When Karl Kaiser turned his attention to the impact of the internet on the global order around the turn of the millennium – and thus quite early on – the world was a different place, both politically and technologically. And yet, even then, he recognized the profound consequences that the internet and technology would have for world politics. In terms of the latter, the world was then a vast technosphere of the United States. US companies such as Microsoft, Cisco, or Intel had little competition when it came to hardware and software. In China, on the other hand, just 0.7 percent of the population had access to the internet at the time. In 1998, China began to build its technosphere. In the beginning, the People’s Republic managed to do this mainly by undercutting the prices of Western companies and stealing intellectual property. However, the digitization of the domestic surveillance state was the top priority. Over the past 26 years, China has managed to build up technology companies such as TikTok and Huawei, which have become global heavyweights.
Today we live in two spheres of influence – an American and a Chinese one, increasingly separate and yet often overlapping. A technosphere gives a state privileged access to technological systems, as is currently the case with the United States in terms of telecommunications companies such as Cisco, and with China in terms of some hardware, e.g., exported Huawei routers.
The question, then, is: where does Germany fit in? What about the third-largest economy after the United States and China, what about its technosphere?
Germany’s Hidden Technosphere
Compared to the United States and China, Germany’s technosphere often remains hidden from view: domestic companies such as Infineon are primarily active in the business-to-business sector, while Apple, Dell, or Lenovo enjoy great popularity among consumers. German technologies came to public attention when the first destructive cyberattack in history took place: the United States and Israel disabled centrifuges at the Natanz nuclear enrichment facility in Iran in 2009/10. The industrial control system that the United States infiltrated for the attack was made by Siemens. The United States prepared for the attack using Siemens test equipment, which they knew inside out. As this example shows, German technologies can be found in the most remote and also most critical places in the global security order.
When considering technospheres, one often thinks of fixed infrastructures. Canada, for example, is located in the US technosphere, Cambodia in the Chinese. This is because Canada mainly uses US software and hardware, while Cambodia relies heavily on 5G and other technologies from Huawei, meaning that a large part of the internet infrastructure has been built and supplied by China, which accordingly has privileged access to systems there.
However, this rigid layer of the technosphere is overlaid by a movable one. It consists of cell phones, laptops, and drones that are constantly in motion. Consequently, technospheres are becoming more inscrutable. Germany is getting more involved in this area, especially and increasingly through connected cars. More than 8.5 million German vehicles currently receive over-the-air software updates: Volkswagen ID (400,000+ units), Mercedes S-Class, EQE, and EQS (700,000 units), and BMW (7.5 million units). Connected cars mainly stay in one technosphere, i.e., one country. However, they can easily cross national borders. A connected Mercedes can find itself belonging to a member of the North Korean or Iranian elite, opening up a small island of technological influence in these countries that could be used to gather intelligence.
Preventing Power Abuse by the Leading Nations
Germany’s technological influence brings with it a special responsibility for the security of systems worldwide. Germany should continue to refrain from using its privileged access to its own technologies to gather intelligence abroad. Instead, it should use the technological capacities of companies such as Bosch, Siemens, VW, and Mercedes to prevent the abuse of power by China and the United States. Every German connected car, every refrigerator, every industrial control system for wind energy or factories is one more device that was not manufactured by other countries and thus cannot be easily infiltrated by them.
As a secondary technology power, Germany cannot exert as much technological influence in other countries as do the US and China. Nevertheless, it is a pivotal state. Together with other secondary technology powers, including France, the Netherlands, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, the government in Berlin should work toward developing technology infrastructure in Africa, Southeast Asia, and other regions, where such an attempt would not be undermined from the outset. With Samsung, Sony, Hitachi, the semiconductor giant TSMC, Schneider Electric, ASML, Fujitsu, Honda, Infineon, Miele, and other heavyweights, Germany, the rest of Europe, and their allies have the potential to mitigate the global instrumentalization of technology by major powers and to create more security and trust in the digital infrastructure.
To ensure the security of their own products globally, Germancompanies should guarantee that software and connected hardware components developed in joint ventures with Chinese companies will not be exported beyond the Chinese market. Volkswagen works closely with XPENG, a Chinese electric vehicle manufacturer, to develop software. It can be assumed that this software is insecure and backdoored. China’s own legislation requires access to data and systems developed for the Chinese market to enable complete surveillance. Cars produced and exported in a joint venture with XPENG might contain backdoors. Thereby product security cannot be guaranteed.
Strengthening German Technology by Pooling Resources with Partners
Germany’s technosphere relies heavily on its traditional strengths in hardware. These have recently been enhanced by new semi-conductor locations and synergies with TSMC in Dresden. However, cooperation with China in the software sector can lead to significant security losses due to the surveillance requirements of the Chinese Communist Party. If Germany does not promptly build up its own strengths in the software sector, working with allies and partner countries if necessary, its technological influence will increasingly wane. Volkswagen’s partnership with California-based Rivian to develop software for electric and increasingly autonomous vehicles is one such example.
Karl Kaiser’s statement that the internet solidifies existing power structures still holds true today and, in the context of global developments, is more relevant than ever. Despite China’s rapid growth, the US remains the leader in information technologies. In view of Donald Trump’s reelection and the expected difficulties in transatlantic relations, Germany urgently needs to join forces with like-minded tech powers to strengthen its position. Otherwise, it risks remaining a second-rate technological power for the foreseeable future and suffering under an increasingly fierce great power competition.
This text is a chapter from the book “Paths to the Future: Perspectives on Foreign Policy: On the 90th Birthday of Karl Kaiser” . You can access the full version in the PDF above or via the e-book.
