Finland: Charly Salonius-Pasternak

Historically and as a whole, nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence are rarely discussed in public in Finland, either in official public documents or by members of the government. When the subject is broached, it is within a broader framework of arms reduction/disarmament discussions, or during the past few years through an acknowledgement that nuclear weapons have reentered broader discussions about security (in a way not seen since the Cold War). However, in private, almost all politicians recognize that nuclear weapons have historically had a stabilizing influence, and quite a few see that nuclear weapons and the deterrence they provide are an aspect of strategic stability. Among some there is a wistful sense of a lost opportunity in the late 2000s–early 2010s, when “things could have gone another way,” with Obama talking about Global Zero, NATO discussing whether there was a need for (US) tactical weapons in Europe etc. However, with the rather rapid recent changes nuclear deterrence is now recognized in Finland as a key tool in maintaining stability (particularly among the senior civil servants). It is rarely if ever acknowledged, that during the Cold War this strategic stability also benefited Finland; though the dark side was that apparently both NATO and the Warsaw Pact  quite a few nukes on Finnish territory.

Germany’s role in NATO is again under debate; and clearly, the United States (not only Trump) feels that Germany is not carrying the burden it should. German withdrawal would explode the US-German relationship, which has already suffered in past years. Without participation in nuclear sharing Germany’s role in NATO would change dramatically. There is in Finland a keen appreciation of the domestic policy issues at hand, and that because of it, multiple governments have “kicked the can down the street,” in terms of replacing the capabilities that make Germany’s contribution possible. Ultimately, German participation is seen as good, and unless it was as a component of a long-term and thoughtful NATO-wide process and reevaluation of how “the nuclear bit” is done, “it would be scary if Germany withdrew unilaterally.”

If Germany left, it would open a Pandora’s box. The view is that multiple NATO member states east of Germany would want to participate – with Poland mentioned explicitly (and not positively) – and that this would likely have many negative consequences.

Russian responses would be immediate and long-term; any chance of rapprochement would disappear for a long time. It would also upset the newfound balance in the Baltic Sea region (BSR), with direct consequences to Finland and other BSR littorals. An offence-defense arms race cycle would be likely, with Russia feeling forced to significantly strengthen its western defenses, “requiring” a response by NATO etc. etc. In one sentence: Unilateral German withdrawal from (technical) nuclear sharing would have significant negative consequences for European security.