Ready for Implementation?
The first panel, “Between High Hopes and Dampened Expectations: Priorities, Goals and Instruments of the EU Global Strategy,” featured Andreas Michaelis, political director at the German Federal Foreign Office; Bundestag member Niels Annen, SPD party spokesperson for foreign affairs; and Almut Möller, co-head of the Berlin office of the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) and senior policy fellow at the DGAP.
The second panel addressed “The Role of Defence in the EU Global Strategy: Implications for Germany” and brought together Geza von Geyr, director general for security and defense policy at the German Federal Ministry of Defense; Bundestag member Roderich Kiesewetter, CDU representative on the Foreign Affairs Committee; and Christian Mölling, senior resident fellow for security policy at the German Marshall Fund (GMF).
Panel I: Between High Hopes and Dampened Expectations: Priorities, Goals and Instruments of the EU Global Strategy
The first panel addressed some broader questions concerning the EU Global Strategy (EUGS). What level of ambition does it reflect? Has the strategy found the right balance between global and regional priorities as well as between operational short-term and strategic long-term thinking? How should the EU proceed in implementing this strategy?
Nathalie Tocci stressed that the EUGS was a product of collective action in a time of strong centrifugal forces. Surveys have shown that most Europeans want the EU to play a more active role in global affairs, and the EUGS – rather than embodying unrealistic (“otherworldly”) thinking – reflects that desire. Tocci emphasized the need for approaching multiple challenges in a comprehensive way. The EUGS relies on the concept of so-called “principled pragmatism” – that is, bringing European values and principles to the fore by means of realistic, pragmatic assessment. The manner in which EUGS is implemented will of course be crucial, Tocci said. Words must be followed by action. The strategy aims to connect the goals with the means. She highlighted that certain “sectoral” strategies will be necessary, particularly in security and defense, to fulfill three main tasks of 1) enhancing capacity building, 2) specifying what should be done, and 3) providing better protection for Europe. In the end, the success of the EUGS will depend on EU member states “taking ownership” of the process.
Andreas Michaelis emphasized that the EUGS was the product of much deliberation and intense cooperation among all relevant actors. He concurred with Tocci that the success of the strategy’s follow-up will depend on the activities of EU member states. Overall Michaelis sees the EUGS as a good starting point, particularly because of its regional approach where the tools fit the intent. He also praised the EUGS’s balance, as it is neither over- nor under-determined. He believes that by means of a new honest and modest approach, the EU could live up to its aims, positioning itself as an independent but well connected leader in global foreign policy. He also welcomed the EUGS’s strong focus on security and defense, pointing out that protection is one of the main concerns of European citizens.
Niels Annen laid out the EU’s priorities for the coming months, stating that increasing its legitimacy was crucial. As citizens are very conscious of the immediate crises in the European neighborhood, the EU could prove its foreign policy relevance and and gain public support. He stressed that there are high expectations for Europe and its governments to deliver results by contributing to solving those conflicts. The EU should therefore make full use of the instruments that are laid our in its current treaties. Annen also called for a better inclusion of all relevant actors, particularly national parliaments, into the EUGS’s follow-up process.
Almut Möller pointed out that the EUGS reflected the current state of the EU after the “breathtakingly” fast developments of recent years. In 2003, when the Europeans discussed the European Security Strategy (the predecessor to the EUGS), the EU was widely seen as a model and example to follow. By 2016, however, the changes that had meanwhile taken place had produced a completely new setup. Möller emphasized that the “output” of the old approach had not lived up to its intentions. The new EUGS takes a more honest and modest approach. With regard to the Brexit Referendum, she stressed that the UK’s vote to leave the EU would not harm the legitimacy of European structures. On the contrary, Möller thinks that the institutional structures of the (now) EU 27 are very much worth protecting and will remain the arena for discussion. Nevertheless, the EU’s larger countries must seize the opportunity and forge coalitions so that the EUGS will not only be the starting point of a debate but of necessary action as well.
Panel II: The Role of Defense in the EU Global Strategy: Implications for Germany
The second panel focused on the EU provider of security and defense. It discussed the implications of the EUGS for Germany and aksed what role Germany could and should play.
Geza von Geyr said that his ministry agreed with the analytical content of the EUGS and that this would be reflected in the forthcoming German White Paper on Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr. He agreed that Europe is undergoing critical times, due to demographic and geo-political drivers, and that more European security and defense is needed. Common European security and defense policy should be a focal point of the EU, he said, complementing the EU’s political and financial union. Von Geyr stressed the importance of thinking of security, defense, and development all together. To forge ahead, he said, the EU should follow four paths. First, the European Council should enhance further cooperation with step-by-step decisions. Second, the EU should make use of the full set of instruments of the EU treaties. Third, the member states should extend bi- and trilateral cooperation projects. Finally, they should strengthen Europe’s pillar in NATO. Von Geyr underlined that careful follow-up to EUGS would be crucial for its success.
Roderich Kiesewetter argued that the EUGS is not an isolated approach but is rather embedded in many national approaches, such as the forthcoming German White Paper. In Kiesewetter’s view, security and defense are on the frontline of the European integration project. He feels the EU is equipped to solve its multiple crises and challenges due to its exceptional combination of soft and hard power tools. He described some concrete steps that he believes are necessary in the next few months. For instance, he spoke of the necessity to work on a European White Book on Defense. Moreover, he called for a deeper cooperation between the EU and NATO and said it would be necessary to face the “gap” between capabilities and expectations. Kiesewetter also made a plea for common export rules and a vitalization of the Berlin Plus Agreement. He underlined that domestic and foreign policy cannot be treated separately. Instead, there is a need for an integration of foreign policy in domestic policy, thus gaining the support of society at large and highlighting the EU’s relevance.
Christian Mölling claimed that Europe needs to work hard to counter growing “integration fatigue.” He outlined four possible options. The conservative option would take forward the existing framework along the lines of the current aquis. In his view, however, this option has “run out of steam.” The second, more comprehensive option would be to provide a mix of geopolitical concerns and the so-called “protection agenda,” strengthening the EU as a comprehensive defense and security actor with the necessary tools. EU attempts to orchestrate its tools have, however, thus far failed, due to institutional fragmentation and lengthy procedures. Mölling described the third option as the “ambitious” one: a scenario that focuses on increasing existing benchmarks to gain strategic merit. This requires political consensus, however, which is still lacking. Finally, he put forward a fourth, realistic option, one that is oriented toward what the EU can actually deliver: defining defense as power resource. In this scenario, each member state would have to be clear about what it wants to contribute to future frameworks.
Eberhard Sandschneider, outgoing director of DGAP’s research institute, opened the workshop. The first panel was chaired by Sylke Tempel, editor-in-chief of BERLIN POLICY JOURNAL and INTERNATIONALE POLITIK. Jana Puglierin, head of the Alfred von Oppenheim Center for European Policy Studies at the DGAP, chaired the second panel.
