The Shift
From Russian Energy Blackmail to American Energy Dominance
The EU’s shift away from Russian fuels has been unprecedented. Russian gas deliveries to the bloc fell from 150 billion cubic meters (BCM) in 2021 to 52 BCM in 2024. Rising imports of liquefied natural gas (LNG) helped fill this gap. The US is the largest provider of LNG, accounting for nearly 60 percent in 2025, roughly one quarter of European gas demand – up from five percent in 2021. These imports were initially welcomed, especially in Germany, to help rebalance trade while incentivizing continued US security interests in Europe.
Yet this view is deteriorating as the reality of US energy dominance unfolds. Energy dominance aims to exert Washington’s influence over global energy markets by maximizing US energy exports and leveraging control over key energy assets. The 2025 National Security Strategy frames this as a means to project national power. From the energy provisions in the asymmetrical EU-US trade deal, to the oil-driven intervention in Venezuela and the escalation around Greenland’s critical materials, the message is clear: Trump’s Washington will act unilaterally to secure and leverage energy resources, by force, if necessary, in a way that reinforces American primacy – even at the expense of allies.
These tensions coincide with peace negotiations between Ukraine and Russia, where some American and German actors are pushing reengagement with Russian gas. US President Donald Trump’s 28-point peace plan even calls for lifting sanctions and for the US and Russia to “jointly rebuild, develop, modernize, and operate Ukraine’s gas infrastructure, including pipelines and storage facilities.” This is flanked by US corporate acquisitions of strategic pipelines and storage assets in Germany and elsewhere in Europe. While this is not a coordinated effort, it does create leverage for a president who a) views net zero goals as a threat to the United States and has b) repeatedly weaponized energy trade for political objectives.
The Implications
Between Gas Politics and Technology Dependence
Washington’s new stance is pivotal for German and European energy strategy. American energy was considered an indispensable and secure alternative for a continent grappling with dependence on Russian gas and compromised Chinese energy technology. The gambit for Greenland has shattered this illusion. The bloc is now wedged between gas politics on the side of Russia and the US, and technological dependence on the side of China. Both present risks to Germany and Europe.
Dominating markets and politics regarding energy is standard policy for countries like Saudi Arabia and Russia. These countries will go to great lengths to ensure the primacy of their energy companies because it gives them political control. While the US has not yet gone this far, Venezuela is a warning sign. The world’s largest military intervening to benefit national energy companies should give Europeans pause. The threats issued to treaty-bound allies, together with Trump’s visible disdain for European energy policy vis-à-vis wind turbines creates deep uncertainty. Some auctions for American LNG have already suffered as a result. Amid this uncertainty, Germany must push the bloc to hedge against US gas imports as there is now a non-zero risk that they could be weaponized.
Germany should begin to consider US energy dominance, alongside Russian fossil statecraft and Chinese technological consolidation, as a potential systemic risk
Transatlantic uncertainty creates space for Beijing. Some in Europe welcome this, lauding China as a major ally for climate and energy – yet this is misleading. China is the world’s largest emitter by far. China leads in electrification, but this was achieved through unprecedented use of coal-powered electricity. In 2025, China consumed nearly 5 billion metric tons of coal – 30 percent more than the rest of the world combined. Chinese energy tech also comes with significant risks. This includes monopolized supply chains, export restrictions, industrial espionage, and digital spying. Pivoting too hard in this direction will compromise Europe’s economic viability, energy security and strategic autonomy. Yet China’s industrial strategy has been highly effective; it has become irreplaceable in key supply chains to the extent that a degree of dependency is all but certain for any country seeking to decarbonize.
The Response
Balance Priorities While Pursuing Diversification, Efficiency, and Self-Sufficiency
The convergence of these dynamics requires a reconciliation of commitments, priorities, and core economic and security interests. Thus far, Germany and much of the EU have exhibited a clear commitment to phasing out Russian gas, having approved a ban on Russian gas imports starting in 2027. The future of gas imports more broadly is not as clear. Germany has played an active role in extending gas demand by seeking and acquiring approval to distribute state aid for backup gas power plants.
This coincides with a general backsliding on climate at the EU level, as key instruments have been weakened while targets, such as the 2035 combustion engine ban, have been delayed under the guise of making Europe more business-friendly. Inconsistencies and failed deliveries on climate and energy targets sustain oil import dependencies and weaken Europe’s international credibility on climate. Many EU member states are also revisiting nuclear energy. The Commission has even approved state aid for a Polish plant to start construction in 2028. If these changes materialize on a meaningful scale, European energy security will be strengthened in the long term. However, this timeline will likely not match the five-year threat horizon from Russia. Moreover, it will also bring the severe risks associated with a nuclear energy supply chain for example, proliferation and radioactive waste.
Despite the retreat, the sharp rupture in transatlantic relations has led to a strong pivot toward energy sovereignty. Energy imports from the United States are increasingly criticized, as Europeans see their security as being underpinned by energy efficiency, electrification, and the integrated development of European energy sources. Outcomes from the recent North Sea Summit in Hamburg illustrate this. Denmark and Germany agreed on the terms of a shared energy island project. At the same time, industry and government leaders from the EU and the UK agreed to mobilize €1 trillion for offshore wind investment from 2031 to 2040 to build a European energy backbone.
It remains difficult for Europe to respond to these developments. Europe, particularly Germany, as a major energy importer, is heavily reliant on deep energy relations with partners. In managing these competing priorities and changing geopolitical context, Germany should:
Begin to consider US energy dominance, alongside Russian fossil statecraft and Chinese technological consolidation, as a potential systemic risk to European security. In doing so, Germany should initiate EU-level contingencies that take into account scenarios in which these dependencies may be leveraged for economic coercion.
Stay the course on key energy commitments, particularly for sectors heavily reliant on imported energy where direct electrification is possible. The EU Emission Trading System is the key mechanism for this, and its timeline for free credits should not be extended. While Europe desperately needs deregulation to make it competitive, these efforts do not need to come at the expense of diluting key instruments that improve energy efficiency, electrification, or general renewable deployments. These efforts serve European energy security by reducing reliance on imports.
Prioritize the development of mutually beneficial energy partnerships with like-minded partners eager to avoid asymmetrical and transactional dependencies. While these partners cannot replace the US or China, they are equally concerned about being caught between US-China competition. Deepening cooperation on issues such as clean supply chains is mutually beneficial and provides both partners a way to derisk. Countries like Brazil, Canada, and India are examples that can either be sources of critical materials or destinations for European clean tech.
