Policy Workshop in Tunis: February 25–27, 2016, Tunis
What factors provide fertile ground for terrorist groups in Tunisia? Who are the main actors? What is the profile of their members? And what is their agenda? How are the different groups and actors interconnected? What makes extremist groups appealing, particularly to young people, in post-revolutionary Tunisia? How do such organizations recruit new members, and what roles do propaganda and the media play? What are the Tunisian state’s counter-terrorism strategies, and what methods does it use to tackle radicalization? What can the international community contribute to counterweigh the terrorist trend in Tunisia? These and other questions were discussed during a three-day policy workshop organized by the EU-Middle East Forum of the DGAP’s MENA program in cooperation with the Robert Bosch Stiftung, the German Federal Foreign Office, the Institute for Foreign Cultural Relations (ifa), and Le Labo’ Démocratique. Some 19 young and mid-level experts from Tunisia, Morocco, the Palestinian territories, Germany, the UK, Spain, and Italy participated in the workshop, which was held in Tunis under Chatham House rule.
The increasing number of terrorist attacks in Tunisia has cast a shadow on the progress and transition that was sparked by the uprisings in 2011. While terrorist groups initially focused on military personnel and national security forces, more recent attacks have also targeted civilians, particularly in tourist attractions. Among the most active terrorist organizations are Ansar al-Shari’a (AS-T) and Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). Tunisia also has one of the largest numbers of Islamic State (IS) recruits as well as fighters returning. The turmoil in bordering Libya and Algeria has further contributed to the destabilization of Tunisia’s security environment.
There was broad consensus that Islamist militancy in Tunisia existed long before it resurfaced after the uprisings in 2011. Workshop participants identified four “generations” of jihadis contributing to today’s Tunisian jihadi movement. The first generation comprises those who joined the war in Afghanistan in 2001, followed by a second generation of jihadis who fought in Iraq after the US invasion in 2003. A third generation was radicalized in Tunisian prisons, while those who joined the movement after 2011 constitute a fourth generation.
At the same time, it was pointed out that the jihadi movement in Tunisia is struggling with internal divisions. After AS-T was banned, many of its followers have joined the ranks of either IS or its rival, Jabhat al-Nosra, creating a split within the jihadi movement. It was predicted that internal and external dynamics will likely intensify this rivalry as Islamist movements compete for territory, resources, and influence.
A key factor underlying radicalization is a deep anti-systemic feeling caused by a disrupted identification – or non-identification – of individuals with the Tunisian state. Two aspects were emphasized in this context: the existence of a national identity crisis and the marginalization of large parts of the population on different socioeconomic and political levels. It was argued that extremist groups benefited from the lack of a credible alternative identity narrative after the regime of Zine el-Abidine Ben-Ali came to an end. In contrast to the new and weak government, radical groups appeared to offer a strong and simple counter narrative. The use of social media has facilitated the spread of such narratives and the establishment of jihadi “brands.”
While opinions differed on what strategies were most suitable to effectively tackling terrorism and radicalization, there was wide agreement that the Tunisian state’s focus on security measures was insufficient and even had a negative impact on the democratic transition process. Several recommendations were developed drawing on the experiences of one Tunisian and one German NGO that both work on deradicalization.
Suggested policies include the political integration of the Tunisian Salafist movement. Instead of monopolizing the religious sphere, the state should foster an environment of open discussion within democratic and legal boundaries. State commitment to the democratization process and transitional justice was considered crucial, and a stronger focus on the inclusion of marginalized regions and people was strongly recommended.
With regard to the international community, a plea was made for increased international and regional cooperation in the Maghreb, for example by establishing international police stations at the borders and encouraging closer cooperation between international and national organizations in the field of deradicalization.
