National Cohesion

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National cohesion has become a central issue in European security since Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, as it shapes how European states respond to the Russian threat and how sustainable their support for Ukraine remains. It highlights how closely domestic and foreign policy are intertwined. The longer the war continues, the harder it becomes to maintain public backing for support to Ukraine while European states also invest in their own defense. Economic pressures force difficult trade-offs between social and military spending, and growing exhaustion with a “never-ending” war hampers consistent policymaking. At the same time, concerns about declining US engagement in European security – driven by perceptions of unpredictable leadership – are increasing. Moscow is exploiting these vulnerabilities through hybrid warfare, aiming to weaken European cohesion by fueling polarization, insecurity of societies, and distrust in political institutions.

On national cohesion, time appears to favor Moscow, as Russia, as a repressive authoritarian state, faces no domestic pressure to change course and its leaders are not constrained by competitive elections. European democracies, by contrast, must maintain public consent. This study therefore asks: How can European countries strengthen national cohesion during a period of economic crisis and ongoing Russian military and hybrid aggression? The question is crucial for policymakers, since weak cohesion diminishes societies’ ability to resist malign foreign influence, undermines efforts to support frontline allies, limits defense investment, and threatens continued assistance to Ukraine. Yet a range of economic, political, and societal constraints are impeding national cohesion.

Defining National Cohesion

National cohesion matters even more in times of war and crisis. Ukraine’s ability to defend itself against Russia’s aggression was strengthened by the determination of its society to resist. Had Ukrainians not taken a stand in February 2022, there might no longer be an independent Ukrainian state. A shared understanding of the threat posed by Russia, combined with a strong capacity for self-organization, was crucial in preserving Ukraine’s sovereignty and independence. Shared threat perception and solidarity appear to facilitate societal resilience and enhance the ability of societies to recover from external or internal shocks.

Social cohesion is a prerequisite for national cohesion. It can be characterized as “the strength of bonds or social distance between societal members” and primarily refers to their ability to work together toward common goals. Societies with higher levels of social cohesion are more resilient to external shocks, experience stronger economic growth, and are better equipped to confront external and hybrid threats. In contrast, weak societal bonds and growing social distance impair the ability of societies to work together. In recent years, liberal democracies have faced rising political and societal polarization, along with a shrinking space for decision makers to act. Policymakers struggle to implement necessary measures just as overlapping crises demand more leadership and a shared understanding of threats. Divisions between interest groups, combined with limited or misleading political communication, further fracture societies and undermine national cohesion. While many factors shape cohesion, trust in institutions is particularly important.

With the rise of social media as a key means of communication and growing uncertainty over major global trends such as migration, climate change, military conflicts, and economic insecurity, societies are not only changing how they communicate but are also increasingly organizing themselves into like-minded groups. This undermines the ability to reach compromise and is widely exploited by domestic populist actors who build their success on polarization and societal division. While, in the EU context, cohesion policy helps less prosperous member states catch up and reduce economic and social disparities, growing income inequality can lead to a decline in social cohesion. According to the Bertelsmann Foundation’s Social Cohesion Radar, social cohesion in the 27 EU and seven OECD states is lowest in Latvia, Lithuania, and Southeast Europe, and highest in the Nordic countries. Ethnic, religious, and regional divisions can deepen existing social fractures. As societal frustration grows and leaders appear unable to deliver, anti-elitism becomes a widespread phenomenon, making it more difficult for decision makers to respond to challenges posed by malign actors.

Strong national cohesion enables political leaders to implement difficult and costly decisions, while a lack of cohesion makes such policies far harder to enact. Leaders are sometimes required to shape public opinion – such as on unpopular defense investments – and pursue policies that do not fully align with public sentiment. These efforts, however, are more likely to backfire when polarization is high. In the security context, cohesion matters most for support to national defense spending, willingness to assist allies, support for Ukraine, and readiness to bear the costs of these policies. Since 2022, NATO states have provided Ukraine with military and financial support and have increased defense spending to replace military systems and ammunition transferred to Ukraine and to prepare for potential conflict with Russia. Yet a 2024 poll of all NATO member states shows that, despite overwhelming support for NATO membership, public views vary widely on defense spending, assisting allies, and supporting Ukraine.

Although support for NATO remains high, public backing for increased defense spending is significantly lower in most member states. In only 12 NATO countries do at least 50% of citizens support higher national defense spending, and these are mainly states geographically close to Russia or located in Northern Europe. Support for increasing defense spending is 34% in the United States, 46% in the United Kingdom, 54% in Germany, 43% in Türkiye, and 45% in France. Overall, public support ranges from 81% in Albania to 19% in Iceland. When it comes to providing support for Ukraine, there is considerable variation across European NATO member states. Overall, 61% of respondents across NATO countries favor continuing assistance to Ukraine, but support falls below 50% in seven states. Moreover, in only six NATO member states does the share of those who strongly support helping Ukraine exceed 50%. In Italy, Greece, Slovenia, Bulgaria, North Macedonia, and Hungary, fewer than 20% of respondents are strongly in favor of continuing support.

Significant differences exist within European NATO countries regarding threat perception. A public opinion poll conducted by the European Council on Foreign Relations found that in several European NATO member states, roughly half of respondents believe it is either very likely or likely that Russia may attack another European country within the next two years (Portugal 54%, Poland 49%, UK 50%, Netherlands 49%, France 46%, Spain 44%, Sweden 43%, Germany 41%, Estonia 38%, Czechia 33%, Italy 32%, Greece 31%, and Bulgaria 21%). Consequently, perceptions of the Russian military threat have increased since 2022 and remain high across Europe. However, a heightened threat perception does not necessarily translate into greater willingness to increase defense spending or invest in Ukraine’s military capabilities. Factors such as political leadership, political culture, and shared understanding of the nature of the threat also play a role.

Limits of National Cohesion

There are several factors that undermine national cohesion. First, structural conditions limit the extent to which cohesion can be achieved. In democracies, pressure toward consensus is often constrained by groups with opposing interests. There are also structural incentives for opposition parties to disagree with and criticize the government, which reflects differing political priorities. Moreover, challenges such as demographic change and aging societies, climate policy, and the impact of AI do not have clearly defined solutions, allowing for broad disagreement on how they should be addressed. While efforts to build national consensus on certain policies are worthwhile, disagreement is a natural feature of democratic systems.

Second, growing polarization in European societies is further fueled by populist groups that often oppose fundamentally rational arguments about military spending. The inability of democratic elites to provide viable solutions in an increasingly complex environment with multiple overlapping crises has led to a renewed focus on national interests and sovereignty – ironically undermining cohesion both within societies and among NATO allies. Declining trust in public institutions and shrinking space for compromise limit the ability to reach agreements on issues such as migration or widening social inequalities, ultimately weakening societal resilience. The rise of social media is a key driver of the growing polarization.

Third, in post-modern societies where individual interests and consumerism dominate, solidarity has declined. The abolition of conscription and mandatory social service in several European states has reduced engagement with public institutions and weakened bonds between citizens. There is less willingness to pursue objectives that benefit society as a whole, particularly when doing so requires personal sacrifice. This issue is further complicated by generational tensions over climate policy, pension funding, and national debt.

Fourth, the fiscal situation in many European countries poses a major obstacle to defense investment. Although the threat from Russia is serious, debt-to-GDP ratios are relatively low in many frontline states – particularly in Northern Europe – making borrowing less costly. By contrast, the situation in larger European economies such as the United Kingdom, France, Spain, and Italy is more challenging. Increasing defense spending there would require cutting other government programs and reducing public debt, a politically difficult task given domestic tensions. Germany stands out as an exception, with fiscal space to borrow EUR 500 billion for infrastructure and an exemption from its debt brake to raise defense spending for the next decade.

Strengthening National Cohesion

Strengthening national cohesion in Europe is possible, but it will take time to produce tangible results. Current challenges must be addressed jointly by European societies and political elites. At the same time, external actors – such as Russia and, potentially, the United States, with its unpredictable policies under Donald Trump – seek to undermine national cohesion in European countries by interfering in domestic politics. Considering this nexus between foreign and domestic policy is crucial for protecting the European security debate from divisive and distracting external influences. This means that, rather than following the trend toward sovereignty and nationalization – which only reinforces inward-looking attitudes – Europe should focus on cooperation and collective solutions.

There are several ways to strengthen national cohesion. First, building cohesion around security and defense is far easier under conditions of good governance. Research on social cohesion shows that reducing economic inequalities, fostering inclusive societies, strengthening interpersonal and institutional trust, addressing polarization, and encouraging civic participation all contribute to more cohesive communities. In times of tightening budgets and growing pressure on European welfare systems, increasing defense spending will make it more difficult to meet public expectations on social and public services. This trend will place democratic governments under even greater pressure, while populist parties are likely to exploit rising frustrations. Although good governance remains a work in progress even in Europe, gradual improvements are possible if governments take responsibility and demonstrate leadership in reforming European economic, social, and bureaucratic systems.

Second, it is easier to build national consensus on security and defense when policy options are clearly articulated and successfully implemented, even if their benefits are only visible in the medium or long term. Deterrence, for example, is preferable to warfighting because it is less costly in terms of money and human lives. Well-funded deterrence keeps adversaries at a distance and reduces the risk of miscalculation. Although deterring Russia may be a generational challenge, it makes the status quo less precarious. This needs to be communicated especially to societies in countries that are not on the frontline with Russia and Ukraine. In parts of Europe, there remains a misunderstanding that investing in deterrence provokes an enemy, when in fact it prevents military provocations and war.

Third, improvements are unlikely without strong political leadership. This requires leaders who can explain the nature of the threat, the need to invest in defense, and the importance of supporting allies. Leadership is also essential for preparing societies for war and taking the steps necessary to prevent it through deterrence. The willingness and ability to act despite resistance within society and among political elites is crucial in times of multiple crises. In parliamentary democracies, building consensus across political groups is vital, and leadership is needed to strengthen parliamentary cohesion on security and defense. To put it differently, political leaders must guide their societies while also forging compromise among political elites on key security issues.

Fourth, recognizing and countering malign external influences is increasingly important. Measures taken in Europe since 2022 show that Russia’s efforts to divide the EU and NATO can be effectively addressed. Finland, for example, has responded robustly to provocations by the Russian shadow fleet in the Baltic Sea, while member states like Romania and Germany have changed or are changing their legislation to react to drone provocations. Furthermore, many European countries have banned Russia’s propaganda channels and expelled Russian diplomats, curtailing Russia’s ability to spread disinformation and conduct acts of sabotage. Greater cooperation and coordination among member states, however, are needed to improve the effectiveness of countermeasures and to proactively prevent Russian provocations. At the same time, because Russian influence operations are tailored to each target country, national political elites and civil societies must respond within their own contexts and strengthen resilience.

Fifth, any meaningful debate on European security and defense must include conscription as a key element in defending Europe against external threats. Although conscription is often viewed mainly as a tool for generating a large military reserve, it also has the potential to increase national cohesion and resilience. Rearming Europe cannot be achieved solely through money and industrial output. Conscription can strengthen solidarity within societies and prepare populations for external aggression and hybrid warfare. In some countries, governments are considering selective conscription as part of a broader model of societal service, where some individuals serve in the military and others in alternative civilian roles, similar to the German model before conscription was suspended in 2011. Such an approach would represent a long-term investment in national security and make European societies more resilient.

A key question is how to increase solidarity on security and defense within and between European societies and states. This also requires greater empathy for frontline countries along Europe’s eastern confines that are more likely to face Russian aggression. Stronger solidarity at the national level makes broader solidarity with allies more likely. Achieving this will require national and Europe-wide security and defense dialogues aimed at building a shared European consensus on how to address common security challenges.

Conclusion

European societies face a range of factors that undermine national cohesion on security and defense. Countering the impact of external and internal actors that seek to weaken cohesion requires strong leadership and comprehensive responses from political elites and civil society alike. There is a growing recognition that cohesion is under pressure, and Russia’s war against Ukraine, its hybrid operations, and the re-election of Donald Trump as US president have already created ripple effects across Europe. Meeting these challenges will require not only reinforcing deterrence on NATO’s eastern flank, strengthening the European pillar of NATO, and rebuilding European militaries, but also developing an overarching narrative that reconnects societies and political elites, giving Europe’s defense efforts a renewed sense of purpose and legitimacy.

Europe has fallen behind in the global great-power competition, and it is not surprising that societies are losing trust in political leadership and government institutions. Many European governments have failed to prepare citizens for the global challenges ahead and have struggled to deliver economic growth and security. What matters now is building a Europe that is prosperous, secure, and able to act. This requires moving from a politics of fear to a politics of implementation – creating a self-confident Europe that can stand its ground and deliver tangible results for its citizens. A weak Europe breeds fear, but a Europe that is capable of acting in its neighborhood and globally is far more likely to sustain cohesive societies, including on issues of security and defense. Such a Europe would have the practical means to defend its frontline states, partner with the US on equal terms through independent action, and muster the capacity and political will to confront security challenges, even when some member states stray from consensus. At the same time, citizens would need to take greater responsibility for contributing to security and defense.

European Zeitenwende Strategy Group

This paper is part of a series of publications prepared in the framework of DGAP’s “European Zeitenwende” Strategy Group, which seeks to help reconceptualize European security in a rapidly changing geopolitical environment. Against the background of Russia’s ongoing war of aggression against Ukraine, a strained transatlantic relationship, growing rivalry with China, and changing global and regional orders, Europe needs to strategically reposition itself if it wants actively shape security on the continent.

Europe’s strategic reorientation should be inspired by those who – as direct neighbors to Russia and Ukraine – best understand the urgency to act. The Strategy Group therefore draws on in-depth analytical discussions with experts and stakeholders from Central, Eastern, and Southeastern Europe, as well as the Nordic and Baltic states, where debates on security are arguably most advanced, to propel a “Zeitenwende” of security policy and thinking in Europe.

Chaired by the German Council on Foreign Relations, the group met regularly online and in-person over the course of 2025. Convinced of the need for a comprehensive approach, it considered different dimensions of resilience, including security and defense, economic security, institutional reform, and societal cohesion.

The present paper series represents the results of the group’s analysis. It seeks to address questions and challenges that in the currently evolving security discourse remain conceptually and practically underdeveloped. By providing concrete analysis, definitions, and reflections to these open questions, the series aspires to add substance to the European Zeitenwende debate on security and defense. The ultimate question of all the papers is how to strengthen European agency in providing European security and in ensuring peace and stability in a new geopolitical context.

Members: Robin Allers (Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies), Hiski Haukkala (Finnish Institute of International Affairs), Wilfried Jilge (German Council on Foreign Relations), Karl-Heinz Kamp (German Council on Foreign Relations), Pavlo Klimkin (Center for National Resilience and Development), Jana Kobzova (European Council on Foreign Relations), Nicole Koenig (Munich Security Conference), Stefan Meister (German Council on Foreign Relations), Carolina Vendil Pallin (Swedish Defence Research Agency), Katri Pynnöniemi (University of Helsinki & Finnish National Defence University), András Rácz (German Council on Foreign Relations), Kristi Raik (International Centre for Defense and Security), Toms Rostoks (National Defence Academy Latvia), George Scutaru (New Strategy Center), Margarita Šešelgytė (Vilnius University, Institute of International Relations & Political Science), Marcin Terlikowski (Polish Institute of International Affairs)

The European Zeitenwende Strategy Group was established in the format of the project “In Together – Shaping a Common European Future,” which is funded by Stiftung Mercator.

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