

DGAPbericht

Forschungsinstitut der
Deutschen Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik

N° 9

Kathrin Brockmann, Hans Bastian Hauck, Stuart Reigeluth (eds.)

From Conflict to Regional Stability

Linking Security and Development

New Faces Conference 2007

Toledo International Centre for Peace (CITpax)

Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior (FRIDE)

Development Assistance Research Associates (DARA)

5–7 November 2007, Madrid, Spain



DGAP

Deutsche Gesellschaft
für Auswärtige Politik e.V.

Kathrin Brockmann, Hans Bastian Hauck, Stuart Reigeluth (eds.)

From Conflict to Regional Stability

Linking Security and Development

New Faces Conference 2007

Toledo International Centre for Peace (CITpax)

Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior (FRIDE)

Development Assistance Research Associates (DARA)

5–7 November 2007, Madrid, Spain

German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)

Berlin 2008

With the support of:

Robert Bosch **Stiftung**

CITpax
TOLEDO INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR PEACE



FRIDE
FUNDACION
PARA LAS RELACIONES INTERNACIONALES
Y EL DIÁLOGO EXTERIOR

VERTEIDIGUNG - BEVÖLKERUNGSSCHUTZ - SPORT
DEFENSE - PROTECTION DE LA POPULATION - SPORTS
DIFESA - PROTEZIONE DELLA POPOLAZIONE - SPORT
DEFENSIÓN - PROTECCIÓN DA LA POPULAZIUN - SPORT

Kompetenzbereich Wissenschaft und Technologie



Contents

Introduction	5
From Conflict to Regional Stability: Linking Security and Development	7
<i>Foreword by J. Christer Elfverson, former Director, United Nations</i>	
Panel I: The Security-Development Nexus	
The Security-Development Nexus: A Structural Violence and Human Needs Approach	11
<i>Robert Mudida</i>	
Towards Effective and Integrative Inter-Organizationalism	23
<i>Joachim Koops</i>	
EU Institutions' and Member States' Approaches to Promoting Policy Coherence of Development and Security	33
<i>Isabelle Tannous</i>	
Panel II: Africa	
Critical Review of Approaches to Post-Conflict Reconstruction in Africa	41
<i>Richard Akum</i>	
Helping a Continent to Help Itself: Institutional Capacity Building in Africa.	53
<i>Benedikt Franke</i>	
From National Security to Human Security—Less of the Same in Congo?	63
<i>Zoë Marriage</i>	
Panel III: Asia	
Securitization against Democratization: War on Terrorism, Authoritarian Liberalism, and Neo-Liberalism in Post-9/11 Southeast Asia	71
<i>Bonn Juego</i>	
The Aceh Conflict, the EU and the Security-Development Nexus in Asia	83
<i>Saponti Baroowa</i>	
Panel IV: Middle East	
The Security-Development Nexus in Iraq	95
<i>Michael Polyak</i>	
Turkey's Emerging Role in the Middle East	105
<i>Özge Genç</i>	

Panel V: Europe

ESDP Missions and European Union Mechanisms for Police Reform:

The Cases of Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina 113

Isabelle Maras

The Western Balkans and Sustainable Security 123

Tomislav Ivančić

Kosovo and the Divided Region of Mitrovica 135

Gabriella Save

Armenia and the EU: Geo-strategic Democracy. 143

Kimana Zulueta-Fülscher

Participants and Organizers. 155

Participating Institutes. 158



H. E. José María Figueres Olsen, former President of Costa Rica, in his sweeping presentation on global climate change and its consequences

Introduction

The International Forum on Strategic Thinking is DGAP's main instrument for promoting young professionals and scholars in the area of foreign and security policy. Its annual New Faces Conferences gather 20 promising young professionals and scholars pursuing an active career in international organizations, government, NGOs, think tanks and academia. Participants present their own research, compare arguments and approaches, and share feedback and constructive criticism through a forum of like-minded peers. This workshop-style format permits for open dialogue and intense debates, while deepening understanding and broadening professional contacts. For more than a decade, DGAP's New Faces Conferences have been a useful tool in creating positive dialogue and have contributed to a growing international Alumni Network now comprising over 600 members worldwide.

DGAP's 10th New Faces Conference "From Conflict to Regional Stability—Linking Security and Development" was hosted by the Toledo International Centre for Peace (CITpax), in cooperation with Development Assistance Research Associates (DARA) and the Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior (FRIDE). It included 22 participants from 17 countries, who addressed key challenges in Europe, Africa, Asia and the Middle East and presented perspectives for better integrating development and security policy. Divided into five panels, the 2007 New Faces thus contributed to current policy research on a topic that is now beginning to be addressed and advanced by international, regional, and local actors.

Panel I overviewed different concepts pertaining to the security-development nexus, such as structural violence and human security, provided an inter-organizational perspective and introduced the notions of "securitization" of development policy and "developmentalization" of security policy in the European context. The following four panels applied the general topic to the respective regional case studies.

Panel II presented approaches to post-conflict resolution and reconstruction in Sub-Saharan Africa by propounding institutional capacity building to bring about peace and stability to the different regions of the African continent, and highlighted the usage of the human security concept in the case of the Democratic Republic of Congo.

Panel III focused on the complex security and development challenges in South-East Asia, the EU's monitoring mission and role in post-conflict Aceh as well as implications of the Aceh experience for other scenarios in Asia, such as India's north-eastern region. The panel was enhanced with first-hand perspectives and experience from the Philippines, India and Germany.

Panel IV discussed perceptions and strategies of post-conflict reconstruction in the Middle East, with particular emphasis on the controversial case of Iraq, as well as on Turkey's emerging role as a geo-strategic cross-roads, bridge and regional player in the Middle East.

Panel V critically assessed the European construction and consolidation of the concept of the Western Balkans, dealt with European activities in security sector reform in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia, and analyzed the specific case of Mitrovica, Kosovo.

Following the conference, participants were given time to consider their peers' feedback and revise their work for publication through DGAP. This volume presents the revised and edited papers presented by participants of the 10th New Faces Conference and makes them available to the interested public. We hope that this volume will be a valuable contribution to the debate and literature on the security-development nexus and encourage further research for positive implementation in the future.

DGAP and CITpax would like to thank DARA and FRIDE for their contributions and willingness to host the 2007 New Faces in Madrid, Spain, on 5–7 November 2007, with special gratitude extended to H. E. José María Figueres Olsen, International Advisor to the Board of Trustees of FRIDE and former President of Costa Rica (1994–98), for giving an engaging and encouraging keynote speech on environmental security and climate change. Finally, DGAP and CITpax would also like to thank the Robert Bosch Stiftung, the Swiss Ministry of Defence and NATO's Public Diplomacy Division for making possible the 2007 New Faces Conference.

Kathrin Brockmann, Hans Bastian Hauck, and Stuart Reigeluth

From Conflict to Regional Stability: Linking Security and Development

Foreword by J. Christer Elfverson, former Director, United Nations

I had the opportunity and privilege to attend part of this year's "New Faces Conference", held in Madrid in November 2007. The nexus of security and development – the main theme for the Conference – broadly covers the complexity of contemporary conflicts, and, therefore, has become central to the concepts of conflict prevention and crisis management. Security cannot be achieved without addressing the causes of instability; and sustainable development can only occur within a secure environment. Interfaces between security and development are widely acknowledged, and in recent years closer cooperation and coordination have been fostered. However, the mechanisms thus far employed have often proved unable to reconcile the multifaceted dimensions of development and security, including impoverishment and unemployment, environmental degradation and pollution, insufficient education and health care, political corruption and ethnic discrimination, as well as eroding state institutions, which can all cause despair and frustration, and fuel extremism and violence.

To address this plethora of destabilizing factors, a more comprehensive approach, departing from a simple security policy defined by mere military means, is primordial. The desired comprehensiveness could be advanced through a multilat-



J. Christer Elfverson



J. Christer Elfverson (FRIDE) listening to Özge Genç from Turkey

eral approach and by appealing to a wider spectrum of actors, including international and regional organizations, national and local institutions, as well as NGOs and civil society. However, a considerable deficit persists in integrating development and security policy concepts and instruments to effectively promote peace and stability. And a strong need exists for further research and insights from the professional and academic domains to better understand the complexity of contemporary conflicts, in order to better construct and consolidate the security-development nexus.

Given my own professional background, I concentrated on and followed with particular interest the discussions on Iraq, and was impressed by the width and depth of the deliberations. The papers prepared were of the highest quality, as were the oppositions. The liveliness and level of the debate strengthened my strongly held belief that the younger generation provides a pool of knowledge, intellectual curiosity, power of analysis and desire to move things forward that I fear is often underestimated and in all likelihood under-utilized.

The title of the Conference inexorably links security with development, substantiating that the one cannot exist without the other. Nowhere is that more incontestable than in the Iraq of today. As highlighted during the Conference, despite frantic efforts by the Government of Iraq to portray the situation as being better than it was as late as six months ago (which is probably true in some parts of the country) with a view to encouraging refugees and IDPs to return in order to help get the wheels turning, reality overshadows rosy descriptions.

Not only is the number of returnees probably smaller than reported, but, in addition, many seem to be returning not necessarily because of an improved situation, but often out of necessity, because their visas to neighboring countries have expired, or they have simply run out of funds to sustain their families. In addition, UNHCR and other agencies advise against their return, because of the unstable situation. Yet it reaffirms the Government's need to project the vision of security, in order to attract a qualified workforce, to stimulate development. With billions upon billions of reconstruction aid, plus the additional proceeds generated by the country's oil exports, revenue is not lacking. However, Iraq still finds itself in a situation which is probably worse today, in developmental terms, than before the war in 2003. The factor that is sorely missing is security and political stability, rendering reconstruction and development very difficult.

Similarly, internal security cannot thrive in an atmosphere of regional instability, thus adding an additional link to the security-development nexus, to include also

the precondition of regional stability. While the concept that development requires a secure environment to flourish, and that the two are mutually enhancing, is not new – it has often been mentioned as a prerequisite for sustainable development – the link has become more generally accepted and broadly recognized. Still, there are those who maintain that development breeds security, while others see security as a necessary precondition for development.

As suggested above, the participation of new players, including NGOs and civil society at large, should be welcomed, to publicly highlight the connection between security and development, hopefully in that order. Thus this Conference, while a tile in a larger mosaic, was particularly timely in that it brought together a sizeable number of very talented young people whose findings will hopefully be taken up by other institutions and eventually find their way to decision-makers at government level.

I again congratulate the organizers of this Conference for the high quality of the papers presented and the ensuing debate, and wish all participants, who are mostly at the beginning of their professional careers, much success in their future endeavours. Without doubt we will hear more about them in the not too distant future.



Prof. Dr. Eberhard Sandschneider (DGAP), Emilio Cassinello (CITpax) and Carlos Oliver (DARA) welcome the “New Faces” to Madrid



Three days, 22 participants, 17 countries – DGAP's 10th New Faces Conference

The Security-Development Nexus: A Structural Violence and Human Needs Approach

Robert Mudida

The security-development nexus is increasingly vital because of the realization that there can be no long-term security without development and vice versa. The linkages between the two concepts have evolved over the last few decades to eventually exhibit a certain convergence. The rise of the concept of human security has also, by its very nature, implied closer links to development. Examining structural violence and human needs, linkages between these two concepts can be explored and policy implications suggested for the security-development nexus.



Robert Mudida

The Evolution of the Concept of Security

Traditional notions of security were based on the use of force if necessary to preserve vital interests, as based on realism or power politics.¹ Power in this context is defined as the ability to get another actor to do what it would not otherwise have done, or to not do what it would have otherwise done. A variation on this idea is that actors are powerful to the extent that they affect others more than others affect them. The traditional notion of security was seen as closely related to the threat or use of violence, and as such military means were regarded as central to the provision of security.²

Realist concepts of security, associated with traditional security, were popular during the Cold War, during which many believed that all that stood in the way of a harmonious and peaceful world was a hostile Soviet Union committed to a military and economic ideology that was antagonistic to the West.³ However, although Soviet intransigence to some extent fuelled the Cold War, many of the world's problems, especially those of developing countries, existed independently of superpower hostility. The end of the Cold War therefore still left some issues unresolved and also brought some new issues to the fore.

The post-Cold War period implied several new challenges in international security. Many of the conflicts do not fit the traditional pattern of inter-state war,

1 Joshua S. Goldstein, *International Relations*, New York [et al.], 2004, pp. 71–78.

2 Michael Renner, *State of the World 2005: Redefining Security*, in: Makumi Mvagiru and O. Oculi (eds.), *Rethinking Global Security : an African perspective?* (Heinrich Böll Foundation, Regional Office East and Horn of Africa), Nairobi 2006, pp. 1–11.

3 John C. Garnett, *Introduction: Conflict and Security in the New World Order*, in: M. Jane Davis (ed.), *Security Issues in the Post-Cold War World*, Cheltenham [et al.] 1996, pp. 1–11.

which previously dominated international relations. War between sovereign states remains a distinct possibility, but there has been a huge upsurge in intra-state conflict where the main actors are ethnic groups. Ethnic conflict is violence perpetrated by one ethnic group against another because of cultural or racial differences between them. Ethnic violence has become much more common in the post Cold War period. In 1993, Sam Huntington foresaw that the fundamental source of conflict in the years ahead would be cultural, and predicted a “clash of civilizations”, which had not been a predominant source of conflict in the Cold War period.⁴

Many of these intra-state conflicts in turn become internationalized in the sense that they have trans-boundary effects. The fundamental agents of conflict internationalization include interdependence, ethnic relations, the media and refugees. This makes it necessary to adopt a systemic perspective to effectively manage regional conflicts.⁵ The security challenges of managing internationalized conflicts have been manifested in the Horn of Africa and Great Lakes regions. The Somali conflict, for example, has contributed to insecurity in the entire Horn of Africa region while the conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo has destabilized the Great Lakes Region.

Apart from the change in trend towards intra-state conflict, more comprehensive notions of security are developing, for there is an increasing trend towards recognizing the importance of human security and environmental security issues. Human security implies protecting vital freedoms,⁶ and implies protecting people from critical and pervasive threats and situations while enhancing their strengths and aspirations. Human security also entails creating systems that give people the building blocks for survival, dignity and livelihood, and is thus closely tied to development. Human security connects different types of freedoms—freedom from want, freedom from fear and freedom to take action on one’s own behalf. The state continues to have the fundamental responsibility for security. However, as security challenges become more complex and various new actors attempt to play a role, a paradigm shift is needed to broaden the focus from the state to the security of the people. Human security complements state security, by being people-centered and addressing insecurities that have not traditionally been considered as state security threats; it furthers human development; and also enhances the protection of human rights, which are at the core of democracy promotion.

4 Samuel P. Huntington, *The clash of civilizations and the remaking of world order*, New York, NY, 1996.

5 Makumi Mwangi, *Conflict: Theory, Processes and Institutions of Management*, Nairobi 2000.

6 Report of the Commission on Human Security, presented to the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, 1 May 2003.

Conversely, promoting democratic principles is also a step towards attaining human security and development. People are enabled to participate in the process on governance and make their voices heard. This requires the building of strong institutions, which establish the rule of law and empower the people. Human security strives to protect and empower people in post-conflict situations, to provide them with economic security by addressing extreme poverty, to provide adequate health care, and also to enhance knowledge, skills and values. The traditional focus on state security is therefore inadequate and needs to encompass the safety and well being of a country's population.⁷ In situations where individuals and communities are not secure, state security will itself be extremely fragile. Security in the absence of justice will not produce a stable peace. Democratic governance is vital in the context of comprehensive security.

Environmental security has also become critical in recent years, particularly fundamental has been addressing ecological degradation and natural resource scarcity. Environmental degradation needs to be considered in a more integrative concept of global security. Environmental security has become a common security issue due to the recognition that the environment provides the fundamental life support system.⁸ Security for the planet depends on the structure of the entire system while the conventional concept of security has exclusive concerns for the national level. Any attachment to the nation-state and the conventional doctrine of security becomes a fundamental obstacle to the sustainable management of the environment. The essential ingredients for peace lie in cooperation for the common good, which is based on the concept of equality and harmony among people who depend on the earth for their survival. In the environmental context, security problems need to be interpreted by the way societies are organized and connected to the natural world. The main source of threat is from modern industrialization. For a long time, the view has been that there was a trade-off between environmental protection and development. Now, within the concept of sustainable development, the protection of the local and global environment is seen as integral to the development process in an increasingly interdependent world.

Given the nature of the challenges posed by the emerging trends on security, an approach focused solely on the national level is inadequate. Real security in an increasingly globalized world cannot be provided on a purely national basis or on the basis of limited alliances.⁹ Unlike traditional military threats emanating from a determined adversary, many current security challenges are risks and vulnerabili-

7 Renner, *State of the World 2005: Redefining Security*, op. cit. (fn. 2).

8 Ho-Won Jeong, *Peace and Conflict Studies : An Introduction*, Aldershot [et al.] 2000, pp. 95–105.

9 Renner, op. cit. (fn. 2).

ties, which are shared across state borders. Non-military dimensions also have a fundamental effect on security and state stability. States around the globe, especially developing states, increasingly face a debilitating combination of increasing competition for resources, environmental degradation, the resurgence of infectious diseases, poverty and growing wealth disparities, demographic pressures and unemployment. A multilateral or global approach is needed to deal effectively with most of these challenges, which often have trans-boundary effects.

The Evolution of the Concept of Development

The fundamental goal of development policy is to create sustainable improvements in the quality of life for all people.¹⁰ There have been three generations of development thinking.¹¹ The first generation of development thinking was dominant in the 1960s and 1970s, and envisaged extensive government involvement in development planning to overcome pervasive market failures, which were thought to characterize developing countries. However, by the late 1960s and early 1970s, deficiencies in comprehensive planning became acute. Although the rationale for government intervention had been to address market failure, the result of government failure was associated particularly with the adverse effects of price distortions.¹² The second generation of development economics was based on the key principles of neoclassical economics. The emphasis of this school was on removing price distortions and “getting prices right”. Markets, prices and incentives became a core concern in policymaking. Structural adjustment programs in many developing countries in the 1980s and part of the 1990s were based on the ideas of the second generation. But the results of the second generation were also disappointing in many developing states, which were unable to attain sustained economic growth and meaningful reductions in poverty. The third generation of development economics began to emerge at the end of the twentieth century and emphasized the role of institutions in development. The emergence of the third generation coincided with greater emphasis on notions of human security and attempted to consider which institutional changes were required to achieve improvements in the quality of life. Development increasingly came to be viewed as a process of expanding the real freedoms that people enjoyed.¹³ These freedoms included political freedoms, economic facilities, social opportunities, transparency and protective security. Each of these types of freedoms helps to

10 World Bank, *Entering the 21st Century*, in: *World Development Report 1999/2000*, pp. 13–30.

11 Gerald M. Meier, *The Old Generation of Development Economists and the New*, in: Meier and Joseph E. Stiglitz (eds.), *Frontiers of Development Economics: The Future in Perspective*, Oxford 2001, pp. 13–50.

12 *Ibid.*

13 Amartya Sen, *Development As Freedom*, Oxford [et al.] 1999, pp. 3–11.

advance the capability of a person and therefore to improve the quality of life as the fundamental goal of development.

The Concept of Structural Violence

Conflict is a feature of human activity and arises when there is an incompatibility of goals,¹⁴ which is fundamental to the existence of conflict situations, whether dealing with structural or behavioral violence. Behavioral violence involves the deliberate use of physical force to injure or kill another human being. Structural violence is a type of conflict, which is embedded in the structure of relationships and interactions.¹⁵ For example, structural violence can arise from anomalous legal, social or economic structures in society. Galtung defines structural violence as “existing in those conditions in which human beings are influenced so that their actual somatic and mental realizations are below their potential realizations.”¹⁶ In a situation of structural violence, overt violence is absent but structural factors have virtually the same compelling control over behavior as the overt threat or use of force.¹⁷ In a society prone to structural violence, an actor or group is prevented, by structural constraints, from developing its talents or interests in a normal manner, or even from realizing that such developments are possible. In the contemporary world, this may be manifested in class, race, ethnic or religious discrimination.

Violence is built into the structure and shows up as unequal power and life chances. The focus on direct violence would lead one to analyze the capabilities and motivations of domestic and international actors with efforts to create institutions that can prevent them from exercising direct violence by punishing, for example, those who do.¹⁸ A focus on structural violence would lead one to a critical analysis of the structures and possibly an effort to transform violent structures into less violent ones. Such structural transformation is revolutionary, but not necessarily violent.

Structural violence is often harder to identify than physical violence because it is not overt. Structural roots of violent acts therefore are typically ignored and the

14 Anthony de Reuck, *The Logic of Conflict: Its Origin, Development and Resolution*, in: Michael Banks (ed.), *Conflict in World Society: A New Perspective on International Relations*, Brighton 1984, pp. 96–111.

15 Mwangi, *Conflict* (fn. 5), pp. 14–15.

16 *Ibid.*

17 A. John R. Groom, *Paradigms in Conflict: The Strategist, the Conflict Researcher and the Peace Researcher*, in: *Review of International Studies* (Guildford), Vol. 14 (April 1988), No. 2, S. 97–115.

18 Johan Galtung, *Twenty-five Years of Peace Research: Ten Challenges and Some Responses*, in: *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 22, No. 2, June 1985, pp. 141–158.

cycle of violence continues.¹⁹ Conflicts are dynamic and have a distinct life cycle.²⁰ In the context of the conflict cycle, structural violence, which is not attended to eventually, becomes violent conflict. The challenge during the earlier stages of the conflict cycle associated with structural violence is that of peace management. If peace management is not effectively undertaken, the conflict cycle moves to a phase of crisis. At this time the challenge is to undertake crisis management. If crisis management is not effectively undertaken, the cycle moves to a stage of physical or behavioral violence. Once physical violence breaks out the challenge becomes one of managing it. If conflict management attempts are successful, this leads to peace agreements followed by a period of post-conflict peace-building. If the stage of post-conflict peace-building is adequately addressed then this can lead to peace thus completing the conflict cycle. The conflict cycle illustrates the dynamism of conflict or conflict transformation. The actors, issues and interests in conflict are being constantly transformed.²¹ Conflict is an intrinsic aspect of social change.²² Conflict is an expression of the heterogeneity of interests and values that arise as new constructs generated by social change come up against inherited constraints. Social change is structural and may introduce new incompatibilities of goals,²³ and is therefore vital to take into consideration.

In order for structural violence to exist, the inequalities must be the result of relations between groups, which give differential access to social goods. Structural violence may be legitimized by the prevailing political and social norms. Webb considers a situation of negative peace to prevail where there is an absence of behavioral violence but where relations are marked by structural violence. Positive peace is defined in terms of harmonious relations between or among parties, which are conducive to mutual development, growth and the attainment of goals.²⁴ In order for positive peace to be brought about in a society experiencing structural violence, a structural change in relations in society may have to take place.

19 Marc Pilisuk, *The Hidden Structure of Contemporary Violence*, in: *Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology*, Vol. 4, No. 3, 1998, pp. 197–216.

20 Mwangi, *Peace and Conflict Management in Kenya* (Centre for Conflict Research and Catholic Peace and Justice Commission), Nairobi, 2003, pp. 55–64.

21 Raimo Väyrynen, *To Settle or to Transform? Perspectives on the Resolution of National and International Conflicts*, in: Väyrynen (ed.), *New Directions in Conflict Theory: Conflict Resolution and Conflict Transformation*, London 1991, pp. 1–25.

22 Oliver Ramsbotham, Tom Woodhouse and Hugh Miall, *Contemporary conflict resolution : the prevention, management and transformation of deadly conflicts*, Cambridge 2005, p. 13.

23 Galtung, *A Structural Theory of Aggression*, in: *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 1, No. 2, 1964, pp. 95–119.

24 Keith Webb, *Structural Conflict and the Definition of Conflict*, in: *World Encyclopedia of Peace*, Vol. 2, Oxford 1986, pp. 431–434.

Structural violence, if not addressed, may eventually lead to violent conflict as life in the structure becomes unbearable.²⁵ Indeed, the strongest predictor of physical or behavioral violence is stagnation in economic and social development.²⁶ In conditions where relative social equity exists, productive growth will generally result in improved access to goods and services needed for human well-being thereby reducing the potential for physical violence. However, where social equity declines, there is a greater difference between the “haves” and “have-nots”, as structural violence becomes more deeply embedded in societies. Governments in such countries tend to grow more rigid in limiting options to redress social inequalities, thus creating a social pressure cooker. This occurred in Liberia and Nicaragua where structural conflict eventually led to physical violence. Nevertheless, the measures of normal levels of equity are specific to the history and culture of a particular society. Acceptable levels of social differentiation vary widely from one country to another.²⁷ As such the intensity of structural violence tends to vary among societies, which engage in it, from very low to very high. These variations reflect differences in social values and in degrees of inequality with respect to key institutions of social life in particular societies at particular times. The

25 Mwangi, Conflict: Theory, Processes and Institutions of Management, op. cit, (fn. 5), p. 25.

26 Richard Garfield, Indicators of Social System Vulnerability and Resilience to Violent Conflict, Paper Presented at UN Expert Group Meeting on Structural Threats to Social Integrity: Social Roots of Violent Conflict and Indicators for Prevention, 18–20 December 2001, United Nations, New York, pp. 1–3.

27 David G. Gil, Understanding and Overcoming Social-Structural Violence, in: Contemporary Justice Review, Vol. 2 (1), April 1999.



Robert Mudida enriches the debate with insights from Kenya

higher the degrees of inequality, the higher also are likely to be the levels of coercion necessary to enforce the inequalities, and the levels of structural violence.

Hoivik demonstrates how demographic concepts can be used to develop a clear definition of structural violence, and argues that the distribution of a society's resources affects not only the standard of living but also the chances of survival.²⁸ A more equitable distribution will normally increase the average length of life in society as a whole. Hoivik argues that the loss of life from an unequal distribution is an aspect of structural violence. He develops measures of structural violence based on the potential increase in life expectancy. Whenever significant inequalities are prevalent in a society concerning the key institutions of social life, its ways of life involve domination, exploitation, injustice and widespread underdevelopment. In such cases, the people are not free in a meaningful sense and its political institutions are essentially undemocratic, coercive and structurally violent, in spite of the existence of formal democratic structures.

A Human Needs Approach

Christie argues that systematic inequalities in the distribution of economic and political resources deprive needs satisfaction for certain segments of society. Human needs theory posits that there are certain ontological and genetic needs which will be pursued and that socialization processes, if not compatible with such needs, will lead to frustration and anti-social personal and group behavior.²⁹ The whole basis of law and order is threatened in circumstances in which basic needs are frustrated.³⁰ These needs are universal motivations that are an integral part of the human being. In addition to the biological needs of food and shelter, there are basic human needs, which relate to growth and development such as needs for personal identity and recognition.³¹ Institutions and political structures often frustrate these ordinary and well-recognized needs what sometimes leads to aggressive responses.³²

Fundamental needs, such as individual and group identity, are compulsive and in many cases will be pursued even at the cost of physical violence. If conflicts are to be resolved institutions have to be adjusted to human needs. Although there is

28 Tord Hoivik, *The Demography of Structural Violence*, in: *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 14, No. 1, 1977, pp. 59–73.

29 Daniel J. Christie, *Reducing Direct and Structural Violence: The Human Needs Theory*, in: *Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology*, No. 3(4), 1997, pp. 315–332.

30 John W. Burton, *Violence Explained: the sources of conflict, violence and crime and their prevention*, Manchester 1997, pp. 32–40.

31 Burton, *Conflict: Resolution and Prevention* London, 1990, pp. 36–48.

32 Burton, *Conflict Prevention as a Political System*, in: John A. Vazquez et. al. (eds.), *Beyond Confrontation: Learning Conflict Resolution in the Post-Cold War Era*, Ann Arbor, MI, 1996, pp. 115–127.

no precise definition of needs, some behaviors cannot in certain circumstances of structural violence be controlled by threat or coercion. Basic needs are ontological while interests and values are temporal. A group's ontological needs cannot be bargained away and should be treated differently from negotiable interests. Theories of basic needs reject a priori the assumption that violence originates in the aggressive nature of human beings or unconscious psychological dynamics;³³ needs provide objectives and rational criteria for analyzing and evaluating an emergent social situation that may contain the potential for generating conflict.

There are certain political and economic conditions that are essential for the fulfillment of human needs. The institutional set-up in a country should aim as much as possible to provide an enabling environment for basic needs to be achieved. The mal-distribution of power in societies has provided the opportunity for need gratification on the part of some at the expense of others.³⁴ As long as a state represents sectional interests, rather than common interests, thereby creating divisions in society, the use of differential power will remain the ordering principle and the needs of many citizens will be unsatisfied. As the crisis is recognized in the manner that power is distributed, the state will either become increasingly coercive, or manipulative and continue to serve sectional interests or become only an administrative structure serving the common interest. If the common interest is to be served, it must be recognized—and basic human needs are one basis for such recognition. The extent to which basic needs are being met provides one basis for judging the legitimacy of an existing order.

The Linkages between Structural Violence and Human Needs

Structural violence is closely linked to the inadequate satisfaction of basic human needs because structural violence is closely related to the people's inability to develop their full potential.³⁵ When people's basic needs are not met adequately, there is a gap between their potential and actual realization. This gap is the centerpiece of structural violence. The distribution of a society's resources affects not only the people's standard of living, but even the chances of survival.³⁶ A fundamental source of protracted social conflict is the denial of elements required for the societal development—the pursuit of which is a compelling need.³⁷ Conflict arises from the denial of those human needs, which are common to all

³³ Jeong, *op. cit.* (fn. 8), pp. 70–71.

³⁴ Paul Sites, *Legitimacy and Human Needs*, in: John W. Burton and Frank Dukes, *Conflict: Readings in Management and Resolution*, Basingstoke [et al.] 1990, pp. 117–141.

³⁵ Peter Iadicola and Anson Shupe, *Violence, Inequality and Human Freedom*, Lanham 2003, pp. 333–366.

³⁶ Hoivik, *The Demography of Structural Violence*, *op. cit.* (fn. 28).

³⁷ Edward E. Azar, *Protracted International Conflicts: Ten Propositions*, in: Burton and Dukes (eds.), *op. cit.* (fn. 34), pp. 145–155.

and whose pursuit is an ontological need. In countries where the basic needs of the majority of the population are not being met, human development is very low as measured by the UNDP human development index, which is based on life expectancy at birth, educational attainment and standard of living measured by real per capita income at purchasing power parity.³⁸ While augmenting per capita income and consumption is vital to improving the quality of life, other objectives especially reducing poverty, expanding access to health services, and increasing educational levels are also vital.³⁹

Policy Implications

Approaching the security-development nexus from a structural violence and human needs perspective provides some valuable insights. It illustrates from a conflict perspective that development and security are closely related. It reaffirms the argument that there cannot be development without peace or peace without development. The adequate satisfaction of human needs is vital to overcoming structural violence, which leads to the more adequate provision of human security and development. Approaching the security-development nexus from a structural violence and human needs perspective illustrates the importance of conflict prevention. Conflicts progress through a cycle and conflict prevention is always a less costly option than addressing fully blown conflicts. Parties in a particular situation may conceptualize conflict prevention as third party actions to avoid the likely threat, use or diffusion of conflict. Conflict prevention is also fundamentally about overhauling conflict-generating structures.⁴⁰

Essentially this is about having appropriate institutions to address structural conflict. A solid network of effective institutions is also vital to holistic development. Effective institutions are increasingly recognized as being the centerpiece of development.⁴¹ Institutions in this context refer to formal and informal rules governing the actions of individuals and organizations in the process of development. The current emphasis is therefore on “getting the institutions right.”⁴² Having proper institutions for good governance and regulation is vital to overcome intra-state conflicts. Legitimacy of governance is a fundamental issue and effective governance ensures that human needs are adequately met and structural

38 Anthony P. Thirlwall, *Growth and Development: With Special Reference to Developing Economies*, Houndmills [et al.] 2003, pp. 51–70.

39 World Bank, *op. cit.* (fn. 10).

40 Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall, *Conflict Resolution*, *op. cit.* (fn. 22), pp. 118–131.

41 World Bank, *op. cit.* (fn. 10).

42 Ha-Joon Chang, *Institutional Development in Historical Perspective*, in: Chang (ed.), *Rethinking Development Economics*, London 2003, pp. 481–497.

violence in society is reduced. Consequently, this improves human security and development.

Democratic governance has usually been considered basic to political legitimacy although what constitutes adequate democratic governance has been a subject of lively debate. In many cases, the issue of what kind of democracy is established is more crucial than whether a policy is democratic. Avoiding conflict depends on whether local domestic institutions can provide models for dealing with conflict and fostering development. Where governance is legitimate and accountable to citizens, and where the rule of law prevails, conflict is less likely. Development can prevent conflict and thus also enhance security.

However, although agreeing that certain institutions are necessary, one should be careful about specifying the exact form they should take.⁴³ Thus there is an agreement that good property rights are vital but in practice this principle needs to adapt to the realities of individual states. Effective institutions need to be homegrown, rather than externally driven. Such institutions should take into account the historical, political, economic and social realities of particular countries. Above all, institutional development takes time and the process requires patience.

43 Ibid.



Discussions continue well into the coffee break

Conclusion

Gradually evolving, the concepts of security and development have increasingly converged on the fundamentals required to attain both. A structural violence approach reaffirms the importance of overhauling anomalous structures in society so as to achieve security and development. A human needs approach reinforces the structural violence approach by suggesting that anomalous structures can only be overcome by addressing fundamental human needs. This is in line with current conceptualizations of both security and development, which consider needs-based approaches as central. At a policy level, effective institutions that promote good governance are vital to overcoming structural violence and achieving fundamental human needs. Such institutions will promote both security and development in the long-term. However, institutional frameworks that enhance both security and development should be carefully constructed. This implies upholding certain principles like good governance while taking into account the unique realities of individual states.

Towards Effective and Integrative Inter-Organizationalism

Joachim Koops

The end of the Cold War brought about a rudimentary shift in the structure of the international system, and gave rise to unprecedented pressures and opportunities for a fundamental and unconstrained reassessment of the root causes of war, conflict and human suffering, as well as appropriate response mechanisms. The end of the ideologically distorted and congealed bipolar world order also opened possibilities of activity for international organizations and other non-state actors. In the early 1990s, the debates on the preconditions and dimensions of international security resulted in renewed emphasis on the inextricable link between development and security, coupled with heightened expectations towards international organizations as the principal agents behind the promotion of the so-called security-development nexus.¹ The proliferation of failed states on the African continent, as well as the international community's failure to respond effectively and holistically to the crises in the Balkans—and more recently in Iraq and Afghanistan—intensified the need for a more integrated approach to combining economic aid initiatives to long-term, structural peace-building and security sector reform (SSR). Indeed, multi-functional international organizations such as the United Nations (UN), European Union (EU), African Union (AU), and transatlantic bodies such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), with their wide pool of resources and expertise, were seen as the most suitable for promoting such an ambitious and multi-faceted agenda. Consequently, a plethora of policy frameworks, norms and activities have been initiated by these international actors with the aim of promoting a more integrated approach to international security and development.²

Ironically, those very international organizations themselves have become responsible for one of the key institutional challenges behind the security-development nexus. With overlapping mandates and frequently competing mission agendas, the lack of efficient coordination amongst these key international actors has been a major cause for the delay, and often even failure, of the attempt to provide adequately effective and sufficiently holistic post-conflict reconstruction schemes. Outlining the inherent institutional



Joachim Koops

1 See Necla Tschirgi, *Peacebuilding as the Link between Security and Development: Is the Window of Opportunity Closing?*, New York, NY, 2003, pp. 2–5.

2 See the UN's *Agenda for Peace*, 1992, <<http://www.un.org/Docs/SG/agpeace.html>>; the OECD's *DAC Guidelines Helping Prevent violent Conflict*, 1997, 2001, <<http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/57/55/33920283.htm>>; and the EU's *European Security Strategy*, 2003, <<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf>>.

and conceptual difficulties of inter-organizational cooperation in the context of combined socio-economic and civil-military post-conflict reconstruction efforts, and assessing the potentials of a more effective and integrative inter-organizationalism, key insights can be drawn from sociological-institutionalist, economic and international relations (IR) theories. Additionally, drawing on lessons learned from the emerging EU-NATO and EU-UN cooperation schemes, a more synergetic approach between the main international organizations could indeed be realized within the framework of the security-development agenda.

Institutional Challenges behind the Security-Development Nexus

One of the most fundamental institutional challenges behind a coherent and effective promotion of an integrated security-development policy is the lack of coordination within and between the many key international actors, which are increasingly getting involved in the rapidly expanding area of post-conflict development and security policies. In addition to the widely active and almost notoriously uncoordinated non-state humanitarian agencies community, the UN system and other international organizations like the EU, NATO and the OECD have, during the last decade, added their numerous activities and initiatives to the security-development agenda. With overlapping mandates and duplication of efforts, a lack of coordination and collaboration often leads to inefficient and counter-productive outcomes. While policy makers and several studies have already criticized the often acute competition between NGOs, as well as between the various agencies and organs within the UN system in times of severe crises,³ the implications of the growing number of international organizations involved in any given conflict area or underdeveloped region complicates the picture even further. Not only do those international organizations that have advanced the security-development agenda in the first place find themselves at inter-organizational competition for scarce resources, but also the effects of organizational incoherence further hamper their efforts. Indeed, the UN and the EU—in theory the most capable actors for pursuing and implementing a comprehensive security-development strategy—suffer from considerable intra-organizational conflicts and inter-departmental rivalry. In the UN's case, the creation of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) was intended to allay some of the most pronounced inter-agency quarrels, but it so far has enjoyed only limited leverage over other UN bodies and possesses no central authority to impose a top-down coordination scheme.⁴ Similarly, EU

3 See Antonio Donini, Norah Niland, Rwanda: Lessons Learned: A Report on the Coordination of Humanitarian Activities, UN, New York 1994; and Larry Minear, *The Humanitarian Enterprise: Dilemmas and Discoveries*, Bloomfield, 2002.

4 Nicola Reindorp and Peter Wiles, *Humanitarian Coordination: Lessons from Recent Field Experience*. A study commissioned by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), London 2001, p. 47,

effectiveness as a security-development actor is limited by constant competition between the Member States as well as between the Commission and Council, including the Council Secretariat. Taken together, intra-organizational rivalries within an international organization as well as inter-organizational competition between the various international actors themselves pose a fundamental institutional challenge to a coherent and effective promotion and implementation of the security-development nexus. Thus, developing mechanisms for increased inter-organizational cooperation and coherence seems to be of paramount importance. As long as these institutional difficulties are not overcome, the security-development nexus will continue to remain mostly a paper tiger. However, promising developments between the EU, NATO and the UN in the practical realm as well as a growing—albeit still highly compartmentalized—body of economic, sociological and IR theories on inter-organizational relations and networks could offer some valuable insights and overall guidance as to how such institutional challenges might be overcome.

Theory and Practice of Effective and Integrative Inter-Organizationalism

Research on inter-organizational relations remains highly scattered and is rarely directly applied to the security-development area. Scholarly discourse is also marked by the distinct absence of dialogue between the disciplines: sociological approaches remain largely disconnected from economic organization theories, while both disciplines are still very much ignored by IR theory. Several initial insights can nevertheless be gained by combining the theoretical insights and key variables from inter-organizational studies in the fields of economics, institutionalist sociology and IR with the initial practical lessons learned so far from the emerging inter-organizational forms of EU-NATO and EU-UN cooperation in crisis management. While the key variables of the theoretical approaches highlight the “ideal-type” elements of successful organizational networks, the lessons learned from the EU-NATO and EU-UN dyads could demonstrate in a more pragmatic way which actual steps need to be taken in order to overcome the institutional challenges behind the security-development nexus towards more effective and integrative inter-organizationalism on the ground.

Lessons from Theory

In economics and management studies, the study of alliances and multi-party joint ventures points towards two important aspects for successful collaboration schemes between independent organizations and agencies. First, trust between the “linkage partners” seems to be a fundamental and recurrent variable, without

ochaonline.un.org/OchaLinkClick.aspx?link=ocha&DocId=1004152.

which stable alliances could not be formed. Theories of interpersonal attraction, in particular, focus on trust and on what attracts groups or individuals to each other, such as status similarities, complementary needs, aspects of personality, goal congruence and interpersonal fit.⁵ Second, a stable alliance or joint venture ideally requires clear leadership of a “focal organization”, in order to provide the alliance with direction and cohesion. Such a leading focal organization would need to possess some form of legitimacy and exert some degree of power and authority within the alliance. In addition, successful joint ventures and business alliances not only require a legal and contractual formalization of the collaboration schemes, but often also a clear division of tasks and, in many cases, a hierarchy of actors.⁶

In contrast to the hierarchical and focal-organizational emphasis of the alliance and joint venture approach, an important aspect of the institutionalist-sociological approach is the focus on so-called inter-organizational networks and organizational learning. While inter-organizational networks are bound together by shared norms, the exchange of information and the process of learning from the organizational activities and design of a partner organization (or indeed a rival) lead to what P. J. DiMaggio and W. W. Powell have been referred to as “institutional isomorphism”, or the process of organizations becoming similar in functioning and design.⁷ One of the most important factors behind organizational modeling, mimicking and convergence is the process of epistemic isomorphism—the tendency of organizations to converge due to shared epistemic values, norms or experiences of the organizations’ staff and leaders. Applied to the problem of the institutional challenges behind the security-development nexus, one central assumption of this sociological approach is that the more organizations learn from each other and the more similar they tend to become, the easier their cooperation will become. Also, similar to attraction theories, the interpersonal factor of shared goals and complementary between individuals plays an important role.

The role of individuals for successful inter-organizational cooperation is indeed also a key feature of the third and last theoretical approach: inter-organizationalism from an IR perspective. While many of these studies also take

5 Ken G. Smith, Stephen J. Carrol and Susan J. Ashford, Intra- and Interorganizational Cooperation: Toward a Research Agenda, in: *Academy of Management Journal*, Vol. 38, No. 1, 1995, pp. 7–23, especially p. 18.

6 See Ranjay Gulati and Harbir Singh, The architecture of cooperation: Managing coordination costs and appropriation concerns in strategic alliances, in: *Strategic Management Journal*, 12, 1998, pp. 83-103; and Esteban García-Canal, Ana Valdés-Llaneza and Africa Ariño, Effectiveness of dyadic and multi-party joint ventures, in: *Organization Studies*, Vol. 24, No. 6, 2003, pp. 743–770.

7 Paul J. DiMaggio and Walter W. Powell, The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields, in: *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 48, April 1983, pp. 147–160.

network analysis as the starting point, key variables for successful cooperation on the organizational level are the existence of a linking-pin organization, which serves as a communication channel between organizations, while on the personal level, the significance of interpersonal links, trust as well as the central importance of “boundary-role occupants” is singled out as elements for strengthening inter-organizational links.⁸ Boundary-role occupants are individuals who form the interface between their own organization and other organizations in the external environment. In addition, the so-called “alumni effect,” i.e. the switching of key personnel from one organization to the other and thus the facilitation of inter-organizational understandings through personal links—increased diffusion of knowledge about the former employer’s organizational culture and the creation of epistemic inter-organizational communities, is also identified as an important factor for reinforcing inter-organizational links and cooperation.⁹

When coalesced, the key variables of the three branches of theories emphasize the role of trust and attraction between individuals, contractual formalizations of collaboration, strong hierarchy and a powerful and authoritative focal organization or linking-pin organization. Furthermore, interpersonal links, particularly the exchange of “boundary-role occupants” and key staff from one organization to another, can increase inter-organizational understanding and could facilitate the growth of epistemic communities and organizational convergence. These elements would contribute, at least in theory, to integrative, durable and effective inter-organizational cooperation schemes. But to what extent could these insights be applied to the institutional challenges behind the security-development nexus in practice?

A central problem with the alliance and joint venture approach are the practical constraints on agreeing on a clear and rigid hierarchy amongst formally independent organizations. Several authors have recurrently called for more coordination through a single, powerful coordinating organization. The UN often is suggested as the most authoritative and legitimate organization for performing such a role. This seems however to be unachievable in practice: not only are NGOs inherently suspicious of too much UN dominance, but also even UN agencies themselves resist such an approach.¹⁰ Similarly, the emphasis of alliance and joint venture theories on pre-defined legal and contractual formalizations of cooperation schemes would seem to be difficult to achieve in

8 Christer Jönsson, *An Interorganization Approach to the Study of Multilateral Institutions: Lessons from Previous Research on international cooperation, Development and Multilateral Institutions Programme*, Working Paper No. 1, 1995, p. 2–3.

9 *Ibid.*, p. 5.

10 L. Minear, *op. cit.* (fn. 3), p. 22.

practice between international actors. Not only would such detailed agreements reduce flexibility and innovation, but also a too detailed and rigid formalization would severely curtail an organization's autonomy. The problems encountered between NATO and the UN during their cooperation efforts in Bosnia during the early 1990s are an important reminder that international organizations will jealously guard their operational independence, resist a functional division of labor and may only assent to collaboration schemes on a more flexible and less formal basis. The experiences between the EU, NATO and the UN in the realm of crisis management during the last decade point towards the emergence of a more broadly defined and flexible collaboration scheme, where the role of dense interactions and individuals is primordial.

Lessons from EU-NATO and EU-UN Inter-organizationalism

The emergence of relatively stable cooperation patterns between the EU, UN and NATO would have been unthinkable during the Cold War, where ideological constraints imposed a strictly functional division between these organizations. After a decade of approximate ad-hoc interaction since the end of the Cold War, during the last five years the EU has managed to establish close inter-organizational links and coordination mechanisms with both NATO and the UN. As a result, the EU has already conducted three civil-military crisis management operations in close cooperation with the UN¹¹ and two integrated military missions with NATO under the so-called Berlin Plus agreement.¹² These dense interactions in the field led to important lessons learned between the organizations and promoted inter-organizational convergence and a more nuanced understanding of the partner organization's culture and workings.

While several fundamental areas of conflict exist, the degree of cooperation and coordination is remarkable when viewed against the background of the suspicion and inherent competition, which had previously marked the relations between these three international organizations. In addition to dense interaction and inter-organizational learning on the ground, the relations between the EU and NATO and between the EU and the UN are tightened and guided by written agreements. The EU-UN Declaration on Cooperation in Crisis Management of 2003, as well as the NATO-EU "Berlin Plus" arrangement, can be seen as instructive precedents and examples of a flexible, yet more predictable institutionalized framework of inter-organizational cooperation.

11 The ongoing EUPM police mission in Bosnia, as well as two military missions in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in 2003 and 2006—with a further military mission currently in its initial phase in the Chad.

12 EU Concordia in Macedonia in 2003 and the ongoing EUFOR Althea mission in Bosnia, launched in 2004.

Indeed, a key variable in the formation and conclusion of these agreements, particularly in the case of the Berlin Plus agreement, was the personal factor and the trust between two boundary-role occupants: the intimate relationship between the EU's High Representative Javier Solana, who previously served as NATO's Secretary General until 1999, and NATO's Secretary-General at the time, George Robertson, was of key importance for advancing the cooperation agreement.¹³ This confirms

the theoretical findings that personal affinities and pre-established links between individuals can be pivotal to lasting and more formalized inter-organizational coordination and cooperation schemes. Solana's case also highlights the effectiveness of the "alumni effect:" as former NATO Secretary General, Solana knew the partner organization's culture and workings intimately and understood the needs of both organizations. What remains remarkable about the agreement is that it was entirely pre-negotiated outside any formal context by both Solana and Robertson in the early stages.¹⁴



Joachim Koops on the difficulties of inter-institutional coordination

A key lesson learned
and consequence

for overcoming the current institutional challenges and facilitating more institutionalized inter-organizational cooperation schemes should be the active facilitation of exchange (and indeed frequent rotation) between key organizational and bureaucratic leaders. This should not only include joint courses, conferences and desk-to-desk contact, but joint training missions

¹³ See Martin Reichard, *The EU-NATO Relationship: A Legal and Political Perspective*, Aldershot [et al.] 2006.

¹⁴ Interview with Council Secretariat Official, Brussels, 7 March 2007.

and general inter-organizational exchange regimes through, for example, visiting sabbaticals. This would not only lead to greater inter-organizational understandings and trust building, but also to the creation of more integrative epistemic communities.

Apart from the individual factor, the experiences of EU-NATO and EU-UN cooperation schemes on the ground also highlights that the process of inter-organizational cooperation is essentially incremental and depends on an integrative focal organization. The cooperative relationship and the inter-organizational understanding between the EU and NATO and the UN deepen with every new mission. These dense interactions help consolidate the flexible and effective institutionalization of cooperation. Moreover, the EU has managed to establish itself as an integrative focal and linking-pin organization without imposing an overly rigid hierarchy. Instead, broadly defined memoranda of understandings, which nevertheless aid the consolidation of permanent arrangements, have guided inter-organizational coordination and cooperation schemes. These might eventually even lead to the creation of combined institutional systems. Though still in its infancy, the EU-AU Peace Facility seems to be another instructive and promising example of such a more coordinated and institutionalized system. Kosovo, on the other hand, serves as an important reminder of how the lack of inter-organizational cooperation and coordination, with the absence of personal links and inter-organizational informal agreements, lead to sub-optimal results in the promotion of the security-development nexus.¹⁵

Conclusion

Theories of inter-organizationalism and practical experiences with collaboration schemes between the EU, UN and NATO highlight the importance of mutual understanding of partner organizations' workings, peculiarities and functioning. A convergence of organizational self-interests may be induced structurally and externally (through the changing nature of the international system or the increase of conflicts), but also depends on organizational change, adaptations and increased interaction. While a clearly pre-defined hierarchy and fully institutionalized arrangement of inter-organizational cooperation is the most desirable, it also remains the most unrealistic and improbable. International actors compete for scarce resources and international prestige; and diverging interests of their donor countries might also lead to competitive dynamics and inefficient outcomes. Instead of insisting too much on strict hierarchies and clearly defined functional divisions of labor, the creation of less formal

¹⁵ See Dominik Tolksdorf, Implementing the Ahtisaari Proposal: The European Union's future role in Kosovo, in: CAP Policy Analysis, No. 1, May 2007, <<http://www.cap.lmu.de/download/2007/CAP-Policy-Analysis-2007-01.pdf>>.

but nevertheless guiding memoranda of understanding, ideally advanced by an integrative focal organization, between autonomous international organizations would be an important step towards furthering coordination and collaboration. Overcoming the inherent constraints on inter-organizational cooperation depends above all on the personal level at the agenda-setting bureaucracies within each organization. The facilitation of greater interaction and socialization between key leaders and boundary-role occupants of international organizations is as important as greater inter-organizational interaction on the ground in the form of joint training exercises and desk-to-desk dialogue. Sabbatical exchanges between leaders should be encouraged, as it may increase inter-organizational learning and preference-shaping, which may in turn facilitate an increase in inter-organizational trust, understanding and therefore in the general willingness to coordinate and cooperate.



Pierre Antille, discussant on the Europe Panel, listens to Stephanie Ahern's feedback to the introductory presentations

EU Institutions' and Member States' Approaches to Promoting Policy Coherence of Development and Security

Isabelle Tannous¹

Since 9/11, the problem of fragile states has surged to the top of development and security policy agendas. These states have been linked to threats such as transnational crime, intra-state and regional violent conflict, genocide, and terrorism. The risks emanating from these states can no longer be seen as purely local or humanitarian in nature, but rather as having potential ramifications for regional and global security. International decision-makers therefore have placed the problem of fragile states at the centre of their development and security policies.² Security and development are defined as inherently intertwined, and have become increasingly so.

The new paradigm—“No development without security, no security without development”—came via significant changes in the ways in which development and security were conceived during the 1990s when actors from both sectors began to interact increasingly. Security actors have learned that short-term, ad-hoc military responses are insufficient for multi-dimensional state building and post-conflict peace-building processes. At the same time, development actors have realized that, after decades of effort and hundreds of billions of dollars spent in development aid, long-term development in impoverished nations is impossible or even counterproductive when incapacitated states cannot deliver the collective goods of basic security and effective governance.

EU Member States and European institutions have played a leading role in the international debate on the security-development nexus. Some member governments, regional organizations, and international institutions have taken practical steps with the aim of improving the nexus between and even joining development and security. They have established new strategies, structures, and programs that aim to:

- bridge the institutional and policy gaps between development and security;
- integrate civilian and military capabilities and responses;
- enhance coordination, complementarity and coherence at various levels; and

¹ The paper is part of a post-doctoral project within the EFSPS framework (European Foreign and Security Policy Studies), jointly financed by the VolkswagenStiftung, The Riksbankens Jubileumsfond and The Compagnia di San Paolo.

² See European Security Strategy 2003, National Security Strategy 2003, United Nations Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change 2005, OECD-Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations, April 2007.



Isabelle Tannous

- formulate better and more integrated strategies to respond adequately to each phase of the crisis response cycle by improving the links between short-term and long-term crisis response.

These new approaches are often referred to as “joined-up government approaches” or “whole of government approaches” and are closely aligned to the catchword of policy coherence. The fundamental challenge is the same; the approaches to promoting coherence between development and security, however, vary. Fragile states are seen as a development and security challenge, nonetheless, the motivations and objectives fall along two extremes: policy coherence for national security versus policy coherence for development.³

Development policy is still struggling to find its position in the concert of European external relations. The debate on a potential subordination of development—and thereby the rationale between short-term and long-term prevention and crisis management—is far from being settled.⁴ This raised well-known fears and concerns about a securitization of development, and a strengthening of the security-first approach instead of putting more effort and resources in prevention, structural stability and sustainable development. Up to now, little is known about the impact of impulses of agenda-setters and why different strategies towards precarious states result in the specific way the EU is constructing its relationship of security and development. This paper reflects the joined-up government approaches to foster policy coherence among development and security of four “pioneers” among the Member States—Great Britain, the Netherlands, Sweden and Germany—and of EU institutions in order to conclude on the direction taken on the European level.⁵

Pioneering EU Member States and their Approaches to Foster Policy Coherence of Development and Security

A closer look at the national approaches of pioneering states and the European level approach to linking security and development displays the difference among the approaches.⁶

3 See Stewart Patrick and Kaysie Brown, Greater than the sum of its parts? Assessing “whole of government” approaches to fragile states, in: International Peace Academy, New York 2007.

4 See Stephan Klingebiel and Katja Roehder, Subordination or cooperation? New interfaces between development and security policy, in: Peace, Conflict and Development, <<http://www.peacestudiesjournal.org.uk/docs/civil-military%20cooperation%20final%20version%20edited.pdf>>.

5 Since it is not the aim to analyze how the EU agenda is implemented in the face of resistance or how Member States can foster other interests following this agenda, non-pioneers will not be analyzed in depth. However, their interventions as well as the international debate are well known.

6 This builds on a project carried out by the Center of Applied Policy Research (CAP) and is reflected in Kurt Klotzle, International strategies in fragile states: Expanding the toolbox?, Gütersloh / München 2006. For more detailed coun-

- The United Kingdom pioneered an inter-ministerial pooling approach. The establishment of the Global Conflict Prevention Pool and the Africa Conflict Prevention Pool in 2001 has been pivotal as these Conflict Prevention Pools integrate the expertise of the DFID (Department for International Development), the MoD (Ministry of Defense), and the FCO (Foreign and Commonwealth Office), and provide pooled funding for joint initiatives to promote security, development, and good governance in states threatened or affected by violent conflict. A Post-Conflict Reconstruction Unit (PCRU) was established in September 2004 and incorporates inter-departmental staff from DFID, MoD and FCO. The PCRU is tasked with improving civilian-military links in planning and implementing post-conflict reconstruction policies and strengthening coordination between the United Kingdom and other international actors.⁷
- Germany established the Action Plan “Civilian Crisis Prevention, Conflict Resolution, and Post-conflict Peacebuilding” in May 2004, which defines conflict-related activities as cross-departmental tasks. An inter-ministerial steering group, comprised of representatives from all federal ministries and under the supervision of the Foreign Office, was established in September 2004. The German government also made the effort to institutionalize the participation of civil society actors in governmental decision-making processes by creating a civilian advisory board to the inter-ministerial steering group.⁸
- The Netherlands introduced and implemented a Stability Fund that combines resources from the development and foreign policy budgets to provide support for specific conflict-related issues, such as security sector reform (SSR), developing peacekeeping capacities, and small arms control in 2004. The Stability Fund is under the authority of the Directorate for Human Rights and Peace Building (DMV) in the foreign office, established in 2000

try case studies, see Tobias Debiel, Daniel Lambach, and Dieter Reinhardt, ‘Stay Engaged’ statt ‘Let Them Fail’. Ein Literaturbericht über entwicklungspolitische Debatten in Zeiten fragiler Staatlichkeit, INEF-Report 90, Duisburg 2007; OECD/Development Co-operation Directorate (DCD-DAC), Whole of Government Approaches in Fragile States, Paris 2007; Andrea Warnicke, Early warning – early action, Entwicklungspolitische Instrumente zur frühzeitigen Eindämmung von Gewaltkonflikten (Länderstudien, Bonn International Center for Conversion—BICC), Bonn, December 2006; Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Towards a Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding: Getting Their Act Together, in: Overview report of the Joint Utstein Study of Peacebuilding, Evaluation Report 1/2004, Oslo 2004.

7 DFID, *Fighting Poverty to Build a Safer World: A Strategy for Security and Development*, London 2005; MOD/DFID, *The Global Conflict Prevention Pool. A joint UK Government approach to reducing conflict*, London 2003; Greg Austin / Emery Brusset / Malcolm Chalmers / Juliet Pierce (Principal Authors), *Evaluation Report EV647. Evaluation of the Conflict Prevention Pools. Synthesis Report*, London 2004.

8 See the Federal Government, *Civilian Crisis Prevention, Conflict Resolution and Post-Conflict Peace-Building*, adopted by the German Federal Cabinet, 12 May 2004; the Federal Government, *1st Federal Government Report on the Implementation of the Action Plan: Civilian Crisis Prevention, Conflict Resolution and Post-Conflict Peace-Building*, Berlin 2006; and Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), *Development-Oriented Transformation in Conditions of Fragile Statehood and Poor Government*, Bonn 2007.

- The DMV is tasked with the coordination of initiatives in the area of “human security—human rights—human development.”⁹
- In Sweden, conflict sensitivity is a long-standing aim of the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA). SIDA’s Shared Responsibility Unit and the Division for Peace and Security (Department for Cooperation with NGOs, Humanitarian Assistance and Conflict Management) are responsible for the mainstreaming of conflict prevention into development assistance and the implementation of the Conflict Management Interventions (CMI). Prior to CMI are a comprehensive conflict assessment of the respective region and a conflict sensitive impact assessment.¹⁰

These exemplary cases are only 4 out of the 27 Member States of the European Union, and already this cursory overview reflects the differences among the key supporters of this agenda. Joined-up approaches vary according to the specific political, institutional and administrative context in which a particular government or institution operates. The relationship between development and security can be categorized in distance, cooperation or complementary strategies, dependent on the rationale of the cooperation mechanisms between the departments. An illustration: Germany has traditionally relied on a concept consisting of independent sectors (development, foreign policy and defense), and the UK has been working for some time with a pro-active model which provides for strategic, inter-ministerial cooperation and cross-funding between development policy and the military (Conflict Prevention Pools). Consequently, while Germany primarily emphasizes socio-economic projects and widely neglects security issues, the situation in the United Kingdom is reversed.¹¹

The European Union: Agenda-Setter and Late-Comer

Since the mid-1990s, conflict prevention became a crosscutting issue on the European level, and the mainstreaming of conflict prevention was defined as a priority for foreign and security policy. The drive within the EU towards institutional, procedural, and strategic coherence of development and security was led by the UK, with the establishment of the Department for International Development (DFID) in 1997, and two Conflict Prevention Pools in 2001. Other Member States—primarily Sweden, Germany and the Netherlands—followed-up in recent

9 Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs: *Mutual Interests, Mutual Responsibilities: Dutch Development Cooperation en route to 2015*, The Hague 2003.

10 Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), *Promoting Peace and Security through Development Cooperation*, Stockholm 2005; Government Bill 2002/03:122: *Shared Responsibility: Sweden’s Policy for Global Development*, Stockholm, 15 May 2003.

11 Tobias Debiel, *Wie weiter mit effektiver Krisenprävention? Der Aktionsplan der Bundesregierung im Vergleich zu den britischen Conflict Prevention Pools*, in: *Die Friedens-Warte*, Vol. 79, No. 3–4, 2005, pp. 253–298.

years. Besides steps taken on the Member State level, a wide range of initiatives were also taken by the EU to strengthen the consensus on the security-development nexus in general as well as to foster coordination and merging of security and development,¹² namely via the establishment of the Conflict Prevention Unit in DG Relex, the integration of the development council in the General Affairs Council (GAERC), the Göteborg Program on Preventing Violent Conflict, and the set-up of a European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) with its respective structures, guidelines and capacities. These factors stimulated the process at the European level, which conceptually culminated in the “European Security Strategy” (2003). The allotment of an additional €300 million from the 10th European Development Fund (EDF) to the African Peace Facility, the new Stability Instrument of the Commission, and the definition of “security” as one of the priority areas of the Policy Working Programme, were defined as being of major relevance for achieving the Millennium Development Goals. Other areas such as agriculture, energy, migration, and security in the Country and Regional Strategy Papers are more recent examples that illustrate the ongoing changes.

In parallel to enhancing conflict sensitivity within development policy, development policy is defined as only one among other instruments in the “tool-box” available to the EU as an emerging international actor. Responding adequately to each phase of the crisis response cycle implies improving the links between short-term and long-term instruments as well as adopting a more comprehensive approach. Consequently, the dividing lines between development policy and foreign, security and defense policy—Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) / European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP)—are blurring, and this set off the debate on the nexus of security and development. It is not the aim here to minimize the relevance of the securitization debate, nonetheless, it should be brought into focus that the debate about the sensitive boundaries between security and development tends to neglect several major factors that actually imply a strengthening of development concerns in EU Foreign and Security Policy. Most prominent among these are:

- First, the formation of civil-military instruments at the European level (ESDP), widely acknowledged conceptually as an “add-on” instrument to

12 For a study carried out for the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) on the security-development interfaces in European foreign and security policy, see Isabelle Tannous, *Schnittstellen von Entwicklung und Sicherheit der Europäischen Union – Strategien und Mechanismen für mehr Politikkohärenz* (Bonn International Center for Conversion—BICC), Bonn 2007, <www.ifsh.de/pdf/aktuelles/ESDP_Schnittstellen_tannous.pdf>. On the issue of conflict prevention and crisis management of the European Union, see EU Crisis Response Capability Revisited, in: International Crisis Group, *Europe Report No. 160*, 17 January 2005, <<http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=3220>>; Vincent Kronenberger / Jan Wouters (eds.), *The European Union and Conflict Prevention. Policy and Legal Aspects*, The Hague 2004; and Emma J. Stewart, *The European Union and Conflict Prevention*, Berlin 2006.

- the tool-box of European foreign and security policy, an indispensable short-term instrument to assist long-term and structural conflict prevention;
- Second, after decades of resistance in the European integration process, ESDP was—once the compromise between France and the UK was reached in St. Malo—only made possible with the support by the European Commission, as well as by neutral and civilian-oriented Member States;¹³
 - Third, only a handful of pioneering EU members foster pro-actively the idea of joining security and development—and even among the key supporters this agenda differs substantially—while others do not dispose of a conflict-sensitive development policy or even strongly reject the idea of pooling security and development.

Conclusion

More research is required in order to give more reliable indicators if these factors mentioned above can be seen as only “retarding factors,” or if we actually can assume a “developmentalization” in the specific construction of the EU as an international actor. Development issues traditionally have a strong position in the argumentation of the EU as “soft power” and as “stability exporter,” a consequence of the issue-driven integration process and the functional set-up of the European Economic Community with the Treaty of Rome 50 years ago. Nonetheless, development has not fully recovered from the conceptual crisis in the 1990s and the fundamental change of the international system, the loss of legitimacy of the Santer Commission, discrediting European development policy, ten years later has its share. Only recently, especially since 9/11, and the “upgrade” of European development policy with the European Consensus on Development in 2005 did that development policy become en vogue again. Despite the fact that there is only a handful of pioneer states that are actively supporting the joining-up of security and development—and their approaches vary—the common understanding of “jointness” has been strengthened on the EU level during the last years, and new instruments and procedures have been established. Even if there is no technocratic formula for achieving greater policy coherence, the EU has appealed to its Member States to adjust their strategies accordingly and to provide additional support for this task.¹⁴

¹³ Tannous, *Decision-Making by Antagonistic Representation: On the Path to Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management*, in: Dirk De Bièvre / Christine Neuhold (eds.), *Dynamics and Obstacles of European Governance*, Cheltenham 2007, pp. 187–229 (with Mariano Barbato).

¹⁴ Recent Council Conclusions on Security and Development: 2831st External Relations Council meeting Brussels, 19/20 November 2007.

The European Union has often been criticized for its lack of coherence as an international actor, and accordingly is said to not be in a position to develop consistent structures for conflict and post-conflict areas, and reacts solely on an ad-hoc basis. Critics go as far as to say that the EU lacks the qualities of a political actor or defining coherence as a prerequisite of “actorness.”¹⁵ Citing specific characteristics of the EU, especially with respect to the inter-pillar coordination, the inter-governmental and the supra-national decision-making process often explain the alleged incoherent picture, which the EU presents in reaction to new threats, and the competencies shared at national and European levels.¹⁶ These explanations shall not be dismissed, but considering the challenges indicated in fusing development and security for all actors involved, their scope is too limited when it comes to explaining why and in what way policy change occurs. It is not the institutional particularities of the EU that explain the decisive coherence problems, but rather the merger intricacies of the two policies as such. Neither the EU nor any one of the Member States has managed to merge development and foreign / defense ministries into a new department of conflict prevention and crisis management. Instead, a plethora of existing mechanisms to enhance policy coherence between

15 See Charlotte Bretherton and John Vogler, *The European Union As a Global Actor*, New York, NY, 2006.

16 See Hans-Georg Ehrhart, *The EU as a civil-military crisis manager, Coping with internal security governance*, in: *International Journal*, Spring 2006, pp. 433–450; Paul Gauttier, *Horizontal Coherence and the External Competences of the European Union*, in: *European Law Journal*, Vol. 10, No. 1, 2004, pp. 23–41; and Catriona Gourlay, *European Union Procedures and Resources for Crisis Management*, in: *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 11, No. 3, pp. 404–421.



The introductory panel with Manuel Sánchez-Montero (FRIDE), Isabelle Tannous and Robert Mudida from Kenya

pre-existing organizational bodies—the development and security departments of the EU Member States and / or the existing structures for development aid within the Community and the CFSP / ESDP capabilities—are strongly embedded in their own institutional logic and bureaucratic rationality.

While such a super-ministry is far from being desirable, the status quo and the internal dynamics of the debate show to be insufficient, sometimes even wicked: without engaging in a controversial and inconvenient debate to respond adequately to basic strategic and institutional questions on how to deal effectively with the multifaceted problems associated with fragile states, both development and security actors are more or less willingly supporting the security-first approach by referring to the relevance of security and stability. Ignoring the blind spots of the debate on the security-development nexus, by reducing it to civil-military cooperation within the narrow ESDP framework, and obeying to the logic of securitization result in neglecting the potential of developmentalization in European foreign and security policy. Consequently, the discursive connotation linked to the nexus of security and development will remain problematic, since it is often unclear whether it is referred to “our” security (stability in third countries in this chain of argumentation limits the danger of terrorist attacks) or to security and stability as a prerequisite for the sustainability of development efforts in third countries (relevance of the rule of law or security sector reform). Security and development actors need to intensify dialogue, instead of exploiting the concept of security to their own advantage, coming from different angles and sometimes not even referring to the same subject. The European Union can provide a unique platform for this task to promote dialogue among its Member States.

Critical Review of Approaches to Post-Conflict Reconstruction in Africa

Richard Akum

Introduction

As violent conflicts ceded to the prospects for a sustainable peace within the conflict systems which proliferated across Africa in the 1990s, concern simultaneously shifted from conflict resolution towards post-war reconstruction. Crossing the conflict relapse vulnerability threshold has remained a pre-occupation in policy and academic circles, given the number of studies which showed that a majority of countries emerging from violent conflict relapsed into conflict within five years after the signing of a peace accord.¹ As some scholars debated the cause of conflict relapse, Collier grappled with breaking the conflict trap through the infusion of development policy into conflict resolution processes and beyond.² Emerging from this problematic has been the development of approaches which seek to merge political, social and economic considerations to design a sustainable post-conflict peace in Africa.

While conflict relapse vulnerability could be studied in abstraction, the realities of conflict relapse in Liberia, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Sudan remain all too glaring and necessitate further exploration of post-war reconstruction. The carnage of war leaves in its wake broken infrastructure, fissured interpersonal relational dynamics, and a resource deprived community dependent on the benevolence of external forces for social, economic and political sustenance. Thus from the resource level, the point at which post-war reconstruction takes off is an asymmetric power dynamic between the victimized community emerging from conflict and the donor community. The realities of the post-conflict environment therefore necessitate an understanding of the endogenous and exogenous actors and structures involved in post-war reconstruction efforts. These actors and structures have definitional, assumptive and derivative frameworks which underpin their post-war interventions, which in turn hold clues to preventing conflict relapse vulnerability.

Over the past decade, post-conflict reconstruction in Africa has taken the form of an admixture of approaches which include approaches of democratic recon-



Richard Akum

1 Roy Licklider, The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars 1945–93, in: *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 98, No. 3, 1995.

2 Paul Collier, *Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy*, The World Bank, Washington, DC, 2003.

struction, security sector reform, rule of law/institutional reform and community-driven development. These approaches are not mutually exclusive and there is even a tendency for them to overlap spatially at the level of implementation. This paper seeks to provide a conceptual description of these approaches through the identification of the actors involved within specific approaches, the conceptual and operational assumptions which guide each approach as well as the potential implications on post-conflict reconstruction. This paper seeks to locate the space for a sustainable peace at the point of intersection of all the above approaches, thereby calling for the harmonization of post-war reconstruction in societies emerging from protracted conflict. Given the complexity underpinning conflict causation in Africa, it would be foolhardy for any single approach to claim to provide the panacea against conflict relapse vulnerability.

The Democratic Reconstruction Approach

The democratic reconstruction model is premised on the perception that the structural elements of governance were part of the causal edifice of conflict. The end of the Cold War and the rise of intra-state conflicts in Africa are not coincidental occurrences in international affairs. Since independence, many African states had witnessed the creation of monolithic repressive polities, with state-planned economies. Hence the end of the Cold War ushered in a transitional era when contending forces for the status quo and forces for change pushed against and for the liberalization of political systems and for the accommodation of new global forces of change. Fukuyama optimistically saw Western victory at the end of the Cold War as pointing to a liberal democratic and capitalist economic end to human history, with different countries at different stages on that journey.³ Meanwhile Huntington pointed to a third wave of democratization which would not elude the African continent this time around.⁴ These dominant post-polar perspectives explain the inclination of donor and international Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) communities, to construct democratic institutions from the rubble of intractable conflict.

Many of the conflicts which exploded onto the African scene post-Cold War initially were driven by forces which claimed to be working to replace the monolithic old guard with new and more accountable, representative and legitimate systems. What started in most places as revolutionary transformations responsive to the developmental, security and access needs of the majority quickly faltered as belligerent parties differed on objectives, tactics and end goal, as was evident

3 Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*, New York 1994.

4 Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*, Norman [et al.] 1993.

with the fractioning of Taylor's National Patriotic Forces for Liberia; Laurent Kabila's Alliance for Democratic Forces in Congo, while unified in their vision to dethrone Mobutu, lacked a unified vision on the future of the DRC; meanwhile postponing of the 1995 presidential elections in the Republic of Congo led to the unleashing of militia forces loyal to former President Denis Sassou Nguesso, Brazzaville mayor Bernard Kolelas and incumbent democratically elected president Pascal Lissouba. The infusion of ethnic dichotomization into these conflicts also made them even more intractable. Hence a major challenge of post-conflict peace-building is the creation of an accommodative and responsive governance system which is legitimate and accountable.

The argument can be taken further to state that most of Africa's civil wars are the product of years of authoritarianism, disenfranchisement and lack of avenues for participation. Given this premise, it would only be fair for mediators to dangle the democratic reconstruction model as a viable option for legitimate and representative governance in Africa. While this may be widely acceptable as a possible option for moving from conflict to a sustainable peace, the time, methods, structural and relational dynamics ought to be synchronized to meet African post-conflict realities. Responding to this structural governance need, Bloomfield and Reilly develop a conceptual definition of democracy with three essential conditions—meaningful competition for political power amongst individuals and organized groups; inclusive participation in the selection of leaders and policies, at least through free and fair elections; and a level of civil and political liberties sufficient to ensure the integrity of political competition and participation.⁵ From their perspective, the choice of appropriate democratic institutions—forms of devolution or autonomy, electoral system design, legislative bodies, judicial structures—designed and developed through fair and honest negotiation processes are vital ingredients in building an enduring and peaceful settlement to even the most intractable conflict.

Despite the problems akin to budding democracies, they argue that democratic systems of government have a degree of legitimacy, inclusiveness, flexibility and capacity for constant adaptation that enables deep-rooted conflicts to be managed peacefully. Building on the constructs of Waltzian “democratic peace theory,” the assumption is made that by building norms of behavior of negotiation, compromise and cooperation amongst political actors, democracy itself has a pacifying effect on the nature of political relations between people and between governments. These assumptions fall short of accounting for the lack of fear,

⁵ David Bloomfield and Ben Reilly, *The Changing Nature of Conflict and Conflict Management*, in: Peter Harris and Reilly (eds.) *Democracy and Deep-Rooted Conflict: Options for Negotiators* (Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance—IDEA, Handbook Series ; 3), Stockholm 1998.

trust and compliance required to dispel the potential of a security dilemma within democratic societies.

However, this over-optimistic view on the healing and participatory potential of democracy in post-conflict peace-building efforts is tempered by Horowitz's assessment of dilemmas of majority inclusion and minority exclusion resulting from democratic processes and the potential for these dynamics to create enduring rivalries between groups in divided societies.⁶ He notes that when democratic elections produce ethnic exclusion, undemocratic reactions can be expected from it. This nuanced view of the pervasive effects of ill-conceived organizational structures to power nascent democracies points to the requisite organizational and human capacity needed to ensure participatory democracy.

All the peace agreements signed in Africa between 1990–2003 have recognized the importance of democratic institution-building as a key component in the management and resolution of protracted social conflicts. However, Call and Cook observe that of the 18 countries that experienced UN peacekeeping missions, with a political institution-building component, between 1988–2002, thirteen (72%) were classified as some form of authoritarian regime as of 2002.⁷ This sobering statistic points to the fact that even the most well-intentioned internationally-engineered post-conflict democratization processes do not always turn out right. Many reasons could be advanced for this problematic in engineering democratic reconstruction into post-conflict peace-building.

The absence of clear conceptual linkages between peace-building and democratization remains evident. The confluence of post-conflict peace-building and democratization theory is necessary, taking into account the relational dynamics of the groups and structures which emerge from protracted social conflicts. Starting off with transitional processes, generally the time frame for the establishment of a transitional government and the holding of elections has been precipitated. Acting under pressure for immediate results, most peace processes in Africa have sought to placate the belligerents which control large swathes of the country without taking a holistic approach to the problem of post-conflict democratic institutional engineering. For warlords, peace negotiations in Africa have been a barter of land and terrorism for the legitimization of their monopoly on the use of force through transitional leadership and then the manipulation of elections to power.

6 Donald Horowitz, *Democracy in Divided Societies*, in: *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 4, No. 4, 1993, pp. 28–29.

7 Charles Call and Susan E. Cook, *On Democracy and Peacebuilding*, in: *Governance After War: Rethinking Democratization and Peacebuilding*, Special Issue of *Global Governance*, Vol. 9, No. 2, 2003.

The creation of democratic societies assumes the existence of participatory organization structures across Lederach's pyramid of groups from the community to the elite level.⁸ The absence of cross-level interaction which was a characteristic of the pre-conflict state is often replicated in post-conflict peace-building. Hence the creation of elite democratic structures which remain disconnected from the masses, apart from being the recipients of effusive campaign promises. This disconnect has been evident in both 1997 and 2005 Liberian presidential and legislative elections. According to the Carter Center and National Democratic Institute, more than 1.3 million Liberians, 50% of whom were women, registered to vote, representing 90% of a UN estimated 1.5 million voters.⁹ They also noted a number of challenges which cast a cloud over the elections (a principal democratic hallmark) in immediate post-conflict societies. These challenges included: the enforcement of campaign finance law and regulations; vote buying; civic education in a country with an illiteracy rate of 85%; the de-ethnicization and de-personalization of political campaign rhetoric; the disenfranchisement of internally displaced people and returning refugees; and the challenge of hiring 18,000 polling staff for the 3,212 polling places around the country.¹⁰ In immediate post-conflict situations, elections have been plagued with the same security dilemmas which escalated into conflict in the first place. Intangible forces of fear, mistrust and uncertainty drive voter attitudes. Belligerents use democratic practice to legitimize and co-opt a monopoly on the use of violence. These challenges are issues which need to be addressed across the board if the international community is truly committed to democratic reconstruction in post-conflict societies.

The democratic reconstruction model holds great promise for post-conflict reconstruction in Africa. The novelty of democratic processes in societies which have suffered over four decades of post-independence monolithic rule could be an asset for its prospects. The democratic ideal needs to be understood as a dialectical process hence the institutions created to support this process ought to be amenable to change. From the thesis of the immediate post-conflict environment, the international community could play a central role in political party development, civic education, encouraging the creation of longitudinal linkages from communities, through mid-level civil society constituencies to the top leadership. Open dialogue, also a hallmark of democratic processes, is important in the transformation of attitudes, behaviors and structural contradictions which cause and sustain conflict. However, there is the need for greater conceptual and applicative clarity in the infusion of democratic models in post-conflict peace-building.

8 Fukuyama, *op. cit.* (fn. 3), p. 14.

9 First Carter Center Pre-Election Report on Liberia National Elections, October 2005, Atlanta, GA.

10 Geoffrey T. Harris, *Reconstruction, Recovery and Development: The Main Tasks*, in G. Harris (ed.), *Recovery from Armed Conflicts in Developing Countries: An Economic and Political Analysis*, London 1999, pp. 6–8.

Rule of Law/Institutional Reform Approach

Emerging from and inalienably linked to the democratic reconstruction model is the institutional reform model. Institutional failure is one of the root causes of conflict in Africa. The inability of the state to marshal its institutional assets to the service of its citizenry has led to intra-state and cross-border security dilemmas, which have pushed many states in Africa towards collapse. The institutional reform model for post-conflict reconstruction is an approach, which seeks to strengthen institutional capacity across areas such as the institutionalization of the rule of law, institutionally engendering post-conflict reconstruction, institutionalization of transparency and accountability in public finance and the creation of safeguards against abuse. Solid institutions are the bedrock of good governance. Institutions are the key which unlock the mysterious grids belying conflict prevention, sustainable conflict management and post-conflict reconstruction. Well-lubricated, self-corrective, innovative and malleable institutions mediate the interaction between contending groups; regulate the transactional landscape; and provide a prism for consensus building in the face of discord.

Rothman's ARIA framework is premised on functional institutions to mitigate antagonism, resonate disparate views, invent creative solutions to problems and act upon these inventions.¹¹ Meanwhile, institutional reform also plays a central role in Azar's (1990) understanding of post-conflict peace-building, since institutional development is a dynamic process which depends on both endogenous and exogenous inputs.¹² From a macro-economic perspective, Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi claim that institutions play important market-regulating, market stabilizing and market legitimizing roles, which when coupled with the design of sound macroeconomic reconstruction programs, provide sustainable anchors for post-conflict reconstruction.¹³ This institutional role in post-conflict economic reconstruction responds to the pressures of unemployment, capital flight, and inflation which characterize immediate post-conflict economies.

The failure of peace agreements to create institutions addressing the security dilemmas, which fuel polarization and the resort to hostile action, often are strong factors in conflict relapse vulnerability. Lake and Rothchilds note that collective fears of the future persist, when states lose their ability to impartially arbitrate

11 Jay Rothman, *Resolving Identity-Based Conflict in Nations, Organizations and Communities*, San Francisco, CA, 1997, pp. 7–9.

12 Edward E. Azar, *The Management of Protracted Social Conflicts: Theory and Cases*, Aldershot, 1990, p. 15.

13 Dani Rodrik, Arvind Subramanian, Francesco Trebbi, *Institutions Rule: The Primacy of Institutions over Geography and Integration in Economic Development* (National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No. 9305), Cambridge, MA, 2002.

between groups, or to provide credible guarantees for the protection of groups.¹⁴ These fears are exacerbated by the use of violence as an extension of inter-group political interaction. With the state fragility, these functional deficiencies raise the concern of physical security. This perspective is supported by Ignatieff, who asserts that there is one type of fear more devastating in its impact than any other—the fear that arises when a state begins to collapse. He further contends that ethnic hatred is the result of the terror which arises when legitimate authority disintegrates.¹⁵ These intangibles point to structural deficiencies which ought to be corrected as a country emerges from a protracted social conflict. Hence post-conflict institutional reform plays a central role in mitigating the intangibles of fear, mistrust and uncertainty which shape inter-group relational dynamics.

Africa's record of post-conflict institutional reconstruction is dismal. While non-governmental organizations work to strengthen the non-state institutional sector, state institutional structures suffer under the weight of inadequate funding and mediocre functional capacity. Hence within the post-conflict environment the state in Africa remains unable to deliver on political, regulatory, welfare and participatory promises to its citizens. According to Adebajo the 1997 Taylor government inherited a state treasury with 17,000 Dollars and over 500 million Dollars in domestic and foreign debt.¹⁶ This pecuniary fiscal position does not meet the threshold for the delivery of the most basic services expected of the state.

The importance of institutional reform in post-conflict peace-building cannot be overstated. However, there is the need to merge theories on institutional reform with theories of post-conflict peace-building. This merger should aim to address the root causes of conflict and seek to provide structures which protect individuals and vulnerable groups within societies and provide them with avenues for participation in processes which are of concern to them. Post-conflict institutional reform should be geared towards strengthening institutions of states and creating avenues for the creation of non-state institutions which would operate within an interactive nexus. The investment required in developing the organizational and human capacity to harness post-conflict institutional reform is enormous, given the heavy human costs of contemporary conflict.

14 David Lake and Donald Rothchilds, *Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict*, in: *International Security*, Vol. 21, No. 2, 1996.

15 Michael Ignatieff, *Blood and Belonging: Journeys into the New Nationalism*, London 1993.

16 Adekeye Adebajo, *Building Peace in West Africa: Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau* (International Peace Academy Occasional Paper Series), New York, NY, 2002.

Security Transformation Approach

The security transformation model emerges from peace agreements as a direct response of addressing the security crises posed by civil wars. In the immediate post conflict emergency environment, focus has been placed on the demobilization, demilitarization, reintegration and rehabilitation (DDRR) of former combatants, many of whom are children. The security transformation model seeks to reconstruct a standing national army and police force which would meet specifically assigned roles in the service of the state, recreating the state's monopoly over the use of violence. Africa has a mixed history of civil-military relations. In the immediate post-independence environment, the military made incursions into politics in Nigeria, Ghana, Gabon, Togo, Congo, Chad, Zaire, the Central African Republic, Uganda and Egypt among others. In many of these states, like in other African states, the ethnicization of the security establishment has meant the cooptation of security services by specific ethnic groups loyal to leaders in power. Doe filled the ranks of the army in Liberia with members of his ethnic Krahn group, while Taylor filled the ranks of his Anti-Terrorist Force with former NPFL fighters upon taking power in 1997. Meanwhile, even in countries which have avoided the scourge of protracted social conflict like Cameroon, Paul Biya has flooded the elite presidential guards with members of his ethnic Beti group. These issues, which have affected the efficiency of the army and police forces, are central to the security reform models adopted post-conflict thereby eliciting tensions between regime security and state security.

Call and Stanley observe that although public security reforms are unlikely to be implemented if not written directly into peace agreements, police reform matters for medium and long-term public security and democratization. They also note the tensions and trade-offs that confront local and international decision-makers regarding longer-term public security issues.¹⁷ Looking specifically at African peace agreements, there is the neglect of public security sector reform clauses. While attention is paid to the modalities for disarmament and demilitarization, none of the peace agreements seeking an end to the conflict in Sierra Leone, Liberia, Côte d'Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Rwanda make extensive reference to the structure of immediate post-conflict public security forces.

Despite this deficiency of public security clauses in Africa's peace agreements, the cases of South Africa, Namibia and Mozambique show various models of

¹⁷ Charles Call and W. Stanley, *Military and Police Reform After Civil Wars*, in: John Darby and R. MacGinty (eds.), *Contemporary Peacemaking: Conflict, Violence and Peace Processes*, London 2003.

post-conflict security reform. The military merger model¹⁸ has entailed limited efforts to build smaller national militaries that integrate former civil war adversaries, while developing a higher level of professionalism. The success of the military merger model is predicated upon the ability of third party training to build trust and professionalism within the new post-conflict army and make it responsive to external threats exclusively. Hickson proposes in the case of the DRC, establishing security through demobilization, disarmament and reintegration of armed groups and the creation of an integrated Congolese armed forces and effective police force.¹⁹ In the DRC case, the new national army has lacked the requisite professionalism in its dealing with populations in the eastern part of the country where it has been accused of terrorizing local communities and raping women and children. The verdict is still out on the success of the military merger model, because while it has created the requisite military force in places like Mozambique, South Africa and Zimbabwe, it has failed in Liberia and Sierra Leone where identifiable “spoilers” exist.

There is also the military re-composition model, which seeks to build a new military force from the ground-up. Given that civil wars often witness the demobilization of state armies as their ethnic and other loyalties push them to serve different fighting factions, the need often arises to recompose the military. This process is currently under way in Liberia where the United States has contracted private firms to train and equip a new Liberian military. This model takes into consideration the complexities of civil war realities and seeks to create a distinctly new army breaking with the past, where the army was a violent tool for political oppression as the Doe army was in its brutalization of the Mano and Gio communities of Nimba County in Liberia. Hence, like in all other cases of post-conflict peace-building, there is the need to fashion the security reform model according to local realities.

Public safety and national security are inalienably linked to human security. The post-conflict security environment, with the lingering presence of small arms and the ability for former militia brigades to be reconstituted into criminal enterprises, security ought to be taken seriously in peace agreements and their implementation. It would be fallacious to think of post-conflict security reform as separate from democratic and institutional reconstruction. Public security forces—the military for national defense and the police force for civil defense—are contributors to post-conflict peace-building processes. There is a need for greater focus

¹⁸ Op. cit.

¹⁹ Claire Hickson, Evidence and Analysis: Overview Paper on Strengthening Conflict Prevention, prepared for the Commission for Africa, London 2004, p. 11.

to be paid post-DDRR, on the sustainable reconstruction of public and national security within emergency, transitional and consolidation phases of post-conflict reconstruction. This is one area where third party partnerships could play a primordial role in providing guarantees against the abuse of the state's monopoly on the use of violence. Hence the salience of mission, compositional, structural and operational synchrony between security and non-security institutional establishments within post-conflict spaces.

Community Driven Development Approach

Civilian populations suffer the brunt of contemporary conflicts in Africa. The pre-war conditions of disenfranchisement and the lack of avenues for political and economic participation are exacerbated by conflict situations where civilian populations become explicit targets of the different belligerents. This makes local communities key stakeholders in the post-conflict reconstruction process. The inherently elite nature of peace agreements in Africa, which often fail to address issues of violence on civilian populations, further marginalize communities from the post-conflict peace compact. There is therefore the need to develop innovative ways to incorporate community perspectives and indigenous inputs in the post-conflict reconstruction process. Community-driven development approaches, which are fairly new to peace-building, are seen to create opportunities for the infusion of participatory, accountable, partnership-formation and inclusive tenets in post-conflict reconstruction. The Community Driven Development Approach seeks to explore the potential for peace-building and conflict mitigation in development projects, which members of targeted communities identify and prioritize. This seeks to increase individual participation in post-war reconstruction from the community level through collective decision-making and eventual inter-community interaction. The assumption is that this level of interaction would decrease levels of mistrust, fear and uncertainty which are both a cause and by-product of protracted conflict.

Cockell observes that a sustainable peace can only be founded on the indigenous, societal resources for inter-group dialogue, cooperation and consensus.²⁰ Harris underlines the necessity for a phased and sequenced approach to post-conflict development endeavors.²¹ This approach ought to be sustainable and address the root causes of the conflict. This is a theoretically sound approach which hopes to make local communities custodians of post-conflict reconstruction. International NGOs are increasingly creating partnerships with local community based organi-

²⁰ John G. Cockell, *Conceptualising peacebuilding: human security and sustainable peace*, in Michael Pugh (ed.), *Regeneration of War-Torn Societies*, London 1999, p. 23.

²¹ Harris, *op. cit.* (fn. 10).

zations to address the participatory needs of these local communities. While this direct interaction with international partners creates avenues for participation in health care, education and economics, it does not necessarily lead to inclusiveness in the creation of intra-state partnering. This runs contrary to the goal of post-conflict peace-building which seeks to harmonize and facilitate the exchange between state and civil society organizations for sustainable peaceful coexistence.

However, community driven development approaches hold the promise of using the development medium to harmonize state goals with those of its local communities through sustained dialogue between both groups. Sen noted the inter-related nature of development, institutions and security when he underscores the importance of freedom as a means and an end to development.²² This interaction between freedom and development ought to be the bedrock upon which countries emerging from protracted social conflict are built. Community driven development approaches challenge the state to look beyond the capital city and strengthen service provision in peripheral regions and to provide avenues for cross-communal interaction in meeting similar needs.

Conclusion

The different models for post-conflict reconstruction need to be harmonized for inclusion in peace-building processes in Africa. This highlights the need for the creation of specific structures within the African Union and NEPAD to focus specifically on contextualizing the democratic reconstruction, institutional restructuring, security reform and community driven development models to the specific country realities. While these entities may provide the organizational capacity for the design and implementation of post-conflict reconstruction processes, there is also the need for considerable sustained financing for post-conflict peace-building programs. To make peace agreements extend beyond cease-fires, these approaches need to be discussed during peace processes. It does not suffice for belligerent parties to sit together and try to maximize their gains in political power and resource control through peace agreements. Addressing post-conflict reconstruction specifics during peace processes would challenge parties to look beyond the specifics of personal gains made by the barrel of the gun to responsibilities they owe to the citizens of the countries they aspire to lead. They need to be challenged to come up with ways of ensuring a sustainable peace in the immediate post-conflict environment.

²² Amartya Sen, *Development as Freedom*, New York 1999, p. 16.



Benedikt Franke presents his paper on Africa's security architecture ...



... and debates its implications with discussant Teresa Cravo during a stroll through the nearby Retiro Park

Helping a Continent to Help Itself: Institutional Capacity Building in Africa

Benedikt Franke

Introduction

The disappointing performance of the African Union's peace operations in Darfur and Somalia has rekindled widespread skepticism about the wisdom of relying on African institutions for promoting peace, security and development on the continent. While acknowledging a wide range of difficulties, this paper rejects such pessimism and argues that the unique, multi-level structure of Africa's current institutional landscape offers an exciting window of opportunity for capacity building which the international community cannot afford to ignore. To this purpose, the paper first elaborates on Africa's current institutional architecture, the international community's ongoing support as well as the key challenges to its implementation; and then points to the rationales for expanding capacity building support before offering some specific policy recommendations to this effect.

Doubts about Africa's ability to take over responsibility for peace and security on the continent are as old as the attempts by African organizations to do so. During the Cold War, the dismal performance of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), which had been founded in May 1963 in order to "achieve a better life for the peoples of Africa,"¹ certainly proved the skeptics right. Since the early 1990s, however, Africa's organizations have shown an increasing willingness and capacity to provide "African solutions to African problems" or, in the words of former French President François Mitterrand "to finally resolve their conflicts themselves and organize their own security as condition for the continent's development."² While critical voices continue to doubt the practicability of regionalizing the responsibility for peace and security in Africa—usually citing insufficient institutional resources and a lack of political will—this paper argues that the continent's current move from ad hoc initiatives to institutionalized security frameworks has created an unprecedented chance for the international community to help Africa to help itself.³



Benedikt Franke

1 OAU, Charter of the Organization of African Unity, Article 2b.

2 Former French President François Mitterrand, in: *The Washington Post*, 10 November 1994.

3 For a particularly scathing critique, see Walter Dorn, *Regional Peacekeeping Is Not the Way*, in: *Peacekeeping and International Relations*, Vol. 27, No. 2/1998. For a response, see Benedikt Franke, *In Defence of Regional Peace Operations in Africa*, in: *Journal of Humanitarian Assistance*, No. 185/2006.

Africa's Current Institutional Architecture

Increasingly aware of the link between widespread insecurity and stalling development, African governments made important steps towards creating a viable institutional architecture through which to tackle the continent's many perils in the late 1990s. While such efforts were certainly not new, previous attempts at creating a favorable climate for development through institutionalized cooperation had failed miserably.⁴ With the end of the Cold War, however, conditions changed. The deteriorating security landscape in Africa, the international community's diminishing interest in the continent as well as a discernible change in the continent's self-perception forced the OAU to reconsider its own role with regard to Africa's security and development. This jump-started a process that in July 2002 led to the replacement of the OAU with a structurally more promising African Union (AU) modeled in many ways after the European archetype. At its first session, the assembly of the AU established a Peace and Security Council (PSC) as a standing decision-making organ including "a continental early-warning system (CEWS) to facilitate timely and efficient response to conflict and crisis situations in Africa" as well as an African Standby Force (ASF) and Panel of the Wise to respond to such crises.⁵ The incorporation of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), as well as the formulation of a Common African Defense and Security Policy, which delineates the member states' collective responses to both internal and external security threats, completed this institutional architecture in February 2004.

While the creation of this arrangement in itself constitutes a major achievement in institutional reform, it is the AU's underlying acceptance of the normative commitment to protect that distinguishes it from its feeble predecessor. Where Articles II and III of the Charter OAU had placed a premium on sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-interference in member states' internal affairs, the AU's Constitutive Act imposes important limitations on state sovereignty.⁶ Under the AU, member states enjoy the privileges of sovereignty such as the non-interference in its internal affairs only as long as they fulfill their responsibility to protect their citizens.⁷ If states fail to honor this responsibility, the AU reserves itself "the right to intervene pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave

4 See Franke, *A Pan-African Army: The Evolution of an Idea and Its Eventual Realisation in the African Standby Force*, in: *African Security Review*, Vol. 15, No. 4, 2006.

5 See Article 2, Paragraph 1, Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, 2002.

6 Articles II and III, Charter of the Organization of African Unity, 25 May 1963, reprinted in *International Legal Materials* 2, no. 4, July 1963, pp. 767–78.

7 *The Responsibility to Protect*, Report by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, December 2001, Paragraphs 6.1–6.12.

circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity”.⁸ The significance of this shift in the non-interference norm cannot be understated: a pivotal OAU principle was that states would not interfere in the internal affairs of other African states. This core principle not only prevented the OAU from taking action in a number of severe crises in Africa, but also extended to a continent-wide silence on the abusive tendencies of autocratic leaders. The simple acceptance that sovereignty is not completely inviolable represented a major change.

A second prominent feature of the new peace and security architecture is its multi-layered and symbiotic approach to security cooperation. Likened by some to a “peace pyramid,” the continental security structure rests firmly on Africa’s existing regional security mechanisms, which act both as pillars of and implementation agencies for continental security policy.⁹ This structural interdependence not only contrasts starkly with the OAU’s often uneasy relationship with the continent’s regional economic organizations (RECs), but also helps to focus the plethora of African security initiatives onto one common objective. Moreover, the AU can profit from the regional organizations’ comparative advantage in military and security matters, their experience with peace operations and—in the case of Western, Eastern and Southern Africa—their established frameworks and mechanisms for conflict prevention, management and resolution. Congruently, the cooperative structure does not deny the regional organizations a significant stake and central role in all processes and respects their regional authority and responsibility. Under this system of decentralized collective security, the primary responsibility for peace and security remains squarely with the regional organizations while the AU serves as the clearinghouse and framework for all initiatives, thus filling the conceptual and institutional gap between the global level (the United Nations) and the regional level. The resultant symbiosis ensures the regional organizations’ ownership in the process of establishing a continental security architecture and virtually eliminates the risk of competition between the various levels of inter-African security cooperation; and increases the stakes all actors have in the process and thereby reduces the chances of failure.¹⁰

While some critics argue that this decentralized approach merely creates or reinforces additional layers of bureaucracy and thus slows down responses to crises and conflicts, there is ample evidence that the symbiotic relationship between the

8 The Constitutive Act of the African Union, July 2002, Article 4 (Principles), Paragraph h.

9 For the concept of “peace pyramid”, see Mark Malan, *The OAU and African Sub-Regional Organisations—a Closer Look at the Peace Pyramid* (Institute for Security Studies), Pretoria 1999.

10 See AU Document AU-RECs/EXP/2(II) Rev. 3, Draft Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in the Area of Peace and Security between the African Union, the Regional Economic Communities and the Coordinating Mechanisms of the Regional Standby Brigades of Eastern Africa and Northern Africa, 2 September 2007.

continental and regional levels is already beginning to bear fruit. Over the past five years, the ambitious dream of a comprehensive security architecture has been taking shape at a remarkable pace and the AU has become deeply involved in the continent's manifold security problems by building on the experiences and relying on the resources of regional organizations. In Burundi, for example, the African Union Mission (AMIB) stabilized the fragile situation and prepared the ground for a subsequent UN peacekeeping operation. In Darfur, the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) has, despite severe financial and logistical difficulties, done remarkably well in alleviating widespread suffering and containing a conflict in which no one else was prepared to intervene. Similarly, the AU was the only organization ready to deploy to Somalia following Ethiopia's invasion in December 2006. In Togo, the AU prevented the undemocratic take-over of power following the death of President Gnassingbe Eyadema; and on the Comoros the African Union Military Observer Mission (AMISEC) successfully safeguarded a complicated election and reconciliation process.

Current Capacity Building Initiatives

The international community has not missed these positive developments and has gradually increased its capacity building support to the AU and the continent's regional organizations through the channels of the UN, G8, EU as well as national efforts, most notably those of the United States, the United Kingdom and Germany.

United Nations

The United Nations has a long history of institutional capacity building in Africa. As early as 1992, UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali established the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa in order to support the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) in its incipient efforts to promote regional peace and stability.¹¹ Since then, the UN has expanded its capacity building to other organizations such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the AU,¹² which, as a result of the reports of the Brahimi Commission (2000) and the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (2004), has increasingly emerged as the focal point for UN capacity building support.¹³ Given the emergent division of labor in which the AU or RECs provide the initial response to crises before the UN takes over (as happened in Sierra Leone, Burundi and Liberia)

11 See UN Document A/RES/46/37 B, 6 December 1991.

12 See Victoria Holt, *African Capacity Building for Peace Operations: UN Collaboration with the African Union and ECOWAS* (Henry L. Stimson Center), Washington, DC, 2005.

13 Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, *A more secure world: Our shared responsibility* (United Nations), New York 2004, para 272c.

as well as the anticipated growth of so-called “hybrid” missions where multiple organizations try to synchronize their field activities (as is currently the case in Darfur), the UN has now deployed a permanent liaison team to the AU in order to coordinate support activities, assist with operational planning and management and strengthen headquarters capabilities.

G8

The G8’s involvement in capacity building in Africa began at the Genoa Summit in 2001, and has since grown steadily and culminated in this year’s Heiligendamm Summit, which declared Africa’s development one of the group’s top priorities (the others being climate change and economic growth). To this purpose, the G8 leaders pledged to increase their capacity building support in line with the 1992 Paris Declaration, their own Africa Action Plan—agreed to in Kananaskis in 2002—and the so-called Joint Plan adopted in 2003. A fundamental aim of the latter was to “mobilize technical and financial assistance so that, by 2010, African partners are able to engage more effectively to prevent and resolve violent conflict on the continent, and undertake peace support operations in accordance with the United Nations Charter.”¹⁴ Realizing that implementation of the ambitious Joint Plan was lacking, one problem being that the G8 has no bureaucracy or other machinery through which to implement its policies, and thus has to rely on coherent actions of its member states, the G8 began to narrow its focus on particular areas of the African peace and security architecture.¹⁵ These areas include the ASF, and specifically its civilian component, as well as capacity building for conflict prevention and stabilization, reconstruction, reconciliation and development in post-conflict situations.¹⁶

European Union

Like the G8, the European Union (EU) has been increasingly involved in Africa over the last couple of years. Beginning in earnest with its Africa strategy of 2005 (“The EU and Africa: towards a strategic partnership”), the EU has stressed the fundamental role of institutional capacity building in its development initiatives. Based on the implementation policies outlined in its Concept for Strengthening African Capabilities for the Prevention, Management and Resolution of Conflicts as well as various action plans, the EU has promoted long-term capacity building, including military and civilian crisis management support for the ASF. To this effect, it has earmarked €27 million out of its €250 million African Peace Facility (APF) for capacity building purposes and began to fund personnel recruit-

14 Implementation Report by Africa Representatives to Leaders on the G8 Africa Action Plan, para. 12.

15 Alex Ramsbotham, Alhaji Bah, and Fanny Calder, *The Implementation of the Joint Africa / G8 Plan to Enhance African Capabilities to Undertake Peace Support Operations: Survey of Current G8 and African Activities and Potential Areas for Further Collaboration* (Chatham House), London 2005.

16 G8 Summit Declaration, *Growth and Responsibility in Africa*, 8 June 2007, Articles 39–45.

ment, staff costs, equipment, rent of office space and duty travel, a series of ASF workshops, the creation of liaison offices of RECs with the AU, as well as the development of early warning capacities. In addition, the EU has recently Europeanized the successful French training initiative *Renforcement des capacités africaines au maintien de la paix (RECAMP)* and established a separate delegation to the AU in order to increase coherence. The joint EU Africa strategy adopted at a joint AU-EU summit in Lisbon (December 2007) will further expand Europe's role in institutional capacity building in Africa.

National Efforts

Over the last decade, various members of the international community have begun to complement their multilateral capacity building support with more specific national efforts. The German Corporation for Technical Cooperation (GTZ), for example, has emerged as the principal supporter of the operationalization of CEWS, having organized and paid for several workshops, contracted three external experts as early warning consultants for the AU, supported the development of an authoritative CEWS Handbook and installed the necessary IT-components throughout Africa. The GTZ has also provided temporary office space for the AU's Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD), until a permanent arrangement is found, and facilitated the formulation of a Memorandum of Understanding between the RECs and the AU. During her widely publicized speech at the AU in October 2007, Chancellor Angela Merkel promised further German capacity building initiatives.

The United States, for many reasons from the Global War on Terror to resource interests, is an even more active capacity builder than Germany. Besides its long-existent programs like the Global Peace Operations Initiative, the African Contingency Operations Training Assistance and the Enhanced International Peacekeeping Capabilities Assistance,¹⁷ the US recently established a separate embassy to the AU and announced the creation of a new African Command (AFRICOM), which will "provide a comprehensive and multi-dimensional approach to capacity building."¹⁸ Other notable national initiatives include the United Kingdom's Conflict Prevention Pool as well as China's unconditional provision of \$100 million for an urgently needed expansion of the AU Headquarters in Addis Abeba.

Key Challenges to Capacity Building in Africa

There are three key challenges to institutional capacity building in Africa today. First, the continent's organizations crucially lack institutional human resource

17 For a more detailed description of US capacity building in Africa see Franke, *Enabling a Continent to Help Itself: US Military Capacity Building and Africa's Emerging Security Architecture*, in: *Strategic Insights*, Vol. VI, No. 1, 2007.

18 Otto Sieber, *Africa Command: Forecast for the Future*, in: *Strategic Insights*, Vol. VI, No. 1, 2007.

capacity. Second, there still appears to be too little coordination within the donor community. Third, the insufficient coordination among African actors also remains an area of concern.

Institutional Human Resource Capacity

Identified as “the major problem both at the AU and within Africa’s regional bodies” by Alex Ramsbotham and Alhaji Bah over two years ago, the lack of institutional human resource capacity continues to cripple Africa’s institutional effectiveness.¹⁹ For instance, the AU PSC has a huge mandate, but still has no formal secretariat to support its work. Its Peace Support Operations Division tries to run several operations (AMIS, AMISOM and AMIB) and simultaneously coordinate the establishment of the ASF and the CEWS while being as much as 55 percent short of its planned personnel strength. Operational pressures such as those to respond to the crises in Darfur and Somalia further exacerbate already weak headquarters capacity for strategic, long-term planning and development. Naturally, such shortcomings cause many difficulties for international capacity building efforts. The AU’s subsequent inability to determine clearly the specifics of what support it wants and how that support should be delivered, for example, weakens its capacity to secure coherent donor assistance for identified priorities, and the lack of financial audit and administrative staff dealing with peace funds reduces its absorption capacity for aid.

Donor Coordination

Despite many promises to the contrary, there still appears to be insufficient donor coordination even where synergies seem natural. Effective coordination, however, is vital if the multiplication of donor partners in the capacity building process (including the comparatively recent arrival on the scene of the G8, China and emerging powers such as India and Brazil) is not to create more impracticable accounting demands and increase transaction costs for the AU and the RECs thus further undermining institutional capacities.

Coordination among African Actors

Lack of coordination between the AU and the RECs also continues to impact on the effectiveness of international capacity building. While the recent creation of REC liaison offices at the AU and the expected adoption of a Memorandum of Understanding between the AU and the RECs at the next AU summit will go a long way towards formalizing the relationship between the continent’s various organizations, effective communication and collaboration between them is still far from assured. The presence of at least six African institutions with serious secu-

¹⁹ Alex Ramsbotham, Alhaji Bah, and Fanny Calder, *Enhancing African Peace and Security Capacity: A Useful Role for the UK and the G8?*, in: *International Affairs*, Vol. 81, No. 2, 2005, p. 334.

riety and development ambitions and often overlapping memberships will continue to create tensions.²⁰ These are potentially further aggravated by donor-driven capacity building initiatives, which often tend to favor some regions and member states over others. In addition to the uneven political and economic development of African states, the differing political and security agendas and visions as well as competition between states could contribute to the asymmetrical development of regional organizations and undermine the rationalization and integration efforts of the AU as well as the consensus required to realize a common approach to security and development.

The Rationale for Expanding Institutional Capacity Building in Africa

Why should the international community expand its institutional capacity building effort? Is it not true that the existing institutional structures of organizations like the UN, EU or even NATO are, at least for the foreseeable future, much better suited to deal effectively with Africa's many perils? Also, does the fact that the UN lately had to take over several African-led missions (Liberia, Burundi, Côte d'Ivoire and Darfur) not suggest that ten years of western capacity building programs in Africa have had, to date, a relatively moderate effect, and that the ability of the continent's organizations to take over responsibility for peace and security remains severely limited? While the above may be true, there are at least three good reasons for the international community to increase its capacity building support to the continent's emerging institutional architecture. The first is the nature of this architecture itself. Contrary to Africa's previous attempts at cooperation, the multi-level structure of the current architecture is highly inclusive and ensures that all states and regions can feel ownership in its initiatives. Instead of regarding the RECs as competitors in a zero-sum game as the OAU had done, the AU—applying the principles of subsidiarity, burden-sharing and sub-contracting—relies on them as essential building blocs and implementation agencies for its continental programs.²¹ This “organized complementarity” is best illustrated by the heavily regionalized character of central AU projects like the ASF (based on five regionally administered standby brigades) or the CEWS (based on five regional early warning mechanisms). Besides the benefit of welding together Africa's states, the emerging peace and security architecture also epitomizes a much needed common objective which can finally channel the multiplicity of resources, initiatives and ambitions devoted to African capacity building into one

²⁰ For a more detailed discussion of the proliferation of regional organizations and the effect of overlapping memberships, see Franke, *Competing Regionalisms in Africa and the Continent's Emerging Security Architecture*, in: *African Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 10, No. 1, 2007.

²¹ Article 16 of the PSC Protocol and the CADSP stress that the regional mechanisms will form the “building blocs” of the AU's peace and security architecture; see also Articles 3c, j and k of the AU Constitutive Act and Article 3p of the 2003 Amendment to the Constitutive Act.

direction, or as Cedric de Coning put it in 2004: “The development of an African peace and security system is a significant achievement because it provides Africa with a common policy framework for capacity building. This means that the various initiatives currently underway, and any new programs, can be directed to support this common objective, regardless of whether such initiatives are taking place at the regional, sub-regional or national level.”²²

The international community should expand its support to Africa’s emerging institutional architecture not only because the latter provides a unifying framework for all the continent’s cooperative efforts, as well as a useful focal point for international assistance, but also because it, more than anything else, has come to symbolize Africa’s (self-declared) renaissance and process of self-emancipation, which has a very real and valuable impact on African politics in general. Increased political institution-building and the establishment of an administrative base for cooperative ventures in other fields, such as economics, are only a few of the positive spillover effects of a functional continental security architecture. Lastly, the international community should expand its efforts because, in light of the UN’s current overstretch and its own apparent reluctance to get involved otherwise, home-grown African initiatives represent the best chance for halting the violent conflicts and resultant humanitarian tragedies which continue to thwart development in large parts of Africa.

Policy Recommendations

- Build AU institutional capacity—a pivotal priority to control and streamline the development of the RECs in order to avoid unnecessary duplication of effort and to ensure a common approach to the continent’s troubles. It needs to be credible and must overcome its deficiencies in communication, planning and management. The international community must not let the AU follow the OAU’s slip into institutional insignificance.
- Establish reliable financing mechanisms—the EU’s APF was a good start, but did not provide African organizations with sufficient planning security. As Africa’s institutions move away from ad hoc initiatives, so should the donor community.
- Enhance further donor coordination—the institutionalization of regular liaison and partner group meetings is an important step towards identifying and using potential synergies and harmonizing long-term capacity building strategies.

²² Cedric de Coning, *Towards a Common Southern African Peacekeeping System*, in: *Electronic Briefing Paper* (Center for International Political Studies), No. 16, Pretoria 2004, p. 4.

- Share more expertise with the AU, namely from the UN, the EU and NATO—areas for increased collaboration should include the development of headquarters capacity, focusing on mission planning and support. They could also work on the coordinated use of logistics sites, organizing staff exchanges between headquarters, supporting hand-offs between African- and UN-led operations, sharing lessons learned and planning expertise, improving the use of early warning and analytical information in Africa, harmonizing training and doctrinal materials as well as operational funding.

Conclusion

Security is an essential foundation for Africa's development. However, the challenges to African peace and security defy easy solutions. Many conflicts are multifaceted and deeply entrenched such as those in the Mano River Union conflict system (Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea, Côte d'Ivoire), the Great Lakes (Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda), the Horn of Africa (Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea) as well as Central Africa (Sudan, Chad, Central African Republic) and therefore likely to remain on the international agenda over the next decade or more. Coupled with the apparent unwillingness of large parts of the international community to respond meaningfully to these crises, this fact highlights the need for alternative approaches to conflict management in Africa. Though numerous problems persist for African organizations to spearhead such approaches, the last decade has seen several important developments. The parameters have clearly shifted in the direction of greater visibility and a heightened political will to act and the various organizations have slowly forged ahead with the process of establishing a viable security architecture. Administrative, financial, institutional and operational structures have been established to serve as benchmarks and guidelines for future missions and several international initiatives have begun to remedy the significant institutional deficiencies of African organizations, which, given appropriate resources, could certainly help to ease the United Nations' heavy burden without infringing upon the latter's authority. Expanding institutional capacity building surely is no panacea to Africa's manifold perils, but the notion is not without its merits, due to the decreasing willingness of the international community to accept responsibility for peace and security on the continent and the increasing African ability to take on such a task.

From National Security to Human Security—Less of the Same in Congo?

Zoë Marriage

With the end of the Cold War came shifts in the way security was perceived and pursued. The failing favor of the nation state provided space for the concept of human security and with it a plethora of associated security actors. Human security has particular resonance in Congo as millions of people have died, and the majority of deaths have not resulted directly from military violence. However, at the level of policy and practice, the contribution of human security is questionable: it has not inspired effective protection of the population. In addition, the relationship between human security and national security, originally theorized in terms of exclusive sovereignty, has proved to be more complex.

What is Human Security?

The security debate was revived in the 1980s and gathered pace through the 1990s as the paradigm of human security emerged and was debated. A corresponding policy discourse engaged major donors, and this overlaid the notion of national security with concepts of human, environmental, economic and international security.¹ Academic and practitioner discussions have moved the concept of security away from one defined by national interest, pursued through the use of force and being dominated by northern and masculine perspectives. The concept of human security takes human populations as the referent objects of security.

There is little agreement on how human security is defined—and what is excluded,² but a seminal and referential piece of work is the 1994 Human Development Report,³ which identified the component parts of human security as being personal, economic, health, political, food, community and environmental security.



Zoë Marriage

- 1 Peter Dombrowski (ed.), *Guns and butter: the political economy of international security*, Boulder, CO, 2005; Human Security, in: *St Antony's International Review*, No. 2/2005; Roland Dannreuther, *International Security. The Contemporary Agenda*, Cambridge [et al.] 2007; Karen Fierke, *Critical Approaches to International Security*, Cambridge and Malden, 2007; Barry Buzan, *People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*, London 1991.
- 2 Roland Paris, *Human Security : Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?*, in: *International Security*, Fall 2001, pp. 87–102; Gary King and Christopher J. L. Murray, *Rethinking Human Security*, in: *Political Science Quarterly*, Nr. 4, 2001/2002, pp. 585–610; Jakkie Gilliers, *Human Security in Africa. A conceptual framework for review*, African Human Security Initiative, <<http://www.africanreview.org/docs/humsecjun04.pdf>>, Nairobi 2004 (16/10/2007).
- 3 *New dimensions of human security*, in: *Human Development Report 1994 United Nations Development Programme*, pp. 22–46, <http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/hdr_1994_en.pdf> (17/12/2007).

Others argue that human security and national security complement each other;⁴ but the fact that a long liberal tradition has sought ways of ameliorating the relationship between the state and the population is not in question, but rather what happens when national security and human security collide?

The political impact of the human security notion was to signal some international agreement that the state was not permitted to abuse its citizens—the rights of human populations could trump sovereignty claims and large-scale abuse would attract international disapprobation and intervention.⁵ Human security brings with it some implied criticism of the state and with it an interventionist agenda: concretely—the state is not doing its job in protecting civilians and may be threatening them, and theoretically—international war is not the major threat and major threats cannot be dealt with by states. By asserting the sovereignty of populations, the challenge was issued: two things cannot be sovereign, and if the population is sovereign, the state must cede.

Human Security and Politics in Congo

The end of the Cold War was significant in the Great Lakes region of Africa because support from the USA and Europe was suddenly withdrawn. Northern states' declining need for buffers or proxies was accompanied by a declining respect for national sovereignty and for clients such as Mobutu Sese Seko. An era had ended: there was no more foreign patronage—in financial or military assets—and no more pretence at internal state-led development.

The move towards a human security framework appears to have potential for protecting the population from violently neglectful and abusive leaders. The concept diversified the way that security is conceptualized, shifting the focus from international war to a more varied explanation of why people are dying. In doing so it problematized destitution in such a way as to identify areas for intervention and licensed a number of actors protecting or promoting security. Across Africa there were increasingly interventionist aid packages that addressed themselves, amongst other things, to demobilization, security sector reform and peace negotiations.⁶

4 Freedom from Fear. Canada's Foreign Policy for Human Security, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Ottawa, <[http://pubx.dfaic-maeci.gc.ca/00_Global/Pubs_Cat2.nsf/0/56153893ff8dfda285256bc700653b9f/\\$FILE/Freedom_from_Fear-e.pdf](http://pubx.dfaic-maeci.gc.ca/00_Global/Pubs_Cat2.nsf/0/56153893ff8dfda285256bc700653b9f/$FILE/Freedom_from_Fear-e.pdf)> (16/10/2007); Stuart MacFarlane and Yuen Foong Khong, *Human security and the UN: a critical history*, Bloomington, IN, 2006.

5 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping*, New York 1992, <<http://www.un.org/Docs/SG/agpeace.html>> (17/12/2007).

6 Mark Duffield, *Global Governance and the New Wars. The merging of development and security*, London and New York, 2001.

In the context of Congo, the impact of the shift in thinking and policy-making can be explored with reference to two sets of documents that have been fundamental in defining the interpretation given to the conflict; neither document mentions human security explicitly, but both address the effects of the war and have emerged from the ranks of the new security actors—NGOs and the operational arms of the UN. The first is a series of mortality surveys published by the International Rescue Committee⁷ and the second is the UN Panel of Experts Report.⁸ Both have been updated and re-released in subsequent years.

The IRC mortality survey is widely cited and makes two notable contributions. One concerns the number of casualties—starting at 1.7 million in 2000 and rising by around a million a year through the war. Though heavily caveated with regard to access and methodology, this revelation established the second Congo war as the armed conflict involving the highest number of casualties since World War II. The second contributing factor was that the majority of the deaths were not the direct result of military violence, although areas of high levels of direct violence also saw the highest levels of fatalities due to disease. The population was being killed by the destitution that war occasioned. The focus on the safety of the population, the variety of vulnerabilities faced and the attention drawn to the lack

⁷ International Rescue Committee, Mortality Study, Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo 2000, 2002, 2003, Bukavu (DR Kongo), <<http://www.reliefweb.int/library/documents/mortalitydrc.pdf>> (16/10/2007).

⁸ Report of the UN expert Panel on the Illegal exploitation of natural resources and other forms of wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, S/2001/357.



Zoë Marriage, Stuart Reigeluth and Benedikt Franke listen to an intervention by Robert Mudida

of development—the destruction of infrastructure, for example—all correspond to the concept of human security.

The UN Panel of Experts Report was the document that brought international and official recognition to the widespread and unregulated exploitation of resources in eastern Congo. This document is also inspired by post-Cold War thinking on security: the invasion and occupation of two thirds of the country is not the primary issue identified by the report. Instead, what is presented is pillage, an economic venture described as “illegal”, with the “violation of sovereignty” contributing to its illegality. The violation of sovereignty is defined in terms of “extraction, production, commercialization and exports” (p. 3)—not occupation. The culprits were individuals and companies, including some military personnel, but not the states of Rwanda or Uganda. The report states that “fighting erupted” in 1998, not that Congo was invaded, and the economic agents were named and apparently shamed in an appendix. The 2001 report listed a “sample” of the companies importing minerals from Congo via Rwanda. The 2002 report presented 85 companies considered to have violated the OECD guidelines for multinational enterprises.

These two sets of documents have been influential in determining the kinds of intervention made in Congo. Both exemplify mainstream policy discourse on security and in their presentation of events, reinforce the interpretation of Congo as a country in need of humanitarian intervention (and ultimately development) and conformity to the market. They present a version of events that contributes to and is strengthened by the human security framework. Both documents were ‘shocking’ in the magnitude of what they described and as such have been debated at length with regard to their accuracy, reliability and purpose. Their significance, however, lies not in the details they include, but rather in the political machinery they overlook. The IRC mortality survey and the UN Panel of Experts Report combined to present the conflict as widespread human suffering and economic pillage, not as violent politics, invasion and globalized war.

What is Left Out?

The documents achieved certain goals: the IRC mortality surveys have been widely cited in academic and practitioner debate and by the press as a measure of suffering, and aid allocations to Congo have increased steeply over the last seven years. Similarly, the pillage of Congo has been accepted as a fact in international relations and policy circles, and some steps have been taken accordingly, including the physical withdrawal from the country of the Rwandan and Ugandan armies.

What is not addressed, though, are the processes by which people are made and kept vulnerable and the political conditions that enable the extraction and exploitation of resources. As a result, foreign aid has not transformed life chances and the absence of troops has not led the trade in minerals to be regulated, less harnessed still for the development of Congo.

Nor did either report fulfill certain stated aims. The IRC survey aspired to “guide health programs” and presents the hope that “those who have influence over the warring parties and over the processes which may bring peace will add a sense of urgency to resolving the conflict” (p. 2). The UN report presented a set of recommendations—“tough measures”—including sanctions, preventive measures, reparations, reconstruction, regulation and security (p. 2). It is not obvious from either document how these aims would be achieved. As a quantitative, information-gathering exercise, the IRC is perhaps deliberately politically vague. The UN report involves an analysis that delineates events from the exploitation of resources to the continuation of conflict, rather than the other way around. This analysis accords with mainstream liberal thinking at the time,⁹ and proposes little in practical terms: for as long as there are resources, war is inevitable.

National security has always been about contract and compromise—between states to respect the sovereignty of others, and the Leviathan bargain for people to surrender some of their freedom in return for some protection. Previous to the end of the Cold War, all parties had strong—if not always compelling—incentives to respect the security machinery. However, human security is presented in terms of a number of elements that reinforce each other for mutual gain, which can be achieved through increased humanitarian assistance and voluntary corporate responsibility.

The combination of a broad—practically limitless—human security category and an evasion of any discussion on contracts or compromises are prone to critique. With no theoretical or empirical basis, human security has shifted security thinking away from a focus on territorial integrity and proposes the promotion of a new brand of security, not through arms but through sustainable development. At best this legitimizes benevolent actors to intervene to protect vulnerable populations, but there is no agreed responsibility or incentive, and no sanctions for interventions that do not achieve their goals or are not undertaken in the first place. The similarities to the frailties of humanitarianism are evident.¹⁰

⁹ Paul Collier et al., *Greed and grievance in civil war?*, Washington, DC, 2000.

¹⁰ Zoë Marriage, *Not breaking the rules, not playing the game : international assistance to countries at war*, London 2006.

Congo and the Concept of Human Security

In Congo, the outcomes have been severe. The move away from the focus on national security contributed to the fall of Mobutu, which feted a host of non-state actors and paved the way for predatory leaders of foreign countries to lead campaigns in Congo. The rebellion led by Laurent-Désiré Kabila and the invasion by the Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD) a year later are two of the most extraordinary challenges to national sovereignty that have occurred in recent years, and yet neither attracted significant condemnation or intervention. The invasion by Rwanda is described as a “counterrevolution” in the IRC survey. The UN report refers to “territories conquered by the armies of Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda,” but expresses little disquiet about the nature of this conquest. The situation for the majority of the population at the end of the decade was incomparably worse than it had been at the beginning of the decade: the abusive leader had been removed, but the security of the population had deteriorated.

The second shift, from security through military weight to security through sustainable development, also failed to ameliorate people’s security. The decommissioning of personnel and weapons from national armies in many countries around the world contributed to the rise in private military firms and second-hand arms markets. These phenomena impacted negatively on security in Congo: the proliferation of thousands of weapons in the area has enabled groups to arm, and demobilized soldiers have found mercenary activity lucrative. In addition, Rwanda and Uganda instituted huge non-state networks in Congo to support their own states while lauding sustainable development at home. Sustainable development—both through government policy or through external intervention—has been absent and has not enhanced any aspects of life for the population of Congo.

The result in practical terms is that the rhetorical championing of the human population over the interest of the state has informed interventions that have further undermined the Congolese. This is significant because human security has become something of an organizing principle for aid and plays a role in legitimizing other forms of intervention as well. Parallels can be seen in Iraq and Afghanistan where interventions made purportedly on behalf of human populations, or sections of them, have left those populations less secure than they were before.

There is little to suggest, though, that these events are politically naive. Human security frames the political space, not by defining what happens, but rather what is politically visible. The pursuit of power has not been curtailed by the discus-

sion on human security, and much of the military activity in Congo can be analyzed in classic terms. Human security offers another perspective: the presentation of suffering and pillage overlooks the support given by the UK government, among others, to Rwanda and Uganda. At a sub-national level, it does not examine the processes by which power is forged during a conflict and what patterns of protection and control are established. Devoid of these analyses the documents examined become static—moments recorded in history. They do not investigate causes or processes; they say how things used to be.

Because the concept of human security is lacking in context, no serious attention is paid to its relationship with national security. The IRC survey notes that “war means disease” as areas of insecurity saw high mortality rates from disease, but the observation is not pressed further. In Congo, while human security was being developed in policy discourse as a concept to champion the security of populations over the interests of leaders, the events that contributed most forcefully to the insecurity of the population was the effectual destruction of the state, by building-up and then removing Mobutu, and the sponsorship of foreign invasion.

Furthermore, human security can be seen to patronize areas not deemed worthy of real security, or those that pose no threat. (This hypothesis is tested by the alterations that have taken place since the War on Terror: the peace process has been promoted with renewed vigor, but the numerous setbacks and flaws suggest that Congo still does not pose a serious threat). The paradigm of security through sustainable development is not a military blueprint in northern countries. To pursue this reasoning, northern countries that have in some sense “achieved” development would no longer require military capability. The reverse is observable, whereby human security is a paradigm applied to countries in which human life is threatened daily, whilst northern countries employ a range of military and diplomatic tools to defend themselves from the threats posed by migration, non-compliant markets and terror.

Policy Implications

Considering the problematic conceptualization and contradictions with actual implementation, this overview of human security and Congo gives rise to three specific policy-related conclusions:

1. The concept of human security nestles easily within the mainstream discourse of the liberal peace and as such problematizes Congo’s situation in such a way that responses can be made and carried out successfully, accord-

ing to delineated criteria. Foreign aid has increased, and considerable international attention has been given to the extraction of mineral wealth from the east of the country and the withdrawal of Rwanda and Uganda, including a demobilization program with a designated wing for the return of foreign troops.¹¹

2. The human security approach has not—empirically—improved the situation in Congo. Mortality rates continue at a disastrous level (despite the fact that most of the fighting has ceased), extractive industries have not been re-oriented to the benefit of the Congolese population; the structures of impoverishment, differentiation and violent power remain in place. Massive international investment, including funding UN troops has yet to prove its worth; the plan has not become unstuck entirely, but has been consistently violated. Human security did not give a robust means for analysis of the security situation in Congo or an action agenda.
3. Security is not “out there” to be discovered. There are dialectic processes by which the conceptualization of security influences what is perceived and prioritized and what response is given. How security is conceptualized in northern policy discourse is significant not only in recording events, but in shaping them. Misperceptions and scattergun responses may aggravate forms of violence. The security of the population is not defined solely or even largely by the Congolese—and least of all by the civilians. There is a web of political interests competing and impacting on the population. Focusing on the people’s suffering and championing their rights intimates a discourse of empowerment, but no means by which to operationalize it.

To conclude, while conventional thinking on security focuses predominantly on national interest, and is inadequate for examining the decentralized violence of Congo and the multiple forms of vulnerability that people face, the human security concept has not provided a useful analytical tool. In addition, the political shift inherent in theorizing is dangerous and the lack of respect for the nation-state has allowed for circumscribed achievements—in terms of removing leaders or increasing aid—, but has contributed to compromising further the security situation for people, most notably in Congo.

11 Marriage, Flip-flop Rebel Dollar Soldier, Demobilisation in the Democratic Republic of Congo, in: *Conflict, Security and Development*, Vol. 7, No. 2/2007.

Securitization against Democratization: War on Terrorism, Authoritarian Liberalism, and Neo-Liberalism in Post-9/11 Southeast Asia

Bonn Juego

Introduction

The securitization of social life is becoming palpably evident in Southeast Asia. The events of 9/11 have ramifications for security-development dynamics of the region. Since then, the idea of “security” seems to have become a master narrative, a dominant discourse—if not a political-economic imaginary—that informs and shapes strategies on all scales from the individual to the firm to the wider economy, and on all territorial scales from the smallest community through the state to the regional and the global levels. The basic idea is being articulated in many organizational and institutional sites (from firm security to state security), on many scales from national to regional and global (national security, regional security, global security), and in many functional systems (health security, educational security, environmental security, internet security and business security etc.). It has been translated into many visions and strategies, such as the various human security legislations, national security frameworks, and regional security community projects. The imperatives of security have thus penetrated just about every aspect of human life.

Security and development policy-makers stand again at a historic crossroads in dealing with post-9/11 Southeast Asia, a region of strategic importance in the Cold War. Post-9/11 has ushered in yet another political-economic contradiction in the region, being perceived as a global security threat in the contemporary “war on terror” and a promising dynamic economic region in the globalizing world. Against the background of intensifying globalization, addressing the geopolitics of security and the political economy of development in Southeast Asia is bewilderingly complex. This complex security-development challenge in the region thus requires comprehensive policy responses firmly grounded on history, geography, culture, and political economy.

This paper argues that 9/11 has accelerated the Americanization of the security-development architecture in Southeast Asia, as shown in the increasing institutionalization of principles and practices that are easily ascribed to US hegemony. In particular, the Americanization of security-development has paved the way



Bonn Juego

either to the strengthening or resurgence of the hegemony, both in policy and discourse, of:

- a. “Global war on terrorism” over historically sensitive conflict resolution mechanisms;
- b. “authoritarian liberalism” over democratization; and
- c. neo-liberalism over developmental statism.

Each of these phenomena is inherently unstable and conflict-ridden. Hence, the securitization of social life in the region is not resulting in the reproduction of a security-development agenda patterned after the US, but in the reproduction of social antagonisms that spring from the very contradictions of the securitization project itself. The paper concludes with a proposal for a “democratic security-development policy” built from the bottom-up, in which security and development are both seen as “political” and “economic” ideals in organic synergy.

Global War on Terror over Local Historical Specificities

The US-launched global war on terror is a fierce and global response to the 9/11 attacks. The campaign intensified in Southeast Asia as the Bush administration tagged the region the “second front” in the war against terror for being the hide-out of alleged al-Qaeda operatives and the training camp to radical Islamist groups (such as Jemaah Islamiyah, Abu Sayyaf, and the Kumpulan Mujahideen Malaysia), and hence one of the weakest links in the quest for global stability. After putting the Taliban to rout, security policy-makers, especially those from the US, have since then regarded Southeast Asia as the second front indeed on the war on terrorism, with the US deploying more than 500 troops supposedly to assist in hostage rescue and counterinsurgency operations in southern Philippines in January 2002. This approach of looking at Southeast Asia through the lenses of the US-led “Coalition of the Willing” wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and the global war on terror will, however, result in erroneous conclusions and hence wrong policies. So long as security policy-makers become overly fixated on the global war on terror, they will never grasp the complex reality of various conflicts in the region in order to put an end to the roots of violence. There is need to critically situate conflicts in the region in their varying geographical and historical contexts.

Southeast Asia is a region of conflicts. Most major conflicts from and among identities are homegrown and fought over long before 9/11. These racial,

religious, and ethnic conflicts are not at all epiphenomenal; these are complex conflicts that are related to—but cannot be simply reduced to being by-products or secondary symptoms of—poverty, inequality, and uneven development. There are historical reasons why issues of race, religion, nationalism, and ethnicity have so much purchase on the lives of many peoples in Southeast Asia. But, at the same time, there are also material reasons why these conflicts are articulated in an increasingly unequal capitalist world. While these conflicts may predate 9/11, the latter has given a much more conflictual, or even a new, terrain of struggles in the region.

In this multi-cultural region, racial, religious, ethnic and national identities are still at the center of many conflicts. Burma, Singapore, Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, and the Philippines have their respective enduring internal conflicts among identities (e.g. the religious conflicts in Poso in Central Sulawesi, Indonesia, and the ethnic conflicts in West Kalimantan, southern Thailand, and southern Philippines). There exist politicized and actively struggling organized identities based on race, religion, ethnicity, and nation. The conflicts in Maluku and Poso islands in the Indonesian archipelago (1999–2003), which were believed to be instigated by military and paramilitary forces, resulted in the killing of thousands of people and the destruction of ethnic and religious harmony in the region. These conflicts exemplify the local intensity of homegrown and largely religious, Muslim-Christian, conflicts that are by no means upshots of 9/11.

Against the background of economic globalization, the struggle of identities is not only conspicuous in the cultural arena, but also in the materiality of the political economy. Identity conflicts in the region—such as the Muslim rebel groups in the Philippines and Indonesia—are becoming intractable due to the fact that their struggles are based on demands both for recognition and for redistribution. The resistance of oppressed identities is twofold: against their respective states and against increasing material inequality.¹

The resurgence of military-oriented 9/11 strategies is gradually unfolding. This hardcore stance is inimical to peace and stability in the region, not only because it equates rebellion, be it pre- or post-9/11, with terrorism, but it also fails to recognize the legitimate aspirations and demands of struggling identities and

1 For a discussion on the relationship between state and ethnicity in Southeast Asia, see David Brown, *The state and ethnic politics in Southeast Asia*, London 1994; and for a discussion on the coexistence of the struggle for recognition and the struggle for redistribution in Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, and the Philippines, see A. B. Shamsul, *Globalization and democratic developments in Southeast Asia: articulation and social responses*, in: Catarina Kinnvall and Kristina Jonsson (eds.), *Globalization and Democratization in Asia: The construction of identity*, London 2002; and Temario C. Rivera, *Assessing Democratic Evolution in Southeast Asia: Philippines* (Institute of Southeast Asian Studies), Singapore 2002.

oppositions. For instance, in the case of the Bangsamoro problem in southern Philippines, 9/11-oriented policy-makers and strategists have been outright in linking the rebel Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) with the terrorist Jemaah Islamiah at the expense of prejudicing the process of ongoing peace negotiations between the MILF and the Philippine government. The MILF, which has been pursuing armed struggle for more than half a century now, has been fighting for a wide variety of social, cultural, economic and political issues and concerns that include: a) ancestral domain; b) displaced and landless Bangsamoro; c) destruction of properties and war victims; d) human rights issues; e) social and cultural discrimination; f) corruption of the mind and the moral fiber; g) economic inequities and widespread poverty; h) exploitation of natural resources; and i) agrarian reform.² The accusations that MILF has links with terrorist organizations and has been involved in deliberate attacks on civilians to spread fear and terror are matters to be investigated by an independent, impartial organization that is free of 9/11 bias without distracting substantive issues of the Bangsamoro problem. Post-9/11 security policies seem to have given primacy to military actions over peace negotiations in dealing with the legitimate outcries of rebellion.

A number of key themes can be identified in the complex reality of enduring conflicts in Southeast Asia. First, existing racial, religious, ethnic, and national identity struggles in the region are anything but epiphenomenal. Second, there are deep historical reasons these struggles mean so much to their lives. Third, these struggles have been more or less closely bounded with the evolution of global capitalism and the increasing material inequality in the world. And, finally, it is therefore necessary that security-development policies today must take issues of political identities seriously, firmly grounding them on historical and materialist analysis. In other words, there is need for historically specific security policy and a socially embedded development policy.

Authoritarian Liberalism Installed, Democratization Stalled

The process of securitization in Southeast Asia has overshadowed the relatively important post-Cold War debates on “democratization”, particularly concerning the synergetic relationship between democracy and development. The idea of security has now become inflected in neo-liberal (Philippines), neo-corporatist (Singapore), and neo-statist (Malaysia) ways, as well as in authoritarian terms. This suggests that security, as an idea, is amenable to strategic alliances and

² See Agenda, Technical Committee on Agenda Setting, in: MILF, 25 February 1997; and Soliman Santos, Dynamics and Directions of the Peace Negotiations Between the Philippine Government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, 24 September 2004.

institutionalized compromises among disparate interests, and even among conflicting orientations, in different political regimes.

An emergent political-economic regime referred to as “authoritarian liberalism” (i. e. a mix of strong state and free economy, or a neo-liberal economy in an authoritarian polity) is being institutionalized in Southeast Asia, not only during the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, but also until the contemporary epoch of post-9/11 neo-liberal globalization. This institutional fit between authoritarian polity and neo-liberal economy is being increasingly strengthened, as well as justified, amidst the structural requirements of the post-9/11 security environment. Far from stymieing the pursuit of a capitalist market-led development strategy in a framework of authoritarianism, the imperatives of the war on terror seem to have provided a deeper logic than ever to underpin its perpetuation for the preservation of elite rule and capitalism in Southeast Asia.

Against the background of the institutional imperatives of the war on terror, (semi-)authoritarian, strong states have become strategic sites of opposing terrorism. Malaysia’s Internal Security Act (ISA) and Singapore’s surveillance measures have once again found badly needed justification amidst growing domestic and international criticisms against these repressive security policies used to stifle political dissent. The declining popularity of Gloria Macapagal Arroyo’s administration has eventually enacted the Philippine Human Security Act of 2007 or the anti-terror law that had long been under public scrutiny and strong opposition. Initiated under former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, Thailand has implemented a series of repressive laws and decrees peddled as deterrent to terrorism but in guise of strengthening domestic security agencies after the slaughter of over a hundred Malay Muslims in its southern province in April 2004. And in Indonesia, once one of the strongest military regimes in the past decades under Suharto, the prospect for the resurgence of military and security powers has come to life, especially as a result of the Bali and Jakarta bombings in 2002 and 2004, respectively. The war on terror project has thus provided “exceptional” powers to Southeast Asian governments, and their discretionary powers of detention and surveillance expanded, which are being used as legal license for abuse of power to suppress dissent and opposition.

Post-9/11 security under conditions of authoritarianism provides institutional justification for a state’s exercise of exceptional executive power in the name of public order against terrorism, allowing for the suspension of civil and political rights—even if these rights are protected in the constitution—and activating the use of coercive force (police and military) during times of perceived “state

emergency”. This “regime of exception” provides far-reaching powers to the state, not only by suspending normal political and legal processes, but also by enabling the reorganization and centralization of its (coercive) apparatus of power. This regime of exception has become an all too familiar situation in recent Southeast Asian politics, increasingly becoming the norm, rather than being supposedly temporary and effective only in times of national emergency. This then implies the hostility of Southeast Asian regimes of exception to political pluralism, and hence to democracy. Politics in the spirit of political pluralism is easily dismissed either as disruptive to the presumed political order or simply as terrorism.

Contrary to the mainstream globalist pronouncements that globalization will bring about a world of liberal democracies, post-9/11 Southeast Asia is by far a region of authoritarianisms—a security complex of authoritarianisms. Regional stability seems to come from a “peaceful coexistence among authoritarianisms”, rather than among democracies, following the policy of non-interference, which every government in the region normatively proclaims. The region is progressing towards the resurgence, or deepening of, a variation of authoritarianisms: (semi-) authoritarian regimes in Malaysia and Singapore; the military governments in Myanmar and Thailand; the monarchy in Brunei; one-party rule in Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam; a military general leadership in Indonesia; and an administration predisposed to authoritarianism and the militarization of the cities and countryside in the Philippines. Time and again, numerous researches conducted to guide policies for protecting human rights have identified the conditions under which governments and people are most likely to commit large-scale murder, torture, and arbitrary imprisonment. They conclude that authoritarianism, alongside war and poverty, can lead to large-scale human rights violations.³

The toppling of two military regimes—Ferdinand Marcos’ in the Philippines in 1986 and Suharto’s in Indonesia in 1998—were regarded as democratic moments, signaling the process of democratization in the broader region. This comes at a time when the dominant discourse from mainstream scholars and policy-makers adhering to either the modernization theory or the transitions perspective prophesies that economic liberalization encourages the development of liberal and democratic modes of governance. Empirically, Southeast Asia appears to

³ See Steven C. Poe and C. Neal Tate, Human Rights and Repression to Personal Integrity in the 1980s: A Global Analysis, in: *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 88, 1994, pp. 853–900; Steven C. Poe, C. Neal Tate and Linda Camp Keith, Repression of the Human Rights to Personal Integrity Revisited: A Global Crossnational Study Covering the Years 1976–1993, in: *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 43, 1999, pp. 291–315; and Kathryn Sikkink, A Human Rights Approach to Sept. 11, in: *Social Science Research Council*, New York 2002, <http://www.ssrc.org/sept11/essays/sikkink_text_only.htm>.

demonstrate a quite different prospectus from this dominant discourse. In fact, pace modernization theory and transition perspectives, globalization may mean the end of liberal democracy rather than its triumphant ascendancy. Historically, if there is any cogent lesson that the past two decades have shown about the relationship between democracy and political-economic regime, it is that capitalism can thrive and survive even without democracy. Southeast Asian elites do not necessarily become forces for political liberalism and democracy; they can be downright illiberal and anti-democratic so long as it serves their interests.

What the ongoing campaign against terrorism in the case of Southeast Asia signifies is that “security” can thrive, and can be promoted, even without democracy. The war on terror project has thus stalled the process of democratization in the region, paving the way for a protracted institutionalization of authoritarianism. And herein lies a serious security challenge in Southeast Asia. The war on terror carried out under authoritarian auspices is not reproducing regional security as its most ardent proponents suggest. Above all it is generating the reproduction of social antagonisms that spring from the very logic of the repressive practices of authoritarianism itself.



Bonn Juego advocates democracy promotion in South-East Asia

From Developmental Statism to Neo-Liberalism

Southeast Asia has purportedly followed a development paradigm referred to as “developmental statism” that made possible the “East Asian Miracle”, in which Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand are among the high-performing Asian economies (together with Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong) that registered high growth with high equity during the period of 1965–1990. This Southeast Asian model of development is characterized by state involvement in the economy through a strong “industrial policy” that coordinates a whole set of economic policies and institutions, as well as by a strong manufacturing sector that is synergistically linked to agriculture and services.

The Washington Institutions consider this development strategy as “bad” economics based on their neo-liberal ideology, which posits that markets are efficient and that government intervention in the economy distorts market efficiency. Instead, they prescribe the realization of an open market economy through structural adjustment programs (SAPs) in the macroeconomic policies of privatization, liberalization, deregulation, and fiscal reforms. These SAPs have been imposed especially to the highly indebted countries of Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines. September 11 and its aftermath offered an opportunity for the Washington Institutions and their neo-liberal proponents to restructure the political and economic apparatuses of the state to be more responsive to the demands of the market forces than the multitude, and hence accelerating the financial and economic reforms initiated right after the 1997 Asian economic crisis. The Americanization of development strategy in the context of post-9/11 allows for active state involvement in the economy so long as states pursue “market friendly” policies without fear or favor.

The destructive attacks on the Pentagon and the World Trade Center were initially thought of as a crisis of US geopolitical security and of global capitalism. Post-9/11 political economy is, however, revealing that this supposed crisis is becoming functional to US geopolitical and economic interests. The terror attacks have led to the restructuring of the US security and political-economic agenda in the context of contemporary historical juncture. Importantly, 9/11 has resulted in a series of internal reorganizations of Southeast Asian states in line with the requirements of a “securitized global competitiveness”, or of neo-liberal globalization in the context of post-9/11 security dynamics.

A little over a month after 9/11, the World Economic Forum organized the East Asia Economic Summit 2001 that came up with the conclusion on the the

need “to tackle the root causes of terrorism and enduring poverty in developing countries”, and accordingly called for “a new development paradigm based on fair trade and equitable partnerships between developing countries and developed ones.”⁴ State leaders, business leaders, and technocrats who participated in the Summit recognized the existence of uneven development in the world between rich and poor countries, realized the close connection between global political and economic security, proposed development as a security strategy, and affirmed their shared interests in counterterrorism. However, this common commitment and understanding for security-development in East and Southeast Asia has been imperiled because of the apparent return of the US and other developed countries to the political economy of security along Cold War terms. But this time it is framed in the language of a bifurcated worldview between “zones of safety” and “zones of danger.” The categorization of Southeast Asia as “terrorist hot spot,” alongside the release of numerous travel advisories for citizens of rich countries, defines Southeast Asia as a zone of danger. Notwithstanding the implied double standard of the US and West, this categorization discourages the investments needed for economic growth and overall development in the developing region.

The post-9/11 security-development nexus in Southeast Asia suggests that security concerns have implications for the restructuring of regional political and economic relations in the region. In particular the selective logic of the capitalist market is guided by the coercive arm of security. Regional supporters of the US-led war on terror were promised preferential trade access to US market. For instance, when Thaksin’s Thailand implemented tough counterterrorism measures, the US called it a major “non-NATO ally”, and signed a bilateral trade agreement with Thailand.

The securitization of neo-liberal globalization in Southeast Asia compels the restructuring of institutions in ways that are much more responsive to capitalist market forces than to popular democratic ones. It also calls for change in human values, putting premium on private sector, private property, and their attendant values in the conduct of social life. This is the context within which security is promoted at this time—one that works for the market and with the market. Government and social institutions are all mobilized to sustain this system of private appropriation to provide a certain degree of predictability for capital. To a large extent, they also manage market forces through policies of privatization (the sale of public assets to private investors) and liberalization (opening up of restricted markets to competition). Equally important for the system is that market forces

4 World Economic Forum, East Asia Economic Summit Report: Responses to Recession Regaining Stability and Growth in Asia, 2001, pp. 18–19.

are institutionally managed through the reorientation of regulation—in particular, a regulatory framework in a regime of de-regulation. However, the central task of this regulation under a neo-liberal regime is to secure the interest of business, and not of the broader citizenry. But again, the accountability of the market—whose conduct of business implicates the rest of the society—is not sanctioned. It therefore enforces the separation of “the economic” from “the political” in capitalist discipline, as well as the paradox at the heart of capitalist production: the exclusion of the poor and workers from wealth, and yet their inclusion in the circuits of its production. Furthermore, it implies that states, and hence the people of Southeast Asia, will be the absorber of risks as well as of failures of market adventurism.

Particularistic and exclusivist identities are so often a response to something universal. The neo-liberal development paradigm, with its mathematics-like attempt for universal applicability as well as its all-embracing social implications, is essentially conflictive for human relations. Accordingly, neo-liberalism in a framework of authoritarianism is inherently unstable and conflict-ridden. Likewise, the attempt to reproduce capitalism across Southeast Asia is tantamount to reproducing antagonisms from society to society in the region. A much bolder security-development project that brings back Southeast Asia to the track of democratization is, by all means, ambitious; but it is utterly necessary to resolve the contradictions of authoritarian liberalism.

Towards a Democratic Security-Development Policy

Mindful of the historical dynamics of the political economy of conflicts in Southeast Asia, as well as the contemporary regimes of authoritarian liberalism across the region, a democratic security-development policy built from the bottom up is herein proposed. The starting point for the proposal is that security-development policy is essentially a social endeavor that implicates the rest of society. Any security-development policy must therefore be historically sensitive, socially embedded, and culturally specific. Hence, the only social ideal that can perfectly capture this proposal is democracy, especially if by democracy we mean “democracy as a social relation”, in which “the political”, “the economic”, “the cultural”, and all the other spheres of social life are not separated from, or merely reflective of, one another, but rather organically connected.

In this sense, political democracy does not only mean the enjoyment of liberal freedoms and equally weighted votes among enfranchised citizens, it also means the rule of the demos and its original signification as “popular power.” Cultural

democracy is about being and not about having, in which every human being is respected for who one is and not for what one owns. Economic democracy is not simply about equitable distribution of wealth, but democracy as the driving mechanism of the economy. Democracy is therefore suggested both as a means and ends of security-development for purposes of developing peaceful security and securing real development for human beings. In a word, it is democratization, rather than securitization, that can best develop security and secure development in Southeast Asia.

In practical terms, a program for a democratic security-development policy does not offer extravagant claims for “what to-dos”, but modest reflections on “what not to do”, to guide policy for the time being in Southeast Asia:

- i. Not to imperiously deny the cultural capacity of the peoples of Southeast Asia for economic, political, and cognitive development;
- ii. Not to come up with security-development policies that are devoid of context, history, and culture; and
- iii. Not to forget the salience of state-level perspective in security-development analysis and policy because the state remains the point of concentration of instability, and hence remains the most strategic site for containing it, and, at the same time, the only arena for acquiring peoples’ legitimacy.

The pressing need now is to have the political will at all levels of governance—from the workplace to the state to the regional and global levels—to regard democracy both as a security-development tool and goal. Each and every security-development policy must therefore be oriented towards the deepening of the institutions, processes, and visions of democracy.



The nearby Retiro park offers a welcome change and fresh air in between panels

The Aceh Conflict, the EU and the Security-Development Nexus in Asia

*Saponti Baroowa*¹

The Nature and Genesis of the Aceh Conflict

The Aceh conflict dates back to 1976 when a separatist movement, spearheaded by the Free Aceh Movement or Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM), consisting of a few hundred rebels, engaged in a guerilla struggle against the Indonesian armed forces. This low-intensity resistance was easily quelled by the Indonesian army and the movement subsequently subsided within a few years of its inception. Popular resentment in Aceh against the Indonesian state continued, however. Apart from a number of historical factors, including questions of identity, the highly-centralized and authoritarian Indonesian state system was largely responsible for aggravating the sense of alienation among the Acehnese. Moreover, bad socio-economic governance on the part of Jakarta altered the traditional Acehnese social order and also infringed on their economic freedoms, particularly with regard to their land rights. The Acehnese also increasingly felt that they were losing control over their rich natural resources which were exploited by Jakarta without any benefits trickling down to the local populace.

After its initial setbacks against the Indonesian army, GAM regrouped in 1989 and resumed its armed struggle albeit in a subdued fashion in the wake of the high-handed repressive measures undertaken by Jakarta. The low-intensity guerilla warfare was to continue for the next 16 years accompanied by large scale human rights violations by the Indonesian armed forces resulting in thousands of deaths among the Acehnese population coupled with immense losses to their properties and livelihoods, which in turn gradually accentuated the support for GAM's separatist agenda. After the installation of a civilian government in Jakarta in the late 1990s, followed by the gradual erosion of the army's influence on Indonesian power politics, and subsequent international attention on Aceh resulting from the devastation by the Asian Tsunami of December 2004, an agreement to settle the issue was reached between GAM and the Indonesian Government in August 2005. The terms of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed in Helsinki by the two sides on 15 August 2005 included the governing of Aceh, human rights, amnesty for former combatants and their reintegration into society,



Saponti Baroowa

¹ The author would like to thank Felix Heiduk for his comments on the earlier version of this paper and the participants and organizers of the 10th New Faces Conference for their valuable insights provided in Madrid.

the establishment of the Aceh Monitoring Mission, and dispute settlement.² The implementation of the provisions of this MoU, however, required proper and effective monitoring by an impartial third party, and this is where the European Union (EU) stepped in as the external agency which would monitor the effective implementation of a sustainable peace and development process.

The EU's Strategy and Approach towards Asia and Asian Security

In the first report of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in 1997, the Council made it clear that “Asia continues to constitute key priority for the Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy.”³ Previously, in 1994, the European Commission (EC) produced an overall approach to Asia (including Australasia) in a document titled *Towards a New Asia Strategy*, and followed-up in 2001 with a revised policy document titled *Europe and Asia: A Strategic Framework for Enhanced Partnerships*. The latter signified a more robust EU approach by emphasizing the importance of the security dimension as well in relations with Asia. The document subdivides Asia into four sub regions: South Asia, South East Asia, North East Asia and Australasia.⁴ Of the six broad objectives spelled out by the document, from the security point of view, mention may be made of the EU’s aim to: a) “contribute to peace and security in the region and globally, through a broadening of our engagement with the region”; b) “contribute to the protection of human rights and to the spreading of democracy, good governance and the rule of law”; and c) “to build global partnerships and alliances with Asian countries [...] to strengthen our joint efforts on global environmental and security issues.”⁵ A European Parliament (EP) Study in 1999 also called for more active “involvement of the CFSP in ‘Asian’ security issues, for instance in the areas of confidence-building, proactive and preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution.”⁶ The significance of real and potential conflict in some of Asia’s prolonged flash points remains high for Europe. This is evident from “the indication, often heard in EP and in EU security circles that the 1992 Petersburg Declaration [...] may well be worth emulating in connection with conflict resolution in Asia.”⁷

2 <http://www.cmi.fi/files/Aceh_MoU.pdf>.

3 Annual Report CFSP 1997, Council of Ministers, point 15a.

4 European Commission, *Europe and Asia: A Strategic Framework for Enhanced Partnerships*, Brussels, 4.9.2001, COM(2001) 469 final, <http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/asia/doc/com01_469_en.pdf>, p. 3.

5 *Ibid.*, p. 15.

6 Georg Wiessala, *More than Distant Neighbors: CFSP and Asian Countries*, in: Martin Holland (ed.), *Common Foreign and Security Policy: The first ten years*, London / New York 2004, p. 96.

7 *Ibid.*, p. 97.

The EU's Role in Post-Conflict Aceh: The Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM)

Although the AMM was to be the European Security and Defense Policy's (ESDP) first foray into Asia, several EU Member States expressed their apprehension towards undertaking a mission in a region which was 10,000 miles away from home and thus did not seem to constitute a European priority. Others, however, felt that "a mission in Indonesia would match the vision of those who regarded the Union as a global player, not limited to stabilizing its neighborhood but nurturing more ambitious goals."⁸ The AMM was a EU-led ESDP mission but it was conducted together with five Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member countries, namely Brunei, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand, and with contributions from Norway and Switzerland.

As part of the MoU and outlined in the Council Joint Action of 9 September 2005, the AMM mandate involved some demanding and sensitive tasks on the ground for the EU mission.⁹ The MoU established that a new Law on the autonomous provincial governing of Aceh be in force no later than 31 March 2006. Other provisions established a Human Rights Court for Aceh and a Commission for Truth and Reconciliation. Interim provisions also involved roadblocks, and therefore the AMM was not only to play a vital role in "building confidence and encouraging dialogue" between the two sides but also to "guarantee an enabling environment on the ground."¹⁰ The AMM was empowered with the following mandate:

- a) Monitoring the demobilization of GAM
- b) Monitoring and assisting with the decommissioning and destruction of its weapons, ammunition and explosives
- c) Monitoring the relocation of non-organic military forces and non-organic police troops
- d) Monitoring the reintegration of active GAM members
- e) Monitoring the human rights situation and providing assistance in this field in the context of the tasks listed above
- f) Monitoring the process of legislation change
- g) Ruling on disputed amnesty cases
- h) Investigating and ruling on complaints and alleged violations of the MoU
- i) Establishing and maintaining liaison and good cooperation with the parties.

8 Pierre Antoine-Braud and Giovanni Grevi, *The EU Mission in Aceh: implementing Peace*, (EU Institute for Security Studies, Occasional Paper 61), Paris, December 2005, p. 22.

9 Council Joint Action 2005/643/CFSP, 9 September 2005, OJ L234/13.

10 Braud and Grevi, *op. cit.* (fn. 8), p. 27.

On the ground, AMM activities and responsibilities extended beyond these initial provisions. The AMM was initially tasked to monitor decommissioning, but later took charge of the entire process, largely due to the apprehension of the GAM fighters to hand over their weapons to the Indonesian forces, thus demonstrating preference for a reliable and impartial third party.¹¹

Despite some initial pre-launch institutional deadlocks and confusions as regards logistics and finances, the AMM went underway as planned. The Aceh conflict was not only a test case of the security-development nexus in Asia in that the conflict owes its origins so much to the bad political and economic governance of the central authority as to the regional quest for identity and socio-economic self-determination, but also in that the devastation brought about by the Asian Tsunami reinforced the development woes of the region. Leadership of the AMM therefore provided a real opportunity for the EU to address a potent situation of the security-development nexus in the Asian continent. The EU soon found out that it was not only the main external organization monitoring peace, but also one of the main providers of humanitarian assistance and development aid. Aceh also became a test case where both Commission (Development Aid) and Council (ESDP Missions) instruments could be applied to address the larger issue of the security-development nexus in regions outside Europe. Aceh proved how both sets of instruments could be complementary and mutually reinforcing. The EU had to recognize the interplay between the reconstruction efforts and initiatives to put an end to the conflict in Aceh and therefore had to strike the right balance, for instance, “in the aid provided to the coastal population, most hit by the tsunami, and to the population of the mainland, which suffered the most from the civil war. EU action must be clearly and perceivably directed at building the future of the entire region, and not of one particular area or social component.”¹² The Aceh experience showed how the EU could combine instruments towards not only securing immediate peace and development, but also towards developing and sustaining long-term security.

Aceh Implications and the Case of Northeast India

In situating the EU’s Aceh experience within some other security-development scenarios in Asia, mention may be made of the separatist insurgency in India’s northeastern state of Assam. India has been confronted with a decades-long protracted and intractable separatist insurgency led by the outlawed United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA). Although the insurgent group today no longer en-

¹¹ Ibid. (fn. 8), p. 28.

¹² Ibid., pp. 29–30.

joys the popularity and support that it once perhaps commanded among sections of the population, the problems of Assam and the other conflict-ridden states of the region, a prominent commentator on the region, Sanjib Baruah argues that the problems of Assam and the other conflict-ridden states of the region should not be addressed from a state-centric “insurgency problem” approach, and also questions how a democratic India could tolerate the “Northeast Indian exception.”¹³ The root causes of the conflict have never been adequately addressed by policy-makers, and have resulted in a mere postponement of a congenial solution and in the festering of a low-intensity warfare-like situation.

Mainstream political and academic thinking however attributes the troubles of Assam and the Northeast to the region’s underdevelopment and poor integration in India. Some regional commentators argue that an inequitable distribution of Assam’s rich petroleum resources have created a sense of alienation. Baruah however contests mainstream and simplistic paradigms by stating that although the “Indian Government has pumped enormous resources into the development of Northeast India in order to remove what it sees as the structural cause of insurgencies”, till “date they have not significantly altered the conditions that give rise to and sustain ethnic militancy.”¹⁴

Interestingly, Baruah tries to imagine the Northeast outside the narrative of national development and wonders if the framework of the EU’s Committee of the Regions could offer an alternative paradigm. He draws attention to the fact that regional identities that were once considered as threats by European nation-states are today flourishing within the EU, which pursues transnational politics of recognition that managed to compensate for the marginalization of those identities within nation-states, and have allowed certain regional interests enough influence in the EU’s decision-making. He says that these European regional identities “are not unlike the identities that animate the militias of northeast India.”¹⁵ Developing this premise further he wonders if Northeast India could also forge transnational linkages with India’s eastern neighbors.

Since the 1990s, India has been engaged in the enhancement of its relations with countries of South-East Asia within the framework of its “Look East Policy.” The Northeastern region of the country shares its borders with Myanmar and is located in close proximity to South-East Asia. This location advantage opens up the possibility of the development of economic links between the Northeast

13 See Sanjib Baruah, *A Durable Disorder: Understanding the Politics of Northeast India*, New Delhi 2005.

14 *Ibid.*, p. 25.

15 *Ibid.*, p. 26.

region of India and the countries of South-East Asia. In fact, in recent times, many mainstream policy makers have increasingly begun to see India's Northeast as a gateway to South-East Asia and the geographic launch pad for its Look East Policy. Considering that the problems of India's Northeast, including Assam, continue to defy simple solutions, possible opportunities for the region to interact economically and culturally with South-East Asia under the framework of India's Look East Policy may offer an alternative paradigm to address the ills that ail this resource-rich, culturally diverse and strategically important part of India.

Potential Parameters for EU Engagement in Asian Security

EU strategic discourse propounds that in conducting external relations it has successfully maintained its civilian image as a responsible international actor firmly committed to the norms of international stability informed by the principles of the United Nations (UN) Charter. Indeed, "UN-centrism in European security cooperation in Asia could offer an alternative Western identity for Europe in Asia and strengthen the EU's image as a more independent security actor in the region."¹⁶ Consequently, "Europe should seek constructive involvement in Asian preventive diplomacy and try to utilize its expertise in the field of 'soft security', which uses civilian means instead of military means." In fact, ESDP's experiences in conflict resolution and crisis management, together with its frequent use of civilian measures, can provide a comparative advantage for the EU to constructively develop a culture of security cooperation with Asia in the field of crisis management. Moreover, rather than developing new structures, the EU's main policy in Asia "should be related to the strengthening of the development of the existing security institutionalization in Asia." To this end, the EU "should give sufficient priority to official Asian security dialogue forums such as the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) and ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)."¹⁷

EU-ARF Relations

Although the ASEM process provides an important forum for dialogue and cooperation between the EU and East and South-East Asia, meaningful political and security dialogue within ASEM has been hard to come by, as many of the topics for discussion are considered "out of bounds" or "too sensitive."¹⁸ Cooperation on security issues is therefore found to be more feasible in the frame-

¹⁶ Timo Kivimaki and Jorgen Delman (ed.), *The Security Situation in Asia: Changing Regional Security Structure?*, Copenhagen 2005, p. xi.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. iv-v.

¹⁸ Patrick Koellner, *Whither ASEM? : Lessons from APEC and the future of transregional cooperation between Asia and Europe*, in: *Südostasien aktuell* (Hamburg), Vol. 19 (September 2000), No. 5, pp. 425-434, or: <<http://library.fes.de/fulltext/bueros/seoul/01683.html>>.

work of the EU's relations with ASEAN and in the ARF where the EU enjoys a full seat and participates as an organization. However, in practice, the ARF has remained more of a consultative forum and all security discussions "have focused hitherto primarily on threat perceptions and confidence-building measures rather than on concrete management of regional security conflicts and conflict resolution mechanisms involving legal obligations and not just non-binding political declarations."¹⁹

Since the early 1990s, the EU had expressed a strong desire in widening the security agenda in its relations with ASEAN, and the non-compatible security cultures between the two organizations meant that "for most of the 1990s the EU and ASEAN could not find any common ground on conflicting issues such as the liberalization and democratization of authoritarian regimes, human rights, sustainable development, and good governance."²⁰ Recently, however, there is a growing acceptance of the importance of non-traditional security on the ASEAN side as security culture has changed with an ongoing process of harmonization of Asian and European security cultures.²¹ As long as the ARF does not develop mecha-

19 Frank Umbach, EU-ASEAN Political and Security Dialogue at the Beginning of the 21st Century: Prospects for Interregional Cooperation on International Terrorism, in: Panorama (KAS, Singapur), 1.1.2004, <<http://www.dgap.org/midcom-serveattachmentguid-f843fe76ca0c11dab612d7e9e959130b130b/EU-ASEAN-Panorama%2B2004.pdf>>, p. 2.

20 Jorn Dosch, Changing Security Cultures in Europe and Southeast Asia, Asia-Europe Journal, Vol. 1, No. 4, December 2003, p. 494.

21 Ibid., p. 486.



Saponti Baroowa from India with Prof. Sandschneider and Bonn Juego from the Philippines

nisms for preventive diplomacy, the EU can insist on cooperation on soft security issues, and the experiences of ESDP's civilian instruments may prove beneficial. For the EU, Asia is the most challenging test case for building regional security arrangements.²² The EU maintains its ESDP missions open to participation by other regional and extra-regional states, but "to give meaning to ideas such as 'ownership' and 'open coalitions', the EU needs to channel more resources and expertise to regional organizations in the developing world."²³

The EU and Human Security in Asia

It is also imperative for the EU to practically harmonize its instruments for crisis management and conflict prevention within the larger framework of a human security approach, which envisages insecurity as emanating from not only underdevelopment and violent conflict situations, but also from situations arising due to natural disasters, environmental crises and pandemics. In the Asian context, countries in the region are increasingly beginning to realize the implications of the human security dimension. Most South-East Asian nations have generally regarded economic development and prosperity as the cornerstone of their national security and have therefore increasingly realized that it is imperative for them to cooperate on human security questions as well. Any major environmental or human security crisis in one country may well have trans-boundary implications and therefore endanger economic growth and security of the region. In the context of South Asia, effects of climate change and natural disasters pose serious security challenges. For instance, climate change and the frequent incidences of tropical cyclones cause recurrent floods in Bangladesh displacing large populations. Many of them are forced to cross over the porous border into the Northeast Indian state of Assam causing tensions and socio-political upheavals which have at times turned violent. In addressing human security issues, the EU can condition its security and development strategies in far-flung Asian regions towards collaborating with regional and local actors in mitigating and preventing environmental crises and life-threatening epidemics.

The EU and Asia's Emerging Global Actors: India and China

The incremental EU experience in civilian and humanitarian crisis management may prove beneficial in evolving common strategies with India and China when addressing regional humanitarian crises. Any direct EU involvement on the ground may also introduce a multilateral dimension to any regional humanitar-

22 Amitav Acharya, *An Asian Perspective: Regional security arrangements in a multipolar world: the EU's contribution*, in: Martin Ortega (ed.), *Global Views on the European Union (Chaillot Paper 72)*, Paris, November 2004, p. 93.

23 *Ibid.*, p. 100.

ian crisis management operation and help in ameliorating the fears and distrust among smaller nations, especially in the context of South Asia. The emerging political relations between the EU and India have also shown greater signs of maturity with the two sides increasingly exhibiting a greater understanding of each other's approach to difficult issues such as terrorism and human rights. The two sides have already expressed their desire to "establish an EU-India security dialogue on global and regional security issues, disarmament, and non-proliferation."²⁴ The current political dialogue under the broad framework of the emerging India-EU Strategic Partnership may offer future possibilities to both India and the EU to develop strategies for potential cooperation in the field of crisis management.²⁵

Despite their long-standing bilateral disputes, the emergence of effective confidence-building measures between China and India are also perceptible. China has increasingly begun to view India less as a rival and more as a potentially strong economic trade partner. Although both countries may be seen to be continually trying to exert individual influence among smaller nations in regions along their peripheries, the real potential for India-China collaboration lies not so much in the resolution of violent conflicts, but rather in addressing human security issues such as environmental degradation, natural disasters, epidemics, drugs and migration. The EU, along with the ASEAN, India and China, can potentially forge a symbiotic partnership in addressing such questions related to the security-development nexus in Asia.

Policy Imperatives and Recommendations

The roots of instability may be complex and may not be merely economic or over the control of resources. Some may go back many centuries and can be deeply rooted in differences of culture, ethnicity, religion, and language. Mere economic instruments and top-down approaches may only put many of the unresolved animosities into deep freeze where they could fester and attain greater and unmanageable proportions. Therefore, institutional capacity-building from below which takes into account local realities and recognizes regional uniqueness and respective development processes should be encouraged.

²⁴ European Council Brussels, 7 September 2005, Political Declaration on India-EU Strategic Partnership, in: EU Security and Defence: Core Documents 2005, Vol. VI (Chaillot Paper 87), Paris, March 2006, p. 248.

²⁵ For an analysis of the EU-India Strategic Partnership, see Saponti Baroowa, The Emerging Strategic Partnership between India and the European Union: A Critical Appraisal, in: European Law Journal, Vol. 13, No. 6, Oxford 2007, pp. 732–749.

Greater integration into the national mainstream of troubled regions may not be enough and could maintain political and economic alienation. Instead, opportunities should be identified whereby regions may be integrated not only in a national project but also in a larger regional and trans-national system. This would not be antithetical to national interests or sovereignty, as some in governing establishments would like to believe, but would lead to a kind of placebo effect in the short-term and sustainable development and security in the long-term.

EU approaches towards security sector reform (SSR) cannot be applied in a uniform pattern in all Asian conflict scenarios: local realities and the fundamental elements which make one conflict situation distinct from another have to be taken into consideration. Enforcing the EU's SSR initiatives in a Failed State in Africa is certainly different from enforcing initiatives promoting SSR in troubled areas in countries such as India, which is already a highly developed functional democracy with long entrenched formal institutions of governance and policy. What is therefore required is a greater sharing of experiences and expertise, thus leading to effective partnerships towards finding viable solutions.

An alternative solution would be to address the root causes of instability and promote development by engaging regional partners and integrating troubled regions in mutually benefiting economic trade systems. As far as the EU is concerned, a Commission driven development agenda approach could be adopted in troubled areas, such as Northeast India, whereby collaborative development initiatives could be evolved with India towards ameliorating the development dilemmas afflicting the region by reducing the existing inequities and mitigating the adverse effects of natural disasters, such as the recurrent floods in Assam. Therefore, in regions like India's Northeast, EC instruments, as part of the EU Development Policy, may prove more effective than the Council's ESDP capacities, which could be more applicable in situations where there is an overall breakdown of governance in the parent country and in the face of an international crises where there is a growing international consensus for involvement and intervention.

Conclusion

The EU lacks a coherent policy towards Asia. The AMM resulted mainly from the fact that the two main external actors in the region, namely the United States and Australia, both discredited themselves with their involvements in Iraq and East Timor respectively. Many EU Member States were also reluctant to support the AMM, in a region far away from the EU and with no tangible European interests. Aceh may therefore be viewed as an exception and a contingency, but

such contingencies also provide a real opportunity for the EU to devise a more comprehensive and durable approach. If the Union is to ultimately emerge as a responsible global actor, the Aceh experience can very well provide a direction which could inform future EU strategies when addressing the security-development nexus in Asia and other parts of the world. To bring its development and security policies in line with its existing development assistance programs in underdeveloped but more stable regions, the EU could allocate greater resources to current and potential conflict-prone regions. Such an approach would introduce the much-needed development dimension to the prevalent security-related efforts in regional conflict mitigation. The EU should therefore combine its develop-



Felix Heiduk from Germany talks about his field work experience in post-Tsunami Aceh

ment resources and security instruments towards a more long-term global crisis response and development approach, rather than resorting to reactive ad-hoc arrangements in select situations.



Michael Polyak served as press officer at the US embassy in Baghdad

The Security-Development Nexus in Iraq

Michael Polyak

In 2003, US-led Coalition Forces invaded Iraq with two goals: ending the regime of Saddam Hussein, which it perceived as a grave and gathering danger, and fostering a stable democracy in its place. The Coalition Forces achieved the first objective successfully; the second goal has been more elusive. In Iraq, a violent insurgency, malicious foreign interference and sectarian warfare have made providing security a daunting challenge. Meanwhile, internal rivalries have led to political gridlock and a weak, albeit democratically elected, central government. In turn, the lack of security and political cohesion has made Iraqi reconstruction an arduous task, greatly stunting the country's potential for economic development. The international community can best promote success in Iraq by brokering domestic political reconciliation, while conducting innovative security operations and building capacity for the Iraqi government. Through Iraqi capacity development, the international community can support Iraq with political consultation and material assistance. Since security and development are inter-dependent, they must develop in a simultaneous, stair-step like fashion.

Challenges in Iraq

Iraq will not succeed unless it overcomes the multiple security challenges eroding the country's cohesion. A failed Iraq would affect the entire Middle East, and the disaster could result in a regional war that would significantly harm the world's strategic and economic foundations. The international community therefore has a high stake in Iraq, and until the Iraqi Security Forces are fully capable of handling domestic security operations, assistance from abroad is essential.

While it is common to hear of strategic threats from an "Iraqi insurgency," in actuality, several conflicts are occurring simultaneously, reinforcing each other. In the wake of Saddam Hussein's demise, numerous sub-national groups developed into armed gangs. In central and southern Iraq, as well as in Baghdad, Shi'ite militias such as the Jeish al-Mahdi and the Badr Brigades grew, ostensibly with the purpose of providing security for their local communities against Sunni militants, al-Qaeda and ex-Ba'athists. Unfortunately, instead of strictly providing local security, these militias frequently used their power to settle personal scores, commit sectarian murders and enforce sectarian cleansing throughout Iraqi cities.



Michael Polyak

In other parts of Iraq, disaffected ex-rank and file members of the Ba'ath party formed “resistance” groups, with the initial aim of fighting the Coalition Forces. Examples of such groups include the Islamic Army of Iraq and the 1920 Revolution Brigade. These groups primarily based themselves in central and western Iraq, where they gained infamy through attacks on Coalition Forces and Iraqi civilians.

Subsequently, al-Qaeda was quick to establish a presence in Iraq, known as al-Qaeda in Iraq. Largely based in the Anbar and Diyala provinces, it recruited individuals from inside and outside of Iraq, often working in concert with domestic Iraqi insurgent groups to carry out attacks on Coalition Forces. While a common enemy brought these groups together, beneath the surface, deep divisions existed. Many Iraqi insurgent groups existed under a banner of Sunni nationalism and the insurgency was a means to reclaim what they considered their historical rule over the country. Al-Qaeda's plan, however, was to undermine overall confidence in the Iraqi government and Coalition Forces, and to drive the country into a sectarian-based civil war, eventually leading to the Coalition's withdrawal and a failed state. Al-Qaeda hoped that such a state would provide a base of operations to carry out attacks throughout the region, in order to pursue its vision of establishing a regional caliphate. In an attempt to ignite a civil war, al-Qaeda killed large numbers of innocent Sunnis and Shi'ites, while attacking persons and places of religious significance. Unfortunately, the strategy was partially successful, as sectarian warfare erupted between Iraq's factions.

Economically, Iraq's progress has stalled out due to decrepit pre-war infrastructure, attacks on reconstruction sites, widespread corruption, and an inability for the Iraqi government to properly budget and spend dedicated reconstruction funds. A combination of these tragic factors has undermined the country's ability to generate strategic, political and economic progress.

Responses

In response to these challenges, the Coalition Forces have been training and working alongside the Iraqi Security Forces in order to combat foreign terrorists, prevent sectarian warfare, and convince domestic insurgent groups to pursue their agendas through the political process. Towards these ends, strategies, such as “Clear, Hold and Build”, have been effective. Initially, when conducting security operations in Iraq, the Coalition Forces would clear a city of insurgent influence and move on to other cities. As a result, the insurgents would melt away upon hearing news of an approaching military force—only to return once the

Coalition Forces had departed. This created a “whack-a-mole” type of scenario, which prevented lasting progress in Iraq’s cities. More importantly, because many tribal sheikhs and mayors felt unable to count on sustained military support, they allowed insurgents to take root in their towns.

In response, the Coalition Forces implemented the “Clear, Hold, and Build” strategy whereby the military would clear a city of insurgents, and rather than moving along, troops stayed put—pursuing suspected insurgents, helping to rebuild critical infrastructure, and working with the city’s elected officials to build effective governance and security capabilities. In cities like Tal Afar in northern Iraq, this was successful. The strategy, however, was not sustainable as it required many troops, and most of the Coalition Forces were stretched thin and dedicated to other tasks. Meanwhile, sectarian warfare raged in other provinces and security in Baghdad was minimal.

In January 2007, President Bush, as part of a “New Way Forward,” sought to address these challenges by deploying 21,500 additional US troops to Iraq,¹ primarily to stabilize Baghdad, along with an additional 4,000 Marines to secure the Anbar province.² The military also adjusted its tactics to address the conflicts on the ground: rather than operating exclusively from Forward Operating Bases, some Coalition Forces positioned themselves on sectarian fault lines in mixed Sunni and Shia neighborhoods in Baghdad, to provide a buffer zone in areas prone to attack. Since its inception, the troop level increase, or “surge,” has significantly reduced violence in Iraq. Not only have attacks decreased in Baghdad, but Anbar province—once a notorious insurgent stronghold—has become far safer.³

The turnaround in security in Baghdad and Anbar can be largely attributed to the Anbar Uprising and Concerned Citizen Group programs. The Anbar Uprising represents a strategic re-alliance of Sunni tribal sheikhs and ex-insurgent groups away from al-Qaeda and towards the Coalition Forces. In 2005/06, Iraqi insurgents and sheikhs from Sunni regions became increasingly frustrated with al-Qaeda’s attacks on innocent Iraqis—often their brethren—and came to understand the grave threat they would face if Coalition Forces were to leave. Additionally, some sheikhs viewed the US troop surge as a tangible, lasting commitment to Anbar’s security, reassurance that they would not be abandoned after choosing to turn against al-Qaeda. As the troop surge progressed, former insurgents and Sunni sheikhs became more comfortable with the idea of aligning with Coalition

1 Tracking Variables of Reconstruction & Security in Post-Saddam Iraq, in: Brookings Institution, Iraq Index: <<http://www.brookings.edu/fp/saban/iraq/index.pdf>>.

2 President’s Radio Address, in: White House Radio, 15 September 2007.

3 Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, in: Department of Defense Report to Congress, September 2007, p. 24.

Forces against al-Qaeda. Furthermore, many sheikhs saw this as a chance to gain political influence in Iraq.⁴

Similarly, in the restive DIALYA province, thousands of volunteers have joined performance-based Concerned Citizen Groups, which work with Iraqi and Coalition Forces to identify security threats.⁵ The Coalition Forces have agreed to pay nominal fees to these individuals to help provide localized protection for their communities. In practice, this system has drastically improved security in Sunni and mixed provinces, and has provided an effective buffer between the largely Shi'ite Iraqi Security Forces and the populations of Sunni cities. Indeed, by October 2007, al-Qaeda violence had dropped drastically since the beginning of the year. In late October 2007, Major General Richard Sherlock, Director of Operational Planning for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, reported that “in and around Baghdad, terrorist operations are down by 59 percent; operations targeting Iraqi security forces are down over 60 percent; car bombs are down by 65 percent; fatalities due to car bombs have decreased by 81 percent; casualties due to enemy attacks are down by 77 percent; and the violence during this last Ramadan period was the lowest in three years.”⁶

Security Policy Recommendations

While the strategy of incorporating the Sunni “uprising” has been effective, some have criticized Coalition Forces for working with former insurgents. Critics argue that after al-Qaeda is forced out of Iraq, the insurgents will only turn against Coalition Forces once again. Even if that scenario transpires, however, it still removes al-Qaeda from the battle space—along with its attempts to stoke sectarian warfare. Moreover, given the limited resources of the Iraqi Security Forces and the strong sectarian tensions in Iraq, this option—while risky—seems to be an effective way of reducing communal violence while giving interested Iraqi citizens a stake in maintaining local security.

In order for this strategy to work, Iraq’s leaders must take advantage of the relative lull in violence to create conditions that will make ex-insurgents less likely to return to violence if militant leaders later declare a call to arms. For this strategy to be consistent with national unity, the Coalition Forces must ensure that the volunteer forces meet several criteria. At a minimum, the volunteer forces must be accountable to—and supervised by—the Coalition Forces to ensure that they

4 Hamza Hendawi, Brittle bond: Iraqi sheik joins US fight, in: Associated Press, 12 October 2007.

5 Fred W. Baker III, Grass-roots Security Efforts Help Drive Out Insurgents, in: American Forces Press Service, 16 October 2007.

6 Maj. Gen. Richard Sherlock, DoD Regular Briefing, 24 October 2007.

act appropriately and do not form militias. These groups must strictly adhere to the Iraqi Security Forces' rules of engagement, and should eventually be absorbed into the security forces. Most importantly, this strategy must not only have the approval of the Iraqi government, but the government must ultimately own the strategy, building relationships of trust with the volunteer forces. This final point is critical to mitigate the risk of volunteer forces fighting against the Iraqi government after the Coalition Forces' withdrawal. As the volunteer forces continue to isolate al-Qaeda, identify attackers and weapons caches, the nationwide level of violence will continue to fall. Such progress will be felt in both Sunni and Shi'ite regions of the country, lending credence to the value of this strategy.

In spite of recent progress, terrorist attacks continue and Iraq remains far from stable. In order to achieve lasting national security, the Coalition Forces and Iraqi Security Forces must continue to implement adaptive tactical measures as the strategic picture changes. For instance, given the Coalition Forces' success in driving a wedge between many of Iraq's Sunni insurgents and al-Qaeda, it is worth considering whether a similar policy could isolate frustrated populations from militias and Iranian-backed death squads in the Shi'ite regions of Iraq. By dedicating comprehensive, consistent support to Shi'ite leaders tired of malicious interference in their lands, the Coalition Forces could begin to undermine the base of operations for militias and Iranian influence. Granted, the nature of destabilizing activities differs greatly in Iraq's Sunni and Shi'ite regions, as do the hierarchies of leadership in the insurgent organizations. While the two scenarios are not completely analogous, it is possible that an overall desire for change could prompt a similar re-alliance in Iraq's Shi'ite regions.

In an idealized scenario, through al-Qaeda's dwindling support in Iraq, coupled with the isolation of death squads, two of the greatest perpetrators of sectarian violence would be muted. The subsequent drop in sectarian killings would take the wind from the sails of insurgents who justify attacks based on other sectarian violence. Furthermore, a reduction in sectarian conflict would provide a more suitable climate for political and sectarian rapprochement, which could ideally culminate in a lasting peace agreement. Such an agreement would create greater stability, instilling confidence in international donors contemplating sending financial, personnel or material assistance to Iraq.

In the security realm, the international community could play a greater role. Collective security organizations can contribute to the efforts of the Coalition and Iraqi Security Forces and greatly support the critical fight for Iraq's future. Although NATO currently has a major role in Afghanistan and a minor role in Iraq,

improved conditions in Afghanistan or a greater overall NATO commitment would allow the organization to augment its presence in Iraq and demonstrate its primacy in addressing modern security challenges. Alternatively, were the UN or the Arab League to establish a presence of troops for support and peacekeeping missions, this would help balance out the overwhelming US presence, while demonstrating a tangible commitment to a secure Iraq.

Fundamentally, security policy in Iraq must protect the population from terrorist attacks. This creates space for economic development and political reconciliation throughout the country. Indeed, in some provinces, including much of Anbar, this has been successful. Any effective security initiative in Iraq must protect the populace while isolating foreign and domestic threats.

Finally, despite Iran's rhetorical support for a stable, democratic Iraq, there is continuing evidence of Iranian involvement in providing training and material support to militias that carry out attacks on Iraqi civilians and Coalition Forces.⁷ These actions are violating Iraq's sovereignty and straining the cohesion of the Middle East. In an attempt to reach a diplomatic solution, the United States and the international community have engaged with Iran in several different forums; however, evidence suggests that Iran has maintained its destabilizing activities in Iraq.⁸ To counter this, the Coalition Forces must bring to light more evidence of Iran's involvement in Iraq, and the international community must place more pressure on Iran to cease its activities. Ultimately, however, the greatest check on Iran's regionally hegemonic aspirations will be a stable, democratic Iraq. Therefore, it is in the interest of the international community to assist Iraq, as this provides a corollary benefit of reigning in Iran's regional ambitions.

Political and Economic Assistance Recommendations

In Iraq, military operations alone will not create success. A secure environment is essential for progress, but even then, it is not preordained that political and economic development will follow. In the political realm, sectarianism and corruption are presenting major obstacles to reform. In negotiating many key landmarks for political progress in Iraq, officials frequently advocate policies that greatly benefit his or her religious or ethnic sect, at the expense of national unity. This has caused gridlock on key reform processes, such as deciding the status of Kirkuk, allocating oil revenues, and determining the relationship between Baghdad and Iraq's provincial governments. The tendency for politicians to negotiate

7 David Mays, *More Evidence Shows Iran Directly Supports Iraq Insurgents*, in: American Forces Press Service, 3 October 2007.

8 Kenneth Katzman, *Iran's Influence in Iraq*, CRS Report to Congress, 9 August 2007.

policies based on sectarian interests stems from an overall lack of confidence in Iraq's future. The politicians, fearing the collapse or partitioning of Iraq, are hedging their bets by investing in regional, sectarian structures of governance. To move beyond this state of affairs, all of Iraq's sectarian groups need to feel that they have an equitable, lasting stake in the central government.

Capacity Development Programs for the Central Government

In this regard, capacity development programs for the central government should focus on managing and sharing national resources, securing borders, resisting

influence from neighboring countries, and devising strategies to hold together the country's sectarian blocs after the eventual withdrawal of Coalition Forces. Another critical topic is determining the strength of the relationship between Iraq's central and provincial governments. Given Iraq's great diversity, the central government will only succeed if it upholds cooperative relationships with all of Iraq's provinces, which requires granting substantive authority to the provincial governments. At the same time, a relatively strong central government will be necessary to uphold national interests, ensure domestic security, collect taxes and prevent sectarian strife or separatist tendencies. Thus, striking the correct power balance between national and provincial governments will prove critical to Iraq's long-term stability. While Iraqis must make these decisions, the international community



Kamal Amakrane, who works in the Department of Political Affairs of the UN Secretariat, presents the UN's perspective

While Iraqis must make these decisions, the international community

can provide consultation, while creating conditions that allow secure, equitable, democratic negotiations to occur.

Programs for the Provincial Governments

Iraq's provincial governments require similar political assistance. Some leaders in the Sunni regions, benefiting from the "uprising," have seen improvements in security, families returning to their homes and city life stabilizing. This stability could be leveraged by developing sound, responsive governance structures and by encouraging local economic development. In support of this, international donors could enhance economic growth by rebuilding critical infrastructure, initiating micro-credit schemes for small businesses, and by fostering economic stratification by diversifying Iraqi exports. Such products and services might include agriculture, minerals or secure transport corridors. By developing new markets, these regions would experience direct financial growth and the country's economy would begin to reduce its monolithic dependence on oil revenues. Eventually, Iraqi provincial leaders could point to lasting regional stability to encourage foreign investment. Some institutions, such as the U.S. Commercial Services, have already implemented programs in conjunction with local businesses to encourage investment in Anbar province. While past attempts of this nature have had limited success, the environment is becoming increasingly ripe for similar initiatives.

By capitalizing on secure regions of Iraq through economic development programs, the country would acquire more bastions of security and trade in Arab regions that allow for the same economic opportunities as in the country's Kurdish region. As more Arab provinces experienced security and development gains, capital would flow to these regions, giving residents a greater stake in ensuring that their lands remained secure. Subsequently, the military could then free up resources from these regions to focus on other threats, and lay the groundwork for economic development in other provinces. Improved conditions in Iraq's provinces would also create space for genuine political dialogue—allowing provincial leaders to formulate initiatives that improve the lives of their constituents, and strategies to be the most effective when negotiating with the national government.

Foreign Assistance

Assistance from abroad would best take the form of capacity development programs. Such consultation must continue to focus on enforcing the rule of law, protecting rights of women and minorities, and it must provide technical assistance on subjects like monitoring corruption and allocating budgets and resources. Indeed, several organizations already exist to help the Iraqi government build capacity and develop good governance practices. Examples include the US

Agency for International Development (USAID), the International Republican Institute, the National Democratic Institute, the US Embassy's Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) and Regional Embassy Offices. Interested donor countries would be of great service by contributing to these existing development operations, or by starting new initiatives to meet unmet needs.

Finally, international supporters must insist upon augmented and accelerated de-Ba'athification reform. After the downfall of the Ba'ath party, many party members fled or were released of their services, leading to widespread resentment and unemployment from this group. In Saddam Hussein's Iraq, Ba'ath party membership was a requirement for holding a professional, academic, or military position. A vast number of low ranked Ba'athists were not involved in the regime's egregious crimes, but enlisted solely as a means of getting ahead in life. As such, there is a need to invite these individuals to return to public service. Currently, the process of de-Ba'athification reform has been too slow and ambiguous, and many consider it marred by sectarianism. Successful de-Ba'athification reform can help alleviate unemployment and disenfranchisement, and it represents a critical step in overcoming sectarian discord. In order to ensure that equitable debate and proper de-Ba'athification reform occur, the Iraqi government must entrust this process to a religiously and ethnically diverse group of officials, while demanding transparency and oversight on its decisions.

Conclusion

The processes of strategic, political and economic development in Iraq must happen simultaneously, in a stair-step process. Securing a city or province provides an environment for political dialogue, which can produce a stable, legally transparent framework for conducting business and economic development. Encouraging inclusive, grass roots business practices creates jobs and gives residents an incentive to keep their regions safe, which would free up national resources to replicate the process elsewhere. Iraq will continue to require international economic, political and military support. Iraq's neighbors and the broader international community have much to gain from Iraq's success and much to lose from its failure. In order to properly assist the Iraqi government, donor countries must make clear to Iraqi politicians the disadvantages of defection and the rewards of cooperation.

At both state and local levels, elected officials engaging in corrupt behavior or shirking their duties should be encouraged to reform by the international community, and should not be supported until they do so. Foreign donors should therefore augment support to Iraqi leaders that put aid resources to good use, as

this will eventually lead to the development of more bastions of stability. Finally, donor countries must link material support with programs that prevent the Iraqi government from becoming dependent on foreign aid. In the security realm, this means continuing to train the Iraqi Security Forces; economically, it means developing sustainable business practices; and politically, it requires governance consultation. While no initiative is perfect, this broad overview provides a general framework, which holds better chances for success in the land of two rivers.



Pablo Barrera Cruz, here with Michael Polyak, currently works as Middle East Representative for a Spanish NGO in Lebanon

Turkey's Emerging Role in the Middle East

Özge Genç

Turkey has become more assertive in the Middle East. Underlining the obstacles and opportunities leading to Turkey's foreign and security policy towards the region, an overview of the more traditional dynamics of Turkish foreign policy is useful and complementary to an analysis of the dynamics of change from a hard security approach towards a more comprehensive foreign policy. Elaborating on the prospects for a comprehensive policy, development strategies need to be integrated into foreign and security policy-making. Though this need is particularly relevant for Turkey's approach and relations with adjacent conflict zones in Iraq, Syria-Lebanon and Palestine-Israel, there are some promising cases worth highlighting in which a great deal of coordination and cooperation has been achieved between Turkey and countries of the Middle East.



Özge Genç

Traditional Dynamics of Turkish Foreign Policy

Since the foundation of the Republic of Turkey in 1923, the ruling elite, in keeping with the legacy of Kemal Atatürk, tended to identify more with the West than with the Middle East and the Islamic world.¹ By identifying Islam and the Islamic state as the main cause of backwardness, secularism became the constitutive part of the Turkish state discourse. The politics of “Westernization” also prompted the gradual erosion of the role of Islam in politics and public administration. Yet, breaking with the Ottoman past reinforced the formation of state identity based on Turkishness. The formation of the Turkish state and national ideology was a transformation of “a non-western, de-central, a-national and non-secular social formation (the Ottoman Empire) into a western, central, national and secular one (the Turkish Republic).”²

In Turkey, national identity formation and conflicting identities shaped preferences in foreign policy decision-making, and led to different foreign policy goals at times. Therefore, the components of Turkish identity, narratives and symbols of belonging, threat perceptions and insecurities have all had repercussions on Turkey's behavior toward its most immediate Middle Eastern neighbors. According to Philip Robins, the role of state ideology was significant in Turkey's political marginalization, which established the differences between the Turks and the

1 Sabri Sayari, Turkey and the Middle East in the 1990s, in: *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 26, No. 3, Spring 1997, p. 51.

2 Mesut Yeğen, The Kurdish Question in Turkish State Discourse, in: *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. 34, No. 3, 1999, p. 559.

peoples of neighboring states.³ The Turkish state elite's perception of the Turks as "distinct people" led to a "frigid isolationism" in foreign policy; Turkey became a "peripheral", "awkward" and "uneasy" actor in the Middle East.⁴ Often-times, the Middle East has been conceptualized as a region full of threats and dangers aiming at the integrity of the Turkish state, for instance by supporting Kurdish insurgency and radical Islamists. Moreover, as Turkey was born out of several conflicts with Greece and tribal ethnic Kurdish uprisings, the overriding concern about security has not only been synonymous with the state-building project, but has also dictated foreign policy. Since the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire, fear of losing more territory and the fear of abandonment has become a major aspect of Turkish security culture; these fears still continue to influence some of the elite and public opinion.⁵

Another important factor in the production of insecurities and threats has been the role of the Turkish military in the evolution of a national security culture.⁶ In Turkey, the military has played an overly influential role in defining and acting against external and internal threats, by not only using its military power, but also influencing the domestic policy-making apparatus. The Turkish military has long portrayed itself as the protector of Turkey's secular state. In this "guardian" role, it has ousted four democratically elected governments in less than 50 years. The military is struggling not only to preserve its privileged position within Turkey's political system, but also the "security first" logic of the state. According to many in Turkey, the rationale of security is used to justify a large and strong army, a big defense budget, the practices of gendarmerie, intelligence and armed forces, and other measures which erode freedoms and enable press censorship and closing down political parties.⁷ In fact, the Turkish public is fairly supportive of using military strength in ensuring peace, and eliminating terrorist organizations in fighting terrorism.⁸ The military usually supports a hard security approach focused on preventing any disruption of the integrity of the Turkish state and its borders. For instance, they have recently been insisting on the need to raid the northern Iraq hideouts of anti-government Kurdish rebels of the PKK.

However, parallel to Turkey's EU accession process many reforms have been undertaken to diminish the role of the military in the political system. The military's

3 Philip Robins, *Turkey and the Middle East*, New York, NY, 1991, p. 10.

4 *Ibid.*, p. 155.

5 Ali Karaosmanoğlu, *The Evolution of the National Security Culture*, in: *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 54, No. 1, Fall 2000, p. 201.

6 *Ibid.*

7 Philip Robins, *Suits and Uniforms: Turkish Foreign Policy Since the Cold War*, London, 2003, p. 161.

8 See *The German Marshall Fund of the United States and Compagnia di San Paolo, Transatlantic Trends Key Findings 2007*, <http://www.transatlantictrends.org/trends/doc/Transatlantic%20Trends_all_0920.pdf>.

privileged position within the political system is being challenged by a rising sector within the middle class, which is conservative and Muslim, and helped the Justice and Development Party (AKP) come to power in the 2002 parliamentary elections. Thus, along with foreign policy initiatives implemented by the Islamic-rooted AKP and Turkey's bid to secure European Union membership, the meaning of (in)security is being transformed and Turkey is achieving significant progress in its relations with neighboring Middle Eastern countries.

Considering recent developments in Turkish foreign and security policy towards the Middle East the impact of Turkey's bid for EU membership is very significant. Although the EU does not have a coherent foreign policy approach or clear foreign policy benchmarks, Turkey's latest efforts can be claimed to be in line with the EU policies. Turkey's direct and indirect contributions to the objectives of the European Neighborhood Policy include its role in the Middle East Peace Process, its relations with Syria, its participation in UNIFIL, its efforts to persuade the Sunnis in Iraq to cooperate, its efforts to rebuild Afghanistan and attempts to talk Iran into abiding by international demands. Turkey's support in these areas was recorded as positive developments in the 2006 Progress Report.⁹

The AKP's foreign policy seems to represent a new political and cultural trend in Turkey and it is based on "Turkey's reconciliation with its geographical vicinity."¹⁰ Having "revived long-dormant ties with the Muslim world,"¹¹ this vision collides with the concept of national security, historical grievances and the so-called politics of strategic positioning, which resulted in intense diplomacy with regional countries, as well as efforts to strengthen mutual dialogue by addressing controversial issues. The positive atmosphere created with Middle Eastern neighbors, who have had overlapping identity-building processes, opposed each other and have grown alien to one another over time, seems to have considerably increased trust towards Turkey.¹² Accordingly, good relations with Middle Eastern countries, especially with Syria, Lebanon and Iran, face-to-face contact, regional cooperation and summits, especially with regard to Iraq and the Israel-Palestine conflict, have marked developments in the last few years, which have benefited all sides drastically due to flourishing diplomatic relations and increased trade. Despite positive achievements it is still too early to assess the outcome of steps aimed at resolving regional conflicts such as Israel-Palestine and Iraq.

9 Commission of the European Communities, Commission Staff Working Document, Turkey 2007 Progress Report, SEC(2007) 1436, Brussels, 6 November 2007, <http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2007/nov/turkey_progress_reports_en.pdf>.

10 Interview with Ali Sarikaya, Foreign Policy Advisor to Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan, 19 June 2004.

11 Turkey's Foreign Policy: An Eminence Grise, in: *Economist*, 17 November 2007, p. 38.

12 See Özge Genç, Turkey EU and the Middle East, in: TESEV Foreign Policy Bulletin, No. 4, April 2007, pp. 13–14.

Bilateral ties with Syria have improved since the late 1990s, particularly after the Adana Process, which ended the October 1998 crisis between Turkey and Syria when the two states came to the brink of war, due to Syria's support for PKK by hosting its leader Abdullah Öcalan. In 2004, Bashar al-Assad's official visit to Turkey – the first for a Syrian President – invigorated the desire to increase economic, political and social cooperation and relatively reduced the level of insecurity felt by both states. Since then, owing largely to face-to-face contacts between Syrian and Turkish officials and working together at regional summits, Turkey and Syria have become close “partners” rather than “distant neighbors.”¹³ Recent figures show that “in the last two years the Syrian authorities have approved more than 30 Turkish investment projects in the country with a total value of over 150 million Dollar; and bilateral trade is expected to be around 1.5 billion Dollar in 2007, more than triple the figure when the AKP came to power.”¹⁴

A significant step for Turkey's engagement in the conflict in Lebanon was taken during September 2006 after the July 2006 War between Israel and Lebanon, when the Turkish parliament approved the deployment of Turkish peacekeeping troops between Israel and Hezbollah in the reinforced United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) operations in South Lebanon. Despite strong domestic opposition, the government ensured that Turkey's involvement in this mission would bolster Turkey's role in the Middle East as a constructive player and thus passed the resolution in the parliament. Turkish troops in UNIFIL II are now composed of a Turkish engineering unit, which helps to rebuild damaged bridges and roads, and a frigate from the Turkish Naval Forces patrolling off the Lebanese coast.¹⁵ Recently, following the conflict between Fatah al-Islam and the Lebanese Army in the Nahr al-Bared Palestinian refugee camp in Northern Lebanon, which led to the displacement of over 30,000 refugees and the damage and destruction of much of the camp infrastructure, Turkey donated an assistance package of around 1.1 million Dollar through the Emergency Management Agency.¹⁶

Turkey's engagement in Iraq is a more complicated story. Since the beginning of the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, Turkey has conducted active diplomacy concerning the reconstruction of a new regime in Iraq and the situation in its Kurdish parts. Turkey's diplomatic efforts for the current situation in Iraq have fo-

13 See Meliha Benli Altunışık and Özlem Tür, From Distant Neighbors to Partners? Changing Syrian-Turkish Relations, in: *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 37, No. 2, 2006, pp. 229–248.

14 Gareth Jenkins, Assad Visit Signals Deepening Rapprochement Between Turkey and Syria, in: *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, 17 October 2007, <http://www.jamestown.org/edm/article.php?article_id=2372511>.

15 *Journal of Turkish Weekly* (Ankara), <<http://www.turkishweekly.net/news.php?id=40268>>, 19 October 2006.

16 ReliefWeb, <<http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900sid/LSGZ-788GXM?OpenDocument>>, 22 October 2007.

cused on preserving the territorial integrity and unity of Iraq so that no separate Kurdish state is formed in northern Iraq. The overriding concern with northern Iraq led to two different and often contradictory attitudes by Turkish policy-makers towards the region, which has had its repercussions in Turkey's Iraqi policy until today. Thus, in October 2007, the Turkish parliament passed a resolution for a possible cross-border operation into Iraq, which would involve a military raid into northern Iraq to crush the PKK forces. Subsequently, in November 2007, Turkey hosted the Extended Iraqi Neighbors Conference in Istanbul as a continuation of its previous attempts at regional diplomacy and summits for the Iraqi cause, which often aimed at bringing different local Iraqi and regional groups together to ensure their support for Iraq's political, social and economic reconstruction. However, this time the conference had a reiterated focus on cooperation against ending the PKK's presence in Iraq. The recent conference made it evident that the central government in Baghdad is closer to the Turkish position than ever before and is not willing to sacrifice its economic and cultural relations with Turkey.¹⁷ As described by Bulent Aras, Turkey portrays two different images in relation to Iraq: "One is Turkey getting ready for an incursion, ready to confront with Iraqi forces or even American forces in the region. The other is the Turkey that is providing 70 percent of the logistical support for American troops in Iraq, supporting the building up of Iraq in regards to the many construction projects going on, and a Turkey in relationships with many different ethnic groups in Iraq, trying to help their inclusion in the political system."¹⁸

Turkey's latest efforts in the Israel-Palestine conflict are also noteworthy. In November 2007, Turkey hosted Israeli President Shimon Peres and Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas just prior to the prospective international conference on the Middle East in Annapolis. Both leaders gave speeches in the Turkish Parliament and expressed their willingness for peace in the region. This visit was part of a larger plan entitled Industry for Peace Initiative, commenced by the Turkish Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges (TOBB) in cooperation with the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and aimed at building a permanent dialogue mechanism between Palestinian, Israeli and Turkish business communities with more focus on private sector development and employment generation projects in the West Bank. It is now exploring opportunities to embark on an industrial park project in the region.¹⁹

17 Bulent Aras, Turkey's War on Terror, in: SETA Policy Brief, No. 2, November 2007, pp. 1-6.

18 Bulent Aras interview, in: Today's Zaman, 22 October 2007.

19 For more information, see: <<http://www.industryforpeace.org>>.

As the cases presented above have shown, in the recent years a shift has occurred from a “peripheral” and “uneasy” Turkey to a more central and involved one in the Middle East. Particularly in the post- September 11 context, Turkey began to present itself more actively as a mediator between Islamic and Western civilizations through its noteworthy efforts and projects, especially with regards to creating common platforms for both sides, while vigorously seeking to pursue a more constructive role in the region despite concurrent crises. However, occurrences such as Hamas’ visit to Turkey in February 2006 (immediately after its election victory in the Palestinian parliamentary elections) and its repercussions on international and local media have shown how Turkey fails to create effective dialogue mechanisms in matters related to its involvement in Middle Eastern affairs, and how Turkey lacks an ability to make itself fully understood by others. Again, contrary to the repeated claim of Turkey being a bridge between Europe and Asia, Western and Islamic civilizations, Turkey has not yet been able to fulfill this role of understanding both cultures, and hence having a unique role as interpreter of both.²⁰

One of the barriers for Turkey to pursue a constructive policy towards the Middle East is the fact that Turkey’s foreign and security policy is largely shaped by its internal politics as much as by international and regional dynamics – these include the domestic balance of power, civilian-military relations, identity and citizenship debates, elections and society’s political outlook. The way problems are handled within domestic politics highly affects Turkey’s relations with its neighbors. Occasionally, an introspective Turkey and the rising politics of nationalism and insecurity reinforce a hard-security approach, which prefers national security over human security, and prevents prospects for a more democratic foreign and security policy in the Middle East.

Towards a More Constructive Foreign Policy

Conditions emerging in the post-Cold War era, namely the advance of globalization, have changed trends in the world security agenda. The new definition emphasizes new security threats, such as economic and developmental threats, environmental pollution, ethnic conflicts, international migration, drug trafficking and smuggling, and some other problems regarding the threats aimed at the well-being of citizens. Such a broadened security agenda requires a more comprehensive security approach and policies, which transcend the narrow confines of hard security strategies that focus on military means. This new agenda further neces-

²⁰ Philip Robins, *Turkey and the Middle East*, New York, 1991, p. 14.

sitates the engagement of civil society, as well as international and local organizations in formulating security policies.

Having pointed out different trends and dynamics in Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East, Turkey needs to take into consideration this new security trend and re-think its policies accordingly. Such a policy re-formulation would perhaps require a more idealist approach in terms of foreign and security policy. The above analysis of Turkish foreign policy revealed that there is a two-fold strategy in Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East. There is a realist hard security approach prioritizing national security by all means, which is dominated by the view that “Turkey’s existence is always in jeopardy and has no friends but itself.”²¹ Recent developments, regarding the discussions of sending troops to northern Iraq fortify such a security-first logic. Public opinion, shaped by media and other means of socialization, can also help to support this line of thinking. The military’s role and civilians scoring badly in respecting the difficult balance between national security and human security are major obstacles to avoid this hard security approach. And then there is also the rather idealist approach based on attempts to foster mutual dialogue, diplomacy and economic, social and cultural relations. This approach, facilitated through AKP’s limited efforts, EU candidacy and other regional and international factors, is helpful in defining a

21 Meliha Altunışık, Turkey’s Iraq Policy: The War and Beyond, in: Journal of Contemporary European Studies, Vol. 14, No. 2, August 2006, p. 193.



Hans Bastian Hauck and Özge Genç during the Middle East panel

leading role for Turkey in regional affairs as a mediator between conflicting parties. Such a role necessitates Turkey to be more active in the region and engage in better political and economic relations and closer ties with the countries of the region. When this foreign policy took over, Turkey approached its neighbors as a reliable partner primarily through concrete projects aimed at assisting economic, social and political development. However, too much emphasis on being a political model for the countries of the Middle East (and even Central Asia and the Caucasus) has not proven to be very efficient.

Conclusion

To ensure the sustainability of the second approach in Turkish foreign policy, certain conditions have to be fulfilled. First, the hard security approach should be avoided in order to pursue a more democratic foreign and security policy. Second, decisions about foreign policy should be subject to truly deliberative discussions where Turkish parliament, civil society, and media take on more energetic efforts to monitor and control the policies.²² Third, Turkey should not abandon Europeanizing its foreign policy. A nationalist and inward looking Turkey has the potential to be an uncomfortable and peripheral neighbor to the Middle East. Fourth, Turkey should use its foreign policy to create more strategic communication platforms with groups in Iran, Palestine, Iraq, Syria and Lebanon, to express their wills and interests more effectively. Fifth, Turkey should prove its distinction by transferring its know-how commensurate with the specific needs of each country in the region, which may contribute to the advancing economic regional integration. Sixth, Turkey needs to start more credible and less ambivalent strategies for its actions in the Middle East. Turkey's communication strategy has proved to be mostly unsuccessful. In its economic and developmental relations, Turkey also needs to adopt effective dialogue mechanisms not necessarily through government to government communication; but instead through the interaction of NGOs in different fields such as women, children, education, rights movements, interest groups, and business association networks from both sides.

²² For further reading on the role of civil society in foreign policy making, see Gencer Özcan, Turkey's Changing Neighbourhood Policy (FES Briefing Paper), Istanbul, September 2004, p. 6, <<http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/50027.pdf>>.

ESDP Missions and European Union Mechanisms for Police Reform: The Cases of Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina

*Isabelle Maras*¹

Since the 1970s, the interdependency and consistency between security and development have been advanced in the European Union (EU), according to the paradigm: “Development needs security and security needs development.”² More recently, institutional underpinnings for inter-pillar civil-civil and civil-military cooperation have been developed progressively within the framework of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). 2007 reforms for EU external intervention instruments attest that the European Commission (EC) will improve the security-development nexus by reinforcing the linkages between Community activities endorsing a development-driven logic and ESDP-led activities motivated by external and security considerations.³ The EU has strengthened its support for security sector reform (SSR) through official communications the past years. As regards crisis management, all ESDP civil and military operations have focused in some manner on SSR-related activities, by addressing capacity- and institution-building issues, police and justice reform as well as border crisis management with the primary objective of political stabilization in post-conflict, development or transition situations.⁴ ESDP police missions in particular have been “at the forefront of the operationalization of the civilian component of ESDP” in contributing to improve collective and individual security towards best standards. Support to police reform is crucial to peace-building, eradication of poverty and the establishment of democratic standards, and makes a major tribute to the transition process from a disrupted society to a more developed country governed by the rule of law.⁵

A comprehensive and factual analysis of the practical interplay of the Council and Commission’s achievements in the field of police reform is still lacking. Thus the role-sharing between the Council and Commission, and subsequent “interface areas” regarding police reform as a core SSR component can be questioned. To



Isabelle Maras

1 The author would like to thank the participants and organizers of the 10th New Faces Conference in Madrid, Spain (5–7 November 2007), as well as Claire Craanen and Pierre Antille for their comments on the earlier version of this paper.

2 Isabelle Tannous, *Schnittstellen von Entwicklung und Sicherheit der EU Strategien und Mechanismen für mehr Politikohärenz* (Konzeptpapier, Bonn International Center for Conversion—BICC), Bonn, March 2007, p. 4.

3 Hans-Georg Ehrhart, *Sicherheit + Entwicklung = Frieden? Zur Rolle der Entwicklungspolitik der zivilen ESVP* (Konzeptpapier, BICC), Bonn, March 2007, p. 23.

4 Ehrhart, *op. cit.*, p. 25.

5 Michael Merlingen, *Rasa Ostrauskaitė, ESDP Police Missions: Meaning, Context and Operational Challenges*, in: *European Foreign Affairs Review*, Vol. 10, 2005, pp. 215–235, p. 219.

examine the possible shifts between policy statements and practice: How have the EU SSR-related activities been articulated and coordinated through ESDP missions and European Commission initiatives regarding police reform? And ultimately, to what extent is the European institutional interplay relevant in this field?

This paper provides an overview of the overlapping areas and of the resulting practical coherence characterizing Council and Community initiatives targeted at police reform in two Western Balkan countries; and thus aims to shed light on the relevance of both institutions' role-sharing in this field regarding the continuum binding short-term crisis management to long-term development.⁶ The first part of the article introduces police reform as part of the European approach towards SSR and its impact on the security-development nexus. The second part will focus on the cases of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) and Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), where ESDP police missions have been carried out simultaneously with police-related Community activities.

Role-Sharing and Coordination of EU-SSR Activities in Police Reform

Security Sector Reform: a Bridge-building Concept

Developed since the late 1990s, SSR can be defined as a process applied in post-conflict, developing or countries in transition, in which development is hampered by structural weaknesses in their security and justice sectors, often exacerbated by a lack of democratic oversight.⁷ Following the European Security Strategy (2003) and the Communication on Governance and Development (2003) which explicitly referred to SSR,⁸ both the EU Council and the European Commission have specified their approaches to SSR in two distinct but complementary documents: the EU Concept for ESDP Support to SSR (November 2005) developed by the Council, and the Concept for European Community Support for Security Sector Reform (May 2006).⁹ This latter document focuses on its responsibilities in the developing world and holds that SSR “is an important part of conflict prevention, peace building and democratization and contributes to sustainable

6 Annika Hansen, *Against all odds – The evolution of planning for ESDP operations: civilian crisis management from EUPM onwards*, Berlin 2006, p. 38.

7 Damien Helly, *Security Sector Reform: From Concept to Practice*, in: *European Security Review*, ISIS Europe, No. 31, December 2006, p. 1.

8 *European Security Strategy: A Secure Europe in a Better World*, December 2003; *European Commission Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and Social Committee, Governance and Development*, COM(2003) 615 final, 20 October 2003.

9 As a milestone for the definition of an inclusive SSR approach, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) guidelines developed by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) are the driving force behind the development of both EU concepts. See *OECD-DAC Guidelines: Helping Prevent Violent Conflict*, 2001; and *OECD, Security Reform and Governance, Policy and Practice, DAC Guidelines and Reference Series*, Paris 2004.

development.”¹⁰ Within the EU, SSR is fundamentally a cross-pillar issue cutting across EC and Council competencies.¹¹ A large number of EC activities therefore contribute directly or indirectly to security sector reform.¹² ESDP operations are in turn hardly separable from the whole range of Community instruments available on the external scene, with which they are led in parallel or combined.

Police Reform: a Core SSR Component to the Security-Development Nexus

The delineation of roles and competencies remains a contested issue within the EU.¹³ In the field of SSR and with regard to police reform in particular, both the Commission, in the context of its long-term approach to conflict prevention and crisis management, and the Council with its short-term ESDP operations are significant players. In the field of civilian crisis management,¹⁴ the European Council notably set the Civilian Headline Goal 2008 (CHG) calling for closer collaboration between the Council and the Commission, particularly with regards to planning and implementing ESDP missions.¹⁵ Ongoing discussions regarding crisis management capacities relate to where the “dividing line” between CFSP-ESDP actions and Community development cooperation should lie.

At the operational level, the ESDP police missions have greatly contributed to the Union’s growing ESDP civilian capacity with the number of personnel on the ground, but also by the number of ongoing missions.¹⁶ Some scholars have argued that the key objective pursued by these civilian ESDP operations is to contribute to reforming the security sector of war-torn countries and failed states in order to fight organized crime and establish adequate security conditions for sustainable peace.¹⁷ Since police reform directly impacts on the security

10 The more specific issue of Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) is addressed in a separate, but consistent way with the SSR concept. See Council of the European Union, *EU Concept for ESDP support to Security Sector Reform (SSR)*, November 2005; and *EU Concept for support to Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR)*, December 2006.

11 SSR requires a double legal basis: Articles 11 and 14 TUE for CFSP/ESDP joint actions, and Article 308 TEC for Community actions.

12 EC SSR activities are conducted through geographic and thematic programs. See European Commission, Directorate General for External Relations Supporting Peacebuilding. *An Overview of European Community Action*, Brussels, 1 June 2006, p. 8.

13 Catriona Gourlay, *Civil-Civil Co-ordination in EU crisis management*, in: Gourlay, Damien Helly, Isabelle Ioannides, Radek Khol, Agnieszka Nowak and Pedro Serrano, *Civilian crisis management: the EU way* (EU Institute for Security Studies, Chaillot Paper No. 90), Paris, June 2006, pp. 103–122.

14 See Göteborg European Council, *Presidency Conclusions*, Annex 1, 15/16 June 2001. Civilian management capacity was developed at the European Council of Feira in June 2000. Member States agreed on action in the area of policing as one of the four priority areas where the EU should play an active role. Following the adoption of a “Police Action Plan,” (Göteborg European Council, 2001), the European Council adopted the “Action Plan for Civilian Aspects of ESDP,” June 2004.

15 *Civilian Headline Goal 2008*, Council of the European Union, 15863/04, Brussels, 7 December 2004, para. 7.

16 Merlingen, *Ostrauskaitė*, op. cit. (fn. 5).

17 Grégory Mounier, *European Police Missions, From Security Sector Reform to Externalisation of International Security Beyond the Borders*, in: *HUMSEC Journal*, No. 1, 2007, pp. 47–64, pp. 49–50.

environment, the development of accountable behaviors among officers and of trust in security institutions by the citizens, and thus on the “redesigning of social order,”¹⁸ SSR also contributes to the development and transition process in post-conflict countries. The rationale for launching civilian ESDP operations mostly depends on the context and circumstances,¹⁹ with political will being the necessary preliminary condition. The different driving forces range from NGOs, through interested Member States and impulses from political institutions to the role of international organizations and demands emanating from third countries.²⁰

EU-led Police Reform in the Western Balkans

Highlighting the EU-led police reform initiatives implemented in the Western Balkans, particularly in Macedonia (FYROM) and Bosnia-Herzegovina helps provide “keys of understanding” to shed light on the EU inter-institutional role-sharing. In this area, police forces have been deeply involved in the conflict dynamics with distinct policy settings. Addressing their reform is pivotal to assisting sustainable peace dynamics and improving long-term stability. In the Western Balkans, both the Commission and ESDP operations—the police mission EUPM & the military operation EUFOR Althea (Bosnia-Herzegovina), the military mission Concordia & the Proxima police mission (FYROM)—focus on building institutions that guarantee “democracy, rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities.”²¹ The ESDP missions established in the Balkans have been closely related to the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP), thus paving the way towards a future EU accession of the Western Balkan countries.²²

The ESDP Police Mission Proxima in Macedonia (FYROM)

The completed ESDP police mission Proxima represents a kind of “test case” since EC activities have been simultaneously carried out to complement and follow-up the operation’s implementation and achievements. As a cornerstone of the FYROM’s pacification, the 2001 Ohrid Framework Agreement put an end to months of fighting between security forces, mainly composed of ethnic Macedonians and ethnic Albanian militia. In the aftermath, a EU Special Representa-

18 Marta Martinelli, *Helping Transition: The EU Police Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (EUPOL Kinshasa) in the Framework of EU Policy in the Great Lakes*, in: *European Foreign Affairs Review*, 11, Autumn 2006, pp. 379–400, p. 381.

19 According to the assertion “each EU engagement will have a unique character,” see European Union, GAERC, *External Relations*, 2728th Council Meeting, 90001/05 (Press 126), 2005; quoted in: Ehrhart, *op. cit.* (fn. 3), p. 27.

20 For European Council ESDP operations: <http://consilium.europa.eu/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id=268&lang=en&mcode=g>. This is also valid for ESDP military operations, resulting from international arrangements, such as EUFOR Althea in Bosnia-Herzegovina, or requests from third countries (operation CONCORDIA in the FYROM).

21 Heiner Hänggi and Fred Tanner, *Promoting Security Sector Governance in the EU’s Neighborhood*, (Chaillot Paper No. 80), Paris, July 2005, p. 28.

22 *Ibid.*, drawing on the call for “police reform, judicial reform and border security management”. See EU Crisis Response Capability Revisited (International Crisis Group, Europe Report No. 160), Brussels, 17 January 2005, p. 33.

tive (EUSR) was appointed to contribute to ensuring “the coherence of the EU external action” and “co-ordination of the international community’s efforts” in the country.²³

In line with the 2001 Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA), EC programs in Macedonia have striven to focus on long-term institution building projects.²⁴ Launched in 2003 as a follow-on mission to Concordia,²⁵ EUPOL Proxima’s mandate was primarily to advise local police on fighting organized crime and to promote European policing standards, thus involving the support to various elements of the police reform process.²⁶ EU efforts towards the reform of the Macedonian police have been pursued along a “dual track” approach: the EC has provided assistance to the long-term structural changes in the Ministry of Interior (MoI) and the police to encourage institutional development, according to the SAP, while the completed EUPOL-Proxima coped with “urgent needs” in support of the Framework agreement.²⁷ Regarding the coordination of these “interface areas,” the 2005 EC programs in the sectors of police and fight against crime were expected to form a continuation of former activities, complementing and enhancing interventions under earlier Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilization (CARDS) programs.²⁸ Similarly, in the area of JHA, the CARDS program on police reform should explicitly reinforce the work of the Proxima police mission operating at that time in the country.

Despite comprehensive meetings,²⁹ EU inter-institutional organization experienced difficulties mostly due to the competition between EU entities in the field. The transfer of institution-building projects from the EC Delegation to the

23 Ioannides, *EU Police Mission Proxima: testing the “European” approach to building peace*, in: Gourlay, Helly, Ioannides et al., *op. cit.* (fn. 13), p. 70.

24 After the 2001 crisis, the EC used for the first time the Rapid Reaction Mechanism (programs on police reform) and had recourse to the CARDS Emergency Assistance Programme, and then the Police Reform Project (ECPRP) was carried out. See European Commission Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management Unit, *Rapid Reaction Mechanism End of Programme Report Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia*, June 2004; and *Annual Action Programme for 2005 for Community Assistance to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia*, Skopje, EAR, 2005.

25 CONCORDIA aimed to further contribute to a stable secure environment and to allow the implementation of the August 2001 Ohrid Framework Agreement (with use of NATO assets and capabilities). See Council Joint Action 2003/92/CFSP, 27 January 2003, for the establishment of Concordia, duration: 31/03/2003–31/09/2003; extended 31/09/2003–15/12/2003.

26 Such as the consolidation of law and order, fight against organized crime and the creation of a border police. See Council Joint Action 2003/681/CFSP, 29 September 2003, for the establishment of EUPOL Proxima – European Union Police Mission in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, duration: 15/12/2003–14/12/2004; extended from 15/12/2004–14/12/2005 with an emphasis on more operational needs.

27 Ioannides, *op. cit.* (fn. 23), p. 71.

28 European Commission, *Annex of the Annual Action Programme for 2005 for Community Assistance to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia*, p. 26.

29 It took the form of weekly informal coordination meetings among EU institutions, chaired by the EUSR and gathering the EU Presidency and the Heads of the EC Delegation, the EAR, Proxima and the EUMM office in Skopje. See Ioannides, *op. cit.* (fn. 23), p. 77.

European Agency for Reconstruction (EAR), the EC's fear to lose its competencies on the external scene, as well as its difficulties to recruit police officers for its missions, might explain this atmosphere of rivalry.³⁰ However, the double-hatted EUSR and Head of Delegation in the FYROM has been "instrumental in smoothing all the coordination process" since November 2005.³¹ Furthermore, the "dual-track" approach endorsed by the EU in its police reform efforts might have created confusion among the Macedonian authorities and population about the "very nature" of the Proxima operation that sustained the Commission's long-term police reform in an operational way.³²

The European Council was conscious of the need for a lasting EU presence in the FYROM, and assistance to police reform as well as further activities in the SSR were pursued through Community activities and programs.³³ In mid-December 2005, the EU Police Advisory Team (EUPAT)³⁴ concretely bridged the gap between the termination of the Proxima police mission and the launch of the European Community field level project.³⁵ With a number of difficulties partially overcome, lessons learned driven from the Proxima experience in relation to EC activities in police reform can provide useful insights for current and future crisis management operations. The mission highlighted the benefits of such an ESDP operation, for instance through professionalism, presence on the ground of EU police officers and faster set-up of the mission by the Council. Nonetheless, the question remains of how capability can be mobilized in order to "maximize its effectiveness."³⁶

The ESDP Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH)

After the 1995 Dayton agreement that put an end to the ethno-religious conflicts in the early 1990s, EU intervention in BiH has developed in a context of post-conflict transition. ESDP military and civilian operations were deployed in a mul-

30 A 2004 evaluation of the EAR advances that the Agency model is questioned because of "unclear interpretation of the division of roles and difficult co-ordination between the Agency, on the one hand, and the Commission and the Delegation on the other hand." See Evaluation of the Implementation of Council Regulation 2667/2000 on the EAR, Vol. 1-Part C, Main Evaluation Report, June 2004, p. 57; see Ioannides, *op. cit.* (fn. 23), p. 78.

31 Interview by the author with a representative of the EC Delegation in Skopje, 15 October 2007. Mr. Erwan Fouéré was simultaneously appointed by the Council and Commission, as the first ever joint representative of the two EU institutions.

32 Ioannides, *op. cit.* (fn. 23), p. 81. The notion of EU "crisis management" and its implementation was questioned.

33 *Ibid.* (fn. 23), p. 83. Following a FYROM government's request, a twinning project was launched by the EC in October 2005, with a Member State's team being located within the MoI.

34 EUPAT was a smaller mission including around 30 police advisors and set up a monthly "consultation mechanism," see Council Joint Action 2005/826/CFSP, 24 November 2005, for the establishment of an EU Police Advisory Team – EUPAT, duration: 15/12/2005–14/06/2006.

35 The crucial importance of the CARDS follow-up after the end of ESDP missions was further emphasized in the 2006 Progress Report. See Commission Staff Working Document, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 2006 Progress Report, COM (2006) 649 final, 8 November 2006, p. 5.

36 On how to hand over missions (from Concordia to Proxima for example), to plan and set-up a mission, the need for joint Commission-Council fact-finding missions, and the use of benchmarking for assessing achievements and progress, see Ioannides, *op. cit.* (fn. 23), p. 85.

tilateral context, first through the initial ESDP police mission (EUPM) launched in January 2003, and then with the largest ESDP military mission to date, the Operation Althea in 2004. Negotiations on a Stabilization and Association Agreement began between BiH and the European Union in November 2005.

An important milestone in the peace process, the Peace Implementation Council (PIC) Conference in Bonn (December 1997) requested the High Representative to urge public officials to respect their legal commitments to the Dayton Peace Agreement while imposing laws.³⁷ In February 2002, the EU General Affairs Council (GAC) appointed the High Representative (HR) and EUSR in BiH. The HR/EUSR provides an overview of the range of activities carried out in the field of the rule of law. From the Dayton Peace Agreement derives the sharing of most competencies to the two entities, the Republika Srpska (RS) and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH).

The EU Police Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina (EUPM) was the first ESDP mission in the Western Balkans and took over from the United Nation's International Police Task Force (IPTF) mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 2003.³⁸ The

37 The governing principle of domestic responsibility characterizes the Office of the High Representative's engagement in BiH, see Office of the High Representative and EU Special Representative, <http://www.ohr.int/ohr-info/gen-info/default.asp?content_id=38612>.

38 See Council Joint Action 2002/210/CFSP, 11 March 2002 for the establishment of EUPM, duration: 01/01/2003–31/12/2005; extended from 01/01/2006–31/12/2007 and significantly reduced in size.



Isabelle Maras examines the European Union's activities in Security Sector Reform

EUPM's initial mandate was to monitor, mentor and inspect the Bosnian police forces with special emphasis on developing management capabilities at the mid to senior level in accordance with best European and international practice. Following its foreseeable extension, the mission has recently had an explicit focus on police reform and the fight against organized crime.

Along the EUPM's mandate, the European Commission has supported progress with the aim to establish a unified and centralized police in BiH, pursuing this goal according to three principles: transferring all the legislative and budgetary powers at state level (separate entities still exist); establishing mechanisms to impede interferences with the operational level; creating local zones (policy districts).³⁹ Previous CARDS assistance focused on "training of police officers at all levels in management and investigation techniques [...] in close co-ordination with EUPM," while recent assistance has specifically focused on supporting measures set out in the BiH's Action Plan to fight organized crime, according to the recent 2005-2006 Multi Annual Indicative Program (MIP).⁴⁰ Since 2007, the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA) replaced CARDS and covers 2007-2013.⁴¹

With regard to police reform in BiH as a core SSR component,⁴² the European inter-pillar coordination has proved to be quite well articulated.⁴³ In spite of joint efforts, there has been significant but limited progress in police reform, mostly due to domestic political reasons, according to an EC representative.⁴⁴ The slow path for police reform seems to be confirmed by recent news. In summer 2007, the political leaders of SBiH (Party for Bosnia and Herzegovina), and SNSD (Alliance of Independent Social Democrats, Republika Srpska) refused to sign an agreement on police reform. This led the HR/EUSR to warn the BiH leaders that without significant progress, the EU would be unable to conclude a Stabilization and Association Agreement with Bosnia and Herzegovina.⁴⁵

39 Interview by the author with a representative of DG Enlargement (EC), 21 October 2007.

40 CARDS regional programme will complement assistance provided under the MIP, in particular with training and fostering regional police cooperation. See CARDS Assistance to Bosnia and Herzegovina: Multi-annual Indicative Programme 2005-6, p. 6; and Bosnia-Herzegovina Country Strategy Paper 2002-2006, p. 18, <http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/key_documents/cards_reports_and_publications_en.htm>.

41 The Multi-annual Indicative Planning Document (MIPD) 2007-2009 is the main strategic planning document for assistance to BiH in the framework of IPA (EUR 226 million for the period 2007-2009).

42 In SSR, the community assistance under IPA will continue to help consolidate the rule of law, human rights, public administration reform and the improvement of the overall functioning of the judiciary in BiH. In addition to CARDS, IPA and EIDHR assistance, Community funds support the EU Police Mission, the Office of the High Representative, the EU Monitoring Mission and the EU Special Representative, <http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/financial_assistance/cards/bilateral_cooperation/bosnia-and-herzegovina_en.htm>.

43 The co-location of European Commission staff working on joint EU CARDS-EUPM projects significantly facilitated the coordination and division of labour with regard to the follow-on mission in BiH, see Hansen, *op. cit.* (fn. 6), p. 41.

44 Interview by the author with a representative of DG Enlargement (EC), 21 October 2007.

45 BiH could thus be far behind its neighbors in the EU integration process. See Lajčák, There is no alternative to achieving progress in BiH, Press release, OHR/EUSR, 11 September 2007.

Lessons Learned: An ESDP Mission in Kosovo?

Depending on the current political developments regarding the province's status, a future civilian mission to Kosovo is likely to form "a major test case for the EU's adolescent foreign and security policy."⁴⁶ The EU's much-criticized "political vacuum" during the 1999 Kosovo crisis constituted a major incentive for the subsequent development of the ESDP. In this regard, there seems to be the proper momentum to capitalize on previous missions conducted in police reform, notably those undertaken in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia, while integrating the overall regional perspective in devising a more consistent policy.⁴⁷ Several major issues might indeed come out from the status talks.⁴⁸ Some analysts consider cross-pillar coordination in Kosovo "crucial for a well planned transition from the shorter-term ESDP mission to the longer-term measures pursued by the Commission."⁴⁹ A number of issues drawn from previous and ongoing police ESDP missions have been raised by scholars and could be taken into account in the current context, namely a more accurate definition of the "kind of policy product" the EU wishes to offer, the improvement of recruitment, professionalism and accountability of police officers in order to comply with the missions' statements, the need to address the shift between the missions' achievements and their original purpose of crisis management and the development of genuine local ownership of the reforms undertaken.⁵⁰

Conclusion

The current European discourse on SSR endorses "a renewed willingness to integrate the model into its security and development programmes" and repeats calls for inter-pillar coherence, but institutional mechanisms needed for implementation are still lacking.⁵¹ The EU's biggest challenge in SSR is to translate its theoretical discourse and tools into a "coherent and co-ordinated practice" for

46 Thomas Zehetner, *Waiting in the Wings – The Civilian ESDP mission in Kosovo*, in: *European Security Review*, ISIS Europe, No. 33, May 2007, pp. 4–7, p. 4.

47 In post-status settlement Kosovo, the EU's role will be two-fold: it will contribute to the future International Civilian Office (ICO) in Kosovo, led by an International Civilian representative, "double-hatted" as EU Special representative (ICR/EUSR); and will deploy an ESDP mission in the broader field of the rule of law (police, judiciary, customs and correctional services). See European Union Factsheet, *Preparing for a future international and EU presence in Kosovo*, May 2007.

48 Similar to most conditions the ESDP mission in BiH had to cope with the overall project for further democratization in Kosovo, the state of ethnic divisions, and minority positions. See Milan Sekuloski, *A New EU Mission to Kosovo: Political Context*, in: *European Security Review*, ISIS Europe, No. 29, June 2006, pp. 3–6.

49 Zehetner, *op. cit.* (fn. 46), p. 5.

50 Dominique Orsini, *Future of ESDP: Lessons from Bosnia*, in: *European Security Review*, ISIS Europe, Special Kosovo edition, No. 29, June 2006, pp. 1–12; and Reinhardt Rummel, *Krisenintervention der EU mit Polizeikräften (SWP-Studie 2005/S22)*, Berlin, August 2005.

51 Mark Sedra, *European Approaches to Security Sector Reform: Examining Trends through the Lens of Afghanistan*, in: *European Security*, Vol. 15, No. 3, September 2006, pp. 323–338.

more effective European engagement in developing and transition countries.⁵² The Council's conclusions on security and development recently reaffirmed the paradigm, highlighting the complementary nature of the nexus. Identifying SSR as an area where "pragmatic actions" will be undertaken, the document calls for in-depth and experience-based analysis to find ways to better sequence and coordinate EU activities.⁵³ Far from being exhaustive and to be completed by extensive field research, this contribution first emphasizes that any thorough analysis of EU initiatives implemented in the field of SSR, a fortiori concerning police reform, implies that case studies be carefully observed according to their respective context and distinct political "reading grid." Indeed, the overall picture of the European role sharing appears mitigated and deserves nuances. The EU has also made tremendous efforts in the field of SSR towards better-coordinated and goal-oriented achievements through ESDP operations and EC activities. This has led to substantial progress and valuable outcomes in the field of police reform, impacting in turn on security settings and social order, thus contributing to the overall capacity- and institution-building as well as development in target countries. The FYROM is exemplary of successful hand-over phases from ESDP police operations to community follow-up regarding police reform. But much progress remains to be achieved to overcome crucial challenges facing the ESDP. The elaboration of a consistent police reform concept in the framework of the EU civilian crisis management policy, for instance, could streamline reform-related activities undertaken by the European Union and positively impact on institutional coordination between EU security and development actors.

52 Safer World/International Alert, *Developing a common security sector reform strategy for the EU*, Post-seminar paper, November 2005.

53 Council of the European Union, *Council Conclusions on Security and Development*, 2831st External Relations Council Meeting, Brussels, 19/20 November 2007.

The Western Balkans and Sustainable Security

Tomislav Ivančić

Security and development are deeply intertwined in the politics of the Western Balkans. The era of security seems to have passed and a new epoch of peace and development has begun to rise from the rubble of the wars in the former Yugoslavia. Naturally, development has played an important role since the 1990s, but it would be a mistake to state that the progression from security to development has been stable and linear. With the exception of European Union (EU) Member State candidate, Croatia, which is the Western Balkans country with the most notable transformations in politics, the rest of the countries in the region still largely suffer from insecurity and thus are unable to progress towards sustainable development. Accordingly, the EU cannot avoid analyzing the problems between security and development in the Western Balkans, for it has taken a central role in trying to entice progress through the possibility of eventual membership. In true European spirit, the EU visibly strives to maintain order in the region through the strategies on which it based itself after World War II. But the problems of the Western Balkans have proven to be much more resilient. Since the 1990s, the political turmoil has been frozen and concrete solutions have yet to be devised. The key factor interconnecting all countries in the Western Balkans is their large dependence on the stability and development of their neighbors (and their ethnic groups) in order to attain security. And as such, analyzing the ebb and flow of stability in the Western Balkans, investigating the conceptualization of the Western Balkans as a region, examining European development instruments / initiatives, and current realities in Kosovo, Serbia and Bosnia, all highlight the fact that the true nexus between security and development can only be achieved once outstanding problems are addressed.

De-Coding the Western Balkans

In exploring the security-development nexus, it is important to assess the underpinnings of the Western Balkans as a concept. To the average onlooker, there is little difference in a Balkans or a Western Balkans, yet this is far from the current reality of the region. The former represents an antiquated area including Greece, Bulgaria, Slovenia and at times, Romania and Turkey; the latter is a contemporary term, which is fixed to a select group of former Yugoslav republics, less Slovenia and with the addition of Albania. Regardless of whether the intention of creating a new, recreated space was a conscious or unconscious decision, it was nonethe-



Tomislav Ivančić

less defined and nourished by external international actors for the stabilization of the region and the implementation of development initiatives.¹

Tracing its first usage in political dialogue, the Western Balkans as a regional concept first grew from the threat of a third war in the former Yugoslavia. The US-EU Statement on Cooperation in the Western Balkans (1998) marked a turning point in foreign policy, alleviating US efforts in the area and making way for a new European “cooperative” approach to security and development. The statement illustrated that “the political, civil and economic instability of the Western Balkans... threatens peace and prosperity in all South-Eastern Europe and poses serious challenges across Europe and beyond.” The communiqué further stresses a European effort to securitize the region through its respective strategies.² The re-categorization of the Balkans transpired when Europe was beginning to develop as a joint political actor, thus consolidating the “Western Balkans” concept at the US-EU Summit, only months after the EU’s declaration of a new Regional Approach in South-Eastern Europe (1997).

Slovenia? Bulgaria? Romania? Balkan, but not as Western Balkan as Albania

An interesting twist to external decisions to build upon regional security was the conscious exclusion of Slovenia, Bulgaria and Romania from the Western Balkans puzzle. Owing to their previous political agreements with Brussels and Washington, the triad managed to escape the region amid external efforts to stabilize the Balkans. Slovenia had managed to elude the Western Balkans brand through a new political categorization once it jump-started EU negotiations with its membership application in 1996, a Europe Agreement in 1997 and its relative stability among instability. Hence, Slovenia evaded a regional political label and became disassociated with its aforementioned (Western) Balkans counterparts. The heartland of the Balkans, namely Bulgaria, also escaped a connection to a European Western Balkans, along with its associate Romania.³ Having had long-standing relations and previous agreements with the EU, an association with the Regional Approach and the politicized Western Balkans would not have been appropriate as it would have downgraded or dismissed their previous connectivity to Brussels through regionalization. Lastly, associated to Brussels through PHARE (1992), Albania was segregated significantly from the EU and was an

1 Most commonly used by the European Union and the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe (among others), the Western Balkans are politically fixed to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, Croatia, Macedonia and Albania.

2 Joint Statement on Cooperation in the Western Balkans, US-EU Summit 1998, Washington 1998, <<http://www.useu.be/TransAtlantic/US-EU%20Summits/Dec1898USEUSummitWashington.html>>

3 Bulgaria and Romania both began their associations with the European Economic Community in May 1990 by signing up for PHARE support. Subsequent developments included Europe Agreements (1993), application for membership (1995), beginning of negotiations (1999/2000), ratification of the Accession Treaty (2005) and accession in 2007.

obvious target for becoming part of the Western Balkans. Therefore, it is debatable whether the Western Balkans were in fact created to be escaped, as graduation from this externally created region would mean eventual de-Balkanization through Europeanization.

The Balkan as Other: Explaining the Western Balkans through a Theoretical Lens

In addition to the chain of events, which created a new Western Balkans, theory is also extremely relevant in explaining why a re-classification has transpired on the region. The aforementioned “graduation” from the (Western) Balkans signifies an external, or top-down social understanding of what the Balkans represent in Europe. As an area commonly understood as backwards, hostile, and on the margins of European civilization, recent European and international initiatives have clearly sought to instigate security and de-Balkanize the negation of the Balkans. Notwithstanding, even if the Western Balkans fall within the geopolitical boundaries of the European continent, their external perceptions are clearly in opposition to what is deemed as European, both in political and social terms, and are evidently marked in an Orientalist framework. Reiterating the notions of Edward Said in *Orientalism* (1978), the Balkans have regularly been deemed as “other” within the notions of civilization, akin to other peoples designated as inferior in global power politics. Edward Said writes: “Along with other peoples variously designated as backward, degenerate, uncivilized, and retarded, the Orientals were [and are] viewed in a framework constructed out of biological determinism and moral-political admonishment. The Oriental [...] is thus linked to elements in Western society (delinquents, the insane, women, the poor) having in common an identity best described as lamentably alien. Orientals were rarely seen or looked at; they were seen through, analyzed not as citizens, or even people, but as problems to be solved or confined or [...] taken over.”⁴

The Balkans and the Orient are two overlapping, parallel concepts through their common inferiority in relation to the West. The inability of a peaceful divorce in Yugoslavia reinforced negative connotations of the area, a situation that was displayed in external political dialogue and its foreign policy.

A plethora of negative, often generalized Balkan comments were commonly portrayed by external political leaders, which inevitably reinforced sentiments of otherness. This includes former British Shadow Defence Secretary David Clark (who failed to declare government expenses during a four day, all expense paid gathering with war criminal Radovan Karadžić at the Richemond Hotel in

⁴ Edward Said, *Orientalism*, New York 1978, p. 207.

Geneva in 1993), who was, as an anti-interventionist in the wars of the former Yugoslavia, insisting on “treating it as a civil war between barbarians.”⁵ This is followed by more ‘subtle’ comments of otherness, including that of Sir Peter Hall, former British Ambassador to Belgrade, who expressed the following to former Prime Minister John Major in 1991: “Prime Minister, the first thing you have to know about these people is that they like going around cutting each other’s heads off.”⁶ These few statements are clearly not representative of all international actors during the war in the former Yugoslavia, but do represent aspects of how the West viewed the Balkans. Said’s notions of otherness and barbarism were thus as visible and relevant in the Balkans during the 1990s, as they were during colonial times in Asia and Africa.⁷ What is interesting is the concerted European and international efforts to restructure these observations of the Balkans as alien, or other. After a history of negation, the powers of discourse and deconstruction have been used in power politics to try and refurbish the connotations of the Balkans through an alternative classification of a Western Balkans.

European Instruments for Security and Development

Moving from an internationally coordinated security and development force, the shift to European administration has resulted in piecemeal strategies trying to pull the Western Balkans out of their turmoil. Following the short-lived Regional Approach (1997) mentioned above, a more solidified endeavor was established with the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP) in 1999. The SAP strengthened the targeted approach of dealing with the Western Balkans “five” as a regional strategy,⁸ but was also designed as a more interactive policy, offering each country preferential trade agreements and assistance, financial and otherwise, to promote democratization, institution-building and political dialogue. More precisely, within the SAP structure, contractual relations with the EU were designed to help stabilize the Western Balkans by:

1. Associating them with European Integration
2. Improving existing economic and trade relations between the EU and those countries
3. Helping advance democratization, the development of civil society, education and the establishment of institutions
4. Establishing cooperation in as many areas as possible, including justice and home affairs

5 Tom Gallagher, *The Balkans after the Cold War: from Tyranny to Tragedy*, London 2003, p. 151.

6 *Ibid.*, p. 45.

7 See Said, *op. cit.*, and for a Balkan perspective on Orientalism, Maria Todorova, *Imagining the Balkans* (1997).

8 Now six with the addition of Montenegro.

5. Establishing political dialogue, including the political dialogue on the regional level.⁹

To maintain a step-by-step process, the EU introduced a Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA), which signaled significant domestic development, paving the way for the possibility of becoming a candidate member for accession.¹⁰ In return, each Western Balkans country is obliged to agree on a package of EU measures designed to induce widespread political, economic and institutional reform. The SAA, as the highest point in approaching the EU institutionally, would give the targeted countries the status of an associate EU member.

In a region with deeply divided societies, which only recently had emerged from war, the SAP lacked a concrete goal (or “carrot”), which could activate sustainable security and cordiality between often unfriendly neighbors. Not until the Thessaloniki Agenda of 2003 did the SAP / SAA gain significant momentum in instigating change in the Western Balkans, where member states clearly reiterated “unequivocal support to the European perspective of the Western Balkan countries [...] encouraging them to prepare for integration into the European structures and ultimate membership into the European Union.”¹¹ The Thessaloniki Agenda not only marked a European promise for the Western Balkans, but it also gave Brussels a considerable amount of weight to prompt domestic change, reform, regional security and cooperation. Once the respective countries of the Western Balkans were provided with an impetus for change, cooperation became possible, even if domestically unfavorable.

EU membership was and still remains largely organized around the principle of conditionality. For the Western Balkans, the scrutiny and demands from Brussels are immensely more intense than what was seen with previous enlargements, including that of the EU10.¹² Nevertheless, it would be incorrect to state that conditions are ill founded or should not be applied, for it can be a very constructive device if used properly. In its 2005 Enlargement Strategy Paper, the Commission highlighted the importance of conditionality, illustrating that “Enlargement policy needs to demonstrate its power of transformation in a region where states

9 Multilateral Relations, Stabilization and Association Process, Croatian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration, <<http://www.mvp.hr/MVP.asp?pcpid=1287>>.

10 Directorate-General Enlargement, Stabilization and Association Process (SAP) Serbia and Montenegro, in: Europa Online, <http://ec.europa.eu/comm/enlargement/serbia_montenegro/serbia_montenegro_eu_relations.htm>.

11 The Thessaloniki Agenda for the Western Balkans: Moving Towards European Integration, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/gena/76201/pdf>.

12 This refers to a wide array of issues, including the recognition of a Macedonian minority in Greece, the Cyprus issue, corruption in Romania and Bulgaria, amid numerous other situations that were overlooked in previous conditionality enlargement strategies.

are weak and societies divided. A convincing political perspective for eventual integration into the EU is crucial to keep their reforms on track. But it is equally clear that these countries can join when they have met the criteria in full.”¹³

Hence, in order to become part of the club, the Western Balkans must (understandably) prove that they are respected members of the European and international communities through a series of reforms. Rightly so, the conditionality clause has prompted the arrest of several War Criminals, instigated revolutionary reforms in some countries and has been quite successful. However, while some such as Croatia, Macedonia and Montenegro have begun the reform process, others such as Serbia / Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina have seen some advancement, but the prospect of EU membership has not taken hold owing to severe internal divisions.

Current Realities: Security vs. Development

The case of the Western Balkans is one in which the lines between security and development have been significantly blurred, even if the bloodshed has ended. Frozen instability is characteristic of this region where wars have been glossed over by European instruments or peacekeeping forces that have not solved the ultimate root of tensions. Of course, it is clear that some in the Western Balkans have greatly benefited from EU influence. Examples such as Croatia, Macedonia and even Montenegro demonstrate that institutions are becoming stronger, human rights are being addressed and development has emerged in these select countries of the region. However, while EU strategies have sought to boost national economies and regional connectivity, they have not outwardly addressed the fundamental issues of ethnic division and sustainable security. The temporary “band-aid” initiatives implemented by international and European actors as a means to halt bloodshed have done precisely this, yet they have not managed to solve the root of the problems. Glazing over the reality of regional insecurity has been the common characteristic of interplay in which Brussels seeks to thwart violence in the Western Balkans while also having the capacity to reinitiate instability with one wrong decision. The following excerpts will briefly touch upon the state of affairs in Kosovo, Serbia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, highlighting their problems with EU or internationally administered security plans.

Firstly, factors for instability are important to take into consideration when analyzing the current reality in the Western Balkans. While the respective countries are extremely different in regards to levels of progress and security, Leeda

¹³ Enlargement Strategy Paper 2005, Communication from the Commission, 9 November 2005, COM (2005), 561 final.

Demetropoulou defines the commonalities which some in the Western Balkans share in socio-political culture, outlining their confining conditions in their path towards stability, democratization and EU membership.¹⁴ Even if these notions do not apply equally to each country for an analysis of security-development, they are useful for the novice of the Western Balkans to overview some of the institutional and social problems which plague progress.

Kosovo/Kosova

A peril to the image of European competency as an international actor, global defense, regional progression and a current source of Serbian nationalism, the Kosovo situation is one, which jeopardizes myriad levels of security. For Serbia, this small region represents its historical civilization, maintains its international rights of sovereignty and continues to highlight the fact that Kosovo had never been an independent entity in the history of the region. To Serbs, the thought of loosing its cradle of identification is unbearable, not least the psychological difficulty that Serbian citizens have experienced in reluctantly accepting the demise of Yugoslavia, where Serbia held a position of ascendancy among other republics. In contrast, the Kosovar Albanians are estimated as comprising 90 percent of

¹⁴ For a full description of confining conditions in the Balkans, see Leeda Demetropoulou, Europe and the Balkans: Membership Aspirations, EU Involvement and Europeanization Capacity in South Eastern Europe, in: Southeast European Politics, Vol. III, No. 2–3, London 2002, p. 91.



Tomislav Ivančić questions the concept of the Western Balkans

Kosovo, outnumbering Serbian claims and still scarred from the attempted ethnic cleansing by Serbian forces.

EU Member States are divided as to their approach to Kosovo: accepting its independence could likely unearth dangerous messages in their own respective domestic bids for independence, including Spain and France, among others. To decide the future of Kosovo is to open a Pandora's box of European problems, which is why almost a decade has passed without a concrete European conclusion. The European Commission has constantly played the safety line and indicated that the question of Kosovo is an internal one, where final decisions must emanate from Serbia or Kosovo: "Progress in the Western Balkans towards a future in the European Union includes the implementation of the future status settlement for Kosovo. A positive outcome is also key to a significant improvement in Serbia's progress on its path to the EU."¹⁵

The final decisions for the status of Kosovo will be external, with forced internal acceptance, regardless of the outcome. The international community (or UN) has been mediating for years and the Martii Ahtisaari (UN Special Envoy to Kosovo) Plan for a settlement was announced in 2007, but neither has done much in terms of resolving the frozen conflict. The EU inability to manage or administer the Kosovo situation¹⁶ questions its acting power as a regional overseer and global player. Accordingly, many Western Balkans countries rely on a decision for Kosovo in order to secure their own respective sustainable progress.¹⁷ While Brussels and Washington have put off the Kosovo issue for years, its citizens have been living in limbo and pondering their futures, in addition to the fact that the neighboring countries are stagnated and tied to its future stability. The nexus between security and development in Kosovo is essentially non-existent, considering that security has yet to be addressed by external actors and a consensus has not been reached among domestic players in Serbia or Kosovo. And without security, development is relative and only piecemeal.

Serbia/Srbija

Striving to maintain political order, the Republic of Serbia is arguably the furthest behind on the path to European integration. High levels of nationalism within domestic politics, corruption and economic underdevelopment place Serbia in a dangerous position, which may possibly control the security of the entire re-

¹⁵ Annual Policy Strategy 2008, European Commission, <http://ec.europa.eu/atwork/synthesis/doc/aps_2008_en.pdf>.

¹⁶ As the only international force left in the region, Kosovo has been under UN administration since the conflict in 1999.

¹⁷ Refugee flows from Kosovo to neighboring countries remains a matter of high security primarily in Macedonia, but also in Montenegro and Serbia.

gion. With regards to its on-and-off relationship with the EU, Serbia was given an Enhanced Partnership Dialogue (EPD) with the EU in 2004, which aimed to encourage and monitor reforms on the basis of European Partnership. Owing to the fact that the dispute with Kosovo prevented Serbia from completing the SAP process, it was the closest type of agreement which the EU could provide and maintain some form of official ties with Serbia and gain from conditionality. Unfortunately, the unwillingness of the Serbian Government to assist in capturing war criminals Ratko Mladić and Radovan Karadžić, and cooperate with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), was cause for suspending talks of concluding an eventual SAA with the EU. In its Annual Progress Report (November 2006), the Commission highlighted many problem areas in Serbian progress, particularly with the new Constitution, which did little for the case of Kosovo, while corruption, bankruptcy and privatization were other key stagnating factors inhibiting proper development.¹⁸

Not surprisingly, the European perspective within Serbia is relatively bleak. To Serbs, the cost of entering into the EU would mean losing its sovereignty over Kosovo, and the EU itself is not very popular in Serbia. Serbia recently held parliamentary elections, in which the ultra-nationalist Serbian Radical Party won the greatest share of the vote. Its leader, Vojislav Šešelj, is on trial before the ICTY.¹⁹ In further delineating the state of internal disorder in Serbia, parliamentarians elected Tomislav Nikolić, the interim leader of the Serbian Radical Party as long as Šešelj is on trial, as Speaker of the Serbian Parliament in May 2007. On his second day as Speaker of Parliament, Nikolić met with Russian Ambassador Aleksandr Alekseyev and later presented a speech to Parliament in which he advocated making Serbia a part of a Belarus-Russia super-state, presenting the idea that Serbs would “stand up against the hegemony of America and the European Union.”²⁰ Being offered more stick than carrot, many Serbs feel cheated from the EU, and the West should indeed prepare for the possibility of Serbia turning increasingly away from Europe and more towards Moscow. Under Serbia’s current government, the EU’s strategy of using the prospect of integration and accession is highly problematic and seemingly ineffectual. The EU and US have lost sub-

18 Key findings of the progress reports on Kosovo and the potential candidate countries: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Serbia, MEMO/06/412, Brussels, 8 November 2006, <<http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/06/412&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en>>.

19 Radical in Name Only – Serbia’s Election, in: *The Economist*, 27 January 2007.

20 Serbian Parliament Speaker Calls for Closer Russia Ties, in: *Radio Free Europe*, 9 May 2007. Nikolić resigned from Parliament on May 13, 2007, after the Democratic Party and the Democratic Party of Serbia formed a preliminary alliance in preparation for a coalition government. Nikolić told the Democratic parties that if they “peacefully accept” the independence of Kosovo the Radical Party “will not sit calmly and wait.”

stantial leverage through repeated concessions and now have even fewer policy tools than before to influence Belgrade.²¹

Bosnia and Herzegovina/Bosna i Hercegovina

Significantly more stable than either Serbia or Kosovo, Bosnia sits on a two-throne chair. On one side is Sarajevo, seated as the capital of the Federation, in which Bosnian Croats and Bosniaks primarily reside,²² on the other is Banja Luka, the seat of the Republika Srpska, an entity primarily composed of Bosnian Serbs (with substantial Bosniak communities).²³ These divisions result from the Dayton Peace Accords, which managed to generate peace, but maintained ethnic division through territorialization. This divided country has become a European problem, where the international presence has been ceded to Brussels. The EU, for instance, has taken over the police monitoring mission, now called the EUPM, as well as the NATO force, now called EUFOR, and can be called the most “European” of the Western Balkans by administrative default. Additionally, the internationally implemented Office of the High Representative (OHR)²⁴ will hand its mandate to the EU Special Representative (EUSR) in 2008. The task for the EU is difficult, as it must carry through the peace implementation, facilitate resolution of conflicts between sides and push hard for new laws and other state building steps.

Complicating matters, the looming decision on the Kosovo status will test the very fabric of the Bosnian state. Milorad Dodik, Prime Minister of the Republika Srpska (RS),²⁵ and the Serbian Premier Vojislav Kostunica, have exploited the prospect of Kosovo’s independence to stoke separatist sentiments. Dodik’s threat to call a referendum on RS’s status if Kosovo becomes independent has increased tension with the (Bosniak-Croat) Federation.²⁶ An increasingly assertive Dodik is openly challenging international authority to oversee the implementation of Dayton and the construction of viable state-level institutions. The EU aims at minimal strategies towards reunifying the divided country, most recently by trying to push for a unified police force, which is currently split in two: one comprising of Bosniaks and Croats in the Federation, and the other of Bosnian Serbs in the

21 Serbia’s New Government: Turning From Europe, International Crisis Group, Europe Briefing, No. 46, 31 May 2007.

22 Bosniak is a term, which emerged shortly after the Dayton Agreements and refers to the Muslims of Bosnia.

23 Only after Dayton did many Bosnian Serbs migrate to the Republika Srpska from Western Bosnia (now the Federation), and Bosnian Croats or Bosniaks to the Federation (in addition to Croatia and Serbia) in refugee movements that have yet to be settled in Bosnia.

24 The OHR holds extraordinary powers in Bosnia, which makes it the ultimate authority in the country. With its Bonn Powers, the OHR can dismiss senior officials, ban politicians and enact controversial legislations.

25 Republika Srpska is the Serb entity in Bosnia and Herzegovina, not to be confused with the Republic of Serbia.

26 Ensuring Bosnia’s Future: A New International Engagement Strategy, International Crisis Group, Europe Report, No. 180, 17 February 2007.

Republika Srpska. Not surprisingly, leaders in each territory declined the external recommendations of unifying the two forces, a situation which was unsettling for Brussels and its objectives of assisting the country towards stability. Javier Solana, the EU's foreign policy chief, urged the sides to overcome their differences, stating, "Bosnian politicians are gambling with the future of their own country."²⁷ The real problems now have begun to surface for an EU which has organized its stance around many instruments and initiatives that have had small impacts in relation to the reality of the state of affairs in a divided Bosnia. For the first time since 1997, there is a real prospect of instability, and the RS may do more than merely obstruct. Security is both questionable and extremely fragile in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Conclusions

Security and development are multifaceted in the Western Balkans, and no clear nexus exists for many countries in the region, which continue to be plagued by internal, multi-ethnic disputes. European enlargement incentives have relied on a balance of push-and-pull factors, which have been substantially different. As the costs of ethnic pride outweigh the benefits, which Brussels boasts, the differences have led to disequilibrium between Western Balkans countries. Nevertheless, European efforts have tried to reduce the security risk and instigate progress, and the entire conception of the Western Balkans was created as a security strategy that could hopefully lead to development. The identification of six countries, minus other Balkan states such as Romania, Bulgaria and Slovenia, elucidate the EU's desire to contain and target the threat of volatility in the broader Balkans. The Regional Approach was the first concentrated European effort to coagulate the newly found region, but quickly lost substance due to the complex tribulations of regional coalescence. The subsequent SAP/SAA was much more comprehensive and advanced a graduated process with individual countries, which still applies today. With the muscle of conditionality, the EU managed to accomplish wonders in the candidate states of Croatia and Macedonia, but struggles with the rest, possibly owing to the lack of clear membership potential amid problems with the EU's enlargement capacity. The reality of the security-development nexus at country level is significantly bleak, particularly in Bosnia, Serbia and Kosovo, where ethnic security problems could easily irritate spillover violence. Without a concise and tangible view of EU membership, the respective countries in the Western Balkans are confused about the final objective, especially when painful reforms and internal scrutiny are required. Until the EU solves its problems with enlargement and its integration capacity, conditionality will remain

²⁷ Nidzara Ahmetasević, Bosnia Faces Deadline for Closer EU Ties, in: Balkan Investigative Reporting Network, 29 September 2007, <<http://www.birn.eu.com/en/105/10/5037/>> .

piecemeal and ill effective.²⁸ As elucidated by the International Commission on the Balkans, the EU must augment its commitment to the Western Balkans in order to maintain regional cooperation and stability: “Unless the EU adopts a bold accession strategy which integrates all Balkan countries into the Union in the next decade, it will remain mired as a reluctant colonial power at enormous cost in places like Bosnia, Kosovo and even Macedonia. The real referendum on the EU’s future will take place in the Western Balkans.”²⁹

The EU cannot divorce itself from the Western Balkans; at this stage it can only choose what kind of relationship it will have.³⁰ If the Western Balkans can prove security and development to the world and join the EU, the relationship may be beneficial. If this does not happen, the relationship could continue to be costly, and instability could mushroom into a problem for all of South-Eastern Europe.

28 Under the Treaty of Nice, the EU can comprise of only 27 members, which was reached with Romania and Bulgaria. Moreover, Member States have begun to put a further cap on how enlargement is to be accepted; the most notable instance being the French government amending the national constitution to ensure that all future accessions after Croatia are to be subject to a positive referendum vote, which impedes EU potential in securitizing and developing the Western Balkans.

29 Statement from the International Commission on the Balkans, 9 May 2006, <<http://www.balkan-commission.org>>.

30 Adele Brown and Michael Attenborough, EU Enlargement: the Western Balkans, United Kingdom House of Commons, International Affairs and Defense Section, Research Paper 07/27, London 2007, p. 26.



Discussant Claire Craanen brings in her experience from working with the Crisis Management Policy Section at NATO

Kosovo and the Divided Region of Mitrovica

Gabriella Save

The Mitrovica region in Kosovo is a concrete example of how security and development are mutually interlinked. Dividing lines between communities must be put into their context and the reason whether the conflict will remain in status quo or be resolved is closely linked to other factors of the society besides pure politics. Mitrovica is an example of a region where different communities used to live and function together but where conflict has changed it all. As different as the cultures are and as deep the historical wounds might be, the only way to address them is, alongside the political process, through a comprehensive approach addressing the roots and causes of conflict. The Mitrovica region has become a symbol for the difficulties linked to the stagnated on-going talks between Serbia and the Kosovo provisional government. Mitrovica is a striking example of a post-conflict region where negative economic and social development and the serious environmental situation makes the wounds of the conflict even more difficult to heal. In turn, this makes the reconciliation process difficult and maintains the status quo. The international community needs to address these aspects, particularly now when most focus is on the political process, in order to be able to create long-term stability in the Balkans.



Gabriella Save

Background: Kosovo after the Conflict

Kosovo was the poorest region of the former Yugoslavia, and is now one of the poorest in Europe. About 90 percent of the inhabitants are ethnic Albanians. The Serbs are the biggest minority group, but there are also others, including Roma-Ashkali, Bosniaks, Goranis, Egyptians and Turks. The administrative capital of Kosovo, Pristina, has some 600,000 inhabitants. Kosovo's GDP per capita, ca. 800 Dollar, is among the lowest in Europe. The growth mainly derives from foreign aid and money transfers from Kosovars abroad. The economy is prone by low productivity and lack of revenue creating production. Exports constitute only 3.7 percent of imports.¹ The unsolved status question and Kosovo's overall unclear political future makes it difficult for Kosovo to get international loans and credits, which is a major obstacle for foreign investments and economic development. At the same time, international development aid is decreasing. The population of Kosovo is the youngest in Europe, with over 50 percent under 20 years of age. A very young population with no job opportunities and no future expectation is obviously a situation that easily gets volatile.

¹ Strategi för utvecklingssamarbete med Kosovo, <<http://www.ud.se/sb/d/108/a/11492>> (20/11/2007).

The United Nations (UN) has administered Kosovo, since Slobodan Milošević's regime came to end with the 1999 NATO campaign. The United Nations Interim Administrative Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) was set up by UN Security Council Resolution 1244 on the situation relating to Kosovo,² which consists of four pillars: UN police, UN civil administration, democratization and institution building led by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and economic development and reconstruction (funded by the EU). UNMIK is a special mission in the sense that for the first time other multilateral organizations are full partners under United Nations leadership. Furthermore, UNMIK operates closely with the Kosovo Force (KFOR), which currently has 15,000 soldiers deployed in Kosovo.³ UNMIK is presently downsizing considerably to prepare for the hand over to the new EU-led presence, which will include an ESDP mission, the European Commission, and an International Civilian Office (ICO), led by an International Civilian Representative double-hatting as EU Special Representative (ICR/EUSR). A political entity in the ICO/EUSR will oversee the settlement. An operational entity in the ESDP mission will support the Kosovo authorities in the area of rule of law. The European Commission through its liaison office will promote Kosovo's approximation to the EU within its SAP Tracking Mechanism.⁴

Mitrovica: Areas of Development and Security

The municipality of Mitrovica is situated 40 kilometers north of the Kosovo administrative centre of Pristina and consists of one city and 49 villages. Before 1999, different communities lived together in Mitrovica. After the conflict, the town has been ethnically divided along the river Ibar between Albanians and Serbs, with Serbs living on the northern side of the river and Albanians on the southern side. All of the 300 Kosovo Serb families who used to live in the south have now moved to the north.⁵ There is practically no freedom of movement between the two communities. The lack of sufficient social and economic development, as well as increasing distrust towards the political leadership, are among the main reasons for the emergence of intolerant nationalism, which led to the violent riots starting in Mitrovica in March 2004, and quickly spreading across Kosovo. Tensions can be foreseen to increase when the status talks proceed.

Mitrovica is a clear example of the Kosovo stalemate. Achieving a positive solution for Mitrovica could have stabilizing spill-over effects in Kosovo and other

2 S/RES/1244 (1999), 10 June 1999, via <<http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1999/sc99.htm>>.

3 Topics: NATO in Kosovo, <<http://www.nato.int/issues/kosovo/index.html>> (20/11/2007).

4 The European Commission Liaison Office, <http://www.delprn.ec.europa.eu/en/about_us/role.htm> (20/11/2007).

5 OSCE Municipal profile of Mitrovica, <http://www.osce.org/documents/mik/2005/12/1191_en.pdf> (20/11/2007).

vulnerable regions, such as the Presevo valley, the Sandžak region, Republika Srpska and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). Realistic options are either to split Mitrovica (which is not desirable with regard to negative spill-over effects in the region) or to develop strong economic, social and cultural ties which would in the long term ease up tensions. Since the will of co-operation between the local institutions is lacking, the international community will continue to play a great role in this respect. Some areas of attention will be mentioned below, including obvious ones such as economic development and institution building and more indirect areas such as the link between environment and security and the strengthening of civil society.

Economic Situation

Poverty in Kosovo has clear implications for short-term stability and represents a challenge for the development of the region on a long-term basis. Economic development and poverty reduction are the central areas for cooperation in order to reduce the risk of future conflicts. Before the conflict, Mitrovica was one of the wealthier towns in Kosovo. As in other parts of Kosovo, 15 percent of the population now lives in extreme poverty. The unemployment rate is very high: approximately 77 percent of the Mitrovica population is jobless.⁶ The stagnated economic growth is caused by, among other things, the unclear status question, corruption and the absence of basic services, such as reliable energy and water supplies. The uncertainty regarding the future status of Kosovo makes it difficult to attract investors to Mitrovica, since there would not be any guarantees for their investments. The absence of a status is also an obstacle to get World Bank loans. The lack of a reliable energy supply is also a serious problem, since investors are reluctant to invest capital when 24 hours energy supply cannot be guaranteed and power cuts occur several times a day.

There is high expectation among the population that the former mining complex Trepca, the biggest lead and zinc producer in former Yugoslavia, which used to employ 20,000 people, would become operational again. Trepca was partially closed by KFOR due to severe environmental hazards, and went bankrupt in 2005. However, Trepca's privatization could encourage economic development, although its economic importance would certainly not be as it once was in the past. Raising awareness that no privatization process or status solution will be a definite solution to the employment problem is important; and building platforms to boost entrepreneurship and strengthen business opportunities among the communities is necessary. Economic and employment measures and the

⁶ Ibid. (fn. 5).

creation of increased trust towards local authorities are factors closely linked to a sustainable peace and stability in Mitrovica, Kosovo and the broader Balkans.

Environment

The link between environment and security is another issue of importance in Mitrovica, one of the most polluted areas in Europe. One of the main sources of income, the Trepca battery factory, had to be closed down by force due to environmental hazards (levels of atmospheric lead measured were around 200 times the World Health Organization acceptable standards).⁷ The impact on the Kosovar population is considerable, especially among the most impoverished sectors. Therefore, it is fair to say that the lack of proper environmental standards is having implications for economic development and consequently also for security. The area will be lead contaminated for a long time and the serious environmental situation is one of the reasons for the bad health condition of Mitrovica inhabitants. High levels of lead in the environment of Mitrovica and its surrounding areas are a significant risk for mental and physical health, especially among children. Child mortality is among the highest in Europe and life expectancy is decreasing consistently. The health sector in Mitrovica and in Kosovo is facing a serious crisis. This will have social consequences, which may also have implications for the security situation in the long-term. The environmental sector has nevertheless been one of the few areas where co-operation between the different communities has been possible and has shown certain results. Such cooperation and dialogue is perceived as necessary to benefit all communities, and has led to some positive developments, for example in the areas of environmental clean-up and water and waste management.

Lack of Stable Institutions and Rule of Law

To create a solid democratic society, the development of institutions and strengthening of the rule of law is fundamental. This will be one of the international community's biggest challenges in the years to come even after status talks conclude for Kosovo.

In Mitrovica, as well as throughout Kosovo, there is a lack of stable institutions. Mafia and clan structures rule business life and corruption affects most of the society. Furthermore, there are numerous unsolved property disputes due to the occupation of houses after the conflict and the division of the town among ethnic lines. No working cadastre system exists, since most records were destroyed

⁷ UNMIK Kosovo State of The Environment Report, <http://enrin.grida.no/htmls/kosovo/Kosovo_SOE_part1.pdf> (20/11/2007).

during the conflict. The ordinary crime rate is relatively low in Kosovo, but organized crime has a strong base due to its unclear status and non-functioning judicial system. Considerable proportions of consumer goods, which are commonly available for sale throughout the region, are counterfeit. The sale of these goods occurs openly and there is only limited enforcement against counterfeit products due to legal loopholes. Funds generated from intellectual property crime are suspected to benefit both criminal organizations and extremist groups.⁸

The issue of human trafficking is also a serious threat to security with important repercussions throughout Europe. Kosovo is both a country of origin and a transit country for trafficking, and is also gradually developing into a final destination. The badly functioning judicial system makes it easy for the traffickers to circumvent laws and only a few criminals have actually been prosecuted. Trafficking in its different forms is undoubtedly linked to the mafia and is suspected to finance other organized crime structures such as international terrorism.

Civil Society and Human Rights

Civil society is still underdeveloped in Mitrovica and in Kosovo. Women, youth, and minority groups, such as the Romas, are particularly marginalized. Basic fundamental rights such as gender equality and the rights of women, necessary for the development of civil society, need to get attention on all levels. The implementation of UN SC Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security,⁹ which calls for the full and equal participation and involvement of women in all efforts of maintaining and promoting peace and security, is of great importance for long-term stability. A practical example of this can be found in the disarmament process, where the implementation of Resolution 1325 and the important role carried out by women has facilitated the process considerably in the densely armed Mitrovica region.

Regarding education, the percentage of children who attend school is relatively high in Kosovo, especially in primary school. However, the school day is divided into shifts, which is not enough to guarantee sufficient quality of education. The division of Mitrovica along ethnic lines and the current political situation has had a significant impact on the education system. Kosovo-Albanian students and other non-Serb minorities attend schools in the south while Kosovo Serbs and Romas attend schools in the north, where schools function with a Serbian cur-

⁸ The links between intellectual property crime and terrorist financing. Public testimony by Ronald K. Noble, Secretary General of INTERPOL, before the United States House Committee on International Relations, July 16th 2003, <<http://www.interpol.int/Public/ICPO/speeches/SG20030716.asp>> (20/11/2007).

⁹ S/RES/1325 (2000), via <<http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/2000/sc2000.htm>>.

riculum. This division is preoccupying, since the education system plays a vital role in societal reconciliation.

The possibility of entering university is linked to corruption, which creates frustration due to the lack of equal opportunities. The university programme is largely out-dated and there is a considerable brain-drain of professors who leave to Western Europe. Moreover, there is an important number of internally displaced people (IDPs) in the Mitrovica region, many of whom are of the Roma minority. The size of the Roma population in Kosovo is difficult to assess due to a lack of proper information and statistics. In 2004, the number of Roma in Kosovo was estimated to be between 42,000 and 150,000.¹⁰ Since the situation in Kosovo has gained relative stability in comparison with the situation of 1999, many Roma have been sent back from countries in Europe where they do not have refugee status anymore. In Mitrovica, the Roma's situation is particularly precarious, since the division leads to the Roma being marginalized in both the Albanian and Serbian communities of Kosovo.

How to Move Forward?

UNMIK is phasing out of Kosovo and is handing over activities to a new, considerably smaller, EU-led presence. Currently, the EU has a better image among the local population than UNMIK and expectations are high. However, in order to benefit from this momentum, trust can not be taken for granted. The EU will have to respond to the problems that UNMIK has not managed to solve, otherwise this fragile trust and confidence may disappear rapidly. The planned ESDP mission will also take place within the framework of a wider international community engagement in Kosovo. The UN will remain an actor, via the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), which could undertake a leading co-ordinating role for all UN agencies after status negotiations conclude.

Once the status question is solved, there is a risk that international political attention will diminish. In this phase, it will be important to put international development aid into a bigger context and to promote an integrated strategy, resulting in heavy pressure on the EU. Due to the blocked political situation in Mitrovica, the international community will still show a special commitment after a future status settlement. However, it is vital to emphasise a bottom-up approach at the same time as the political process continues to move forward, and the need to work closely with local institutions both sides of the river Ibar in Mitrovica in order to achieve local ownership in all areas of development. Trust can not be created by

¹⁰ Swedish Assistance to the Roma Population in the Western Balkans, <<http://www.sida.se/sida/jsp/sida>> (20/11/2007).

the international community artificially. Only if the different parties see real benefits of co-operation, as has been the case in environmental issues, confidence can hopefully be built in a natural way. The international community can facilitate confidence building by creating platforms for engaging local authorities in practical multi-ethnic projects which address everyday problems, including private sector improvement and entrepreneurship, capacity building and environment projects.

If the objective is a multi-ethnic independent Kosovo with an integrated Mitrovica region, the international community must offer an alternative to the Kosovo Serb community to attract them to take part in the society. The will has to come from the communities themselves and local ownership will be key. The link between the ICO/ESDP mission and European integration is essential, as well as the work to fully involve the local institutions from both sides in this process. Better donor co-ordination will be needed and equally important is the coordination between development and security actors. Traditionally, there have been dividing lines between the “hard” security perspective and the “soft” development side on how to deal with conflict solution. Creating bridges between these cultures and working fully from the basis that these are mutually dependent and reinforce each other is of paramount importance to fight the root causes of conflict.



Gabriella Save and Tomislav Ivančić taking questions on Kosovo

Conclusion

Security is a multi-dimensional concept and a society built on the rule of law, democratic institutions and economic growth is less likely to be conflict-prone. The divided town and region of Mitrovica illustrates that an evolution towards increased tensions or a lasting peace highly depends on the way the region will manage to develop economically and socially. Economic growth and stable democratic institutions might not only lead to better living conditions in general, but also to a feeling of self-sufficiency and responsibility which can create positive tolerance towards other communities. In time, ethnic dividing lines could be erased, which would pave the way for even greater economic growth. From the international perspective, local authorities must be engaged in order to create a sense of responsibility in attaining stability and a lasting peace. Currently, there is great focus on the top-down political process; it is crucial that the bottom-up work acquires more, if not equal attention.



Closing Session with Emilio Cassinello and Patricia Perez-Gomez from CITpax

Armenia and the EU: Geo-strategic Democracy

Kimana Zulueta-Fülscher¹

Armenia does not rank very high on the international agenda. Geographically and politically, the country is landlocked, and lacks energy resources and transport facilities. In addition, Armenia depends largely on Russian support. The economy runs on relatively cheap Russian oil and gas deliveries and Russian “military aid” is indispensable in Armenia’s almost two decades old conflict with Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh (NK). Nonetheless, Yerevan’s foreign policy has opened up in recent years looking for new geostrategic partners that can help end its political isolation. Relations with the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) have deepened, and democratization is firmly on the agenda. Is the EU interest on Armenia, however, substantial enough to pull the country out of Russia’s orbit and increase chances of coming to a peaceful settlement over NK?

Context: neighbors and desirable alliances

Democracy, security and energy issues are mostly related to Azerbaijan and Georgia, Armenia’s best-known Southern Caucasus neighbors. Discourse tends to overlook Armenia, which finds itself at a crossroads between two elections that most likely will determine the main policy vectors for the next ten years.² In terms of foreign policy, but also domestic reform, the EU’s European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) and NATO’s Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) are important assets for Yerevan to exit its stagnated political situation. In the first years of these programs, Armenia acquired a reputation of being a pragmatic and realistic partner that implements agreed upon reforms.

With its eastern and western borders closed due to the NK conflict,³ Armenia only has two exits: via Georgia to Russia and Europe, and via Iran. However, close ties with Russia strain relations with Georgia. Complicating Armenia’s



Kimana Zulueta-Fülscher

1 Thanks to the support of Richard Youngs and Jos Boonstra (FRIDE), and especially to Stuart Reigeluth (CITpax), without whose help this paper would not have been published.

2 Parliamentary elections were held on 12 May 2007, and Presidential elections will be in February 2008.

3 EU accession talks with Turkey may have several impacts for Armenia: on the one hand, Turkey’s accession may bring Armenia’s accession closer. Apart from this, Turkey’s accession will apparently only be possible with the recognition by this state of the genocide earlier last century. This recognition may bring some economically substantive advantages to Armenia, but may also open up borders between the two countries, which may boost its economic relations with the West, through Turkey. See Turkey faces international pressure over Dink killing, in: Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), 20 January 2007. This recognition from the Turkish state may take some time, if indeed it ever does come, however. Even in the US Republicans and Democrats are pushing for recognition, and being hampered by the very strong Turkish lobby in the country; see US unable to name new Armenia envoy amid genocide row, in: Eurasia Daily Monitor, 23 January 2007.

geostrategic position even more, Russia closed its border with Georgia.⁴ But even if its partnership with Russia were not an issue, Armenia's relations with Georgia would not be easy either. The Armenian minority living in southern Georgia, in the Santskhe-Javakheti region, is a source of current and potential future conflict, also taking into account oil and gas pipelines crossing the region.

The current international scene also complicates Armenian relations with Iran. Though limited to economic ties, foreign aid may be conditioned on Armenia's "good behavior," implying adherence to US and EU policies, or more concretely, its compliance with international constraints. Iran, as well as the US, is a key political partner for Armenia,⁵ as demonstrated by the agreement signed by the Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki and Armenia's Energy Minister Vardan Movsisian to carry out studies for the construction of a railway linking the two countries and energy facilities at their border.⁶ Many observers say Armenia is pursuing a "multidirectional complementarity" to maintain simultaneously strong relations with the EU, Russia, Iran and the US.⁷

Democratization and the role of the OSCE

Armenia's interest in being perceived as a serious partner by the EU and US prompted the government to demonstrate to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe / Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE / ODIHR) that free and fair elections would be held in Armenia in May 2007. Several improvements in the electoral procedures were then made, since earlier elections were characterized by ODIHR as flawed.

To contextualize the democratic process: in 2003, Robert Kocharian was reelected in a presidential campaign that was widely regarded as rigged. In the run-up to the elections, authorities put more than 200 opposition supporters in detention for unsanctioned demonstrations. The constitutional court rejected appeals from opposition leaders to invalidate the election results, but proposed holding a "referendum of confidence" on Kocharian within the next year to support the

4 For more information on the tense relations between Russia and Georgia, see the Abkhazia and the South Ossetia conflicts, two other "frozen conflicts" in the Caucasus that could develop into open conflicts, both of which also have important implications for Georgia's bid to enter NATO.

5 See Haroutiun Khachatryan, Armenia debates its relations with US, Iran, in: Eurasianet.org, 3 April 2007. Cooperation with Iran, which diversifies Armenia's energy supplies, "diversifies the political orientation of the country, even bringing it closer to the 'European choice'" because of decreasing dependence on Russia. See The European Union as an External Democracy Promoter in the South Caucasus Region, in: Jünemann Annette and Michèle Knodt (eds.), Externe Demokratieförderung durch die Europäische Union / European External Democracy Promotion, Schriftenreihe des Arbeitskreises Europäische Integration e.V., Vol. 58, Baden-Baden, 2007, p. 285.

6 Armenia, Iran plan to expand economic cooperation, in: Armenian Daily Digest, 23 July 2007.

7 Armenia: internal instability ahead, ICG Europe Report, N° 158, 18 October 2004.

questioned validity of the election results. Kocharian did not comply with the proposal and a standoff emerged with the political opposition, formed mainly by two opposition groups: Artarutiun (Justice Bloc)⁸ and the National Unity Party (AMK), which eventually chose not to attend sessions at the National Assembly. In October 2004, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) adopted a resolution expressing concern about the lack of investigation into the flawed 2003 elections.⁹ But only after a referendum in November 2005, and upon exhortation from the Council of Europe (CoE), the government adopted modifications to the electoral code.

Before the parliamentary elections held on 12 May 2007, the election procedures seemed unlikely to differ much from those of past ballots. A number of opposition members were arrested some months before the elections, charged with plotting a coup against the government. Internationally, as well as domestically, concerns were raised over the political motivation of these detentions.¹⁰ Nevertheless, foreign minister Vartan Oskanian said in an interview in late 2006 that “everyone must realize that we simply have no more room for holding bad elections, because this time the damage to our people would be not only moral, but material.”¹¹ What he meant was that foreign aid to the country might be jeopardized in the case of flawed elections,¹² or as a senior analyst stated: “As time goes on, there are [fewer] reasons, not more, for Western states to promote engagement with an Armenian government that seeks to rule through anti-democratic methods.”¹³

The OSCE / ODIHR observer mission, which also included members from the CoE and the European Parliament, nonetheless concluded in a preliminary report on May 13 that the electoral process had been “an improvement from previous elections and were conducted largely in accordance with international standards for democratic elections.”¹⁴ This was a boost to the international reputation and democratic image of Armenia’s political elite, mainly Robert Kocharian and Vaz-

8 Artarutiun comprises a union of nine opposition parties.

9 Freedom in the World – Armenia (2006), Freedom House, 25 January 2007.

10 Arrest of Armenian ‘coup plotters’ raises questions, in: Eurasia Daily Monitor, 9 January 2007; Armenia, Crisis Watch, ICG, 1 January 2007, N° 41.

11 Armenia: Junior coalition partner warns against election fraud, RFE/RL, 18 February 2007. This quote comes from an interview published in autumn 2006 in the opposition daily Haykakan zhamanak.

12 See OSCE official discusses Armenian elections, Armenia Liberty, 16 January 2007; and Sabine Freizer, Armenia’s emptying democracy, Open Democracy, ICG, 30 November 2005.

13 US and EU unlikely to ostracise Yerevan, despite election warnings, in: Eurasia Insight, 20 March 2007.

14 See Armenian party of power wins parliamentary elections, Eurasia Daily Monitor, Vol. 4, N° 96, 16 May 2007; and Armenia back pro-presidential parties, in: The New York Times, 20 May 2007.

gen Sarkisian; and according to a veteran member of Parliament, meant “not the victory of the ruling party, but the defeat of the opposition.”¹⁵

Elections may have been conducted well in comparison with previous occasions, but this did not mean they were entirely democratic, free and fair. What underlies OSCE statements is a two-fold strategy: 1) the EU and US fear the destabilization of Armenia through a possible democratic revolution and perceive a stable Armenia as a fundamental precondition for resolving the NK conflict; and 2) the pro-Russian position of the government (against the pro-Western opposition) may actually impede resolution, since Russia is not interested in seeing the “frozen conflicts” resolved. Two contradictory strategies are therefore at play. What can the EU do to resolve this stalemate?

The role of the opposition

Internally, the potential of the opposition as a real alternative has been debatable. In 2004, the perception was that the opposition did not offer a credible alternative to governmental parties.¹⁶ At that time, leading opposition forces were holding negotiations regarding the possibility of forming new alliances ahead of the 2007 parliamentary elections. Indeed, the National Unity Party (AMK), led by Artashes Geghamian, indicated its willingness to join another opposition heavy-weight, Stepan Demirchian, and his People’s Party of Armenia (HZhK).¹⁷ But the opposition failed to form a united front against what it considered an “illegitimate” government. Demirchian did not form an electoral alliance with any party, despite having received offers by three different pro-Western parties, led respectively by Aram Sarkisian, Vazgen Manukian and US-born former Foreign Minister Raffi Hovanisian.

Artur Baghdasarian and Artashes Geghamian, who came third in the disputed 2003 presidential elections, also decided to go it alone in the elections.¹⁸ This gave Kocharian a better chance to retain control of the Armenian parliament: “In effect, the opposition has decided not to participate in the elections, as participating independently means creating favorable conditions for the reproduction of

15 Kocharian was former President of NK, before becoming Prime Minister, elected President in 1998, and re-elected in 2003. See *Armenia: internal instability ahead*, (2004), op. cit; since the sudden death of the former Prime Minister Andranik Markarian in March 2007, Sarkisian is President of the Republican Party and Prime Minister, see *Armenia: PM’s death has minimal impact on parliamentary election campaign*, in: *Eurasia Insight*, 30 March 2007; and Haroutiun Khachatryan, *Armenia: a new era for a new opposition?*, in *Eurasianet*, 16 May 2007.

16 *Armenia: internal instability ahead*, (2004), op. cit.

17 *Armenia: Opposition leaders mull new alliances*, in: *RFE/RL Reports*, 11 January 2007.

18 *Armenian parliamentary election race kicks off*, in: *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, Vol. 4, N° 35, 20 February 2007.

the current regime”.¹⁹ With voter frustration over previous elections, this factor fuelled political apathy in Armenia.²⁰ The result has been that most of the opposition leaders, including the two men who had nearly unseated Kocharian in the last presidential ballot, failed to win a single parliamentary seat and now face political oblivion. Only Raffi Hovannisian, who had served as Foreign Minister in Petrosian’s previous government, strengthened his position: his Heritage Party got almost six per cent of the vote and seven seats in the National Assembly, becoming one of only two opposition groups represented in the 131-member legislature.²¹

Via expensive advertising campaigns, the Armenian government did its best to discredit opposition members, like Artur Baghdasarian, which often worsened the opposition’s situation and forced them to travel from region to region.²² Credible opinion polls are practically non-existent while the seizure of voters’ passports, and other issues also impinged on the results.²³ There were efforts to make progress on the lack of proper voter databases, an issue that undermined the 2003 elections in accordance with OSCE standards,²⁴ but many people still felt that “this has been one of the worst elections possible,” according to opposition party representative Vartan Mkrtchian, who also said: “we recorded widespread violations in many forms ... Some pro-government parties were giving bribes of between 4,000 and 20,000 drams right in front of polling stations.” Election officials, however, said there were no major violations.²⁵

Sarkisian and his Republican Party won the ballots with a sufficient majority to govern alone, but agreed to share the burden with Prosperous Armenia (a new party funded by the populist oligarch Gagik Tsarukian) and the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (Dashnaktsutiun). The alliance was clearly formed to mobilize broad-based political support for Sarkisian’s aspiration to succeed Kocharian in the 2008 presidential elections.²⁶ But, since October 2007, Ter-Petrosian, for-

19 Civil society: Armenian opposition divided ahead of election, in: Eurasianet.org, 8 March 2007.

20 Marianna Grigoryan, Voter apathy appears widespread on eve of parliamentary poll, in: Eurasianet.org, 9 May 2007.

21 Emil Danielyan, US-born politician reshapes Armenian opposition camp, Eurasia Daily Monitor, Vol. 4, N° 124, 26 June 2007.

22 Emil Danielyan, Armenian security services suspected of spying on opposition leader, in: Eurasia Daily Monitor, 8 May 2007; Marianna Grigoryan, Armenian opposition: TV campaign ad prices a political handicap, in: Eurasianet.org, 14 February 2007.

23 Armenia’s murky politics, in: The Economist, 11 April, 2007; Gayane Abrahmyan, Armenia: Demands for voter passports spark election controversy, in: Eurasianet.org, 4 April 2007.

24 Improved voter register presented in Yerevan with OSCE Office support, OSCE Press Release, 5 February 2007.

25 Opposition says Armenia poll flawed, Al-Jazeera, 13 May 2007.

26 Emil Danielyan, Armenian PM forms new cabinet after election triumph, in: Eurasia Daily Monitor, Vol. 4, N° 114, 12 June 2007. If Sarkisian steps in when Kocharian steps down, Kocharian could still stay in government and exert power. According to the constitution, the president is elected for a five-year term and can serve a maximum of two mandates.

mer President of Armenia (1991–1998), has become a credible opponent to the duo Kocharian-Sarkisian. Seen as more prone to find a negotiated solution to the NK conflict, his candidacy is favored by the West. His governmental experience and possible broad civil society support make of him the ideal pivot for Armenia to slowly move away from Russia.²⁷

Democracy: a point in question?

The democratic future of Armenia depends nonetheless largely on its own actions, partly with regard to good governance and human rights promotion, through liberalization and social policies aiming at tackling poverty. How is Armenia pursuing democratization? Is the rhetorical part of reforms preponderant or is a real path visible towards foreign-inspired democratization? And more specifically, how can the EU assist in this process?

Since June 2004, a program was included in the ENP, aimed at strengthening EU relations with neighbors to promote EU common values and standards.²⁸ In November 2005, the Council welcomed the decision to establish Action Plans with several countries, among them Armenia, thus inviting the country to enter intensified political, security, economic and cultural relations with the EU, along with enhanced regional and cross border cooperation and shared responsibility in conflict prevention and conflict resolution.²⁹ The ENP Action Plan was signed in November 2006.³⁰ Among the different priorities of the EU towards neighboring eastern and Mediterranean countries are the “strengthening of democratic structures, of the rule of law, including reform of the judiciary, and combat of fraud and corruption,” and the “strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, in compliance with the international commitments of Armenia (PCA, CoE, OSCE, UN).”³¹ According to the EU, the accords should help defuse separatist disputes in the three South Caucasus countries.³²

He appoints the prime minister and cabinet, without approval from Parliament; see Armenia: internal instability ahead, (2004), *op. cit.*

27 Emil Danielyan, Ter-Petrosian gains supporters in Armenia, in: *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, Vol. 4, N° 212, 14 November 2007.

28 European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument, Armenia, Country Strategy Paper, 2007–2013.

29 Proposal, Commission of the European Communities, Brussels, 25 October 2006, COM (2006) 627 final.

30 EU: Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia sign accords, in: RFE/RL Reports, 14 November 2006. For information on what the EU actions in relation to an approach to Armenia, an ENPI Country Strategy Paper 2007–2013 exists, as well as a National Indicative Programme 2007–2010, both adopted on 7 March 2007. There is also an ENP Action Plan for Armenia, approved on 14 November 2006.

31 Proposal, Commission of the European Communities, COM (2006) 627 final, Brussels, 25 October 2006.

32 EU: Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia sign accords, in: RFE/RL Reports, 14 November 2006.

However, despite the amount spent by the EU (€380 million)³³ in Armenia since its independence in 1991, the question remains over whether economic incentives have advanced democratic objectives. Doubts focus on Armenia's perceived strategy of consistently pleasing the EU, by making some systemic, but rather limited, reforms related to human rights and democratization, while maintaining Russia's military presence and control over energy resources. According to the European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument's (ENPI) National Indicative Program 2007–2010, European support has not focused on the first priority area ("strengthening of democratic structures and good governance"), but improvement on this front is considered important to further improve trade and the investment climate in Armenia, and to strengthen European values in all possible fields. For this period, the ENPI has made available €98.4 million for investment in three priority areas, the other two being "support for regulatory reform and administrative capacity building" and "support for poverty reduction efforts."³⁴ EU democracy promotion through ENP is thus largely through indirect projects and objectives.

Nagorno-Karabakh: insurmountable?

Armenia's internal situation and external relations with the EU are conditioned in part by the Nagorno-Karabakh (NK) conflict, as well as by its dependence on Russia.³⁵ Though a non-violent resolution of the NK conflict is vital,³⁶ Armenia is not aiming at just any kind of political resolution, but rather the independence of the territory from Azerbaijan and maintenance of the Lachin corridor between Armenia and NK.³⁷ As a predominantly ethnic Armenian enclave within Azerbaijan's territory, NK seceded in 1988, due in part to Yerevan's efforts. Armenian forces gradually took control of the mountainous region before seizing a number of adjacent Azerbaijani administrative districts, which they continue to occupy to this day.³⁸ The OSCE Minsk Group, co-chaired by representatives from Russia, the US and France, has overseen negotiations since the 1994 ceasefire came into effect.³⁹ Azerbaijan is only in favor of giving the territory maximum autonomy within its borders, and is opposed to the possibility of calling a

33 European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument, Armenia, Country Strategy Paper, 2007–2013.

34 European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument for Armenia, National Indicative Programme, 2007-2010.

35 The Nagorno-Karabakh (NK) region is located within Azerbaijan's borders, but is populated mainly by Armenians. NK was transferred to Azeri jurisdiction in 1923 by Stalin, to appease Turkey, and in the hope of also sovietizing Turkey after the sovietization of Transcaucasia.

36 On "frozen conflicts," see: East: frozen conflicts not so 'frozen' after all, in: RFE/RL, 10 November 2006.

37 Armenia: internal instability ahead, (2004), op. cit.

38 Nagorno-Karabakh: OSCE says solution in sight, in: RFE/RL, 5 December 2006.

39 Azerbaijani president says Karabakh talks nearing "final stage," in: RFE/RL, 29 November 2006.

referendum on the status of NK.⁴⁰ The resolution of the conflict would open borders with Azerbaijan and Turkey, which would enhance economic trade with its neighbors and with the EU.⁴¹ Russia would most probably lose influence in the region, and a regional cooperation agreement could take place, which would be in the interest of the Southern Caucasus countries and Western players.

Armenia and Azerbaijan seem to agree on the deployment of a United Nations force to secure the zone and on the reparation of the infrastructure, but disagree on the possibility of a referendum, as suggested in the draft peace plan of the Minsk Group.⁴² Azerbaijan's Deputy Foreign Minister Araz Asimov said in early 2007 that the parties are also divided on the return of Azerbaijani refugees to Karabakh⁴³ and the status of the strategic Lachin corridor linking the enclave to Armenia. Some Armenian sources also say that a peace settlement was prevented in 2006 by another issue: the time frame for Armenian withdrawal from Kelbajar, one of the two Azerbaijani districts sandwiched between Karabakh and Armenia proper. Apparently, Armenia will relinquish control of Kelbajar only after holding the referendum, a condition that Azerbaijani officials have publicly rejected.⁴⁴ Added to all this, due to its energy revenues, Azerbaijan's defense budget now equals Armenia's entire state budget, which puts even more pressure on Armenia and increases its dependence on foreign support. Though it is currently unlikely that Azerbaijan would start a war now, by 2012, with depleted energy resources, the probability of hostilities erupting will augment.⁴⁵

Armenia and Russia: a possible breakthrough

The EU faces an uphill struggle if it is to compete with Russia in the Caucasus, particularly due to Armenia's difficult geopolitical situation and because of the EU's energy interests in Azerbaijan, which could override democratic efforts in the region. However, the High Representative for the Common Foreign

40 Caucasus: Azerbaijani, Armenian, Karabakh officials assess talks, in: RFE/RL, 1 December 2006. With all these referenda, the question persists as to who is entitled to vote: only people actually living in NK (Armenia's option) or all Azerbaijani citizens, including all the Internally Displaced People (IDP) (Azerbaijan's option).

41 See Armenia urges Turkey to talk, in: RFE/RL, 14 January 2007; and Armenia: internal instability ahead, (2004), op. cit.

42 See Caucasus: Azerbaijani, Armenian, Karabakh Officials assess talks, in: RFE/RL, 1 December 2006; Yerevan, Baku discuss Nagorno-Karabakh referendum, in: RFE/RL, 2 December 2006; and Azerbaijan says sticking points remain on Karabakh, 5 December 2006, and Armenia/Azerbaijan: has a new chance emerged for Karabakh peace?, in: RFE/RL, 15 February 2007.

43 See Statement by the Head of Delegation of the United States of America Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs R. Nicholas Burns at the fourteenth OSCE Ministerial Council, Brussels, 4 December 2006.

44 Emil Danielyan, Armenia/Azerbaijan: has a new chance emerged for Karabakh peace?, in: Eurasianet.org, 18 February 2007.

45 According to the ICG, Azerbaijan oil production may peak and start decreasing in 2012. As its economy is almost fully dependent on its natural resources, this will mean economic crisis. To divert attention from this crisis, the ICG forecasts an increase of the likelihood of war; see Nagorno-Karabakh: Risking War, ICG Europe Report, N° 187, 14 November 2007.

and Security Policy, Javier Solana, said “most of the EU’s energy doesn’t come from Azerbaijan. For us Azerbaijan is not as important a source of energy as other countries are. We would like Azerbaijan to develop because it’s an important country, and we would like Armenia to develop because it’s an important country.”⁴⁶ But despite official EU declarations, the fact is that the potential for EU energy investments exists in Azerbaijan and is non-existent in the case of Armenia, at least with regard to primary resources. Russia is in this sense more “reliable,” since it is not interested in Azerbaijan’s growth as an energy supplier. Russia may therefore have more to offer to Armenia than the EU does, since full EU integration is not on the table.

Armenia’s links to Russia are the result of a historically conditioned pragmatism, which may also be an impediment to further development. Armenia could only escape by moving towards an independent position, resolving the NK issue, and becoming not only a transit country for energy, while using its human capital to boost its economy. Historically, Russia has been the guarantor of peace for Armenia, which it defended from the Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth century and incorporated in the Soviet Union for most of the twentieth century. After gaining independence in the 1990s, Russia impeded a collapse of the Armenian state after the war against Azerbaijan, and saw it as an economic partner in the region. The military alliance with Moscow has served as the backbone of Armenian foreign policy since the collapse of the USSR in 1991. The presence of Russian troops at military bases in Yerevan and Gyumri, as well as along the Turkish and Iranian borders with Armenia are seen by successive governments as a national security necessity.⁴⁷ This pro-Russian sentiment has prevailed over time, and in return, Russia uses Armenia as a stepping-stone to the Southern Caucasus. Russian interest in helping to resolve the NK issue, as a member of the Minsk Group, is therefore minimal. The resolution of this conflict would mean Russia loses leverage as peace guarantor for Armenia and thus loses a stronghold in the Caucasus.

Armenia’s dependency on Russia is reflected furthermore in its rather limited commitment to NATO. Although it takes part in NATO’s Partnership for Peace program since 1994⁴⁸ and agreed to an Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) in December 2005, Armenia is also member of the Collective Security Treaty

46 EU: Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia sign accords, in: RFE/RL Reports, 14 November 2006; EU: Solana says membership for Caucasus ‘A different story’, 15 November 2006.

47 The EU’s relationship with Armenia, EU External Relations, 2006. Armenia signed a collective defence clause in its Friendship and Cooperation Treaty with Russia, and is part of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), that followed the Tashkent Treaty; Azerbaijan is not. See Alberto Priego Moreno, Las elecciones parlamentarias de Armenia, la presidencia española de la OSCE y la resolución del conflicto de Nagorno-Karabakh, in: ARI (Real Instituto Elcano, Madrid), N° 81, 18 July 2007.

48 See Bilateral relations, in: International Cooperation, Ministry of Defense, Republic of Armenia.

Organization (CSTO) – the Russian counterpart of NATO. The duality of cooperation with NATO and membership in CSTO is unclear for Armenia in the future. NATO does some democratic defense reform in Armenia and promotes democracy in general terms through diplomacy and advocacy, but leaves most of the practical programs and critical assessments to the OSCE and the CoE.⁴⁹ Nevertheless, taking the economic pull of the EU and opportunities of the ENP into account, Armenia may one day lean more towards the European side of the equation. If Armenia were to move away from Russia, it would need enhanced ties with other regional partners, especially Turkey. While other South Caucasian countries are still looking for this balance, Armenia remains relatively isolated.

One option for the EU and US to increase leverage on Armenia is to help diversify its energy sources.⁵⁰ Currently, Armenia's main energy supplier is Russia, and nearly all its energy infrastructure is owned by Russia, including the Medzamor nuclear plant, thermal power plants, and the electricity distribution networks. In its energy-diversification efforts, Yerevan is building a network of new thermal and hydroelectric power stations while the new gas pipeline from Iran is also crucial to its efforts.⁵¹ Russia has made gas supplies from Iran conditional on not facilitating further commerce with Europe via Georgia. The EU and US therefore have a special interest in resolving the NK issue: Armenia could then import as well from Azerbaijan and even Central Asia, as well as becoming an intermediate state, like Turkey, for bringing Iranian and Caspian gas to Europe. Surprisingly, the proposed peace plan envisages a gradual resolution of the NK dispute that would require policy continuity in Baku and Yerevan, suggesting that the EU / US would prefer to avoid regime change in either country.⁵² This was until former President, Ter-Petrossian, came back into the picture.

Conclusion

The EU and Russia want a stable Armenia, but for different reasons. Russia's interest is to maintain its influence in the region; the EU's to resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict for regional Southern Caucasus contacts to blossom. The question arises whether democracy or the resolution of the NK issue come first. The EU (mainly through the OSCE) will push for the latter, while trying to please Russia (member of the Minsk group). Europe will thus aim to assuage

49 For more on NATO and democratization, see Jos Boonstra, NATO's Role on Democratic Reform (FRIDE Working Paper N° 38), Madrid, May 2007.

50 Haroutiun Khachatryan, Armenia media: plans for new Russian investments raise hopes and spark skepticism, in: Eurasianet.org, 13 February 2007.

51 Armenia: Making the best of a difficult neighbourhood, in: RFE/RL, 22 November 2006.

52 Emil Danielyan, Armenian/Azerbaijan: has a new chance emerged for Karabakh peace?. op. cit.

Russia's concerns about losing yet another allied republic, while simultaneously pressuring the Armenian government via the ENP and possible NATO membership; but neither incentive will be a one way policy. The EU has security interests that are not entirely consistent with its democratization objectives, and therefore is not pushing the issue. In the meantime, while agreeing only to reforms that do not endanger external relations, Armenia has been pragmatic in its approach to the ENP, producing limited but tangible results in improving its democratic credentials, as evidenced by the latest parliamentary elections. Increased EU assistance and political commitment is necessary to encourage Armenia to make a leap towards a consolidated democracy.

Participants and Organizers

Participants

Stephanie Ahern, Major in the US Army currently assigned as Assistant Professor in the Department of Social Sciences at the US Military Academy at West Point, New York, USA.

Richard Akum, Programme Manager at the Office of the Executive Secretary for the Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA), Dakar, Senegal.

Kamal Amakrane, Political Affairs Officer in the Department of Political Affairs of the UN Secretariat, New York, USA.

Pierre Antille, Directorate for Security Policy, Ministry of Defense, Berne, Switzerland.

Saponti Baroowa, PhD candidate at the Centre for European Studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India.

Pablo Barrera Cruz, Middle East Representative for the Spanish Fundación Promoción Social de la Cultura (FPSC), Beirut, Lebanon.

Claire Craanen, Crisis Management Policy Section at NATO Headquarters, Brussels, Belgium.

Teresa Cravo, PhD candidate at the Centre of International Studies of Cambridge University, UK.

Benedikt Franke, PhD candidate in International Studies and Kurt Hahn Scholar at the University of Cambridge, UK.

Özge Genç, PhD candidate at Istanbul Bilgi University and Project Assistant with the Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV), Istanbul, Turkey.

Felix Heiduk, Research Associate at Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (German Institute for International and Security Affairs), Berlin, Germany.

Tomislav Ivančić, Researcher at Development Assistance Research Associates (DARA), Madrid, Spain.

Bonn Juego, Visiting Doctoral Scholar at the School for Postgraduate Interdisciplinary Research on Interculturalism and Transnationality (SPIRIT), Aalborg University, Denmark.

Joachim Koops, PhD candidate in Political Science at the University of Kiel, Germany, and Analyst in the Security and Defense Section of the Oxford Council on Good Governance.

Isabelle Maras, PhD candidate in European Security Studies at the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy (IFSH), University of Hamburg, Germany.

Zoë Marriage, Lecturer in the Development Studies Department of the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), University of London, UK.

Alexander Mattelaer, Researcher in European security and defense at the Institute for European Studies at the Vrije Universiteit, Brussels, Belgium.

Robert Mudida, Lecturer and Researcher at the Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies of the University of Nairobi, Kenya.

Michael Polyak, Master's candidate at Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government, Cambridge, USA.

Gabriella Save, Security Policy Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Stockholm, Sweden.

Isabelle Tannous, Institute for Peace Research and Security Studies (IFSH) at the University of Hamburg, Germany.

Kimana Zulueta-Fülscher, Junior Researcher in the Area of Democratisation division at the Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo (FRIDE), Madrid, Spain.

Organizers

Kathrin Brockmann, Program Officer of the International Forum on Strategic Thinking, DGAP.

Emilio Cassinello, Director-General, CITpax.

H. E. José María Figueres Olsen, International Advisor to the Board of Trustees of FRIDE and former President of Costa Rica (1994–98).

Hans Bastian Hauck, Head of Program of the International Forum on Strategic Thinking, DGAP.

Carlos Oliver, Project Officer, DARA.

Patricia Perez-Gomez, Projects Coordinator for the Latin America Programme, CITpax.

Stuart Reigeluth, Projects Manager for the Africa and Middle East Programme, CITpax.

Manuel Sánchez-Montero, Director of Humanitarian Action and Development, FRIDE.

Prof. Dr. Eberhard Sandschneider, Otto Wolff-Director of the Research Institute, DGAP.

Participating Institutes

German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)

www.dgap.org

The German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP) is the national network for German foreign policy. As an independent, non-partisan and non-profit organization, it actively takes part in the political decision-making process and promotes understanding of German foreign policy and international relations. More than 1800 members – among them renowned representatives from politics, business, academia and the media – as well as more than 80 companies and foundations support the work of the DGAP. The DGAP comprises the research institute, the journal IP and its Global Edition and the library and documentation center.

The DGAP's research institute works at the junction between politics, the economy and academia. The research institute works interdisciplinary, policy-oriented and in all areas of German foreign policy, which are anything but static in a globalizing world: security and supply risks, international competition, integration and network issues.

IP Global Edition is the quarterly English-language magazine of the German Council on Foreign Relations. It brings the missing European voice on global issues to readers across the world and is essential reading for everyone who is working in the field of politics and global economic issues.

The DGAP Library and Documentation Center (BiDok) is one of the oldest and most significant specialized libraries in Germany open to the public. It holds substantial collections on German foreign and security policy.

Toledo International Centre for Peace

www.toledopax.org

The Toledo International Centre for Peace (CITpax) aims to help prevent and resolve conflicts, to contribute to crisis management and the consolidation of peace, within a framework of respect and promotion of human rights and democratic values. Besides trying to end and prevent violence, CITpax recognizes that a lasting peace also requires action leading towards social transformation, development and the strengthening of institutions.

Registered as a non-profit foundation in June 2004, CITpax is a Spanish organization that seeks to offer innovative, workable solutions to international and national situations of conflict. It achieves this by establishing cooperation and communication channels between parties involved, governments and representatives of all sectors of civil society. It also promotes peace-building initiatives and acts as a mediator and facilitator in negotiations, as well as in the implementation of peace agreements.

Essentially, CITpax acts via what are known as Track II or Private/Parallel Diplomacy tools, and comprises of three programmes: two are geographically-oriented – Africa & the Middle East, with particular importance placed on the Arab-Israeli conflict, and Latin America, with strong emphasis on Columbia; and the third is a transversal programme inter-related to both – Conflict Prevention and Resolution..

Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior

www.fride.org

FRIDE is a think tank based in Madrid that aims to provide the best and most innovative thinking on Europe's role in the international arena. It strives to break new ground in its core research interests of peace and security, human rights, democracy promotion, and development and humanitarian aid, and mould debate in governmental and non-governmental bodies through rigorous analysis, rooted in the values of justice, equality and democracy.

FRIDE seeks to provide fresh and innovative thinking on Europe's role on the international stage. As a prominent European think tank, FRIDE benefits from political independence, diversity of views and the intellectual background of its international staff.

FRIDE concentrates its work in the following areas:

- Democratization
- Peace, Security and Human Rights
- Humanitarian Action and Development

Since its establishment in 1999, FRIDE has organized or participated in the creation and development of various projects that reinforce not only FRIDE's commitment to debate and analysis, but also to progressive action thinking.

Development Assistance Research Associates

www.daraint.org

DARA is an independent non-profit organization based in Madrid and committed to improving the quality of development aid and humanitarian action through evaluation. With its work, DARA contributes to the global effort of alleviating human suffering and reducing poverty. DARA's objectives include promoting beneficiaries' participation and empowerment, optimizing the impact of development interventions. As part of its mandate, DARA also strives to promote an evaluation culture in the fields of humanitarian aid and international development.

DARA's perspective is thoroughly international; the organization has worked in Latin America and the Caribbean, South East Asia, Southern and Eastern Europe, the Middle East and North Africa, and Sub Saharan Africa. DARA has built a solid track record providing technical assistance, developing studies, and conducting evaluations for a broad range of commissioners from the public and the private sectors, including multilateral and bilateral donors such as the United Nations, the European Commission, the Spanish International Development Agency, Danida, ALNAP, Spanish and international non-governmental organizations.

DARA is a full member of the Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action (ALNAP). As a key player within the Tsunami Evaluation Coalition (TEC) and the evaluation of ECHO's disaster preparedness programme (DIPECHO) in Central America, DARA holds a strong competence in disaster risk reduction and disaster preparedness. In November 2007, DARA launched the first Humanitarian Response Index (HRI), which ranks OECD DAC donors performance in relation to their commitment to the Principles of Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD). The HRI is a unique exercise based largely on over 1,000 questionnaires conducted in eight crisis countries and major humanitarian agencies.

Impressum

Februar 2008
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik e. V.
Rauchstraße 17/18
10787 Berlin
Deutschland

Tel.: +49 (0)30 25 42 31-0
Fax: +49 (0)30 25 42 31-16

info@dgap.org
www.dgap.org

Fotos
Konferenzteilnehmer

Satz
Tilman Chladek

Belichtung und Druck
Messedruck Leipzig GmbH

ISBN: 978-3-9810553-6-8

Bibliografische Information der Deutschen Nationalbibliothek.
Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek verzeichnet diese Publikation in der Deutschen
Nationalbibliografie. Detaillierte bibliografische Daten sind im Internet über
<http://dnb.d-nb.de> abrufbar.

