EU CRISIS MANAGEMENT: MATCHING ENDS AND MEANS IN THE FUTURE

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KEY RECOMMENDATIONS

Constantly increase and perpetuate knowledge about political economy and governance capacities in (likely) host countries

“EU Corps of Trainers” with dedicated infrastructure

PESCO project on niche force multiplier capabilities (transport, ISR)

Politically revive Joint Support Coordination Cell (JSCC) and Integrated Approach

Government and EU-independent mission assessments
THE WORKSHOP

- On November 25, 2020, DGAP and the German MoD hosted an expert workshop on the future of EU crisis management

- Think-tankers and practitioners from around Europe were invited to provide their input on challenges and opportunities for crisis management going forward

- The following presentation highlights some of the results of the discussions

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How can we improve the non-executive approach of our CSDP missions and ensure that EU military missions are more effective in the long term?
CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS
SOURCE: EPRS
POLITICAL DIMENSION

1. Main Political Challenges
2. The Political Way Forward
POLITICAL DIMENSION

MAIN POLITICAL CHALLENGES

DIVERGING CONCEPTION(S) OF SECURITY

• CSDP missions are more than just military CSDP non-executive missions
• Need to balance a range of security issues and differing conceptions of security
• Integrated Approach should be mainstreamed in each level of engagement – from planning and mandate to implementation and evaluation – and needs to be made a reality

COORDINATION PROBLEMS

• Internal EU coordination and inter-agency coordination
• Fragmentation of responsibilities – e.g., between Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability and Military Planning and Conduct Capability – with the JSCC as key to overcoming this
• Insufficient honest conversation between the EU and host nations so far; does the EU really understand its partners?
POLITICAL DIMENSION
MAIN POLITICAL CHALLENGES

AGENDAS THAT ARE TOO AMBITIOUS
• The EU mixes too many objectives into missions/operations; greater clarity on the intentions of CSDP engagement is required
• Impact (and entanglements) and intent: are we listening to partners?
• Being too ambitious and then failing risks the EU losing credibility

ASSESSMENT: THE WRONG WAY
• Assessment is undertaken in “Brussels” by handful of member states

BUY-IN FROM MEMBER-STATES?
• How to ensure member states buy into missions: why invest/deploy capabilities?
POLITICAL DIMENSION
THE POLITICAL WAY FORWARD

IMPROVE PREPARATION FOR MISSIONS
• Dashboard on governance capacity of host country to get a better idea of missions and better shape their "scale" of "executiveness" in mandate
• Need to assess the quality of EU CSDP training (guidebook, map to go with the compass)
• Need to incentivize through purpose and clear understanding of CSDP missions: how do we incentivize partners wanting to be part of CSDP?

REGULARLY UPDATE MISSION TASKS
• Do not copy and paste mission tasks in renewals, but regularly revise tasking for the missions

HONEST ASSESSMENT OF MISSIONS
• Provide additional routes to bring information and lessons learned from missions into the debate in European capitals; external evaluations to provide additional analyses
• Impact assessment or evaluation of CSDP missions and operations; need to see where EU training and capacity building makes a difference
• Critical assessments are good for generating a sense of purpose
POLITICAL DIMENSION
THE POLITICAL WAY FORWARD

CHANGE NARRATIVES TO BETTER SELL THE MISSIONS
- Establish acceptance for longer-term missions by changing the narrative: how can long-term engagement be linked to short-term objectives? (and what are these?)
- Lessons learned from Afghanistan will be crucial for domestic public opinion of CSDP—honest assessment is required

ACROSS THE MISSION DURATION
- CSDP aims to deal with all stages of the conflict cycle; carefully consider what CSDP non-executive military missions can bring to the table compared to other tools and mechanisms
- Develop more knowledge on conflict stages, involvement, and outcomes: when should actors get involved at different stages of conflict?
- Map and discuss diverging socialization in participating organizations that might lead to different logics in institutions/bodies
- Map and discuss the different conceptions of security that exist among partners and different agencies
- More targeted communication to stakeholders (about CSDP, mission, and purpose) to get more buy-in from interlocutors
- Provide key niche capabilities from the EU (EU joint capabilities); PESCO project on the needed capabilities could be one way to create permanent capability
- Remove duplication between military and civilian engagement
OPERATIONAL DIMENSION

1. Main Operational Challenges
2. The Operational Way Forward
OPERATIONAL DIMENSION

MAIN OPERATIONAL CHALLENGES

INSUFFICIENT SITUATIONAL AWARENESS FOR THE HOST COUNTRY
- Need to better understand the political economy of countries and regions to which the EU deploys
- Minimum of local governance (capability) is necessary to conduct non-executive missions successfully
- Lack of knowledge, e.g., about morale of military forces and public opinion in host countries (and in the EU)

UNDERESTIMATING MULTI-ACTOR INTERACTIONS IN THE HOST COUNTRY
- Parallel missions (national, EU, UN, etc.) might pose problems, especially if the footprint of one mission is significantly larger than that of others
- Risk of creating stovepipes and not integrated/coordinated mandates
- What are the dangers of incoherent (and contrary) messages to audiences in the host countries?

SHORT DEPLOYMENT CYCLES OF MILITARY PERSONNEL
- Makes effective integration into “the field” difficult, risks inconsistency in training
OPERATIONAL DIMENSION

THE OPERATIONAL WAY FORWARD

REFORM DEPLOYMENT

• Increase duration of staff rotations, which increases sense of mission and motivation
• Install an “EU Corps of Trainers,” in which pre-deployment cultural education and training are streamlined and harmonized
• Create whole military career paths that focus on regions, e.g., deploy people to regions repeatedly – in missions, as military attachés – and provide extensive cultural and language training to those “force multipliers”
• Tailor capability-building elements (equipment, doctrine, infrastructure) specifically to the host country

REFORM MISSION AUTONOMY

• Delegate more authority to field level and away from Brussels and member states
• Explore ways to lighten top heaviness in missions, e.g., increase local sourcing of basic goods

FURTHER CIVILIAN AND MILITARY INTEGRATION AND COORDINATION

• Remove duplication between military and civilian engagement
• Joint Support Coordination Cell (JSCC) needs fresh look
CONNECTIONS TO OTHER BASKETS IN THE STRATEGIC COMPASS
CONNECTIONS TO OTHER BASKETS
IN THE STRATEGIC COMPASS

• Resilience and Crisis Management Baskets Define the Level of Ambition for Capabilities and Partnership Baskets to Achieve

RESILIENCE BASKET
• Mainstream the resilience perspective (domestically and in partner countries); relate mission tasks and mandates – as well as conflict exit/development perspectives – to it
• Increase the resilience of missions in countries through increased local ownership (acceptance of mission in capitals, local governments)
• Include host country technology management in addition to political resilience
CONNECTIONS TO OTHER BASKETS
IN THE STRATEGIC COMPASS

CAPABILITIES BASKET

• Focus on capabilities that can be used across a wide range of military (and some civilian) missions, such as strategic transport, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
• Initiate PESCO project(s) on such niche capabilities—both for closer cooperation and further development and procurement
• Increase mission situational awareness through ISR assets and provide sufficient assets
• Conduct demand-side assessment (capability needs) and capability planning for both military and civilian mission elements through scenario-building
• If support costs outweigh the EU’s limited deployment capacities, then reconsider deployment with the EU

PARTNERSHIP BASKET

• Define main partners for CSDP missions but retain some flexibility to be able to react quickly
• Coordinate, lend, and share information and capabilities across participating organizations
• Prioritize partnerships with host country to enhance local ownership
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