Apr 15, 2026

Ukraine-Moldova Relations After 2022

Shift to Strategic Partnership
Anastasia Pociumban
President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy and President of Moldova Maia Sandu hold a joint press conference following their meeting, Kyiv, Ukraine, on April 26, 2026.
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IMAGO / Ukrinform

Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine, together with the second Trump presidency, has put an end to the previously existing rules-based international order. These developments continue to shape not only Ukraine but also the whole of Europe and have profound implications for Moldova–Ukraine relations in particular, as Ukraine is also impacting how the new order will look. In the current context, Ukraine and Moldova have put aside their previous differences and created a more strategic relationship between them, as well as greater interdependence.

The relations between Ukraine and Moldova are driven by four interconnected dynamics: 1) shared security concerns and Ukraine’s defense are providing Moldova with protection, 2) the EU accession process and the question of decoupling, 3) increased connectivity in the region and with the EU and decoupling from Russia, and 4) the social dimension of their relations. This article examines how the war created more structural interdependence. This relationship also presents asymmetry, as for Moldova, Ukraine’s resistance to Russian aggression affects its own security protection. For Ukraine, a stable Moldova means a reliable ally and partner, as well as a secure southwestern flank, but this is one relationship among many, and the stakes are mutual but not equal. Nevertheless, this strategic partnership is real and acknowl edged by both governments.1

Moldova’s Security Is Tied to Ukraine 

In the aftermath of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, security against Russia has become the defining concern for the region. In the first days of the full-scale invasion, Moldova found itself in a situation where a further advance of Russian troops could have directly threatened its territory. Without Ukraine’s defense, Moldova’s statehood would have been under immediate threat. Therefore, this reality underpins every dimension of the bilateral relationship. First, Moldova did not align with the sanctions regime against Russia because of its economic and energy dependency on Russia. However, it has gradually done so, leading to stronger alignment with the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy, which increased from 64% in 2022 to 88% in October 2025 (this percentage refers to the alignment with state ments by the High Representative on behalf of the EU and Council decision on sanctions).2 
Moldova’s align ment on sanctions was a strong decision of support for Ukraine and a clear turn away from Russia. Russia’s invasion created an environment in which being a ‘gray zone’ country is no longer a viable security posture, as Russia attacked a country with whom it had security assurances and it is acting as a spoiler power in its neighborhood. 
Ukraine is waging a defen sive war against Russia, while Moldova is countering sustained Russian disinformation and ongoing hybrid attacks. Russia also maintains its influence over Moldova through the Transnistrian region—a lever that, while its importance has diminished as Moldova decoupled from its energy dependency from Russia, has not dis appeared, due to the presence of Russian troops in the Transnistrian region and the military depot Cobasna. Russia has repeatedly attempted to rig Moldovan elections: the presidential election and EU referendum in 2024 and parliamentary elections in 2025. Russian proxies operate through illicit voter funding, cyber attacks, and disinformation campaigns—tools that are rapidly evolving and increasingly hard to identify.3 
Despite the high financial investment backing them, these operations did not ultimately deliver electoral victories, although they demonstrated the extent to which Russia can meddle in domestic politics without needing to conceal its operations. The Moldovan gov ernment and population showed unprecedented resil ience, and the government addressed electoral corrup tion through legislation and prosecution. This also raised the cost of Russian electoral interference, which increased from 200 million euros in 20244 to 350 mil lion euros in 2025.5
Ukraine has also played a role in supporting the Moldovan government. In February 2023, President Zelenskyy stated publicly that Ukrainian intelligence had intercepted Russian plans to overthrow Moldova’s democratically elected government, in allegations subsequently corroborated by Moldovan authorities.6 Mol dova is also learning from Ukraine’s response to Russia, particularly in the sphere of cyber attacks. Moreover, at the beginning of 2026, Ukraine, Romania, and Moldova signed a trilateral cooperation agreement on cybersecurity, showing a close level of cooperation between the countries and as security concerns with respect to Rus sia’s activities expanded to the EU countries.7

The Issue of Transnistria8

The issue of Transnistria is now higher on the agenda than at any point since the 1992 war. The interdepend ence between the left bank (Transnistria) and the right bank (de facto Moldova) was always structurally present, but it has come to public attention, particularly so in 2022. For Kyiv, the region represents a security threat and a large vulnerability.
In the beginning of the war, there was a genuine fear that Russian forces advancing in southwest Ukraine could create a direct land corridor to Transnistria; how ever, Russia’s military losses in Ukraine made this scenario implausible, and Transnistria had not publicly supported the war. Notably, in the early months of the full-scale invasion, several explosions occurred in Trans nistria. Both Chișinău and Tiraspol sought to keep the situation calm, avoiding provocative statements. Tiraspol’s authorities appear to have an interest in not being drawn into escalatory actions that are pushed by the Kremlin. This is widely believed9 to have been a false flag operation planned by Moscow that failed.
The energy situation and crisis in Transnistria are challenging but also important. Cheap Russian gas has been the structural foundation of its entire economy. Removing that subsidy raises questions concerning the region’s economic viability, which has been effectively frozen for three decades. It is, however, a balancing act: Transnistrian authorities remain subject to Rus sian influence, which limits how far Chișinău can push without risking destabilization.
However, economically, a reorientation of trade is taking place: Transnistria exports approximately 77% of its total exports to the EU, and imports from the EU account for close to 46% of the region’s total.10 This shows that while the region represents a security and political threat, economically, there is also an interest in benefitting from EU free trade.
Overall, the Moldova government has managed to keep the situation under control and prevent escalation, and both Kyiv and Chișinău are interested in the stability of the region. Moreover, Ukraine’s position is that the Transnistria region represents a security threat, whereas for Moldova, a peaceful solution, not a forced or rushed one, is desired. In this regard, the recent steps by the government of Moldova to create a convergence fund are a step toward reintegration11. While the issue of the Transnistrian region has been managed well by the Moldovan authorities to prevent any escalation, this could resurface, with Ukraine insisting on a quicker resolution or Russia using the region for destabilization.

Ukraine Is Driving the Revival of the Enlargement Process

Ukraine and Moldova’s EU accession process, following Russia’s invasion, marked a profound shift in the EU’s approach to the region and a revival of the enlarge ment process. Now, the two countries are coupled in the process, and Chișinău acknowledges that Moldova’s accession is strongly linked to Ukraine’s. For both coun tries, EU accession is also considered part of security assurance, in particular as NATO membership remains off the table for Ukraine, and Moldova remains a neu tral country.
President Zelenskyy said that “Ukraine will do everything to be technically ready for EU accession by 2027… and wants a specific date”,12 while Moldovan president Maia Sandu said in 2026: “I believe that now there is a window of opportunity and that by 2028 we must take serious steps”13, a timeline that is optimistic even without accounting for the EU’s own institutional constraints. Ukraine and Moldova have been coupled in the enlargement process, and, owing to Hungary’s veto against Ukraine’s progress, neither country has opened the negotiation clusters, instead informally proceeding with reforms and technical negotiations.
For Moldova, however, the coupling is a balancing act. While Chișinău is not officially advocating for decoupling, there is a concern that, if there is no change in the Hungarian position, Moldova risks being held hostage to the political blockage on Ukraine’s path. As a much smaller country, many concerns about Ukraine’s EU accession that have been raised by Member States, par ticularly concerning economic and agricultural impacts, do not apply to Moldova in the same way. However, there is also a clear understanding in Chișinău that Ukraine is a strategic and security partner and that decoupling would create political tensions and risk, leaving Ukraine in a geopolitical gray zone. Russia would use any such narrative to claim that the EU does not genuinely want Ukraine to join. This is a question that might create a strategic dilemma for Moldova.
Ukraine is wary of any decoupling signals, even if, in the long term, Moldova might advance more rapidly when not tied to Ukraine’s more complex reform and security environment. In both Ukraine and Moldova, democratization and reform are considered fundamental to their future. Fighting corruption remains a defining test for both countries, and their bilateral relationships are implicitly shaped by how each performs on this front in the eyes of EU member states.
The issue of enlargement has also become a geopolitical one and a matter of the EU’s credibility. On the one hand, EU member states acknowledge the need for a merit-based system; on the other hand, enlargement must respond to current geopolitical urgency. In this context, whether Ukraine’s accession can be treated differently should be discussed. The discussion of a ‘membership lite’ or reversed/phased enlargement14 by 2027 is one scenario under discussion, but it faces significant opposition from Member States. However, having a different arrangement for Ukraine15 may ultimately offer a way to resolve the tension without forcing Moldova to choose between its own progress and its relationship with Kyiv.

Connectivity

While Russia’s objective was to destroy Ukraine’s state hood and re-establish a zone of Russian dominance, it has instead led to Ukraine and Moldova decoupling from Russia. This is driven by Ukrainian resistance and has been echoed in Moldova. This decoupling takes place across political, economic, and cultural spheres, while Ukraine and Moldova are increasingly perceived to be part of the EU space and see themselves in this way. 
The war accelerated Ukraine and Moldova’s struc tural decoupling from Russian energy and economic systems—a process that began after 2014 but reached its defining point with Ukraine’s decision not to extend the contract for Russian gas transit to the EU. Ukraine’s and Moldova’s withdrawal from the unified CIS electric ity grid and their emergency synchronization with the ENTSO-E network in March 2022, which was com pleted in under three weeks against a timeline that had originally been foreseen over a year, was a milestone in both countries’ integration into the EU energy market and was a direct expression of bilateral coordination under pressure. 
Russian missiles and drones have been striking Ukraine’s energy infrastructure since October 2022, making energy security a key concern. In 2026, Ukraine faced its largest recorded energy attacks, leaving many Ukrainians without heat and electricity,16 although the Ukrainian public remained skeptical about the prospects of a negotiated deal.17 The EU’s financial and technical support for rapid repairs and decentralized generation has been critical but remains reactive—longer-term resilience will require structural integration into EU-wide energy security planning. Moldova has offered humanitarian support to Ukraine and has also been affected by a few Ukrainian blackouts because of energy network instability, which highlights the importance of the con nectivity between the two countries.
Moldova, which has historically been almost entirely dependent on Russian gas, has undergone a rapid diversification strategy supported by the EU and Romania. This includes reverse-flow capacity and interconnections with Romania’s electricity network to bypass Transnistria: the first high-voltage Isaccea–Vulcanești–Chișinău line is planned to be operational by the end of this year, the Strășeni–Ghidighici line by 2031, and the Bălți Suceava line by 2027.18
Both countries are becoming more interconnected with the EU. In 2025, Moldova joined the Single Euro Payments Area (SEPA), and Ukraine is scheduled to follow.19 As of January 2026, both countries joined the Roam Like at Home initiative, integrating them into the EU roaming area.20
Following the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements, both countries reoriented their trade toward the EU; however, the full-scale war meant a drastic reduction in trade with Russia for Moldova and a halt for Ukraine. For Moldova, Ukraine is one of the key trading partners, and in the aftermath of 2022 in par ticular, Moldova’s exports to Ukraine increased (see Fig ures 1 and 2 on pp. 14–15 and the statistics section at the end of this issue).
end of this issue). Moldova also considers itself in the light of a poten tial strategic partner for Ukrainian reconstruction, particularly in terms of transit and logistics connectivity. This bilateral relationship also hinges on the evolution of connectivity projects, although bilateral and regional initiatives in transport, infrastructure, energy, cyber resilience, and security.21 Moldovan officials regularly pay visits to Ukraine, including to discuss connectivity, and new projects such as the construction of a new border crossing bridge on the Nistru River, agreed upon in February 2026.22 Moldova also serves as a transport hub for Ukrainians from regions close to the Moldovan border. Overall, the connectivity aspect represents a large potential for Ukraine–Moldova coop eration and, in particular, for reconstruction and can anchor both countries deeper into the EU connectiv ity agenda.23

Social and Humanitarian Dimension

In terms of relations as perceived by the population, both the Ukrainian and the Moldovan population assess relations with each other as very positive, and 89% of Moldovans rate the relation with Ukraine as positive. Ukraine takes third place for Moldovans in the list of the most important political and economic actor for their country, following only Romania and the EU, which confirms the importance of their relations.24 At the same time, approximately 75% of Ukrainians consider their relations with Moldova to be positive.25
Before 2022, Moldova had never experienced a large-scale refugee influx, as it was historically a coun try of emigration rather than of reception. Beginning with the opening of the war with Russia, more than a million Ukrainians crossed through Moldova, with approximately 140,000 remaining. according to official statistics.26 Compared with other receiving cou tries, Moldova has one of the highest shares of refugees per capita. According to surveys, 90% of Ukrainian refugees feel protected in Moldova, with 97% having acquired temporary protection status and 72% planning to remain where they are in the following year.27 Ukrainian refugees report challenges, such as financial difficulties and a lack of stable income, challenges that are also encountered by the Moldovan population. More over, the fact that the majority of refugees were hosted privately when they arrived, not institutionally, reflects the mobilization of Moldovan society.
This reflects a broader structural change, as the scale of the Ukrainian presence will have a medium- to long term impact on Moldovan society. The bilateral rela tionship needs to account for its social and political implications—including the integration of Ukrainians and the development of sustainable solutions through self-reliance, local integration and voluntary and safe returns to Ukraine.

Conclusion

Moldova and Ukraine’s relations have not always been straightforward28, and the war has not made them sim pler, but they have become much more strategic and interdependent. Moldova’s security hinges on Ukraine’s defense, while Ukraine benefits from a stable, EU oriented Moldova on its southwestern flank. The EU accession process of the two countries has important implications for the countries and the EU’s credibility.
The four dimensions examined in this paper—EU accession, security, connectivity and social and humanitarian dimensions—are key aspects that reinforce this relationship. The question of EU accession and coupling remains open. Moldova’s views advancing its own accession process as a priority, and it also considers that decoupling from Ukraine will carry political costs. How Chișinău navigates this, particularly if Hungarian or other vetoes persist, will mark the bilateral relationship.
The current alignment between Chișinău and Kyiv is based on shared threat perception and on the political configuration of both governments that are reform oriented and pro-EU. Changes in government or Ukraine’s being forced into an unsustainable peace deal might be a destabilizing factor for this relationship.
 

Bibliographic data

Pociumban, Anastasia. “Ukraine-Moldova Relations After 2022.” April 2026.

This article was first published n April 2026 by the Moldovan Analytical Digest, No. 006 (2026), pp. 9–15.

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