What are the interests that Russia is pursuing in Syria?
Domestically, President Putin is under pressure due to the demonstrations against his re-election in March 2012. He is thus attempting to make his mark vis-à-vis the West through hard-fisted policies. In addition, the Russian armaments industry is suffering a loss of market share and the Assad regime has been an important customer for Russian armaments.
In terms of foreign policy, Moscow is mainly concerned with prestige. As with the conflict over the Iranian nuclear program, the Syrian civil war is one of the few international conflicts in which Russia can act on a par with the United States and be wooed by the West as a partner. Furthermore, Moscow does not want to lose its last military base outside of the post-Soviet space (in the Syrian port city of Tartus) and will not allow another Libya scenario.
What can Russian influence bring about in Damascus?
Russia’s possibilities in Syria are limited. Moscow still had a chance to act as a mediator between the Syrian government and the rebels in the fall of 2011. At the time, Russia had contact with on both sides and carried a certain influence. It could have offered President Assad and his family asylum and thus facilitated a transition brokered by him. But this moment has been wasted. Its support of the Assad regime means that Russia has lost any credibility it may have had with the Syrian rebels. Too much blood has been spilled to allow for such a solution today.
How can Moscow benefit from the harsh course of action against Syria?
From the outside, Russia’s position appears to be irrational, as its obstinance will not win it future partners in the region. In the end, their ally Assad will not be rescued. Russia’s stubbornness also has a lot to do with the fact that the United States and NATO have ignored Russian interests in the past. For Moscow, Libya was the fall from grace: Russia sees its abstention in the UN Security Council as having been used for regime change through the subsequent NATO military operation. This was not covered in the UN mandate and Moscow feels that it was short-changed by the West.
One could perhaps offer Russia a compromise, for example by making concessions on missile defense systems. But whether that would work under the current circumstances is questionable. Russia does not want to experience further regime change through Western military action under any circumstances. In any case, Western pressure on Russia, above all that exerted by US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, is rather counterproductive and will lead to a defiant response from Moscow.
Is Syria an important issue in the Russian media and Russian civil society?
No, that is the problem when pressure is exerted on the Russian regime. In Europe and the United States, the Syrian civil war receives so much attention due to news coverage of atrocities. In the Russian media, these events are merely a side note. If anything is reported at all, it is about how Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov voted in the Security Council. For the Russian public, it is a civil war between many sides, and Russian civil society has its own problems to struggle with. Only a small minority is actually observing what is going on in Syria.
What effects will the dissent between Russia and the West regarding Syria have on the handling of other international issues?
The cleavage is an expression of the generally deteriorating relations between Russia and the West. Obama’s “reset policy” has been completed, and disputed issues such as the US missile defense system in Europe or conflicts regarding post-Soviet states are once again in the foreground. And from the Russian perspective, the attempt at cooperation with the West has failed. The West probably did too little here to respond to Russian fears and interests.
Even regarding Iran, Russia is more interested in gaining prestige than in resolving conflicts. At the same time, the Western view of things is not entirely fair: Why is Russia so strongly criticized for its blockade and not China as well? It raises suspicion that some Western governments are happy that Russia is currently blocking its attempts because no one has an interest in drawing the consequences of Russian cooperation and pursuing military action in Syria.
