Policy Workshop, October 1–3, 2015, Berlin
Egypt has witnessed a dramatic increase in terrorist attacks since former President Mohamed Morsi was ousted in July 2013. North Sinai is the center of this insurgency, which that has killed hundreds of people, mainly members of the security services but civilians as well. The group called SP (Province of Sinai, originally Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis) is the principal terrorist group active in Sinai and is allied with ISIS. The group has recently also claimed responsibility for attacks in Egyptian urban centers. Ajnad Misr (Soldiers of Egypt) and the Al Qaeda group al-Murabitun are next on the list of major militant actors. There are also smaller groups with unfamiliar names appearing on the scene. Increasingly, attacks targeting civilian hotspots are carried out on a regular basis and remain unclaimed.
Workshop participants broadly agreed that the problems of Sinai go back to the 1980s and that the peninsula showcases a history of total neglect by the government and discrimination against the region’s original inhabitants, the Bedouins. As a result, Bedouin loyalty to the state was compromised decades ago, offering fertile ground for collaboration with militant groups in Sinai and/or additions to their ranks. Workshop participants stressed that a group such as the SP has more difficulty absorbing new young members than actually finding recruits. And despite the powerful messages conveyed through Internet and satellite channels, it is in fact the personal contact on the ground that convinces young people they wish to join militant groups.
A clear distinction was made between members of Al Qaeda and members of ISIS and ISIS-affiliated groups today. The former are guided much more by ideology and intellectual indoctrination, submitting to long training periods, while ISIS-affiliated groups today allow new members to join very quickly, using ideology as an instrument but capitalizing more on the emotions of recruits and the concept of empowering them. This is perhaps a reason for why the ISIS base fluctuates and might not prove as solid and sustainable as Al Qaeda’s.
Workshop participants also reiterated that the SP differs in many aspects from ISIS in Syria and Iraq. The group relies heavily on locals for information, support, and logistics. While they profit through their allegiance to ISIS in terms of manpower (returnees from Syria and Iraq), propaganda, and weapons supply, they cannot afford to be as harsh in their treatment of locals as ISIS is in Iraq and Syria, for example.
As far as deradicalization is concerned, several participants urged an examination of the experience of Al Gamaa al-Islamiyya. This former Egyptian terrorist group, involved in the assassination of Egyptian president Anwar al Sadat in 1981 and active in numerous terrorist activities in the 1990s, officially renounced violence in 2003 and has redefined its ideology to urge nonviolent social and political activism. It was noted that lessons could be drawn that would be helpful in dealing with jihadists today. Participants disagreed about the Egyptian government’s current policies and methods in combatting terrorism and how to create a balance between maintaining security and fostering political openness, particularly in the short run. But there was broader consensus in the workshop that the current severe closure of the political sphere is indeed fueling more radicalization. Rather: peaceful means of expression are essential to constructively channel frustration.
Short-term policies suggested by participants were, for example, that the government signal a shift in its approach and change its tactics from targeting civilians and using collective punishment. An explosion of IEDs, for example, should not be countered with a massive destruction of the area regardless of civilian casualties. The military should try to win the support of local Sinai inhabitants by also showing its own vulnerability and its need for their help and intelligence. The workshop agreed that “changing the narrative” about Sinai was core. Consensus was also present concerning mid- and long-term policies, namely that socio-economic development and inclusive economic growth must be given central importance.
Attending the workshop (October 1–3, 2015) were 23 mid-level and senior experts from Egypt, Morocco, Turkey, Germany, the UK, Switzerland, France, and the Czech Republic. It was realized with the kind support of the Robert Bosch Stiftung and the German Federal Foreign Office.
