Belgium: Prof. Dr. Alexander Mattelaer

Belgium contributes personnel and means to NATO’s nuclear deterrence and subscribes to the notion that NATO will remain a nuclear alliance as long as nuclear weapons exist. Despite the controversy this policy occasionally generates, Belgium has supported NATO’s nuclear deterrence because of three reasons.

1. Foremost, the NATO’s deterrence posture has made unrestrained conflict with Russia nearly unthinkable. The enduring success thereof has provided the foundation of European security.
2. By making the security of all allies indivisible, it has obviated the need of more allies to acquire nuclear arsenals of their own – thus countering proliferation pressures.
3. NATO’s nuclear-sharing arrangements have provided participating allies with a meaningful voice on deterrence matters they would not have had otherwise. This aligns with Belgium’s longstanding preference for multilateral solutions and dialogue. 

German participation in NATO’s nuclear sharing (together with that of other DCA nations) helps ensure that the NATO’s nuclear posture is not shaped by the nuclear weapon states alone and that the voice of other allies gets taken into account – at least to some extent. By sharing the effort and risk the nuclear mission entails, these nations contribute to sharing the overall burden within the Alliance in a way that is unique – and therefore difficult to compensate conventionally. DCA constitute a unique tool for signaling purposes and strengthening the credibility of extended deterrence. Finally, NATO’s indivisible nuclear bond has helped to pacify (inter alia) the Franco-German rivalry for European dominance – the ultimate specter haunting Belgian national security thinking. In essence, discontinuing nuclear sharing would raise the question of how committed Germany remains to its own security as well as that of its neighbors.

The first-order effect would be the increased polarization of the European security debate. If Germany were to discontinue the nuclear mission, it would in all likelihood increase political pressure in other capitals to either follow suit (thus ‘exporting’ the intra-government disagreements we see in Berlin today) or alternatively intensify the calls for others to take Germany’s place (e.g. by Poland joining the community of DCA nations and destabilizing the relationship with Russia further). In the absence of Alliance unity, the second-order effect would be the progressive weakening of NATO’s deterrence posture – which would become increasingly reliant on the (already tenuous) willingness of Washington, London and Paris to underwrite NATO deterrence and leave Europe’s eastern flank more exposed. The third-order effect might encompass the erosion of the Euro-Atlantic order and the rekindling of Westphalian dynamics on the European continent itself – hardly a prospect that any Belgian government would welcome.