Saxony, a Seismograph

The web version of the report includes only the executive summary and the introduction. To read the full report, including footnotes, please download the PDF version.

Executive Summary

While debates in Berlin regarding the “Zeitenwende” (sea change or watershed moment) focus on budgets, alliances, and strategic priorities, the reality of life for many people – including in eastern Germany – remains disconnected from these discussions. This alienation jeopardizes public support for foreign policy actions. At the same time, the AfD and the BSW are mobilizing against this new foreign policy course, particularly in the East, by championing a kind of “anti-Zeitenwende.” This exploratory study examines how the Zeitenwende and the opposition to it are perceived on the ground and explores the scope for a foreign policy that can garner domestic support beyond populist and national-authoritarian polarization. The study is based on in-depth interviews as well as conversations in pubs and public spaces across Saxony.

The analysis identifies three underlying narratives: First, many interviewees view the Zeitenwende against the backdrop of 36 years of structural change since reunification. Consequently, it appears less as a historic rupture and more as one of several political turning points. With the end of the peace dividend, foreign policy has become a matter of distribution and identity. Acceptance of rearmament appears linked to whether its benefits are tangible, for example, in the form of job opportunities.

Secondly, alignment with the West is not a given. Experiences with the intra-German divide also shape perspectives on international politics. “Interests before values” is increasingly replacing “interests instead of values” as exemplified by the motto “rent before morality.” In other words: Before you intervene somewhere because of your values, the economic foundations must be secured.

Thirdly, the interviewees desire a more sovereign Europe that is open to Central Europe. They are pro-European but at the same time susceptible to a national-populist reinterpretation favoring a “Europe of Fatherlands.” This narrative is now being fueled not only by Moscow but also by Washington.

East German skepticism is thus less a rejection of rearmament than a sensitivity to how the burdens are distributed and who has a say in the decision-making process. In our study, Saxony serves as a seismograph rather than an outlier: The trends recorded there also affect other regions undergoing structural change far beyond Germany’s borders.

For policymakers, this means that trust cannot be built in a sprint but only in a marathon. It takes time, repeated dialogue, and staying power. Three guiding principles emerge from this:

First, participation must begin at the local level, with the European and federal levels providing targeted support to local and regional actors. In terms of procedure, the Federal Foreign Office, the Ministry of Defense, and the Bundeswehr should recognize East Germany’s experience with transformation as a source of expertise and close the representation gap within their own ranks. By working together with federal states, municipalities, and educational institutions, such as adult education centers and vocational schools, they can reach people in places where they already gather.

Secondly, local communities must benefit from the economic advantages of defense investments. The federal and state governments should promote regional value creation and research and take dual-use facilities into account when awarding contracts. Companies, chambers of commerce, and trade unions can help bring democracy and participation from the kitchen table to the factory floor. The guiding principle is: “Those who help pay should also benefit.”

Thirdly, a compelling and constructive European perspective is needed. The German federal government, the EU, and centrist parties should position Europe as a bulwark and problem-solver situated between Washington and Beijing. Cross-border infrastructure can anchor this narrative at the regional level. Furthermore, a “Görlitz Security Forum” could bring the eastern German states and Central Europe into the heart of Europe.

Introduction

Germany is in the midst of a “Zeitenwende” (sea change or watershed moment) in foreign and security policy. Since the Russian attack on Ukraine, German foreign policy has undergone a fundamental shift. While discussions in Berlin focus on budgets, alliances, and strategic priorities, these debates remain disconnected from the daily lives of many people, including those in eastern Germany. This disconnect jeopardizes public support for foreign policy actions. The foreign policy debate often lacks a connection between the political center and the perspectives of citizens in the periphery.

Alongside the paradigm shift in foreign policy, anti-establishment movements such as the AfD and the BSW have continued to gain support, particularly in eastern Germany. In the upcoming state elections in Saxony-Anhalt and Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, the AfD is leading the polls in many areas. Current surveys also show the party as the strongest force in Saxony, with around 42 percent of the vote. AfD and BSW capitalize on the feeling of alienation regarding foreign policy, mobilizing – in the spirit of an anti-Zeitenwende – against liberal democratic institutions as well as against a value-based and Western-oriented foreign policy.

At the same time, findings from across Germany show that a large majority of Germans increasingly perceive global political events as part of their daily lives and feel affected by the consequences of international politics. Yet they doubt Germany’s capacity to act on the global stage. The question, then, is not whether foreign policy resonates with the public. What matters is how it resonates – and whether centrist parties can offer a compelling and competitive agenda.

Eastern Germany is particularly well suited for examining how foreign policy resonates at the local level. Here, foreign policy decisions directly intersect with experiences of social and economic transformation. Structural change, deindustrialization, and gaps in representation intersect with foreign policy measures such as sanctions, conscription, and defense spending. At the same time, energy and living costs are rising, jobs are under pressure, and the economic future is becoming more uncertain. The consequences of the Zeitenwende are perceived – and often reinterpreted – differently on the ground; in our conversations, we encounter fatigue regarding change, narratives of social decline, and a sense of loss of control. This complex dynamic highlights where rifts and communication problems arise and why parts of the population are skeptical of German foreign policy.

This study explores two key questions:

• What is the societal resonance of the (anti-)Zeitenwende in eastern Germany? To this end, we first examine the background of the Zeitenwende and its interplay with domestic political developments in Saxony.

• What scope exists for a foreign policy that can garner the support of society even beyond populist and national-authoritarian anti-establishment mobilization? This question is the focus of the chapters on findings and discussion. We then describe concrete measures that would make it easier for the public to connect with foreign policy.

To answer these questions, we draw on in-depth interviews, pub discussions, and conversations with local stakeholders (see Methodology). The aim of the study is to examine the connection between federal politics and everyday life experiences in eastern Germany. The focus is on societal resonance: How do elements of the Zeitenwende – and the opposition to it – connect with daily experiences, frustrations, and visions of the future beyond party-political affiliations?