Limits of a Partnership: Iran-Russia Relations After the Recent Escalation in the Middle East

Israel’s military strikes on Iran have triggered a moment of reckoning for Tehran’s supposed alliance with Moscow. Despite their recent strategic partnership agreement and growing defense cooperation since Russia launched its war in Ukraine in 2022, Moscow reacted with restraint. The Kremlin has limited itself to a formal condemnation while leaving the Islamic Republic to deal with what initially appeared to be an existential crisis alone – a crisis that has now been temporarily paused through a ceasefire. This muted reaction underscores the reality of the relationship: for all the rhetoric of anti-Western solidarity, the Iran-Russia relationship remains limited, interest-driven, and devoid of binding commitments. Israel’s escalation has not only exposed these constraints – it has also raised serious questions about whether Tehran can rely on Moscow when core regime interests and even survival are at stake.

This silence is all the more striking given that Iran is one of the few countries actively supporting Russia’s war in Ukraine, supplying drones, arms, and military equipment. Some observers have already described the relationship as an axis against the West (together with China and North Korea). Yet Russia’s reserved posture should come as no surprise. For all the lofty rhetoric, the relationship has never amounted to a true alliance based on mutual obligations. This is also evident in the partnership agreement, which contains no provisions for military assistance – in stark contrast to the deals Moscow has struck with North Korea.

When it comes to Tehran’s role in what some have dubbed an emerging “Axis of Upheaval,” its collaboration with Beijing, Moscow, and Pyongyang appears less about forging a functioning alliance than cultivating transactional relationships among authoritarian states. Tehran and its partners prioritize strategic flexibility, ambiguity, and autonomy over binding commitments or shared obligations. They converge around a shared objective: weakening U.S. global influence and positioning themselves as key actors in a multipolar world. Yet this does not make them allies committed to mutual defense in existential crises. If the recent U.S.–Israeli campaign against Iran is a litmus test, it highlights the limitations of this alignment rather than its deepening. Far from prompting intensified anti-Western coordination, the crisis has exposed how conditional, transactional, and fragile the cooperation among these states is.

Tehran and its partners converge around a shared objective: weakening U.S. global influence and positioning themselves as key actors

As far as Iran and Russia are concerned, fundamentally, they share a desire to roll back Western influence and dismantle the rules-based international order. Their cooperation – from weapons transfers to sanctions evasion in the context of the Ukraine war – serves this shared goal. Beyond this, however, the two countries pursue divergent agendas. Russia harbors global ambitions, aiming to position itself as one of the poles in a multipolar world. Iran, by contrast, has been seeking regional hegemony in the broader Middle East for the better part of the past decades. Moscow and Tehran often diverge in precisely those regions that are central to Iran’s geopolitical priorities – including the Levant, the Persian Gulf, and the South Caucasus. Here, Russia favors a balancing strategy, cultivating pragmatic ties with Iran’s adversaries, including Israel, Turkey and key Arab states.

Though Iran’s drone shipments to Russia have elevated bilateral relations to a new level, structural constraints have also deepened. Western sanctions and wartime pressures have forced Russia into growing dependence on Iran’s regional rivals: Azerbaijan in energy exports to Europe and transit to Iran and India; Israel in an effort to dissuade it from supplying arms to Ukraine; Turkey in energy trade and sanctions circumvention; Saudi Arabia in oil market management; and the United Arab Emirates in diplomacy and finance.

Despite Iran’s transfer of drones and drone blueprints, which has granted Moscow a strategic edge in Ukraine, promised arms shipments – such as the S-400 air defense system or Su-35 fighter jets – have failed to materialize. Russia has been reluctant to tilt the regional military balance in Iran’s favor, out of concern that doing so would jeopardize its ties with key regional actors. At the same time, Moscow has minimized its reliance on Iranian drones by setting up domestic production facilities. North Korea’s large-scale deliveries of ammunition and weapons as well as soldiers have further eclipsed Iran’s contributions.

Russia exploits the crisis, but faces risks

Against this backdrop, Israeli and U.S. strikes on Iran place Moscow in a difficult position. On one hand, the escalation offers Russia several tactical advantages: it diverts international attention from the war in Ukraine, has driven up oil prices, and disrupted the flow of Western military aid to Kyiv. The United States has already redirected key systems – including anti-drone munitions – to reinforce Israel’s defenses, and further reallocations of high-value assets such as Patriot missiles were announced in the meantime. At the same time, Moscow is seeking to leverage its ties to all major regional actors to reposition itself as a mediator – or at least to project the image of one.

Beyond this, much to Moscow’s benefit, the U.S. and Israeli strikes on Iran expose a deeper contradiction in the West’s normative stance. While Ukraine has been upheld by Europe, and by the United States until January, as a test case for defending the rules-based international order, Israel’s military escalation enjoys Western support despite violating international law. This inconsistency reinforces widespread global grievances over double standards, particularly in the context of the West’s approach to the war in Gaza – a perception that Russia is exploiting in its global messaging. For Moscow, this inconsistency is more than a momentary advantage. It is a strategic narrative tool. By pointing to the selective application of Western principles, Russia reinforces its claim that the rules-based order is little more than a vehicle for Western interests – a message that resonates across much of the Global South.

Yet these potential gains cannot obscure the risks for Moscow. An allied authoritarian regime came under severe strain – just months after Bashar al-Assad, a key Russian partner, was toppled in Syria. This development puts pressure on the core tenets of Russia’s regional approach, which has relied not only on maintaining a balance of power through pragmatic ties with all key actors, but also on presenting itself as a reliable partner of embattled autocratic regimes. This strategy has served as a deliberate counter to U.S. influence, particularly after the Arab uprisings of 2010–11 led many regional strongmen to conclude that Washington could no longer be trusted to guarantee regime survival, given its abandonment of Egypt’s Mubarak and Tunisia’s Ben Ali. Assad’s fall had already raised doubts about Moscow’s ability to deliver on that promise. And if Russia is perceived as standing by while Iran’s leadership is cornered, its credibility as a guarantor of authoritarian stability could be seriously damaged over the medium to long term. It is obvious that Russia’s war in Ukraine is weakening its ability to act in other regions and has shifted its priorities. 

Furthermore, the conflict risks spilling over into other regions of strategic importance to Russia. One such flashpoint is the South Caucasus, where an Azerbaijani offensive to seize the so-called Zangezur corridor or parts of Armenia’s Southern Syunik region remains a real possibility. In this context, Iran’s weakening is especially consequential: it is the only regional power to have unequivocally backed Armenia’s territorial integrity. Should Tehran’s ability to deter Baku further erode, Moscow could face a serious challenge in a region it has long viewed as part of its sphere of influence. A shift in the regional balance would not only undermine Russia’s authority but also highlight the limits of its ability to shape outcomes along its post-Soviet periphery. Moreover, any Azerbaijani advance – tacitly or explicitly backed by Turkey – risks opening the door to a deeper NATO footprint in the South Caucasus, a direct threat to Russia’s regional posture.

The outlook for Moscow is equally fraught: Should the Islamic Republic maintain stability beyond the recent escalation, it may decide to finally opt for nuclear armament. A prospect that could trigger a regional arms race is hardly in Russia’s interest. Not only would this raise the risk of further destabilization, it could also prompt key regional powers – particularly the Gulf states – to once again seek closer defense ties with the U.S. Such a development would undermine Russia’s broader effort to displace Washington as the security partner of choice in the Middle East and weaken its long-term strategy of eroding U.S. influence in the region.

Russia is both unwilling and unable to offer Iran any meaningful support that could shift the balance in Tehran’s favor

Conversely, a collapsing or Western-aligned Iran would present the Kremlin with a profound geopolitical dilemma. It would strip Moscow of a key partner in challenging U.S. dominance and unravel the fragile network of regional alignments Russia has cultivated – not only with states, but also with non-state actors such as Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Houthis in Yemen. Worse still for Moscow, it could pave the way for renewed Western influence on Russia’s southern flank, directly undermining Moscow’s ambition to shape a post-American order in the Middle East and beyond. Moreover, an Iran descending into chaos would trigger mass migration and likely send shockwaves across its neighborhood, from the South Caucasus to Central Asia, confronting Russia with a cascade of new security and political challenges in regions it still regards as vital to its strategic depth.

In the end, Russia is both unwilling and unable to offer Iran any meaningful support that could shift the balance in Tehran’s favor vis-à-vis Israel and the U.S. While Moscow has a clear interest in preventing the situation from spiraling out of control, it possesses few levers to influence the trajectory of events, particularly when it comes to Israel or the United States. 

Russia can therefore be expected to continue condemning Western actions rhetorically while stopping short of any concrete measures, instead using the current crisis as a strategic distraction from its own war in Ukraine. Ultimately, the Kremlin appears to be betting on its preferred outcome: a protracted phase of instability, even under the current ceasefire, that keeps the region unstable but contained – an outcome that not only buys Moscow time and space on the Ukrainian front but also diverts U.S. and broader Western attention and resources away from Kyiv.

Implications for Germany and Europe

Although a ceasefire has temporarily paused hostilities, the recent Israeli-Iranian confrontation marks a sobering geopolitical turning point for Germany and Europe. In contrast to Moscow, which may at least gain some short-term advantages from the crisis, for Europe the immediate outlook is far more fraught with complications. Across multiple policy domains, and towards both Russia and Iran, European decision-makers are confronted with a complex array of challenges that demand strategic recalibration.

• Russia is now even less of a partner for Europe in diplomatically addressing Iran’s nuclear program. The previously constructive cooperation with Moscow within the framework of the nuclear deal had already ended following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 as the Kremlin shifted course. The recent Israeli attack on Iran has further diminished Europe’s influence: none of the key actors involved – Iran, Israel, or the U.S. – appear to have taken Europe seriously in any meaningful way. Moscow, whose strategic objective remains the weakening of Europe and, ideally, the pursuit of a bilateral arrangement with the Trump administration, will very likely be even less interested in coordinated diplomatic efforts with Europe – complicating Europe’s role in Iran-related diplomacy. It is all the more important that Europe, acting through the E3 (France, Germany, UK), preserves the option of invoking the so-called snapback mechanism under Resolution 2231, thereby ensuring that the Iran nuclear dossier remains within the purview of the UN Security Council.
• In the wake of the Israeli–Iranian confrontation, Russia has intensified its military offensive against Ukraine. Effectively, Moscow is building on the diversion of Western military resources – notably anti-drone munitions – from Ukraine to Israel, followed by the Trump administration’s broader suspension of arms shipments, including Patriot missile systems, ostensibly due to dwindling stockpiles. These developments have significantly improved Russia’s position on the battlefield. For Germany and Europe, this dynamic underscores the urgent need to enhance and accelerate military support for Ukraine. Only through sustained and robust assistance can Europe hope to contain Russia’s renewed offensive and, in the longer term, create the conditions necessary to compel Moscow to a negotiated settlement.
• Russia and Iran are at the forefront of authoritarian efforts to erode the rules-based international order. In light of Israel’s recent strikes on Iran and its ongoing war in Gaza, Germany and Europe find themselves increasingly exposed to global perceptions of double standards. While Ukraine has been portrayed as a litmus test for defending international law, Europe’s silence on – and effective support for – clear violations of that same law in Gaza and Iran has severely undermined its credibility. To reverse this erosion of influence and salvage what remains of its soft-power appeal, Europe must adopt a consistent, principled approach that reaffirms its commitment to international law and the rules-based international order. If that does not happen, Germany and Europe will not be able to play any diplomatic role in the region.
• In the wake of the Israeli strike on Iran, Germany and other European states effectively endorsed the Israeli attack, while attempting to present a united front with the Trump administration – whether in Iran-related diplomacy or within NATO discussions on Ukraine. European efforts to this end created at best little more than an illusion of an alignment, and this at a high cost. Leaders in Europe not only compromised their political dignity, as starkly illustrated by Donald Trump’s public disclosure of private messages from NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, but also exposed themselves to significant strategic risks. These range from security issues in the context of a deterioration of the situation in Ukraine and the Middle East, and economic vulnerabilities such as energy prices and supply chain disruptions to increased migratory pressures. Most critically, Europe bears these risks without having any real influence over the decision-making processes by Israel and the U.S. that shape them. The Israeli-Iranian conflict and the recent NATO summit should serve as a long-overdue wake-up call for Europe to assert its interests more decisively – and develop the necessary tools and resources for this. If Europe fails to act, other powers will shape the dynamics in its neighborhood, leaving Europe to merely manage the fallout – insecurity, economic disruption, and migration – without influencing the conflicts themselves. Europe must urgently develop both the mindset and the instruments necessary to reestablish itself as a relevant geopolitical and diplomatic actor.
• Europe’s marginalization is not inevitable. In Tehran, the emerging debate over the nature of its strategic relationship with Moscow – particularly the absence of advanced weapons transfers such as the S-400 system – signals a potential inflection point. Although the discussion remains limited in scope, it reveals nascent fissures in the Iranian-Russian partnership that could offer Europe a narrow diplomatic window. To capitalize on this opening, however, Europe and particularly Germany must move beyond rhetorical overtures and demonstrate sustained diplomatic initiative backed by credible leverage and incentives.