A report jointly published by the German Council on Foreign Relations and the Asia Society Center on U.S.-China Relations
Co-Chairs
- Melanie Hart, Senior Director, Global China Hub, Atlantic Council
- Andrew Small, Director, Asia Programme, European Council on Foreign Relations
- Evan Medeiros, Penner Family Chair in Asian Studies, Georgetown University
- Angela Stanzel, Senior Research Associate, German Institute for International and Security Affairs
- Elizabeth Economy, Hargrove Senior Fellow and Co-Chair of the Program on the U.S., China, and the World, Hoover Institution at Stanford University
- Jakub Jakóbowski, Deputy Director & Head of the China Department, Centre for Eastern Studies
Rapporteur
- Michael Laha, Senior Research Fellow, Center for Geopolitics, Geoeconomics, and Technology
Table of Content
Views on China from Three Continents: East Asia, Europe, and the United States
Conclusions and Policy Recommendations
A Note from the Co-Hosts
- Thomas Kleine-Brockhoff, Otto Wolff Director of the German Council on Foreign Relations
- Orville Schell, Arthur Ross Vice President of the Asia Society Center on U.S.-China Relations
At a time when conceiving shared approaches to China has been particularly challenging, we are very fortunate to have assembled an impressive group of China experts from the United States, Europe, and East Asia for a conference in October 2025. This community came together in Berlin at a historical low point in relations between the United States and its traditional partners – relations that have since eroded even further. In the months following the conference, the US administration has shaken the foundations of America’s partner system yet again with its capture of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro, threats lobbed at European partners over Greenland, and, most recently, the start of a dangerous war in the Middle East.
At the time of the conference, US tariff wars and mixed messaging on China clouded discussions intended to forge common action in response to China’s chokehold on rare earths (themselves in response to Trump’s tariffs). Nevertheless, participants were clearly committed to identifying ways to sustain collaboration among traditional partners. Some of these efforts now appear to be gaining traction. In early 2026, the United States announced a semiconductor and critical minerals partnership that includes both traditional and non-traditional partners.
To navigate the turbulent period ahead, we will need interlocutors and partners willing to engage in candid dialogue and openly confront our differences. The conference organizers were fortunate to host former chancellor Olaf Scholz for a private evening discussion at the start of the event. In many ways, Scholz speaking to a group of China experts – many of whom have long advocated for an assertive and clear-eyed approach to the People’s Republic – was no typical event. The open-trade idealism of the life-long German social democrat, who spent much of his political life in the Hanseatic trading port of Hamburg, clearly collided with the hard-power realism of this group.
Yet this is exactly the kind of dialogue we need. Intentionally bringing people of differing views together will yield more – especially in these turbulent times – than giving like-minded scholars and strategists space to ruminate in the comfort of common cause. We hope more such events will take place.
Our special thanks go to Ambassador David Lane, Ambassador Kathleen Doherty, and Jeffrey Philipps of The Annenberg Foundation Trust at Sunnylands, as well as Ambassador Daniel Benjamin, Ana Ramic and Rebekka Rexhausen of the American Academy in Berlin. Both institutions were excellent partners in organizing this ambitious gathering. A special thanks also goes to German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP) colleagues Lilly Dieu-Hong Tran and Antonio Fox for ensuring the Berlin conference was a success and to Filip Medunić, also a DGAP colleague, for his support. Our heartfelt thanks also go to Jeffrey Sequeira of the Asia Society Center on U.S.-China Relations and Michael Laha of the German Council on Foreign Relations for overseeing the project with skill and good cheer.
Background
This report is the outcome of two meetings, a preparatory gathering in Buonconvento, Italy, hosted by The Annenberg Foundation Trust at Sunnylands, and a conference in Berlin.. The conference, held at the German Council on Foreign Relations on October 9-11, 2025, gathered more than 30 experts on China from East Asia (South Korea and Japan), Europe, and the United States. The goal was to convene leading scholars and policymakers from traditional partner countries for an interdisciplinary dialogue on China’s evolving role in the international system, with a focus on identifying areas of convergence where coordinated approaches may help mitigate the adverse impacts of China’s foreign policy.
The meeting occurred at a uniquely difficult time in Washington’s relationship with its traditional partners. Partner countries were only just emerging from a monthslong pressure campaign in the form of sweeping US tariffs and demands for new trade pacts. At the same time, Europeans and Americans were scrambling to fend off China’s weaponization of rare earth chokepoints that threaten the semiconductor supply chain.
On the first day of the conference, Beijing announced export controls on rare-earths, rare-earth extraction technology, and battery technology. These appeared timed to respond to new US sanctions on firms that are 50-percent owned by any company on its trade-restricted “Entity List.” A few weeks later, US President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping met on the sidelines of the APEC Meeting in Busan, South Korea, leading to an agreement that both sides would defer these measures by a year. In January, American foreign policy was again upended with the capture of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and the resurgent threat to forcefully take Greenland, a territory belonging to NATO ally Denmark.
The October conference benefited from four co-organizing partners: The Annenberg Foundation Trust at Sunnylands, the American Academy in Berlin, the Asia Society Center on U.S.-China Relations, and the German Council on Foreign Relations. The conference report is co-published by the German Council on Foreign Relations and the Asia Society Center on U.S.-China Relations. It is a compilation of the discussion and main conclusions of the Berlin conference and should not be construed as a participant consensus document.
Participants from the United States are members of the Task Force on US-China Policy, a consortium of leading China specialists who engage on issues in the U.S.-China relationship, in a non-partisan way. The Task Force is convened by Asia Society’s Center on U.S.-China Relations and the University of California San Diego’s 21st Century China Center and is funded by the Carnegie Corporation of New York.
Key Findings
The new Trump administration has left Europeans and East Asians questioning the term “like-minded partners.” To these traditional partners, the United States is not only losing credibility in its foreign policy and security guarantees but is increasingly perceived as a malign actor, with behaviors that are distinct from but occasionally reminiscent of China’s.
Despite difficulties in working with Washington, traditional partners remain willing to coordinate on China. China’s weaponization of supply chains has become a defining feature of its relations with Europe, East Asia, and the United States – most notably in rare earths and other critical raw materials, and increasingly in key industrial inputs such as microchips. Conference participants identified the initiation of joint projects for mining and refining critical raw materials as the most urgent and viable area for cooperation. As of January, and February of 2026, the United States and partner countries had taken steps toward this.
Despite such common interests, the United States has been pulling away from its traditional partners and the set of rules and norms that have long governed these relationships. This has led European and East Asian partner countries to forge closer ties in areas such as security, defense, innovation, and supply chain resilience. This is happening and will likely continue despite Washington’s current desire for these regions to focus primarily on security matters in their own immediate neighborhoods.
Europe is confronting a “China shock.” This emerging economic hollowing out of European industry triggered by Chinese manufacturing overcapacity and cheap exports echoes a similar shock in the United States a number of years ago. However, it remains uncertain whether the link between China and de-industrialization will gain political traction in European public debate. Meanwhile, Europe’s response is constrained by a strong commitment to WTO rules, even as nascent trade engagements and a more forceful use of economic security tools shape an uneven and still-developing strategy.
Russia and China continue to deepen their relationship and are leveraging this partnership to elevate the importance of platforms such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and BRICS as alternatives to Western-led institutions. Despite this convergence, the Russia-China relationship remains marked by underlying unease and competition. At the same time, emerging alternatives for global governance have faced growing pains: Efforts to displace the US dollar have achieved only modest progress, and associated financial institutions remain largely unproven.
Views on China from Three Continents: East Asia, Europe, and the United States
1. Tech, Trade and Economic Coercion
The key issues driving traditional partner countries to reassess their relationship with China are Washington’s aggressive behavior toward its own traditional partners, a changing and uncertain US policy toward China – especially US export controls, China’s chokehold on rare earths, and the emergence of de-industrialization, especially in Europe, driven by intense Chinese competition due to manufacturing overcapacity and innovation.
Citing the “Liberation Day” tariffs and US President Donald Trump’s other measures, such as undermining the EU’s Digital Markets Act, European participants said it had not been possible to advance a prospective transatlantic China agenda in the first year and a half of the new administration. This was despite preparations by the European Commission in Brussels to work with Washington on a shared transatlantic China agenda. While American participants acknowledged that the Trump administration had, at times dangerously, departed from prior China policy and launched attacks on allies and partners, some also expressed frustration that the United States was still expected to take the lead in “pushing” its allies to do more on China.
East Asian partners, such as those from Japan and South Korea, repeatedly questioned whether the term “like-minded” still described their relationship with the United States. They cited the September 2025 raid by US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) on a battery plant operated by the South Korean joint venture Hyundai Motor–LG Energy Solution in Georgia. This generated persistent negative headlines in South Korea and soured public opinion toward the US – especially as it coincided with US efforts to attract further Korean investment.
At this low point in the transatlantic relationship, Brussels sought strategic re-engagement with China. But this yielded few satisfactory results and left Europeans feeling that China was unwilling to cooperate meaningfully on key issues, especially after little progress at the EU-China summit in July 2025.
Washington’s aggressive behavior toward its partners has coincided with a broader departure from established US policy on China. Participants at the conference differed in how they characterized the Trump administration’s approach to China, offering three broad interpretations – either as a “grand reset,” a condition of persistent struggle, or as strategic incoherence. There was consensus, however, that Trump’s China policy marked a clear break from the approach of both President Joe Biden and Trump’s first administration.
Some asserted that the world should be prepared for Trump to target a “great reset” in relations with China, although this would likely trigger a backlash from a number of US constituents, including some in Congress, who strongly oppose such a move. Other participants argued strongly that Congress is not playing its traditional role as a check on the executive branch’s foreign policy, including on US policy toward Taiwan.
Some attendees suggested that the Trump administration has no real China strategy, but only an America First approach. Big Tech will continue to play a major role in shaping US policy toward China, especially as it pertains to export controls.
Yet others characterized US policy on China as in a state of constant struggle leading to an ever-changing series of contradictory policies. This approach could in fact yield unrecoverable concessions in negotiations with China.
Two competing camps within the Trump administration have largely been shaping US export control policy.. One argues that China must be denied access to advanced US chip technologies to prevent their use in military modernization; the other contends that continued exports of high-end semiconductors are necessary to preserve Chinese dependence on American technology. A mixture of these two arguments has produced a varied, at times contradictory, policy in Washington.
This lack of coherence may slow down or hinder an EU effort initiated during the Biden administration to “Europeanize” export control policy. Export policy is primarily the purview of individual member states, making it difficult to formulate a unified European tech policy toward China. Efforts to do so, albeit now uncertain, have also been welcomed by major semiconductor companies such as Dutch machinery maker ASML.
While Washington emerged as a key impediment to closer coordination on China policy, there were two key issues that clearly called for shared action: China’s use of its rare earths chokepoint as a tool of economic coercion and Chinese overcapacity that has led to a flood of cheap goods threatening industry abroad.
European participants acknowledged that Europe’s response to China’s rare earth export controls imposed in April and October 2025 (and then partially suspended) had been a “free-for all.” Instead of acting in unison through the European Commission in Brussels, individual member states had attempted to lobby China’s Ministry of Commerce on their own. This reenforced China’s strategy of dividing Europe to serve its own foreign policy goals. Both European and US participants noted that the checks on military end-use required by China’s controls should be viewed as directly undermining European rearmament efforts.
There was broad agreement that new Chinese licensing requirements and delivery delays for rare earths have created an opportunity for the US and Europe to deepen cooperation with East Asia, particularly Japan. Japan – and to a lesser extent South Korea – offers substantial experience and technological expertise. Japan was compelled to derisk its critical minerals dependence on China after a 2010 boat collision near the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, after which China temporarily halted rare-earth exports to Japan. While European governments have begun gauging vulnerabilities, publishing strategies, and funding select projects, participants assessed that Europe has yet to reach a true “whatever-it-takes” level of commitment.
In addition, with Chinese overcapacity in manufacturing creating intense competition in global exports, European participants warned of a “China shock” capable of devastating its key industrial sectors. Both European and American participants traced how, over the past two decades, the United States had experienced not only an economic shock as cheap Chinese goods decimated US manufacturing, but also a subsequent “national security shock” with China’s growing dominance in advanced technologies possibly threatening supply chains and critical infrastructure. Europeans are now grappling with these shocks years later. Some European participants questioned whether a greater recognition of the pressure Chinese overcapacity is putting on European industry would elicit an adequate European political response.
European action on China remains constrained by a strong commitment to World Trade Organization (WTO) rules, a stance shared by several East Asian partners, in contrast to Washington’s view of the WTO as restrictive. Within Europe, however, there is an emerging discussion about “WTO+” – such as agreements that liberalize trade beyond WTO rules. China features in several ongoing conversations, including with India, Japan, and South Korea. A foreign trade agreement (FTA) with India is getting fresh attention and the Mercosur FTA with Latin America has progressed further than at any point in recent years. At the same time, participants noted that European governments remain insufficiently engaged in shaping technical standards, leaving this largely to industry – despite the strategic importance of standardization, including in areas such as connected vehicles.
2. Indo-Pacific Security
Two key issues driving a closer alignment of European security interests in the Indo-Pacific and East Asian interests in Europe are the role of partners in “globalizing” regional security matters and the intensifying sales of arms between these regions. Participants noted that integration between the European and Indo-Pacific theaters would continue, despite Washington’s stated preference that each region focus primarily on its own security.
European participants acknowledged that Europe “does not have its house in order” to meet the challenges regarding Indo-Pacific security. This lack of readiness is evident not only in Europe’s continued reliance on US security guarantees to deter Russian aggression, but also in its failure to reduce critical dependencies in the Indo-Pacific. This is particularly evident as Europe’s rearmament remains heavily dependent on inputs from China, such as rare earths.
East Asian participants asserted that Europe had a significant role to play in Indo-Pacific security. The focus of such a role would be less the deployment of hard military power or the signing of mutual defense treaties in the region, but rather to “globalize” Asian security matters. For instance, European partners should challenge Beijing’s assertion that the status of Taiwan is solely a domestic matter and not up for international debate. Additionally, Europe has a significant role to play in using sanctions and other economic levers to deter Chinese aggression toward Taiwan. In preparation for a possible Taiwan contingency, such as a Chinese blockade or invasion, Europe has significant work to do. European actors need to prepare and game out what specific sanctioning tools they would be willing to use, what aspects of China’s economy they would target, and how far these measures should go.
A growing number of arms sales between Europe and East Asia are seen as particularly positive and as conducive to wider security cooperation across the Indo-Pacific and European theaters. When Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, South Korea sold substantial lots of ammunition to Poland. Such arms sales will likely be the first of many. There is a growing interest from German industry in arms sales to Taiwan, particularly in drones and sea mines.
These arms sales should be used as springboards to further interlink European and East Asian defense industrial bases and foster distributed production systems and fused innovation streams. For instance, an agreement between the United Kingdom, Italy, and Japan to jointly develop a sixth-generation fighter jet could serve as a template for additional defense cooperation agreements linking East Asia and Europe.
Such efforts should encompass not only conventional military materiel, but also capabilities to counter Chinese gray-zone activities, including offensive cyber operations and undersea cable disruption. China employs these tactics in its region just as Russia is expanding similar activities in Europe. Sharing resilience-building capabilities between Europe and East Asia would enable both regions to strengthen their defenses against their primary adversaries.
3. China-Russia Alignment
The direct security threat to Europe from Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has made the China-Russia relationship central to Europe’s view of China. While the closer ties between China and Russia have produced significant rhetorical and norm-shifting activities, conference participants noted that the two countries had made only modest gains toward becoming a meaningful counterweight to the post-Second World War institutions of traditional partner countries in East Asia, Europe, and North America.
China has begun to more aggressively position itself as a member of an “anti-fascist” coalition, alongside Russia, claiming to safeguard the post-Second World War international order – including by upholding the role of the United Nations and the multilateral system. It pursues this position by borrowing Russian propaganda narratives for its own use. China and Russia both proactively work to shape UN institutions, including technology standardization bodies, to align them with their own policy goals. For example, China has tried to embed common Chinese foreign policy terminology in UN statements, such as “win-win cooperation,” by which Beijing means convincing partners to pursue economic strategies that serve China’s interests.
Beyond engagement in existing international organizations, China has elevated the role of new and separate institutions. In response to Washington’s retreat from global leadership, Beijing has launched a series of ambitious initiatives, including efforts to revitalize the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the release of the Global Governance Initiative in the fall of 2025. Through these efforts, China promotes a governance model that prioritizes sovereignty over rights, including universal rights, and positions these platforms as venues for Global South countries to convene under the auspices of Chinese-led frameworks.
Participants noted that Russia is not always at ease with its relationship with China. It balances relationships with other sanctioned countries and puts forward its own parallel ideas, such as the Eurasian Security Partnership, to signal its own initiatives alongside China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Others suggested that China’s 2023 Global Security Initiative mirrored Russia’s existing Eurasian Security architecture, suggesting that China may also be looking to launch initiatives that challenge Russian influence.
Despite these limitations, platforms such as the SCO are likely to grow in influence – particularly if a proposed SCO development bank is established without Western participation and operates in renminbi. At the same time, the ascendency of groupings such as the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) and BRICS+ should be assessed with caution. Their recent expansion has coincided with greater internal disunity. In 2025, BRICS for the first time failed to issue a ministerial statement due to disagreements over the war in Gaza and broader tensions among existing members, a development that frustrated both China and Russia and is likely to recur.
The G7 has sought greater outreach toward the Global South, but conference participants broadly agreed that Global North countries must do more to engage the Global South. A key litmus test for whether BRICS can function as a meaningful alternative to Western institutions will be whether its development bank resumes projects in Russia. Taken together, these trends point toward a gradual drift into spheres of influence – framed in more benign terms such as “multipolarity” by China – but carrying significant strategic implications.
Discussions also coalesced around the role of China expertise in the future. East Asian participants noted for instance that there has been a decrease in the number of China experts in South Korea and that China expertise is in less demand when left-leaning governments are in power, as they tend to focus on cooperation rather than challenging Beijing. European participants noted the important role of China experts in informing domestic debates on China, in particular Chinese technology and industrial policy. These knowledge deficits on China continue to be notable in European public and political discourse.
Conclusions and Policy Recommendations
Sign critical raw material partnerships: To accelerate de-risking from dependence on Chinese rare earths, the United States and partner countries must work together to initiate critical raw material projects. Reports since the Berlin conference suggest that a competitive dynamic has developed whereby Europeans approach countries rich in raw materials for projects, only to find that the Americans have beat them to it. This creates a spiral of disengagement that undermines coordination among allies and partner countries and risks exacerbating ongoing tensions. If the United States is unwilling to collaborate, East Asian and European countries should forge partnerships directly. That said, on February 4, the United States hosted the Critical Minerals Ministerial, inviting 54 countries and the EU Commission to Washington, DC, to discuss diversifying supply chains and launch the Forum on Resource Geostrategic Engagement (FORGE) which will replace the Biden-era Critical Minerals Partnership (CMP). This occurred just weeks after the launch of the Pax Silica initiative to form partnerships around semiconductors.
Connect de-industrialization with China: While the United States already experienced a “China shock” some years ago, a similar shock is afflicting European partner countries today. However, it remains uncertain whether European politicians will launch adequate measures in response to the role of Chinese industrial policy in European de-industrialization. Nevertheless, it is notable that Europe has taken crucial first steps, including its proposal for an Industrial Accelerator Act (IAA) aimed at imposing local content rules and stricter FDI screening measures in key sectors such as batteries. Experts on China should continue to analyze these connections and communicate their findings to their respective audiences.
Define new groupings and shared concepts: European and East Asian partners need to devise shared narratives independent of the United States. New groupings of countries must weather not only the absence of US leadership but also pressure and acts of division by both the United States and China. In the absence of US leadership, a set of shared defensive measures regarding Chinese foreign policy is more likely to succeed than offensive measures. In finding new vocabulary to describe shared goals, European and East Asian partners should dispense with old terminology such as “like-minded countries,” as many feel this harks back to former US leadership but no longer accurately describes its behavior.
Expand arms sales between East Asian and European partners: The ongoing war in Ukraine and continued instability in the East China and South China Seas mean that higher defense spending will remain a medium- to long-term necessity. Arms sales between European and East Asian countries should be used as springboards for broader security cooperation between these two theaters.
Devise ways of globalizing Asian security: European partners are likely to remain focused on rearming to deter Russia. Yet Europe’s security also depends on resilient and undisrupted supply chains, which depend on China or the region around it. Highlighting this linkage can help sustain European engagement in East Asia by framing regional security as a global challenge – without requiring Europe to deploy hard military assets to the region.
Closely monitor Russian and Chinese cooperation and challenge their shared narratives: The US retreat from global institutions such as the World Health Organization and the retirement of its development agency USAID has not led to an automatic backfilling of projects by China and/or Russia. Despite this, the United States and traditional partners needs to carefully monitor Chinese and Russian influence activities globally and regularly assess their real impact.
Foster new forms of engagement in which China serves as a grounding topic: There is a growing need within European and East Asian countries for China expertise. This growing need arises at a time when interest in studying China, its language, and political system is receding. New exchange formats for China experts should be initiated, including with and between so-called middle powers, for instance a proposed Canada-US Commission on China which would foster bilateral ties on issues pertaining to China. It is especially important to expand such initiatives between Global North and Global South countries in order to proactively to counter Chinese narratives.
Course-correct to achieve allied scale: Washington is not just fast losing standing and credibility among its traditional partner countries – it is also sometimes now perceived as a malign actor, even drawing comparisons, rather than contrasts, with China. Without its traditional partners, the United States lacks allied scale in meeting the China challenge. The Trump administration needs to course correct and embark on a more collaborative phase in its foreign policy.
- Conference Participants
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- Sari Arho Havrén, Associate Fellow, Royal United Services Institute (RUSI)
- Daniel Benjamin, President, American Academy in Berlin [October 9 only]
- Una Bērziņa-Čerenkova, Head of Asia programme, Latvian Institute of International Affairs
- Jae-Ho Chung, former Ambassador of the Republic of Korea to China; Professor of Political Science and International Relations, Seoul National University (retired)
- Robert Daly, Visiting Professor of the Practice and director of the Center on China and the United States at the University of Maryland
- John Delury, Professor of Chinese Studies, Yonsei University (former)
- Kathleen Doherty, Vice President, The Annenberg Foundation Trust at Sunnylands
- Elizabeth Economy, Hargrove Senior Fellow and co-chair of the Program on the U.S., China, and the World, Hoover Institution at Stanford University
- Alexander Gabuev, Director, Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center
- Melanie Hart, Senior Director, Global China Hub, Atlantic Council
- Antonia Hmaidi, Senior Analyst, Mercator Institute for China Studies (MERICS)
- Jakub Jakóbowski, Deputy Director & head of the China Department, Centre for Eastern Studies (OSW)
- Ken Jimbo, Managing Director, International House of Japan
- Marc Julienne, Director, Center for Asian Studies, French Institute of International Relations (Ifri)
- Hyunwook Kim, President, Sejong Institute
- Thomas Kleine-Brockhoff, Director, German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
- Michael Laha, Senior Research Fellow, German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
- Tobias Lindner, Senior Associate Fellow, DGAP; former Minister of State, German Federal Foreign Office [July 14-16, 2025 in Buonconvento, Italy; October 10, 2025 evening in Berlin, Germany]
- Angela Köckritz, Chief Correspondent, Table.Briefings
- Evan Medeiros, Penner Family Chair in Asian Studies & Cling Family Senior Fellow in U.S.-China Relations, Georgetown University
- Filip Medunić, Research Fellow, German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
- Rana Mitter, S.T. Lee Professor of U.S.-Asia Relations, Harvard Kennedy School [July 14-16, 2025 in Buonconvento, Italy]
- Jeffrey Phillips, Director, Policy & International Partnerships, The Annenberg Foundation Trust at Sunnylands
- Ana Ramic, Vice President & Chief of Staff, American Academy in Berlin
- Danny Russel, Distinguished Fellow, Asia Society Policy Institute (ASPI)
- Orville Schell, Arthur Ross Vice President, Asia Society Center on U.S.-China Relations
- Claudia Schmucker, Head of the Center for Geopolitics, Geoeconomics, and Technology, German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
- Jeffrey Sequeira, Associate Director, Asia Society Center on U.S.-China Relations
- David Shambaugh, Gaston Sigur Professor of Asian Studies, Political Science & International Affairs & Director of the China Policy Program, Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University
- Susan Shirk, Research Professor; Director Emeritus, 21st Century China Center at UC San Diego [July 14-16, 2025 in Buonconvento, Italy]
- Andrew Small, Director, Asia Programme, ECFR (incoming)
- Angela Stanzel, Senior Research Associate, German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP)
- Rachel Tausendfreund, Senior Research Fellow (USA), DGAP
- Akio Takahara, Distinguished Visiting Professor, Tokyo Woman’s Christian University; Emeritus Professor, University of Tokyo
- Yukyung Yeo, Professor, Kyung Hee University
- About the Partners
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The Annenberg Trust at Sunnylands
For more than 40 years, Ambassadors Walter and Leonore Annenberg welcomed political, business, educational, and entertainment leaders to Sunnylands, their 200-acre winter home in Rancho Mirage, California. In 2001, the couple established The Annenberg Foundation Trust at Sunnylands to preserve the estate as a place where world leaders could meet to discuss issues of national and international importance. They also specified that the Trust provide the public with opportunities to learn about Sunnylands’ unique place in history. Fostering world peace and international agreement is one of the pillars of the Sunnylands mission. Given its California locale, Sunnylands is keenly interested in advancing relations among nations in the Greater Pacific and the Western Hemisphere. Heads of state, diplomats, business executives, and academic and civic leaders from throughout Asia and Latin America have participated in past convenings to discuss potential solutions to pressing regional and world issues. The U.S.-China relationship looms large in this focus area. Following the summit between former U.S. President Barack Obama and Chinese President Xi Jinping at Sunnylands in 2013, Sunnylands has partnered with the Asia Society, Brookings Institution, Stanford University’s Hoover Institution, and others to examine and analyze the relationship between the two countries.
The American Academy in Berlin
Since the Academy opened its doors, in 1998, it has built up an extensive and enduring network in the academic, cultural, political, and corporate communities of the United States and Germany. Its cross-cultural, interdisciplinary environment and creative programming have made the Academy a highly regarded center in Germany and beyond, leading the German newsweekly Der Spiegel to describe the American Academy in Berlin as “the world’s most important center for American intellectual life outside the United States.” Each year, the Academy awards roughly 20 semester-long Berlin Prize fellowships to outstanding scholars, writers, and artists from the United States. Fellows, who come from the humanities, social sciences, public policy, and the arts, pursue independent projects in a residential community at the Hans Arnhold Center, a historic villa on Lake Wannsee.
The Asia Society Center on U.S.-China Relations
In the years to come, an open and collaborative relationship between the United States and China will be essential to global peace, security, balanced economic growth and environmental sustainability. To help forge a more constructive bilateral relationship, Asia Society established the Center on U.S.-China Relations in 2006 with a generous gift from the late Arthur Ross. In seeking new ways of building mutual understanding between the U.S. and China, the Center undertakes projects and events which explore areas of common interest and divergent views between the two countries, focusing on policy, culture, business, media, economics, energy and the environment. The Center is based at Asia Society’s New York City headquarters and works closely with other Asia Society Centers around the world.
The German Council on Foreign Relations
The German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP) is committed to fostering impactful foreign and security policy on a German and European level that promotes democracy, peace, and the rule of law. Since its founding in 1955, the nonpartisan organization’s members and research have continued to shape the debate on foreign policy issues in Germany. DGAP’s experts provide decision-makers in politics, business, and civil society with strategic advice based on their foreign policy research and train young professionals in international leadership programs. The German-language journal Internationale Politik (IP), which is published by DGAP, starts off where the news stops. Published every two months, IP is available by subscription and sold at bookstores found in railway stations and airports throughout Germany.
