Georgia was once seen by the EU as a model country and a key state for the Eastern Partnership. What does the country’s latest parliamentary election say about the state of democracy in Georgia?
Despite all of the negative developments in the areas of human rights, freedom of the press, and political competition that have occurred over the last few years, the election in Georgia was relatively free and fair, with the opposition Georgian Dream party of billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili emerging victorious. Georgia is thus one of the few examples of a democratic transition in the post-Soviet space.
In the run-up to the election, there was enormous polarization between President Mikhail Saakashvili and the opposition movement led by Ivanashvili. While Saakashvili influenced the election through administrative resources, Ivanishvili sought to counter this with his considerable wealth. These are not exactly democratic practices, but the punishment dealt to the president’s party is a triumph of democracy.
It will be interesting to see how Georgian politics develops under the new prime minister over the coming weeks and months and whether both camps manage to cooperate constructively. The transition from a presidential to a parliamentary system of government – which will take place next year – will see the Georgian parliament play a key role in the process.
How is Georgia doing four years after the war with Russia?
Directly following the war, Georgia received about 4.5 billion euros in reconstruction aid from international donors. This helped the country absorb the effects of the war and the 2008 global financial crisis. Of course, rifts between the Russian and Georgian leaderships still remain, and both sides foster continued animosity through personal attacks against the other president.
The economic sanctions imposed by Russia harm the Georgian economy, and the Georgian president’s liberal course has not succeeded in bringing about the big international investments. Georgia is a small, poor country that finds itself in a complicated geopolitical interface between Russia, the EU, Iran, and Turkey. This difficult security situation makes it unattractive for investors. The strained relationship between Russia and Georgia hinders any kind of cooperation on the separatist regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia – which Russia has recognized one-sided as independent regions. There is a legitimate fear that Russia will permanently occupy these regions and incorporate them into its federal system.
What is the status of the regional tug-of-war between Russia and the EU and how do the three countries position themselves?
For the EU, the Southern Caucasus is a significant transit region for Caspian oil and gas, with resources arriving in Europe through the Southern Energy Corridor. The EU’s central partners are Azerbaijan as a producing country and Georgia as a transit country.
Russia is an ally of Armenia, which has been isolated by the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and Azerbaijan’s close cooperation with Turkey. Armenia is thus entirely dependent on Moscow both economically and politically.
Its resources have put Azerbaijan in the most economically comfortable situation in the region. In an effort to balance between two sides, the country pursues a policy of economic rapprochement with the EU while also cooperating with Russia.
Under President Saakashvili, Georgia finds itself on a collision course with Russia and has sought to hedge against this through domestic reforms and integration with the West. However, successes with the fight against corruption and the introduction of institutional reforms over the past few years conflict with Saakashvili’s authoritarian tendencies. A democratic transition resulting from the latest parliamentary elections could lead to a paradigm shift.
Russia on the other hand uses the region’s conflicts to tighten its control over the countries in the Southern Caucasus and to fuel the arms race between Armenia and Azerbaijan.
What does EU foreign policy need to do better?
The EU did not focus enough on the political realities in its Eastern neighborhood when it developed its neighborhood policy. Instead, it produced a policy that was based on what was political feasible in the EU itself. This faulty design caused much frustration with neighbors, particularly in the Southern Caucasus.
Countries in the Southern Caucasus now find themselves in a completely different geopolitical environment than Belarus, Ukraine, and Moldova, and they thus have entirely different expectations of the EU. Georgia aspires for political and economic integration with the EU, Azerbaijan refuses to tolerate any form of political interference in its authoritarian state system while it has a strong interest in economic cooperation, and Armenia has little leeway politically due to its isolation.
Indeed, the Eastern Partnership should promote political and economic transformation with the goal of harmonization with the EU. However, key subjects such as the region’s conflicts do not play a role here. Political and economic reforms can only be successful in partner countries if such calls for transformation are connected to conflict resolution. This demands a much more comprehensive engagement by the EU than it has previously shown.
The region has been a focus of international politics mainly because of its resources and its status as a transit region for oil and gas. Has the EU succeeded in advancing its projects in the region?
Even if the EU Commission wants to promote the development of a Southern Energy Corridor, it is a very limited actor in the energy field. EU foreign energy policy is still mainly carried out by member states and businesses rather than by Brussels. While the Russian energy firm Gazprom pushes ahead with its South Stream project with European companies such as Italian ENI and German Wintershall, the European Nabucco Pipeline lacks commensurate political support for projects in the Caspian region.
The Europeans are not a relevant actor when it comes to disputes over Caspian resources and the potential connection of an Azerbaijani pipeline with resources from Central Asia. In Central Asia, China is the main actor who will secure resources and compete with Russia. The original version of Nabucco will not come about. At the moment, a reduced variant, “Nabucco West,” is under discussion as well as a connection to existing pipelines. If South Stream really does come about, even these projects could come into question.
