founded risk assessments that adequately account for changes in US policy and include scenarios in which the US administration classifies NATO countries as less strategically relevant and does not prioritize them in arms exports.
