Mark Sedwill, British Special Representative for Afghanistan, on future engagement in the Hindu Kush
NATO has concentrated on military functions during its ten-year presence in Afghanistan, and thus “neglected the political dimension of the operation,” said Sedwill. The Alliance also repeated many of the mistakes made during the Soviet Union’s campaign in Afghanistan.
It is now necessary to draw lessons from developments in the country after the withdrawal of Soviet troops in 1989. The Soviet-supported Afghan regime was able to hold on for three years after troops left – but when Moscow ceased giving aid, the government fell after only three months.
An important signal from the latest NATO Summit in Chicago was thus the Allies’ agreement to support the country politically and financially after international troops leave in 2014. Doing this will require donor countries to master a difficult balancing act: They need to assure their own voters of a speedy drawdown while promising Afghans continued engagement. It will be important to make future aid more transparent and goal-oriented. The uncontrolled influx of funds has too often crippled personal initiatives from Afghans themselves.
Regional Cooperation and State-Building
Effectively stabilizing Afghanistan will depend on expanding regional cooperation, urged Sedwill: from trade relations to security-political agreements, including a declaration of mutual noninterference. Key countries in the region – Iran and Pakistan – are no doubt aware of the noticeable effects Afghan problems such as the narcoeconomy, refugee streams, or Taliban activities have on their own internal security.
The existence of the Taliban remains a major challenge. Only 10 to 20 percent of Afghan citizens support the movement. But this number is probably enough to sustain a long-lasting insurgency. The withdrawal of international troops will certainly remove the Taliban’s most important mobilizing factor, as its members love to see themselves as combating a foreign occupation. This leaves hope that the organization will lose importance – and it may open opportunities to negotiate with the Taliban, according to Sedwill.
But the best way to repel the Taliban is by strengthening Afghanistan’s state structures. “It is not inevitable that the Taliban will return to power if the state is robust enough to provide security,” said Sedwill. By 2014, Afghan security forces need to prove that they can guarantee security in the country. State building can only be successful if it is complemented by national reconciliation between the government, the opposition, and insurgents.
