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Executive Summary
Following the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Russia’s independent journalists, opposition politicians, activists, human rights defenders, and other Kremlin critics have established a new weekly routine. Every Friday evening, after the Russian Ministry of Justice updates its foreign agent registry with new entries, they review it, hoping their names or organizations have not been added.
The law that allows any individual, non-governmental organization (NGO), media outlet, or public organization to be designated a “foreign agent” has been in effect in Russia for many years. Yet, since the start of Russia’s war on Ukraine, the Kremlin has increasingly used it as a key tool to punish its critics and political opponents – particularly those who oppose Russia’s actions in that war. Foreign agents in Russia experience significant violations of their rights. They lose their jobs and income and face harassment from extremists and law enforcement. They are banned from participating in elections at any level or funding candidates’ campaigns. They are barred from public sector employment. Criminal cases have already been filed against dozens of Russians with this status. This number only counts the publicly known cases, and there are likely many more. Therefore, most foreign agents are forced to emigrate to avoid persecution and imprisonment.
Over the last ten years, following the example set by Russia, laws on foreign agents or their close analogs – legislation that requires separate registration for individuals, NGOs, and other organizations receiving foreign funding or under “foreign influence” – have been introduced in various regions worldwide, including in Europe. And they continue to emerge.
The intent and execution of such laws vary significantly across different countries. Both are dependent on the regimes in power and the maturity and independence of the judicial systems involved, as well as broader societal contexts. Political regimes with authoritarian traits often seek to adopt Russia’s approach and, as a result, use foreign influence laws as a tool to suppress dissent, target opposition groups, and limit the scope of civil society. Consequently, the application of these laws in authoritarian states often leads to significant political repression, curtailed freedoms, and the silencing of inde-pendent voices under the guise of protecting national security or sovereignty.
In democracies with a functioning rule of law, the scope of foreign agent laws is typically narrower. There, they are more focused on ensuring transparency rather than serving as a tool for political repression. However, given that no democracy is perfect, abuses of these laws can still occur in such countries. The key difference is that they have procedures for des-ignation as a foreign agent and appeal. Their judicial systems are sufficiently independent and impartial to provide a check against abuse of power and to hold the government accountable for any misuse of such laws.
The issue is that not all democracies – even within the EU – have reached this level of maturity. This is clearly demonstrated by the case of Hungary, where the local version of the foreign influence law is already being used by the right-wing conservative government to target NGOs and journalists whose work has exposed corruption and abuses at the top levels of power. Considering the increasing popularity of right-wing rhetoric across Europe, recent electoral victories of right-wing parties in several EU countries, and the EU’s plans to introduce its own directive on “foreign influence” as part of its Defense of Democracy Package, EU stakeholders must learn how to keep Russia’s path from being repeated and how to incorporate safeguards to prevent similar practices within the European Union.
The challenge for the EU lies in learning from global failures while preserving its democratic values. Its legislation must deter covert foreign interference without restricting legitimate advocacy, research, or civic activism. To ensure that foreign influence laws do not become tools of repression, the EU should take the initiative in developing international standards for regulating NGOs; address internal challenges related to the misuse of foreign influence legislation, particularly in Hungary; strengthen cooperation with international and regional human rights organizations to prevent the abuse of foreign agent laws; provide support to individuals, independent media, and human rights organizations that face persecution due to them; continue to support all forms of internal opposition and democratic movements in Russia; and work to expand funding and asylum programs for persecuted activists and journalists to EU member states.
