What does the Muslim Brotherhood want?
Since its founding 80 years ago, the Muslim Brotherhood has had one single goal: A society that is guided by Islam, which would be the all-encompassing system in all areas of Egyptian life. The Muslim Brotherhood pursued this goal in a flexible and pragmatic way: In the semi-authoritarian system under Hosni Mubarak for instance, they advocated freedom of expression and pluralism because they hoped that they would have more influence in a democratic system. Democracy was seen as an instrument, but not an end goal.
The fall of Mubarak offered them a chance to found a political party and convert their popularity into overwhelming electoral success. The Muslim Brotherhood has since gradually expanded its influence. In addition to concentrating political power in the office of the president, the Brotherhood is also pursuing more control in other areas such as the judicial system and the media. The reorganization of the Egyptian state should take place according to their beliefs as much as possible, with other actors hardly being involved. This was evident during the drafting of the new constitution, which is regarded by the Muslim Brotherhood as a cornerstone of the eventual Islamization of society. The deeply religious population has been persuaded that a “no” to the constitution would essentially be a “no” to Islam.
What do opposition forces stand for?
The opposition has emerged in the form of the National Salvation Front. This fusion of secular opposition figures have stressed that they accept Mohammed Mursi as the elected president, but not his wide-ranging power and certainly not the draft constitution. Nevertheless, calls for Mursi’s withdrawal can constantly be heard at rallies. Forces from the old Mubarak regime are also fighting for a secular constitution and oppose the supremacy of the Islamists. Indeed, the Salvation Front is trying to dispel any impression of cooperation with the old regime, but due to the fact that their interests dovetail at the moment, Mubarak supporters and revolutionaries can increasingly be seen together at demonstrations.
It is doubtful that the opposition forces will remain unified in the long run. At the moment, they have unified around their rejection of Islamist hegemony. But they differ significantly in other areas, which can be seen when one looks at the three most well-known members of the Salvation Front. While Hamdeen Sabahi is a self-avowed Nasserist, Mohammed El-Baradei advocates a liberal economic policy, and Amr Mussa is seen by many Egyptians as a representative of the old regime. Liberal-secular forces have not yet succeeded in reaching the majority of the Egyptian population. As opposed to the Muslim Brotherhood, they cannot fall back on a wide voter base; they are hardly present outside of the big cities.
Is a compromise conceivable on the issue of the constitution, or will confrontation persist?
The divide between the two camps appears insurmountable because Islamists and secularists still have irreconcilable differences. Mursi and the Muslim Brotherhood have pressed ahead with the process of creating a constitution without responding to concerns raised by critics. On the other hand, the opposition appears just as unready for compromise. Both camps operate according to the strong belief that they are defending the revolution. However, their notions of the revolution’s goals are fundamentally different. While the one side aspires for the Islamization of society, the other side wants a secular state and civic freedoms.
The central issue in the current conflict is the fact that the draft constitution fails to provide adequate protection of civil liberties and it enables Islamist legislation. In this context, it is much less alarming that the constitution’s much-quoted Article 2 – which codifies Sharia as the most important source of legislation – remains unchanged. The vague descriptions of the moral and social principles that the state is supposed to defend are much more problematic. Such passages offer much room for interpretation and enable those in power to curb civil liberties in the name of religion. Criticism has also been aimed at the lack of protections for women and children, the fact that only the three “book religions” are guaranteed religious freedom, and that clergy from the Al-Azhar mosque shall be assigned an integral role in the legislation process.
The Muslim Brotherhood is not ready to move away from these elements, especially since many of its followers, as well as most Salafists, are hoping for a constitution that is even more strongly shaped by Islam. The opposition in turn insists on more individual liberties. Compromises will only be possible if both sides move and endorse a real dialogue; but this does not appear to be in sight. But the adoption of the constitution by the majority of voters will not end the conflict. The constitution should enable social coexistence for members of Egyptian society. It must thus also be accepted by minorities and other interest groups.
What role does the military play?
The generals did not lose much power after the removal of Army head Mohamed Hussein Tantawi and Mursi’s decree that the military would have many of their political rights revoked on August 12. The “state within the state” survived without much damage; in fact, the generals hardly lost any power or influence. Their main interests continue to be preserving their own economic empire and remaining free of civilian supervision. As long as that is ensured and the situation within the country remains relatively stable, the military will not care whether the Egyptian government is Islamist or secular.
The generals do not wish to officially take over due to the bad experiences they had during the 18 months following Mubarak’s fall. They act more as a kind of kingmaker behind the scenes: no party can retain power without being tolerated by the military. In the current conflict, the generals have officially presented themselves as neutral. But acting as a patron for the Muslim Brotherhood is beneficial to their interests: The Islamists do not question the military’s economic empire, and their draft constitution only limits the military’s rights cosmetically. But if that changes or if the situation escalates further, the generals could see themselves forced into action.
What can the international community do?
Western influence is extremely low for a number of reasons. First, the West’s reputation is very bad in Egypt. Both the Muslim Brotherhood and the liberal revolutionaries were brutally oppressed under Mubarak – the very despot that the West supported for decades. Second, Egypt has shown very little interest on Western aid since the start of the revolution. It has refused offers for election observers during parliamentary elections as well as for consulting during the process of drafting a new constitution. Third, there is hardly any contact between Western governments and the Muslim Brotherhood because dialogue with Islamists was taboo for decades. And fourth, political uncertainties and nontransparent actors make it hard for the West to develop clear strategies.
In order to retain what little trust remains, Western states should act deliberately, clearly define and communicate their interests, avoid one-sided partisanship, and completely avoid lecturing Egyptians on what they should or should not do. The allocation of aid payments and the restriction of economic and political cooperation – which EU Parliament president Martin Schulz threatened and German development minister Dirk Niebel promptly agreed with – are likely not sensible steps forward. These measures will hardly have any effect on the domestic conflict and will not be enough to convince the Muslim Brotherhood to relent. In fact, the country’s already precarious economic situation will get worse, with the Egyptian people feeling most of the effects. The West is navigating a fine line. On the one hand, they do not want to prop up another authoritarian ruler and place regional stability over civil liberties and human rights. On the other hand, now is not a good moment to exert pressure and thus further exacerbate an already tense situation in the country.