Why, in your opinion, is the process of political transformation in Moldova faltering?
Igor Botan: Three factors have caused the transformation process in Moldova to falter. The first is that the political elite is composed of dishonest businessmen who made their fortunes during the so-called transition period by participating in the unfair processes of transforming public into private property, and who entered politics in order to transform politics in business.
The second is that the political culture of the majority of Moldovans is contemplative rather than pro-active and participatory. As such, they are unable to put efficient pressure on administration. That is because Moldova is the so-called “the village of Europe” – the single country in Europe where the percentage of people living in villages is larger than the percentage of people living in urban areas. Consequently, the political culture is patriarchal, based on the authority of the Orthodox Church, which views the corruption of power as God’s punishment for our sins. This encourages the attitude that there is no point in protesting corrupted power.
The third factor is the EU’s indulgent attitude toward the governing Moldovan elite, which declared itself to be pro-European. The EU’s interest was to help Moldova become a model of rapid transformation and modernization – as an example for Ukraine, Belarus, and the South Caucasus countries. After the robbery of the banking system of Moldova by its elites, the EU recognizes its mistake. [The reference is to the bank fraud scandal of 2014, when it was discovered that one billion dollars had been stolen from three Moldovan banks.]
Valeriu Chiveri: It would seem that “faltering” is too diplomatic a term, considering the cruel reality in the country. It is clear for everyone that there were no reforms or transformations during the last year at least. Imitation reforms; control over the legal institutions and regulatory bodies; selective justice, governance through intermediaries; and decisions taken in party offices have created a sense of distrust within society and practically brought the state to the edge of chaos. This style of governance under the banner of pro-European slogans merely serves the interests of a narrow circle of people and has transformed Moldova into a captured state.
Martin Sieg: Moldova is today effectively a “captured state” in which key authorities – primarily law enforcement, justice, and financial authorities – are no longer controlled by the responsible constitutional institutions but by vested interests that depend on a rent-seeking, monopolized and corrupt economy. Since 2009 all pro-European coalitions and parties were marked by an inherent ambivalence about truly reformist forces and vested interests. As a result, there were constant struggles among the proponents of vested interests as well as between the vested interests and the reformers. This permitted only limited transformation even before the parliamentary elections of November 2014. After this election, however, vested interests finally came to dominate coalition governments, while reformers were marginalized and fragmented into a number of political movements. As a result, political forces truly representing the pro-European constituency and course of the country are now largely in opposition or out of parliament.
How does the population view the policies and actions of the political elite?
Botan: According to surveys conducted by Barometer of Public Opinion (BOP) the main problem in the Republic of Moldova is endemic corruption. Consequently, BOP registered a dramatic decline of respondents’ confidence in the main public institutions: trust in the government, which was 44 percent in 2009, dropped to 13 percent in 2015; in those same years, trust in the parliament fell from 41 to 11 percent; trust in the presidency – 35 percent in 2009 – went down to 11 percent in 2015; and trust in the judiciary declined from 37 to 15 percent between 2009 and 2015. This is the highest level of dissatisfaction to date with the government’s ability to solve Moldova’s most pressing problems. In the same context, 40.7 percent of respondents considered in April 2015 that the level of corruption had increased since the so-called pro-European government was established.
Chiveri: The idea of European integration was completely undermined by being associated with the unlawful actions undertaken by the so-called pro-European parties. According to the latest polls, in case of early elections, the political parties that governed the country over the last years will be at the limit of the threshold or will not accede to the parliament at all.
Complete government inaction in such cases as the “the billion-dollar theft” [i.e., the banking scandal of 2014] gave rise to a strong spirit of protest among Moldovan citizens regardless of their political affiliation. At the same time, lack of a strong [opposition] leader and inability to manage citizens’ protesting capital has significantly diminished the protesting wave.
Ruslan Codreanu: The population is unsatisfied with the fact that policies are not implemented and with the political elite’s lack of transparency. Decisions are taken by the political elite and not by the government itself. The population thinks that the political elite is solving party issues rather than introducing reforms to the benefit of the citizens. According to the last opinion poll, the country’s economic crisis and budget deficit are due to the corruption created by the governing parties.
Which steps should be taken to overcome the ongoing crisis?
Chiveri: The answer is simple, and all required actions are well known. We can speak about early elections, or about genuine judicial reform, de-politicization of legal and regulatory institutions, de-monopolization of economic activities and the media etc. But nothing will happen without genuine political will.
Codreanu: The first priority should be fighting corruption. Not small-scale corruption but corruption at the highest level. The political parties should assume responsibility for the captured state and reform law enforcement institutions. All the heads of the institutions that just witnessed the banking system fraud should be fired. The people are fed up with political discourse and populism. Implementation is needed: transparency of state enterprises and public procurement, reducing the size of administration.
Sieg: Pro-reform forces in Moldova are unlikely to prevail on their own against the power of vested interests. A far more active involvement and willingness of the EU to take co-ownership over reform processes would be needed, including a readiness to send missions and personnel into Moldovan institutions to foster reforms from within. Strict conditionality is also needed; no coalition should be supported just for the sake of having a superficially “pro-European” government. The discrediting and delegitimation of most of the parties in parliament may have reached a point where early elections cannot be avoided to restore a minimum of democratic confidence in government. In Moldova those political forces that represent a truly European course, the pro-European protest movement, and a reformist stance must not stay separate. They need to unite into one strong and credible pro-European movement.
What perspectives do you see for Moldova and the EU integration process in the near future?
Botan: Moldova is a divided society. There have been two poles of attraction – the European Union and the Eurasian Union – since 2011, when Russian President Vladimir Putin launched his Eurasian project. Even if pro-Russian political forces such as the Party of Socialists (PS) were to win potential early parliamentary elections, it is hardly possible that the PS would change its external course dramatically. There are two reasons for this. For one thing, the eventual reorientation of Moldova toward Russia is unlikely because of developments in Ukraine. Second, Russia would have to pay to keep Moldova alive. But Russia is under international sanctions. It is already paying considerable sums to separatist regimes in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus. It is involved in the Syria conflict. None of this makes it eager to potentially pay for maintaining the balance of Moldova’s state budget, about 15 percent of which is currently supported by Moldova’s development partners, including the EU. [With its corruption, the country’s] so-called pro-European elite profaned to a certain extent the vector of European integration. However, the EU’s attraction is still very strong for Moldovan citizens. The latest surveys shows the need for the elite to change, the need to replace the corrupt elite with a new elite, which should be under the control of civil society and will not tolerate it sliding toward corruption and oligarchization. In case of de-politicization of law enforcement and regulatory institutions, Moldova knows exactly what has to be done: implementat the provisions of the Association Agreement agenda.
Codreanu: Due to the [corrupt behavior of the] so called “pro-European” governing parties, the idea of European integration indeed lost the ground. More and more people associate European integration with corruption, lack of transparency, and banking sector fraud. There is a risk that foreign policy direction will change toward Russia because the parties on the left are getting more public sympathy. There are no real, practical signs that members of parliament voted in by the people for their pro-European views understand the political, social, and economic crises in which the country [is embroiled].
Sieg: After the last parliamentary election November 2014, Moldova had a historic chance to gain considerably increased support by the EU – including even the EU membership perspective within a foreseeable time with a clear reform government. This chance has been wasted and will not easily return. It will now be first for Moldova to prove that the country is willing to move forward with serious reforms before future integration steps can be envisioned.
What remaining scope for action does the EU have to support the Moldovan transformation process?
Botan: In the current context, the main recommendations for efficient fighting corruption are as follows: 1) Depoliticize state law enforcement and regulatory institutions. It should be clearly stipulated that the appointments of chiefs of state institutions take place in an open competition based on professional and integrity testing with the participation of local and international experts. 2) Reform legislation on political parties and electoral campaign financing, including transparent reporting of this financing. 3) Exercise coordinated double pressure on governance: from the side of Moldovan civil society and from the side of international development partners in order to urge adequate implementation of anti-corruption legal provisions and action plans. 4) Establish a specialized anti-corruption sub-committee should be established in accordance with the Association Agreement. 5) Make all international support received by Moldova from development partners, especially from the EU, conditional on efficient measures to fight corruption.
Codreanu: The most useful support would be for the EU to serve as a watchdog for the reform process. The flow of the financial support should also be strictly correlated with results achieved and not merely on politicians’ rhetorical professions of intent. All the instruments used by the EU to help Moldova should be based on quality conditionality. The mere adoption of a law does not mean that the situation changes. For example: if the National Anticorruption Center were transferred from a government subordinate to the parliament would not mean that the index of perception of corruption would change positively or that the indicators for doing business [in Moldova] would become positive.
Sieg: Strict conditionality is crucial. As long as the EU puts geopolitics above it, it will get played by the proponents of vested interest in Moldova. The EU should continue demanding a full investigation into the fraud in the banking system – ideally with its own participation – and the application of comprehensive, not selective, justice. It would be also important to have an agenda of clear demands for reforms. Some examples include: merging the different and weak anti-corruption authorities into one powerful institution that can control the whole process from investigation to prosecution; and helping to de-politicize key state institutions by participating in the selection of the heads of key law enforcement and regulatory bodies (such as the national bank), thus guaranteeing fair selection process and the effective independence of those institutions.
About the participants:
Valeriu Chiveri, is moderator for foreign affairs and security policy at the Chisinau-based Institute for European Policies and Reforms (IPRE). He was deputy minister of foreign affairs and European integration for Moldova between August 2013 and March 2015 and ambassador to Austria from July 2010 to August 2013.
Ruslan Codreanu is moderator for public sector reform at the Institute for European Policies and Reforms (IPRE) and a former head of the Moldovan chancellery’s general directorate for the coordination of policy, foreign aid, and public administration reform.
Igor Botan is director of the Association for Participatory Democracy (ADEPT), based in Chisinau, Moldova, and a member of the civic platform Dignity and Truth (DA).
Martin Sieg, an associate fellow at the DGAP, is director of the Institute for European Policies and Reforms (IPRE) and a chief strategy advisor to the prime minister of Moldova from 2013 to 2015.
The questions were prepared by Sarah Pagung.
