Just weeks ahead of the one-year anniversary of his inauguration, President Donald Trump helped analysts and journalists trying to coalesce a hailstorm of actions into a Trump 2.0 foreign policy doctrine. In a press conference following the January 3 capture and extraction of Nicolás Maduro and his wife from Venezuela, Trump himself announced the “Donroe Doctrine,” his update to the Monroe Doctrine of 1823. The latter was derived from an address in which President James Monroe warned European powers to stay out of the Western Hemisphere. Signaled even before Trump took office for the second time, the update was codified in the National Security Strategy released in December, which repeatedly mentions a “Trump corollary” to this doctrine.
The essence of Trump’s foreign policy remains best captured by the citation of a White House official during Trump’s first term published by Jeffrey Goldberg in The Atlantic: “We’re America, bitch.” However, in this initial term, Trump’s foreign policy was reined in and redirected by a slew of officials with more conservative instincts, as thousands of pages of reporting and first-hand accounts have documented. As I have argued before, this time around is different. With the support of an inner circle of loyalists and fellow radicals, Trump is unleashed and, thanks to advisors including White House Deputy Chief of Staff Stephen Miller, even amplified. In an interview in June 2025, Trump himself put it this way when asked how his second term differs from the first: “The first time I had two things to do – run the country and survive; I had all these crooked guys…the second time, I run the country and the world.”
The result is a brazen foreign policy approach that embraces the 19th-century values of white/Christian nationalism – to the extent that it embraces values at all – and is explicitly centered on brute US dominance and profiteering. Given Greenland’s strategic position in the Western Hemisphere, Trump’s consistent covetousness of it, and the hubris that his “success” in Venezuela could breed, Berlin must help the EU respond to the Donroe Doctrine. Although it remains unlikely that Trump is prepared to militarily capture Greenland, the German government must seek continued cooperation on Ukraine while standing firmly against Trump’s expansionist fantasies in Europe.
Core Elements of the Donroe Doctrine
There are three central elements to the Donroe Doctrine.
- Disregard for International Niceties: Previous US administrations have all shown some level of concern for upholding or following international laws and norms. Even in cases in which justifications for invasions seemed to be thin or even contrived (Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction, for example), efforts were made to find legal justification and garner allies’ support. Donald Trump and other leading figures in this administration – including Secretary of War Pete Hegseth, Vice President JD Vance, and Deputy Chief of Staff Stephen Miller – are openly dismissive of what Miller recently called “international niceties.” The January military operation undertaken in Venezuela is, in fact, within the scope of actions occasionally taken by previous US presidents since the 1950s. What is new is the lack of an attempt by Trump to embed or justify this action according to international rules and norms, especially given his blatant emphasis on Venezuela’s oil.
- Muscular Mercantilism: Trump’s focus on zero-sum trade competition and profit-making is one of the most consistent aspects of his foreign policy. He treats trade balances as scorecards of national success. As demonstrated most recently in his remarks about capturing Venezuela’s oil for US business, Trump’s mercantilism is imperialist and avows leveraging military dominance for economic gain. While Miller and Secretary of State Marco Rubio framed the action against Maduro in security terms, Trump has made almost no mention of Maduro’s ties to Iran, Russia, and China. Instead, the president has focused on the wealth the United States will take “out of the ground.”
- Brazen Short-Termism: Trump’s foreign policy is focused on quick wins. Unlike past US presidents, Trump is burdened neither by possible contingencies like second- and third-order consequences nor by questions of democracy and human rights. He is willing to take bold and brazen actions because he does not feel responsible for global stability or heeding norms. He just cares about “winning” today. Other features of the Donroe Doctrine that are particularly challenging for Europeans, including its inconsistency and disregard for alliances, stem from this short-termism and incaution.
The only answer for Europe is flexible readiness. Although Trump may not follow through with the ideas and statements of any given day, rash actions cannot be ruled out.
Consequences for Europe of a Possible Return to Spheres of Influence
One conclusion to draw from the Donroe Doctrine is that we are reentering a sphere of influence world in which Russia, China, and the United States divvy up control over their regions. Russian online influence operations are reportedly pushing this idea with some success on the American Right. But I suspect this is oversimplifying.
Stephen Miller’s comments on CNN following the Venezuela operation do not reflect a willingness to cede ground to China. In his remarks, he said that the United States “is a superpower…and is going to conduct itself like a superpower.…It is absurd that we would allow a country in our own backyard to become the supplier of resources to our adversaries, but not to us.” So yes, the Donroe Doctrine (like the Monroe Doctrine) is about keeping potential adversaries out of the Western Hemisphere. However, it need not follow that the United States would agree to relinquish its influence in territories close to China or Russia, especially when they are economically essential. Trump remains a wild card. Yet, neither the National Security Strategy nor recent statements by Miller, Trump, or Rubio contain hints that the Trump administration is ready to cede control of Asia or Europe to China or Russia. Thus far, the Donroe Doctrine seems a lot more like a traditional US strategy of dominance plus blatant profiteering – minus the normal trappings of concern for order or democracy.
Whether such a mercantilist strategy of US dominance absent strong alliances and support for international systems can be successful in the medium or long term is another question, and one I fear this administration is either dismissing or misjudging. For the governments of Europe, this means that, while they should not fear Trump supporting Putin’s claims to dominance over NATO territory, they cannot count on Trump’s support (for instance on Ukraine) on principle alone. They need to be ready to explain why any given ask includes a win for Washington.
Given Current Support of the Donroe Doctrine by MAGA Voters, Europe Cannot Wish It Away
Stabilizing Venezuela will not be simple. This makes the Donroe Doctrine – and especially claiming control for “running” the country – a tricky gamble for the Trump administration. But, despite opposition in the MAGA movement to “forever wars,” a majority of Trump voters support robust US military engagement. An in-depth survey of Republican voters published on December 1 by the Manhattan Institute, a conservative think tank, finds that “[f]ully 72% of Republicans with a favorable view of [prominent MAGA skeptic of military interventionism] Tucker Carlson, support a proactive, military-forward approach.” Indeed, MAGA criticism of the intervention in Venezuela has been either circumspect (from Carlson) or absent (from JD Vance who instead voiced support).
Therefore, until Venezuela gets messy enough to induce more caution, Republicans will continue to support the Donroe Doctrine, and Europe will have to deal with the consequences.
What the Donroe Doctrine Means for Greenland – and the EU
While a military takeover of Greenland and the capture and extraction of the unlawful president of Venezuela are completely different scenarios, Berlin must prepare for the worst potential version of the Donroe Doctrine.
The two joint statements stressing Greenland’s autonomy – one by Germany and six other European countries, the other by the five Nordic states – were a good start. Now, the German government, together with the governments of Denmark and the 13 European countries that signed and supported the statements, should develop a joint response to a possible (if unlikely) sneak takeover of Greenland while, as promised in the statements, simultaneously addressing US security concerns around the territory. This latter point is crucial.
In particular, the leaders of these European countries should agree on a set of concrete responses, a few of which should be publicly communicated in unison. Privately, they should seek out Republican allies in the US Congress and Trump administration. Then, everyone should move on to other business of the day, including cooperation on the future of Ukraine. Berlin must demonstrate that it is ready and not scared.
Thus far, almost everyone in the Trump administration – including Rubio and Trump’s special envoy to Greenland, Jeff Landry – has almost always been clear that Washington’s plan is to get buy-in from Greenland for a purchase or annexation. Which means that, despite Trump’s bluster, Greenland is almost (but not quite) certainly in control of its fate. The EU needs to act together decisively to increase its chances of saying the same.
