European Zeitenwende

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Introduction

With Russia’s large-scale war in Ukraine and the return of Donald Trump as US president, Europe is facing the biggest geopolitical transformation since the end of the Second World War. Europe is not ready for this new reality, and it is losing time in adapting to it. If Europe wants to be a relevant actor, it will need to proactively take more responsibility for its own security and peace on the continent, including in Ukraine. This watershed moment, or “Zeitenwende,” requires Europe to fundamentally rethink itself, along with its interests, priorities, instruments, and partnerships, as an actor in this new reality. Beyond identifying its internal and external challenges, Europe must define a policy of action for such a new approach.

Both the Russian threat and pressure from Washington provide an opportunity for greater European agency and leadership. To seize it, Europe needs to redefine its place in the world. European countries need to rethink the role of NATO and the EU in European security as well as their contributions to both organizations. European security, this paper argues, must first and foremost become more European, more strategic, and more pragmatic. NATO’s European pillar needs to be defined and strengthened, and Europeans should move independently on issues where the US differs or does not want to act. The present challenges go beyond the military realm. They require Europeans to find answers to pressing societal, economic and institutional questions. If Europe fails as an actor, it will leave the decisions on its own security to others. Whether Europe acts or not, it will have to pay a price. Ukraine will ultimately remain the key test case for Europe’s ability to shape its own future and role in the world.

Defining the Context for European Security

With Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, interstate war has returned to Europe. This should not have come as a surprise to European countries, since Russia under President Vladimir Putin already waged war on Georgia in 2008, has done so on Ukraine since 2014, and intervened in Syria in 2015. At the same time, we must understand that this imperialistic war in Ukraine is a reaction to Russia’s declining influence in its neighborhood – as the Kremlin would assert, in its traditional sphere of influence. The Russian leadership did not see any option other than military intervention to prevent losing control over Ukraine completely. But this war is also linked to lessons drawn from past experience, like earlier in Ukraine and Georgia, that European countries will not react to Russian aggression.

In its justifications of these atrocities, the Kremlin depicts Ukraine as essentially Russian, denies it agency and independence, and claims legitimacy for its domination of Kyiv. Here the Kremlin completely misunderstands the trends in its “near abroad” and confirms that it can no longer claim to be the dominant regional power in the post-Soviet region. Ukraine’s Orange Revolution and the Revolution of Dignity are part of a process of emancipation from Russian dominance, and they stand for the role that Ukrainian society is playing in redefining the Ukrainian state and its own European identity.

This war must at the same time be viewed within the context of the Kremlin’s confrontation with Europe and especially the US, which it has articulated more and more radically over the past two decades: Putin defines Ukraine as “anti-Russia,” an instrument of the West to weaken Russia. This not only completely underestimates the agency of Ukraine and Ukrainian society in determining their own future. It also means that the outcome of the war defines from the Kremlin’s perspective Russia’s role in European security and the world. Russia’s confrontation with the so-called West has become the Kremlin’s most important source of domestic legitimacy, and the war in Ukraine has been part of this policy since the annexation of Crimea in 2014. This war has therefore become existential for the regime, also in the ways it is changing the Russian state, society, and the economy. The Kremlin is preparing the Russian state and society for a constant war. The confrontation over a reordering of European security is a fundamental part of this.

Europe, in Russia’s eyes, is the central battlefield. The Kremlin’s confrontation with the West became visible as early as the Orange Revolution in 2004-2005, when the Russian leadership felt under threat of losing power in its traditional sphere of influence. That means that Russia entered this conflict from a position of weakness. Russia’s hybrid war against Europe is part of a policy to prevent the further loss of influence in its common neighborhood while weakening its opponents’ ability to act and positioning itself in a multipolar world. Military and non-military means go hand in hand in Russia’s warfare. While fighting in Ukraine, Russian security and intelligence services employ centrally coordinated hybrid operations throughout Europe. By fueling domestic political crises, manipulating threat perceptions, and undermining trust in public institutions, Moscow is pursuing the strategic objectives of weakening public support for Ukraine, obstructing Europe’s ability to act, and undermining the collective security mechanisms of NATO. Russia seeks to diminish the role of the United States and NATO in Europe as part of its maximalist demands for restructuring European security, including a right of veto for itself and the recognition of a Russian sphere of influence.

With Donald Trump’s return to the presidency, Washington is fundamentally changing its role in European security and its policy toward Russia. Trump has abandoned close coordination with European partners on a policy of increasing sanctions against Russia and military support for Ukraine. At the same time, he is trying to normalize relations with the Kremlin, while not ceding equal footing to Ukraine and Europe in talks over a potential end to the war. Under Trump, the US has significantly decreased new military and budgetary aid to Ukraine, leaving it to Europe to fill the gap. The Trump administration’s open hostility toward European governments, perpetuated in its recent National Security Strategy, threatens to undermine transatlantic cohesion, calls into question the credibility of US security guarantees, and mirrors signs of a creeping US withdrawal from European security. To deter Russian aggression beyond Ukraine, however,  European NATO members remain dependent on the US nuclear umbrella as well as strategic enablers and critical capabilities, including air defense systems, intelligence sharing, manpower, and deep strike capacities. At the same time, US weapons, ammunition, and intelligence sharing remain critical for Ukraine to defend itself.

While the EU built its economic success and political influence in the world as a normative actor in a security and normative framework provided by the US, it now finds itself confronted with the erosion of this rules-based order and a US president who is actively destroying its fundament and its institutions. Washington is becoming increasingly authoritarian domestically. It undermines international law and questions multilateral institutions and the sovereignty of states. It is aligned with Putin’s approach of using military means to pursue interests globally and to define spheres of influence. Europe is not ready for this post-liberal transactional world: neither militarily, psychologically, nor strategically. Its societies were socialized in peace and prosperity in the decades after the fall of the Soviet Union, and many political elites held tight to the illusion of a comfort zone until 2022. Europe as we know it, just like the global multilateral order, is a product of US policy after the Second World War. If Washington is now destroying that order, Europe will have to reinvent itself in terms of its role in the world, its economy, and its security. To assert strategic autonomy, it needs to reclaim agency without relying on the US, and it must overcome internal constraints.

At the same time, the European project is itself in a deep crisis, with growing divisions among member states on core issues like security and threat perception but also on migration, energy and economic policy. Both the Kremlin and the current US leadership are fueling these divisions in Europe to improve their bargaining positions and to further undermine Europe’s ability to act.

Europe’s Strategic Challenges

All the latest negotiations on a ceasefire have proven that the Kremlin has no interest in ending its war against Ukraine unless its maximalist goals are fulfilled. That would de facto mean the capitulation of Ukraine, a division of Europe into spheres of influence, and a US withdrawn from European security. Reaching these goals would reward Russia’s aggression and further shift the international system away from a rules-based logic to one defined by the power of the strong. Therefore, Europe’s own security and its role as a credible actor are linked to the existence of Ukraine as an independent state and its ability to integrate Ukraine into the EU and European security structures.

In its revisionism, the Kremlin is actively trying to weaken European agency by undermining cohesion among European societies and between European states, spreading insecurity through hybrid means. The creeping military withdrawal of the United States from Europe, the exclusion of European states from formulating a ceasefire proposal, and attempts to normalize relations with Russia all strengthen the Kremlin’s bargaining position. Only more economic and military pressure on Russia will increase Moscow’s willingness to make concessions. The challenges Europe faces, however, are not only external. European countries themselves have also failed to agree on their role at the negotiating table and what they are willing to provide to end the war.

Europe’s challenges, moreover, go far beyond the realm of military and defense, also posing societal, economic, and institutional questions. Diverging threat perceptions, opportunism, different strategic cultures, and fiscal constraints have led to diverging and competing policy priorities across the continent, preventing European countries from formulating a united position. Approaches differ, generally speaking, between Northern and Eastern European countries on the one hand and many Southern and Western European countries on the other. This also pertains to the importance they give to Ukraine. In 2025, Northern Europe, representing only 8 percent of the combined GDP of countries tracked by the Ukraine Support Tracker of the Kiel Institute for the World Economy, contributed approximately 33 percent of European military aid to Ukraine. Meanwhile, Southern Europe, representing 19 percent of combined GDP, accounted for only 3 percent of military aid. This represents not only a lack of solidarity but also an underestimation by some European governments of the threat Russia poses to all European countries and to European security.

Europe needs to reclaim agency without relying on the US and it must overcome internal constraints

Proactive European security policy is further complicated by societal polarization and rising populism. Societies’ lack of trust in institutions and in the ability of mainstream parties to solve problems at the national level creates political deadlocks at the European level. Populists are driving trade-off narratives, playing social spending against defense investments and support to Ukraine. At the same time, many European politicians are not willing or able to convey the urgency of the situation. As a result, we do not see more Europe but a renationalization of many policies. The introduction of border controls by Germany and Poland, Belgium’s blockade, along with the support of other member states, of unfreezing Russian assets to support Ukraine, or the repeated threats of EU countries like Hungary or Slovakia to veto the renewal of sanctions against Russia illustrate the increasing constraints on European agency. Divisions, both at the European and the national level, constitute vulnerabilities that Russia readily exploits through disinformation.

Challenges to Europe’s highly globalized economies have also arisen. The decoupling from Russian oil and gas has sparked a fundamental reevaluation of Europe’s energy policy and security. Several countries had become too dependent on Russian gas, which made them vulnerable to Russian influence. Here it is key to draw lessons about dependencies not only from experiences with Russia but also regarding China and the US. Diversifying and developing access to critical resources as well as the protection of critical infrastructure will require political leadership and major investments. But many companies in Europe do not seem to understand the warning signs, still hoping to return to the good old days of cheap energy and subsidies for their production. They are not investing sufficiently in diversification and the protection of strategic infrastructure and know-how. Business, politics, and society must act together to strengthen European agency and move the integration of Ukraine forward. Ukraine’s integration into the EU and its reconstruction will be a major task for all actors in Europe, comparable only to the Marshall Plan after the Second World War. By December 2024, the World Bank had already estimated reconstruction needs of Ukraine amounting to USD 524 billion, a figure that will be much higher the longer the war takes. This will be a common task for European countries and Ukraine for decades.

Strengthening European Agency

To develop much needed agency, Europe first needs a vision for itself in the world and its role in European security. There is an urgent need for new fundamental strategies, such as toward Russia, in dealing with the US, toward its neighborhood or regarding nuclear deterrence. Medium- and long-term strategies are the prerequisite for more effective political leadership and a more impactful foreign policy. The EU’s 2025 strategic approach to the Black Sea region can become a model for translating a new assessment of the environment into actionable policy options. The EU has reacted to the fact that the Black Sea has become a key theater for Russia to sustain its aggression on Ukraine and threat to European security. By shedding light on the resulting security challenges Southeastern Europe faces, including direct military dangers, threats to critical infrastructure, risks posed by Russia’s Shadow Fleet, or hybrid activities like disinformation, the Black Sea Strategy broadens the – in European security debates often limited – focus on Europe’s Northeast. It also contributes to a reconceptualization of the eastern flank in Europe’s confrontation with Russia. The strategy now needs to be reflected to a much greater extent in the next EU long-term budget for 2028-34, as well as in member states’ action plans. Without member states providing resources and taking ownership in key policy areas, the strategy will remain primarily on paper. Europe needs more such translation work to proactively address the changing role of Turkey, dynamics in the South Caucasus or the EU’s enlargement to include Ukraine, Moldova, and the Western Balkans – to name but a few examples, all of which have acquired new meaning in light of Russia’s aggression and America’s declining engagement on the continent. A clear strategy is also needed for when a ceasefire is reached in Ukraine – a strategy that defines the next steps Europeans are willing to take to stabilize and integrate Ukraine. Russia is preparing for a long war and will continue to pursue its strategic goals even in the unlikely event of a ceasefire. It will not end its hostilities against the EU and European countries, and Europe needs to be prepared.

With challenges mounting not only externally but also internally, however, a key question will be in what institutional framework Europe can develop a future-oriented security policy. The lack of a shared threat perception has been a major constraint for a united European approach. Political deadlocks and cumbersome procedures have led to the emergence of ad hoc coalitions of the willing, including on such crucial issues as European security guarantees to Ukraine or rearmament schemes, and the growing importance of formats like the E3, E5, or the NB8, in which small groups of countries work on specific issues. With the Franco-German tandem having become dysfunctional, these formats have created new opportunities for leadership in Europe. The inclusion of non-EU countries like the United Kingdom, Canada and Norway – countries that are central for European security and Europe’s support to Ukraine – offers Europe and its allies greater agility to quickly respond to the rapid changes in its environment. Ad-hoc alliances also pose risks, however. They threaten to erode the relevance of existing institutions, especially the EU, and hollow out attempts for reforms aimed at improving their ability to function and act.

In the short- and medium-term, NATO and the EU will remain the central institutions for European security. They will continue to complement each other. If Europe wants to remain relevant, however, the division of labor within and between both organizations will have to change. Against ongoing transatlantic tensions, NATO should return to its original purpose of alliance defense, since its redefinition as a “community of values” in political-normative terms after the end of the Cold War seems increasingly implausible and obstructive, raising unnecessary expectations regarding political alignment. Mutual assistance and defense serve the interests of both the US and Europe, irrespective of political disagreements, and also hold in a transactional global environment. But the US share in European security will further diminish and the distribution of burden sharing within the Alliance will change at the cost of European members. If the US moves even closer toward authoritarianism, overlapping interests may diminish further.

The most obvious and immediate step for Europeans to proactively shape their future is to raise their support for Ukraine to a different level

Moreover, the US political turn and its creeping military withdrawal from Europe limit NATO’s deterrence credibility and its role in security in Europe in certain domains. This is where European NATO members and particularly the EU should take a lead. One such domain is the fight against hybrid threats. Not only is the US threatening to undermine the resilience of European democracies by questioning the legitimacy of European governments and by supporting populist and right-wing forces, it has also ended international cooperation on detecting and exposing disinformation from countries like Russia, China, or Iran. Additionally, it recently announced its withdrawal from the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats (HybridCoE), which works under the auspices of the EU and NATO. Here, the EU should step in to develop a proactive strategy that reduces the uncertainty caused by Russia’s malicious activities by improving information sharing, identifying loopholes, communicating red lines, and by considering a more assertive approach. Furthermore, US troop reductions in Europe such as the announced partial withdrawal of forces from the NATO military base near Constanța in Romania create a security vacuum Europeans have to fill. This is an opportunity for developing agency in the wider Black Sea region, which has not received sufficient attention from most European countries or EU institutions in the past. It is also an opportunity to increase cooperation with other partners in NATO, like Turkey, who are part of European security, but are not always fully aligned. European countries must also increase their cooperation with partners who do not share all of the same values and interests but are important in countering Russia and other threats and in managing the US in European security.

In order to strengthen the European pillar of NATO, Europeans must reduce their dependence on the US and develop critical military capabilities on their own. That includes air defense, intelligence, and logistics, but also requires European industrial solutions that are competitive in the market. The eastern flank states are already frontrunners in defense spending. Together with the E3 (France, Germany, United Kingdom), which can mobilize significant economic power and defense industrial capacities, they could take a lead in laying the foundation for a stronger European pillar in the Alliance. Coupled with a deeper integration of Ukraine’s defense industry and the scaling up of its production, this offers huge potential for developing Europe’s capabilities. Strong defense spenders, like Poland, whose military build-up will be key for Europe’s defense posture, should strive to strengthen their industrial cooperation with other European partners. Germany is further developing its defense industrial cooperation with countries like Norway, Canada, and Italy, which have a strong military industrial base. As top spenders in per capita and in absolute terms, respectively, Poland and Germany must overcome their political differences if they are to form the core of a European pillar of NATO.

Additionally, the EU should continue to build European muscle by facilitating funding, research, and the coordination and development of the European Defence Industrial Base. It should also align its initiatives with NATO programs and command structures. Schemes on the eastern flank like the enhanced Forward Presence (eFP), Baltic and Eastern Sentry (all NATO), the Eastern Flank Watch, and the European Drone Wall (both EU) are instructive examples. Better coordination also means reducing the number of different tanks, fighter jets, drones, missiles, etc., to make production cheaper and more competitive and equipment more interoperable among European armies. A stronger European pillar of NATO could constitute the foundation for a European Defence Union project in the future if the US reduces its participation in the Alliance to a critical extent or becomes more destructive.

What happens in Ukraine will drive many developments in Europe in the foreseeable future. Europe’s fate is inextricably linked to Ukraine’s. As President Volodymyr Zelensky spelled out at the World Economic Forum in Davos in January 2026, many Europeans still do not seem to understand what it takes to counter Russia in a serious manner. The most obvious and immediate step for Europeans to proactively shape their future is to raise their support for Ukraine to a different level: to clarify long-term spending for Ukraine and investment in its defense sector, to offer Kyiv credible security guarantees if there is a ceasefire, and to accelerate its integration into the EU and into European security structures. With the political hurdles remaining high, cooperation with Ukraine should be deepened swiftly in areas where this is already possible, notably the defense industry, research, energy, or technology but also in countering cyber-attacks, disinformation and other hybrid threats from Russia.

European Zeitenwende Strategy Group

This paper is part of a series of publications prepared in the framework of DGAP’s “European Zeitenwende” Strategy Group, which seeks to help reconceptualize European security in a rapidly changing geopolitical environment. Against the background of Russia’s ongoing war of aggression against Ukraine, a strained transatlantic relationship, growing rivalry with China, and changing global and regional orders, Europe needs to strategically reposition itself if it wants actively shape security on the continent.

Europe’s strategic reorientation should be inspired by those who – as direct neighbors to Russia and Ukraine – best understand the urgency to act. The Strategy Group therefore draws on in-depth analytical discussions with experts and stakeholders from Central, Eastern, and Southeastern Europe, as well as the Nordic and Baltic states, where debates on security are arguably most advanced, to propel a “Zeitenwende” of security policy and thinking in Europe.

Chaired by the German Council on Foreign Relations, the group met regularly online and in-person over the course of 2025. Convinced of the need for a comprehensive approach, it considered different dimensions of resilience, including security and defense, economic security, institutional reform, and societal cohesion.

The present paper series represents the results of the group’s analysis. It seeks to address questions and challenges that in the currently evolving security discourse remain conceptually and practically underdeveloped. By providing concrete analysis, definitions, and reflections to these open questions, the series aspires to add substance to the European Zeitenwende debate on security and defense. The ultimate question of all the papers is how to strengthen European agency in providing European security and in ensuring peace and stability in a new geopolitical context.

Members: Robin Allers (Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies), Hiski Haukkala (Finnish Institute of International Affairs), Wilfried Jilge (German Council on Foreign Relations), Karl-Heinz Kamp (German Council on Foreign Relations), Pavlo Klimkin (Center for National Resilience and Development), Jana Kobzova (European Council on Foreign Relations), Nicole Koenig (Munich Security Conference), Stefan Meister (German Council on Foreign Relations), Carolina Vendil Pallin (Swedish Defence Research Agency), Katri Pynnöniemi (University of Helsinki & Finnish National Defence University), András Rácz (German Council on Foreign Relations), Kristi Raik (International Centre for Defense and Security), Toms Rostoks (National Defence Academy Latvia), George Scutaru (New Strategy Center), Margarita Šešelgytė (Vilnius University, Institute of International Relations & Political Science), Marcin Terlikowski (Polish Institute of International Affairs)

The European Zeitenwende Strategy Group was established in the format of the project “In Together – Shaping a Common European Future,” which is funded by Stiftung Mercator.

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