The European Enlargement Moment
Europe is in a moment of Aufklärung as it is forced to rethink peace, security and economics in a changing geopolitical landscape. On enlargement, Ukraine is the main driver, even if it cannot persuade member states to reform the outdated accession process. However, it is Montenegro that will test readiness for new membership. While the US-led peace negotiations on Ukraine provide political momentum for enlargement including the Western Balkans (WB) and Moldova, Commission’s proposals on accelerating enlargement have been rebuked by national capitals. Brussels now realizes it will be impossible to integrate Ukraine and the WB without a political decision and compass from member states.
Ukraine on its end, needs a sui generis political anchor, linked with a greater role of EU member states in the peace negotiations1. This article argues that delaying full integration and potentially excluding new countries from Council Veto mechanism – disguised as enhanced gradual integration – undermines the debate and impact of the enlargement policy. They are futile and unhelpful in the context of iterating a new generation of accession treaties and the functioning of the European Union. It posits that while Montenegro should be flexible and persist on the reform path, it needs to seek full and equal membership in the Union. Indeed, since no perfect solution exists, both sides should conceptualize the parameters of next accession in terms of managed risks. A limited, fig-leaf enlargement would be a strategic and moral failure and further weaken the EU in becoming a geopolitical actor.
The interplay of problems
To begin to overcome the impasse and reconcile the geopolitical urgency, with merit based process (i.e. Copenhagen requirements) and the EU reform (i.e. political functionality), the EU Commission and Montenegro need to double down on preserving the existing methodology to achieve full membership, while simultaneously exploring benefits throughout the process. Frontloading access, placated as enhanced gradual integration or staged accession should not replace the end-goal, but be used as an addendum to accession negotiations which will unequivocally feature more ex-post conditionality (safeguards) and designed with the goal of reduced access once a member (transition and grace periods).
Still, the operationalization of accession confronts the EU-27 with three interdependent problems. First, Europe is engulfed by an unreliable United States, a revisionist Russia, and an economically coercive China, who all disrupt the international order. Some argue that enlargement is crucial to enhance the EU’s geopolitical agency, by reinforcing the appeal of a liberal democratic club and consolidating the European continent in opposition to Russian imperialism, by stabilizing the Balkan countries still subject to malign foreign interference.
Nonetheless, pro-enlargement advocates overlook that advancing enlargement must increase rather than dilute Union’s capacity to govern. This leads to, secondly, the internal European efforts to integrate further by deepening the single market and developing a common European defense industry. Member states, in particular Germany, France and the Netherlands are skeptical of Commission’s drive to enlarge an unreformed Union, wary of endangering institutional capacity. Without serious and studious track-reform implementation – in the areas of rule of law and the functioning of democratic institutions – many members states are fearful of fast-tracking new members, suspicious of ‘new illiberal members’, anxious of a new Hungary. This is colloquially the EU-27 absorption problem.
Thirdly, candidate countries, en masse, still exhibit weak democratic institutions, limited administrative capacity and underdeveloped market economies. To assume obligations, they need to advance state-building through acquis alignment and reform implementation. Truth to the matter, Montenegro has achieved remarkable progress in closing chapters and showing political maturity to seize the moment in an increasingly whole of society approach. The country is on good track to finish all 33 chapters by early 2027, even if this means putting more effort in administrative reform, building political consensus at home and strengthening public diplomacy abroad.
A policy in transition
In order to accelerate accession, the Commission has tabled changes to current enlargement process. While innovative and forward-looking proposal to hasten integration, member-states have rejected the proposal of reverse enlargement. Considerations now abound to gradual (enhanced) integration or staged accession in which institutional rewards are frontloaded and linked to reform delivery through sectoral links into EU agencies, institutions, and policies, albeit without clear prospect of full and formal membership. National capitals have not yet openly voiced support or intention to further model this option.
Gradual (enhanced) integration in current iteration may be developed to entail immediate inclusion in security, defence, research, while deferring more sensitive issues such as voting rights, the appointment of an EU Commissioner, and full legal equality with member states. Countries could be permitted to send parliamentarians to the European Parliament as observers, potentially with speaking rights but without voting power. For Montenegro, all of this offers substantial upgrade compared to the Growth Plan funds and gradual integration which already achieved its zenith with SEPA and coming finalization of ‘free roaming’. This option, however, is unfit to either transform the Union into a geopolitical actor, nor to increase the socio-economic convergence between the Western Balkan frontrunners and the EU.
It thus leaves the existing system, a status quo, which cannot satisfy either the position of skeptical capitals, in view of the unanimity rule nor the lack of trust in reform process of candidates.
The politics of full membership
While key member states such as France, Germany and the Netherlands lack the political drive to express unequivocal political support for Montenegro – which is coming closer to the finish line of accession negotiations- the Commission, led by von der Leyen and Enlargement Commissioner Kos deliberate how to tweak the next accession treaty to overcome the current impasse. Importantly, full membership is still on the table, as Commissioner Kos already signaled that the next generation of accession treaties will include stronger protections that would ‘bite hard’ in case of rule of law regress. It may include limiting access to the single market (including transition periods for freedom of movement), placing caps on financial transfers such as structural and cohesion funds, and most importantly ensuring that rule of law and the independence of judiciary is under stringent control once the country joins the EU. All these elements have already been adapted and exercised in previous rounds of enlargement (Bulgaria and Romania, as well as Poland and Croatia2).
In the current global environment, the EU’s inability to reform institutional rules – especially unanimity in CFSP – constrains consensus on enlargement, which skeptics warn could further weaken the Union. Equally, distrust in the capacity of even most advanced, and small country of Montenegro slows the negotiations process (French reservation to back the formation of the Working Group on Accession Treaty). Debates on a new model of enlargement with no voting rights (EU Council veto) are not only unhelpful because they complicate the legality of such membership and ratification models across the EU-27, but moreover fail to offer a vision for more strategy of this and a bigger Union. Therefore, a more helpful way forward would be to ensure that rather than waiting for ex-ante conditionality effect, the EU places more value on mechanism of ex-post conditionality. This demands designing safeguards which would strengthen the Commission’s use of Article 7 of TEU (i.e. anchor it to Article 2) with the acceding states, to consist of new monitoring and reporting mechanisms, and an accelerated judicial review of any breach. Only if these are found to be in violation of fundamental rights, the new country would be suspended from voting rights. It would moreover offer a genuine and credible blueprint for other aspiring members.
Other institutional implications, such as the number of Commissioners and Members of the European Parliament, remain manageable, as the next enlargement would effectively return the Union to its previous EU-28 size. With regard to the composition of the Commission, the Lisbon Treaty revised the legal framework: Article 17(5) TEU stipulates that, from 2014 onwards, the College should consist of a number of members corresponding to two-thirds of the total number of member states. This marked a departure from the principle of automatic national representation, although the Treaty allows the European Council to maintain one Commissioner per member state. Alas, there is no need to expand the college.
In addition, while the EU is negotiating its new Multiannual Financial Framework, structural and cohesion funds are set to be reshuffled for existing members anyhow. For Ukraine, special quantitative caps must be set – particularly for agriculture – while Montenegro is easily controllable. But for both, it will be conditioned on demonstrable compliance with the highest rule-of-law standards, and subject to reverse mechanism. Importantly, this is a European stress test for Franco-German cooperation, indirectly implicating enlargement prospects.
How will Europe swing
This enlargement is coupled with a more fundamental question of how the European Union will evolve. It can develop in deeper institutional integration, or by way of coalition of the willing activating the ‘Enhanced Cooperation’3 to advance integration in selected areas. Alternatively, it can keep to status quo and in words of former Italian Prime Minister Mario Draghi enter a slow agony of decay, or worse relive another ‘exit’. It is, thus, ever more relevant how member states envisage enlargement against this backdrop, and whether Berlin, Paris and others have the political courage to decide whether they want a new member by the end of this Commission’s mandate by 2029. The lack of clarity on EU reform in context of releasing the long awaited pre-accession policy reviews, continuous deliberation on updating the accession methodology, complied with a hesitancy from both France and Germany (albeit for different reasons) thus, now endanger the political momentum behind the geostrategic urgency of enlargement. Still, hope remains that the mandate for working group on Accession Treaty with Montenegro will be agreed among the EU-27 and is set to start work in mid-April this year.
Conclusion
At this year’s Munich Security Conference, German Chancellor Merz issued his clearest statement on enlargement to date, arguing that Montenegro should be brought progressively closer to the Union and only at the final stage admitted as a full member. This reasoning overlooks that Montenegro – having closed its 14th negotiation chapter and aiming to complete all by year’s end – is now on a timeline of months, not years, to finalize the technical requirements for accession. Thus, Podgorica and the Commission need to become decisive in demanding more political, technical and strategic clarity from key member states and open communication. Further, Montenegro should avoid waiting for Iceland – but not shy away from praising its benefits – which might further delay and complicate the thinking and timeline on enlargement.
Ultimately, the bottom line is that key European leaders still want a painless off-ramp for the accession of the Western Balkan front-runners, but more concerningly for Ukraine. In the age of geopolitical rivalry and territorial contestation such complacency will lead to a loss of influence and credibility on international stage. As a way forward, national capitals ought to think about managed risks rather than a perfect scenario if they are serious in defending the ‘European way of life’ and show to adversaries their political ability to act. It is now about the cost of not enlarging – ensuring credibility and power to consolidate gray zones and so ultimately send a geopolitical signal for Ukraine.
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EU-Erweiterung: Sonderfall Ukraine – Regelfall Westbalkan, Kyjiw durch Beitrittsassoziierung neuen Typs in der EU verankern, Barbara Lippert, Nicolai von Ondarza, Frauke M. Seebass
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Bulgaria and Romania’s Accession to the EU:Postponement, Safeguards and the Rule of Law
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Mechanism’ under Article 20 TFEU, allowing a minimum of nine member states to request the Commission to advance policy initiatives in an open-ended format (Article 329 TFEU)
