Jun 19, 2020

German participation more symbolic than tactical

Prof. Malcolm Chalmers and Tom Plant, Royal United Services Institute, United Kingdom
Photo and pull quote from Tom Plant for the nuclear sharing article

This is not a matter to which senior policy makers give much thought. Insofar as some thought is given, the DCA capability is seen to be a primarily symbolic one, reassuring the US that the DCA states are committed to nuclear deterrence. There are no doubt nuclear planners who worry about capability gaps in some scenarios were dual-key DCA no longer available in Germany. There is probably some interest at technical levels on whether new low-yield US SLBM (submarine-launched ballistic missile) warheads replace DCA B61 capabilities, and/or whether future air-based nuclear capabilities need to be missile-launched to be credible, given Russian air defenses. But the primary lens through which this is viewed is symbolic. The question is not about why Germany and DCA, therefore, but about why not. There is a bias in favor of the status quo.

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Bibliographic data

Prof. Malcolm Chalmers, Deputy Director-General, Royal United Services Institute (RUSI)

Tom Plant, Director of Proliferation and Nuclear Policy Programme, Royal United Services Institute (RUSI)