Jun 19, 2020

Alternate measures of showing German commitment to deterrence would be key

Prof. Malcolm Chalmers and Tom Plant, Royal United Services Institute, United Kingdom
Fighter jet on the deck of an aircraft carrier

The likely UK reaction would firstly be to try to understand why Germany wanted to do this, and in particular whether it was part of a wider rejection of nuclear deterrence. If it was, this would be very serious and would lead to escalation of the engagement to a very senior level. Assuming it was not, the UK would likely want to help to find ways that Germany could reassure its allies – especially the US but also the UK – that it was taking other steps to provide this reassurance, and in the meantime get reassurance that the process would take some time to carry out. These measures could include more US DCA deployments into Germany and/or more German conventional spending or commitments, and/or German commitment to supporting the DCA of other allies. Provided Germany made it clear that it wanted to reassure, the UK instinct would be to try to avoid this becoming a threat to Alliance cohesion, and try to kick the issue into the long grass in a NATO committee. It would not want to encourage the US to generate a big public row, although probably would not able to do much to stop this under this administration.

Share

Bibliographic data

Prof. Malcolm Chalmers, Deputy Director-General, Royal United Services Institute (RUSI)

Tom Plant, Director of Proliferation and Nuclear Policy Programme, Royal United Services Institute (RUSI)