Mesh networks have been used by protesters in Hong Kong and elsewhere to keep communication going even when the traditional Internet is shut down. They often consist of small personal devices such as smartphones or Meshtastic LoRa nodes that relay messages to each other through a wireless signal or Bluetooth, instead of going through a centralized server.
Taiwan’s connectivity strategy is prone to fail in times of conflict. An adversary would likely cut subsea cables; Internet exchange points could be hit by missiles, further diminishing domestic connectivity. Satellites could be a backup, providing emergency low bandwidth connections to citizens. Vehicles with satellite dishes could be deployed to regions in crisis. However, with a limited amount of those, they could also be targeted by sabotage or missiles.
We suggest that the government explore the idea of building yet another layer of defense for resilience — a national mesh network. To create a reliable network that connects the west coast urban areas from Keelung to Kaohsiung, one would need large amounts of handheld devices, probably in the hundreds of thousands. To maintain connectivity on the east coast, mesh networks could still play a role, but it would need more nodes that have a longer range than handheld devices and would ideally be deployed on roofs.
Why do all this? When the government has no other way of communicating with its people, mesh devices would be the primary channel to relay the most essential government information. The government would not be able to send video or audio messages, but texts should be sufficient for the most important updates. Handheld devices also have a long battery life that would further bolster resilience. As there are so many devices, a foreign adversary would be unable to destroy a significant number.
Nevertheless, there are a few things to keep in mind. In the case of the Meshtastic network, about 80 to 90 percent of the devices would be on client mute mode, which functions as “receive only” nodes, while the rest of the devices relay communication, extending the network. This method prevents the network from becoming congested.
Wireless signals that a mesh network relies on to relay messages could be jammed, but this could be mitigated through frequency hopping techniques. Another weak point is that a foreign adversary could hijack these networks to spread disinformation, but with proper cryptography to authenticate message origins, such as the Reticulum network, this risk could be countered.
This brings us to the next hurdle in deploying a national mesh network. Many mesh device producers hail from China. However, Taiwan could easily manufacture these LoRa mesh devices with its advanced chip producing capability. Mesh devices only consist of a microcontroller (chip), another radio chip, an antenna and a battery.
If the government were to initiate a broader discussion on the pros and cons of a national mesh network, and decided to adopt the mesh network strategy, it could easily set up and scale production. When the project is deployed successfully, Taiwan could export its solution to other countries who face similar adversarial challenges to connectivity.
