From May 19 to 21, Russia held a suddenly announced exercise of its strategic nuclear forces. It intended to rehearse the launch of nuclear weapons in response to a hypothetical external attack, including of a conventional nature. Following a test launch on May 12, this large maneuver was already the second exercise of Russia’s nuclear forces that month.
Notably, in both cases, the timing of these maneuvers closely overlapped with developments that were detrimental for Russia in its war against Ukraine. Below, we assess the implications of the correlation between such negative developments and the Kremlin’s nuclear messaging. We then outline several policy responses that Germany and its European allies should undertake.
Close Correlation Between PR Defeats and Nuclear Tests
For the first time, Moscow’s annual parade on May 9 – commemorating Victory Day, the capitulation of Nazi Germany to the Red Army in 1945 – had to be held without military vehicles due to the danger of possible Ukrainian drone strikes. A week later, Moscow’s humiliation was deepened. On May 17, hundreds of Ukrainian drones penetrated the city’s layered air defense and conducted a major air strike against the Russian capital.
Russia reacted to the Victory Day fiasco by declaring it would conduct a nuclear test almost immediately thereafter. It also announced that it had successfully tested a RS-28 Sarmat intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). The Sarmat is one of the world’s most advanced ICBMs and a key element in Russia’s efforts to modernize its aging ground-launched nuclear arsenal. As pointed out in an article published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, the test was based on preparations that were already evident in March, as well as two Notice to Airmen Air Missions (NOTAMs) – a notice sent by national aviation authorities to alert aircraft pilots to potential dangers – announced in mid-April. The test was postponed at least twice; the reasons for the delay are not clear.
Therefore, the test launch, which was eventually successful, was technically not directly connected to developments in Ukraine. Although it was an element of a longer process, the way the Kremlin communicated it was most certainly nuclear signaling. The Kremlin published the transcript of a conversation that was held between President Vladimir Putin and Commander of the Strategic Missile Forces Sergei Karakayev when Putin got the report about the successful test launch. In his congratulating reply, the president made lengthy remarks about Russia’s nuclear capabilities being superior to the ones of the West.
The same pattern repeated itself following the Ukrainian drone attack on Moscow. Only two days after that attack, Russia announced a sudden test of its nuclear forces. A major exercise started immediately after the announcement, taking place from May 19 to 21. According to official Russian information, it involved 64,000 soldiers, 200 various missile launchers, 140 aircraft, 73 surface vessels, and 13 submarines, of which eight were strategic nuclear missile carriers. Hence, the whole nuclear triad – ground-launched missiles, submarines, and strategic bombers – was involved.
Participating forces were composed of the Strategic Missile Forces, both the Northern and Pacific Fleets, the Command of the Long-Range Aviation, and units from the Leningrad and Central military districts. Noteworthy was the complete absence of the Black Sea Fleet, the Caspian Flotilla, and the Southern military district. Apparently Russia’s war on Ukraine made it impossible for its military command to allocate even symbolic forces from those units for participation in the exercise.
A likely third element in the chain of Moscow’s signaling steps was the devastating Russian missile strike against Kyiv and the region that neighbors it on May 24. It included a huge number of nuclear-capable weapons, albeit assembled with conventional warheads. This was one of the most complex air strike operations against Kyiv in the entire war thus far, clearly demonstrating Russia’s ability to penetrate Kyiv’s air defenses.
Taken together, the ICBM test, the exercises, and the combined strike of May 24 – all closely following detrimental developments for Russia in its war against Ukraine – constitute clear signaling steps from Moscow toward both Ukraine and the West about the Kremlin’s readiness to use nuclear weapons if seriously threatened.
Implications for the Security of Europe
The likelihood of the most recent exercise serving as a pretense for a nuclear escalation against Ukraine was relatively low. Among other indicators from the outset, Russia did not pull back its combat forces, making a frontline deployment of a tactical nuclear weapon impossible.
Nevertheless, the drill should be taken seriously by Germany and other NATO allies. Moreover, the correlation between the timing of developments in the war that were detrimental to Russia and the Kremlin’s nuclear messaging imply that Moscow will likely take similar steps again if it suffers further fiascos against Ukraine. Thus, Russia’s doctrine of “escalating to de-escalate” should prompt several policy responses. Especially as this doctrine even allows for the potential use of nuclear weapons in the case of a conventional attack if such an assault were to “endanger the very existence of the Russian Federation.”
Germany, together with its European allies, must invest more rapidly in NATO’s conventional deterrence posture. Strong conventional capabilities on the part of NATO complicate Russia’s “escalate to de-escalate” logic by reducing Moscow’s ability to use (limited) nuclear threats to compensate for its own potential conventional vulnerabilities, which are increasingly manifested in its war against Ukraine. This calls, above all, for heavy investment in deep-precision-strike capabilities that strengthen deterrence by credibly threatening high-value military targets while remaining below the nuclear threshold.
Germany lacks sufficient nuclear expertise across politics, bureaucracy, and the wider strategic community
The recent decision by the United States to cancel the planned deployment of long-range fire systems to Germany has further increased the urgency of closing this capability gap. Although these systems would have been assembled solely with conventional warheads, they would have strengthened NATO’s deterrence posture by threatening infrastructure critical to Russia’s military operations and nuclear support architecture, including strategic air bases and command centers.
Hence, the most recent nuclear exercise serves as a stark reminder that European allies must push forward their efforts to find solutions in this category of weapons. In the short term, procurement options from partners such as South Korea, Turkey, or Ukraine could help to partially and temporarily close the gap. Yet, simultaneously, medium- and long-term investments into European programs such as the European Long-Range Strike Approach (ELSA) are necessary to establish a sustainable indigenous capability base.
Russia’s latest nuclear signaling attempts highlight that the nascent debate about Europe’s role in nuclear deterrence can no longer remain purely conceptual but increasingly requires actionable answers. This should not be understood as a substitute for NATO’s US-led nuclear sharing architecture, but as a complementary European layer of deterrence in response to Russia’s intensified nuclear signaling.
In practical terms, Germany should further and support regular French nuclear consultation formats with non-nuclear European allies, joint scenario-based exercises, and visible peacetime deployments of French nuclear-capable aircraft to allied bases. Such measures would not replicate US nuclear sharing arrangements, transporting an important political message to Moscow: nuclear coercion against Europe could not only trigger an American response, but could also entail a European nuclear dimension.
While Russia’s nuclear exercise was reported in German media outlets, it triggered remarkably little public political debate. This circumstance most likely reflects a broader structural problem: Germany lacks sufficient nuclear expertise across politics, bureaucracy, and the wider strategic community. This lack presents a problem given that Germany participates in NATO’s nuclear sharing mission by providing dual-capable aircraft. Raising Germany’s “nuclear IQ” is thus not merely an academic exercise but a strategic necessity.
More broadly, NATO allies should communicate more clearly that Russian aggression against Alliance territory would carry costs extending beyond the immediate battlefield. The purpose of such messaging is not to signal automatic large-scale or even limited nuclear strikes against Russian territory in every contingency, but to deny Moscow the assumption that it can wage aggression against NATO while shielding critical military assets and infrastructure on its own territory from Allied responses.
