Dmitri Trenin visits the DGAP to discuss Moscow’s Syria policy and the Kremlin’s regional and international ambitions
Russia’s Syria policy reflects the Kremlin’s international political ambitions and its efforts to clarify its relationship with the West. Certainly in some aspects of its security policy, it is keen to catch up with the US. Dmitri Trenin pointed out the extent to which Russian policy in recent years has beeb determined by contention with the West. Increasingly emphatic confrontations followed the cooperative phase that initially marked the fight against terrorism. After the attacks of September 11, 2001, Russia at first made a point of standing by Washington’s side. Within a few years, however, Vladimir Putin was moving in a direction that emphasized Russia’s independence in foreign policy matters. The Kremlin bristled at the hegemonic claims of the US and used the Russian-Georgian war of 2008 to make a display of power politics within its own neighborhood. The relationship with the US declined further during Putin’s third presidential term. Putin’s stance toward Washington was increasingly intransigent, with the case of Edward Snowden serving as a particularly vivid example.
Despite reciprocal estrangement, Russia remains on the lookout for partners both in Europe and in America. This will stay the case for its Middle East policy as elsewhere. Trenin emphasized that the door has by no means been shut on a new security cooperation between Russia and the West. “There are many problems that we can address together. The Middle East is a region in which we have common interests. I believe that Syria and Iran will bring us together.”
Russia’s Return to the International Stage
Presidents Obama and Putin had exchanged views on the situation in the Middle East when they met in the context of the recent G20 summit in St. Petersburg. Even if it cannot match Washington in terms of economic power, it is in terms of security that Russia wishes to match the US as a shaping and stabilizing power. According to Trenin, the fact that Russia is now able to negotiate as an equal partner with the US in this realm marks an important milestone – even if this relates solely to the Syria question.
Russia has stood on the security sidelines for years. Now, however, Moscow has managed to transform the problematic case of Syria into an opportunity. Russia was able to deter the US from a military strike by proposing the destruction of Syria’s chemical weapons. Great Britain had already made it plain to Washington that it would not follow suit. Putin then announced that Russia would be willing to participate in sending peacekeeping troops to Syria. According to Trenin, all of this initially marked more of a tactical move than a fully developed Middle East strategy. Russia intends, however, to play a larger role in the future not only in Syria but also in Iran and Afghanistan.
The Syrian Card
Trenin made it clear that Russia’s engagement in Syria has first and foremost to do with international policy. Through its involvement Moscow seeks to strengthen those structures that will give it the greatest influence. It was thus extremely important to President Putin that the UN Security Council once again be brought into play in the question of Syria. The second substantial motive informing Russia’s Syria policy is its desire to prevent radical Islamic forces from coming to power in response to the recent upheavals in the Middle East. Moscow never tires of emphasizing that it is pursuing a common interest with the West in this regard.
According to Trenin, it was not until the civil war that Syria’s president, Bashar al-Assad became a Russian partner Moscow does see him as an important factor in the country’s past as well as future stability. Meanwhile, Russia’s oft-cited but frequently overestimated economic interests in Syria played a subordinate role. Syria does not even count among Russia’s five most important arms clients. The fourth motive often cited by Russia for its involvement in Syria is that it sees itself as a power protecting Christians in the Middle East.
Ewald Böhlke, director of the DGAP’s Berthold Beitz Center, emphasized in remarks made after the speech that “Syria is opening up a new perspective for Russia in the entire Middle East, and on a global level.” Moscow is in the process of building up is own network in the region, and it will not be overly hasty in withdrawing again. At the same time, however, Russia does not have the foreign policy or security resources to push its agenda through on its own in the vast area south of its border. “Moscow needs partners,” says Böhlke. For this the Europeans are first and foremost worth considering, while Iran is practically a natural ally within the region.
For Russia as well as for Europe, the Middle East presents an important field of action. “It is in the interest of both sides to work together to find paths for stabilizing the security situation in this neighboring region,” said Böhlke, criticizing the European Union’s foreign and security policy for continuing to largely rule out the idea of working together with Russia. This relates not only to the Middle East but also to the European neighborhood. The potential value of Europe’s contribution to such a cooperation, however, is not to be underestimated: As Böhlke put it, “Europe’s experience in forging compromise is needed in all regions.” If Russia learns how to make compromises in foreign policy, this could have a positive effect on the overall development of democracy in the country.
Dmitri Trenin, director of the Carnegie Moscow Center, was invited to the Berthold Beitz Center at the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP) on October 14, 2013 to give a speech and participate in a discussion with Ewald Böhlke, head of the center. Paul Freiherr von Maltzahn, the DGAP’s general secretary, moderated the discussion.
