| Although Central Asian states are increasingly distancing themselves from Russia, they are not turning away from it. As they strive to benefit from Russia’s international isolation, they have even deepened relations in some areas. |
| Russia’s war led to strengthened intra-regional cooperation, fostering regional autonomy. |
| More than ever, Central Asia needs to diversify its economic and security relations. The role of players such as China and Türkiye is growing. |
| The war has increased the mutual interest of the EU and Central Asia in diversification. While EU-Central Asia relations are stronger, the EU’s role in the region remains limited. Thus, the EU and Germany should adapt their Central Asia policy. |
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- About the Changing Regional Orders Series
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Due to its war against Ukraine, Russia has lost its role as regional hegemon in Eastern Europe, the South Caucasus, Central Asia, and its impact in the Western Balkans. Moscow not only has to bargain with states in these regions for influence but also with other powers such as China, Türkiye, and Iran. Emerging regional powers and authoritarian governance are challenging the EU’s influence, creating insecurity, transactional relations, and the absence of any functioning order.
The DGAP series “Changing Regional Orders” examines how Russia’s war against Ukraine is reshaping regional orders in these regions, exploring key regional trends and Russia’s changing interests. The series discusses how the EU should adapt to the changing dynamics and their impact on its enlargement and neighborhood policies.
- Further Publications in this series
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Further studies on Eastern Europe and the Western Balkan will follow in 2025.
Since February 2022, Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine has deeply affected the post-Soviet states that neighbor Russia and that Moscow continues to see as its sphere of influence. These include the five countries of Central Asia – Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. All are closely linked to Russia through strong relations related to trade, energy, the military, and migration, as well as their shared Soviet legacy. So far, Russia has served as a security guarantor in the region. For Central Asia, the war has changed the threat perception of Russia, increased the risks of over-dependence, and called Russia’s future role and influence into question. Furthermore, Russia’s changing role impacts the engagement of other players in the region such as China, Türkiye, and the Gulf states. Since the war, Germany and the EU have also been paying increased attention to the resource-rich region with its strategic location between Europe and Asia.
This DGAP Policy Brief examines how the regional order in Central Asia (CA) has been impacted by Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine. It analyzes the changing role of Russia and evolving intra-regional cooperation in CA. It also assesses the role of other key players in the region, including the EU, in terms of regional security as well as economic and political affairs. The paper argues that the war has increased Central Asian efforts to readjust their relations with Moscow, balancing dependence by strengthening international partnerships and intra-regional cooperation while maximizing profits from Russia. Europe is a key partner, but just one among several. Thus, the EU and Germany need to adjust their Central Asia policy to fully exploit the potential and leverage they have in the region due to their significant economic power.
Balancing Proximity and Distance to Russia
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 shattered Moscow’s previous role as a guarantor of security in CA against internal and external threats like terrorism, separatism, and extremism, especially from Afghanistan. This role was based on numerous bilateral military agreements; being the main arms supplier; having military facilities in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan; and its dominance in the regional security alliance, the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). Only a few weeks before its invasion, Russia demonstrated this dominance by deploying CSTO troops – mainly Russian and Belarusian forces – to Kazakhstan. This operation, CSTO’s first combat deployment ever, was implemented “to restore order” there after peaceful protests over rising energy prices escalated into the largest nationwide protests since the country’s independence.
The distancing of the CA states from Russia does not imply a complete breakup.
The start of Russia’s large-scale war against Ukraine marked a watershed event calling both Russia’s capacity and willingness to continue being a security guarantor in the region into question. Russia’s war against Ukraine has not only weakened its military capabilities but has also raised concerns in the Central Asian states about their own territorial integrity. In addition, the war made Russia’s role as a key trading partner and investor in the region uncertain and created fears related to economic instabilities. For example, due to its shared border with Russia and membership in the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), Kazakhstan’s annual inflation rose to 20 percent in December 2022 – the highest since the mid-1990s. In 2023, however, it recovered to almost prewar levels.
As a result, the five Central Asian states have been readjusting their relationship with Russia to reduce dependency and risks. On the one hand, they do not actively support Russia’s war but maintain neutrality – a compromise to avoid both angering Russia and being subject to Western secondary sanctions. This distancing from Moscow, which had already been evident since their non-recognition of the illegal annexation of Crimea, has intensified as they have assessed the risks of over-dependency on Russia. This trend is most visible in Kazakhstan, followed by Uzbekistan. The other three states are more cautious, with Kyrgyzstan remaining closest to Moscow. Moreover, due to high risks and spill-over effects, the war has diminished the attractiveness of Russia’s regional organizations, the EAEU and CSTO, and made further integration rather unlikely.
On the other hand, the ongoing distancing of the Central Asian states from Russia does not imply a complete breakup or a loss of Russia’s significance. Rather, these states aim to mitigate risks associated with over-dependence while simultaneously benefiting from a Russia that is economically weakened, sanctioned, and politically isolated by battling a long war. Consequently, relations are even deepening in some areas. Russia’s isolation from the West has made Central Asia more politically and economically important for the country. In fact, Russian President Vladimir Putin chose to visit all five Central Asian states in 2022 to deepen political ties and reinforce Russia’s regional role – his first foreign visits after the invasion.
While all these states have officially complied with Western sanctions, they have actually turned into key partners for Russia to circumvent sanctions and obtain much-needed military and dual-use technology from the West. This is especially true of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. Their support for Russia stems from economic interest. Increased trade and the relocalization of Russian and international companies to Central Asia, among other factors, have contributed to Central Asia’s economic growth.
Furthermore, Central Asian-Russian energy relations, which were already close, have intensified since the war. In late 2022, Putin proposed a tripartite gas union among Russia, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan to facilitate Russian gas exports to them and also to China. In 2023, Uzbekistan started importing Russian gas via Kazakhstan with plans to increase volumes from 2.8 to 11 billion cubic meters per year by 2026. A domestic energy crisis had caused Tashkent to see the imports as necessary despite its previous concerns about over-dependence. Agreements were also made to increase Russia’s oil exports to Uzbekistan and China via Kazakhstan. For its oil exports, Kazakhstan remains heavily dependent on Russia; around 80 percent of its exports flow through the Russian-controlled Caspian Pipeline. Yet, while this energy interdependence has increased Moscow’s leverages over Central Asia, it also became more dependent on the region. Since 2022, Moscow has needed alternative markets for resources previously supplied to the West. Similarly, the location of the Central Asian states has made them strategically important for Russia’s expansion of alternative transport corridors to countries in the South, including Iran, Afghanistan, and India.
Domestically, Russia’s authoritarian regime and practices to control society have so far been a model for the Central Asian governments. Throughout the region, repression against civil society and media has intensified in recent years. Examples of this trend include the violent suppression of protests in Kazakhstan in 2022, which resulted in 238 deaths and several thousand injured according to official figures, and similar crackdowns on protests in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan that year. The war has reinforced this since external insecurity increases the regimes’ interest in domestic stability. Following Russia’s lead, legislatures throughout the region introduced changes to further restrict media, internet freedom, and civil society organizations. Kyrgyzstan’s 2024 legislation on “foreign representatives,” for example, mirrors Russia’s Foreign Agent Law. It places NGOs that receive foreign funding under strict control and restriction.
However, while serving as a model before, Russia’s current path toward totalitarianism can hardly be viable for Central Asian leaders. Repression alone offers no sufficient answer to the growing societal dissatisfaction, as expressed in the protests and exacerbated by the war’s economic effects. To appease society and ensure regime stability, Kazakhstan’s and Uzbekistan’s presidents have promised economic and political reforms. Yet, economic hardships combined with shrinking civil spaces may lead to future instabilities, especially because the societies of CA are distancing themselves from Russia faster than the region’s political elites. Criticism of Russia and its war is growing, catalyzing societal change and diminishing Russian soft power there. Given that societies in CA have a median age of 26.6 years, major parts of them have not experienced the Soviet Union. Particularly in Kazakhstan and among a young urban population, the strong role of the Russian language and media is increasingly being questioned. Furthermore, whereas Russia had been the main destination for Central Asian labor migrants, rising anti-Central Asian sentiments and stricter migration policies there have now made it less attractive. Recently, Kyrgyzstan’s and Tajikistan’s governments have even issued warnings to their citizens against traveling to Russia. For the regimes of CA, which are highly dependent on the migrants’ remittances, this is very concerning. Thus, the regimes and the societies are seeking alternative destinations.
Evolving Intra-regional Cooperation and Increasing Regional Autonomy
The war has not only caused the Central Asian states to readjust their relations with Russia, but it has also driven them to enhance their political, economic, and military capabilities, fostering greater regional autonomy and resilience. Thus, the war has led to a significant increase in intra-regional cooperation among the five countries, mitigating past tensions. Before Russia’s full-scale invasion, the country’s dominance and integration projects also hindered Central Asian regional integration. In its aftermath, trade turnover among the five has surged by 80 percent since 2018, reaching $11 billion in 2023. In August 2024, at the sixth Consultative Meeting of the Heads of State – a meeting format that has taken place annually since 2018 – the leaders committed to enhancing regional cooperation by approving a roadmap for regional cooperation until 2027 and a concept for a Central Asia 2040 strategy. Next to trade regulation harmonization and linking energy and transport infrastructure, they discussed the importance of forming a common regional identity for the first time. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are driving the emerging integration process, setting an example for the whole region with their progressing bilateral integration. Yet, the future of this cooperation is open. Competition for international trade, foreign investments, and regional leadership may rise alongside cooperation. Its future also hinges on Russia’s role. If Russia feels threatened by integration in CA, it might attempt to block it.
The war has led to a significant increase in intra-regional cooperation among the states of CA.
Diversifying Global Partnerships
In addition to increasing cooperation within their region, the Central Asian regimes are also expanding their engagement with external players to ensure their political, economic, and military security. Due to Russia’s war, the multi-vector foreign policy they had already been pursuing has become even more important. To diversify economically, they are seeking alternative trading partners, transport corridors, and investors.
China was already the key partner to balance Russia before the full-scale war. Since then, Beijing has strengthened its role in the region. Yet, the Central Asian goal is not to replace Russia with China but to work strategically with both. China has surpassed Russia in terms of total trade turnover with CA. In 2023, Beijing was the biggest trade partner of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan – before Russia. In the context of the war, China is using the region as a hub for re-exporting technology to Russia, thus avoiding Western secondary sanctions. Moreover, China is next to Russia a major investor in CA. Through its Belt and Road Initiative, it invests in infrastructure, mining, and energy sectors. Because the war has increased interest in diversifying transport routes, it has accelerated projects like the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan (CKU) railway, which is set to start construction in fall 2024.
However, over-dependency on China poses risks. As China’s role in CA has grown, so too have Central Asia’s reservations toward Beijing and its fear of indebtedness and sovereignty loss. Thus, the governments of the five Central Asian states increasingly intend to counterbalance both Russia’s and China’s role by strengthening additional international partnerships.
Against this background, the presence of other players in CA has risen. Türkiye, for example, is becoming an increasingly important actor, positioning itself as essential to developing transport links between Europe and Asia. Turkish trade relations and investments in the region are growing. In 2023, Türkiye was among the key trading partners of all five Central Asian states. Engagement with Türkiye is also growing multilaterally through the Organization of Turkic States (OTS), a body that has gained importance as the countries of CA look to engage in multinational organizations independent from Russia. The OTS has already enhanced cooperation between Türkiye and Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Azerbaijan in various areas. Such cooperation is fostered by the shared authoritarian regime model and cultural ties. Türkiye enjoys a positive image in Central Asian societies, being the first most favored country in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan and the second in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan (after Russia).
It has also become more important for the Central Asian states to expand relations, transport corridors, and trade toward both the Middle East and South Asia. CA’s engagement with Gulf states has grown in recent years, marked by the first Central Asia-Gulf Cooperation Council Summit in July 2023. The investments made by the Gulf states have increased significantly, particularly in Kazakhstan’s and Uzbekistan’s energy sector and renewables. In 2023, Saudi Arabia became the third largest and UAE the fifth largest investor in Uzbekistan. Moreover, Uzbekistan – based on its pragmatic approach toward the Taliban – and increasingly the other Central Asian states aim to enhance transport links through Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran for better access to the sea and thereby to international markets, including India whose interest in CA has risen too.
Since the five Central Asian states can no longer rely (solely) on Russia’s military protection, they are enhancing alternative security cooperations. Here, China is a key partner. CA’s security cooperation with China that had already been built up before Russia’s war on Ukraine widened, including cooperation related to weapons supplies, military aid, military training and exercises, and increasingly information sharing and law enforcement. Multilaterally, the Central Asian states – except Turkmenistan – cooperate with China within the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), where they focus on countering terrorism, separatism, and religious extremism, as well as on economic and energy security. Security cooperation with Türkiye has also expanded since the start of the full-scale war. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan signed agreements with Türkiye in 2022 and 2023, respectively, for enhanced military cooperation, including training, intelligence sharing, and defense industry collaboration. In 2022, Ankara agreed to export drones to Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan, and signed a deal with Astana to jointly produce Turkish drones in Kazakhstan.
The increased involvement of other players in CA – even in security affairs, and especially concerning China’s strong role – has not led to conflict or competition between Russia and China but rather coexistence and coordination. Because its war has made Russia even more dependent on China, Moscow can hardly risk entering into conflict with Beijing over Central Asia.
In summary, Russia’s full-scale war has increased the need of the five Central Asian regimes to diversify their international partnerships to guarantee their security. Thus, the role of actors like China or Türkiye is widening and the multi-actor environment is getting more complex. Next to the players mentioned above, Europe is a key vector for the Central Asian regimes.
Growing Yet Limited Ties to the EU
Central Asian states are targeting Europe in their diversification efforts in trade, technology, and investments, but they currently consider the EU to be just one key partner among several. Meanwhile, the EU shares CA’s interest in diversification and reducing dependency on Russia; the region’s strategic location and resources – including fossil fuels, renewables, and critical raw materials – also make it attractive. Furthermore, the EU has an interest in regional security as well as enhancing Central Asian resilience and independence from powers like Russia and China.
Based on these mutual interests and building on the EU’s 2019 Central Asia Strategy and Global Gateway Initiative, EU-CA relations have reached a new level since 2022, marked by more high-level meetings and agreements at both the EU and German level. Among EU member states, Germany has taken a leading role. It has maintained diplomatic relations with all five countries since 1992 and was the first EU state to hold a summit with all five leaders in 2023. In September 2024, Chancellor Olaf Scholz traveled to the region for the first time where he held bilateral meetings and attended the second summit. In 2023, Kazakhstan was Germany’s third-largest natural oil supplier. The Swedish-German company Svevind is currently implementing a major green hydrogen project there. Germany is also seeking skilled labor migration from CA. In addition, other EU members, particularly France and Italy, and other Western countries, particularly the United Kingdom and United States, have stepped up their engagement with the region.
Trade relations have grown significantly. In 2022, EU27 goods imports from CA, especially crude oil, gas, and metals, rose by 67 percent. EU exports, especially machinery and transport equipment, increased by 77 percent. In 2023, the EU27 was Kazakhstan’s largest trading partner, accounting for 27.9 percent of its trade – ahead of Russia and China. For Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, the EU27 ranked third; for Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, fifth. The increase is not exclusively positive, however. To some extent, it is also due to Central Asian re-exports to Russia. While the EU has imposed secondary sanctions on a few Central Asian companies, it primarily relies on holding dialogue with the states via the EU Special Envoy for Sanctions and the deterrent effect of secondary sanctions. Both have shown limited results.
The EU has yet to fully exploit the potential and leverage it has in CA.
Collectively, the EU27 is the biggest foreign investor in CA, accounting for around 40 percent of all foreign direct investment in the region. In January 2024, European and international financial institutions committed investments totaling €10 billion to expand the Trans-Caspian Transport Corridor (TCTC), which they plan to help develop into an alternative land corridor between China and Europe, bypassing Russia. Yet, despite a 30 percent increase in container traffic via the TCTC in 2022, the prevailing lack of modern infrastructure and coordination among all actors involved make transport there expensive, risky, and therefore not competitive. In addition to its economic activities in Central Asia, the EU has been implementing programs on border management, combating terrorism, and drug trafficking there for several years.
Yet, despite the EU’s growing engagement and being a key economic partner, its role in CA remains comparably minor. The EU does not play any major security role in the region, and its visibility on the ground is limited. Its engagement faces significant challenges, including the continued close ties of the five Central Asian states to Moscow and the growing role of other players who offer large investments swiftly and without democratic conditions. Furthermore, the lack of civil liberties and rule of law, as well as high corruption, limit economic cooperation with European actors and make investments risky and unattractive for them. Meanwhile, restrictive NGO legislation hampers civil society cooperation. Many of the agreed projects, such as the TCTC or energy and raw materials partnerships, have only produced limited results so far or have yet to be implemented.
Conclusions and Recommendations
Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine has significantly impacted the regional order in CA. It has reinforced existing trends, prompting the five Central Asian countries to reassess their dependencies on Russia and diversify their political, economic, and security partnerships. This has led to an even more complex and dynamic regional order.
The war has heightened the risks of over-dependence on Moscow, driving Central Asian states to seek greater independence while trying to benefit from Russia’s international isolation – a challenging balancing act. For Russia, CA has gained in importance due to the loss of the Western market and a lack of partners. The Central Asian states are acting more confidently toward Russia and on the international stage.
While Russia’s soft power is declining in Central Asian societies, the political regimes continue to learn from Russia’s authoritarian practices to control society and secure their power, shrinking the space and options for civil society throughout the region. In the future, growing divergence between the regimes and their societies could lead to growing instabilities.
The five Central Asian states are seeking to balance Russia’s remaining role and guarantee their security and prosperity in two ways: by enhancing intra-regional cooperation and expanding international partnerships. Due to Russia’s war, intra-regional collaboration has reached a new level, aiming to strengthen regional autonomy and resilience, yet regional integration continues to be limited. Moreover, the war has made Central Asia’s multi-vector foreign policy more important. The region needs to foster growing engagements with multiple external powers, including the EU. Central Asian states are not only seeking to diversify their transport links, trade partners, and foreign investments, but also need new security partners due to Russia’s changing role. China’s strong engagement in the region – the key counterbalance to Russia’s – has continued to grow, along with that of other actors, especially Türkiye and the Gulf states. Their attractiveness as partners for CA and their competitive advantages compared to the EU are based on geographical factors as well as their willingness to make extensive investments regardless of good governance standards.
The role that these actors will play in CA in the future largely depends on the outcome of the war for Russia and the political, economic, and military resources it will be able to make available. China could become even more important for the region, including in security affairs. However, there are also high reservations about over-dependence on Beijing. Central Asia’s quest to diversify its relations will therefore continue and grow. Similarly, the region’s future relations with Russia and Russia’s capacities will influence the development of intra-regional cooperation and the level that genuine integration can attain.
Despite the EU’s growing engagement with CA, its role there remains comparably limited. The EU has yet to fully exploit the potential and leverage it has due to its significant economic power. Therefore, the EU needs to adjust its Central Asia policy. The EU and Germany need to:
- Make a strong and lasting political commitment to the region, including improving coordination among all actors involved, to advance partnerships with all five Central Asian states and compete with other players;
- More closely link cooperation fields and enhance conditionality to adequately respond to domestic developments and use their economic power strategically to leverage economic liberalization, rule of law, good governance, and space for civil society – essential elements for advancing EU-Central Asian cooperation;
- Step up their support for Central Asian initiatives to strengthen intra-regional cooperation;
- More strongly focus on security, a must in the new geopolitical environment, by adapting and expanding current EU programs;
- Expand their efforts to engage with civil societies – especially given the limitations placed on civil society exchange by the regimes – by offering more educational exchange programs and German language courses, as well as facilitating the visa application process to promote people-to-people contacts and skilled labor migration to Europe;
- Develop a coherent, long-term strategy for engaging (or not engaging) with key regional players like Russia, China, and Türkiye; and
- Better coordinate their regional policies, especially toward CA, the EU’s Eastern Neighborhood, and the Black Sea region to address the interconnected challenges presented by Russia’s changing role.
